Hale

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TERRELL HALE, No. 4:25-CV-01900

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

B. STROBLE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEBRUARY 12, 2026

Plaintiff Terrell Hale filed the instant pro se civil rights lawsuit alleging

constitutional violations by prison officials at the Federal Correctional Institution,

Allenwood Low (FCI Allenwood Low), in White Deer, Pennsylvania. He asserts

claims for money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Because Hale fails to state a claim for

relief and granting leave to amend would be futile, the Court will dismiss this

Bivens action with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2025, Hale lodged the instant civil rights lawsuit in this Court.1 At

that time, Hale was incarcerated at FCI Allenwood Low,2 and filed this action

1 See Doc. 1 at 8, 9.

pursuant to Bivens v. Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.3

Hale has since been transferred and is currently incarcerated in FCI Ashland,

located in Ashland, Kentucky.4

In his lawsuit, Hale recounted a host of complaints regarding several

unrelated incidents by different FCI Allenwood Low officials. He first alleged that

Physician’s Assistant J. Stoltz “refused to help [him] with his complaints”

regarding lack of sleep by declining to perform a sleep study, changing his mental

health medication doses “without informing him,” calling him derogatory names

like “fat,” and failing to properly diagnose his “sleep-wake disorder(s) pursuant to

the DSM-V.”5

Hale next alleged that mailroom clerk B. Stroble failed to comply with

certain BOP policies concerning incoming legal mail. He asserted that Stroble

improperly opened his legal mail and copied its contents, refusing to let Hale sign

for it.6 He further averred that Stroble waited two weeks to notify him of his

incoming legal mail, “causing unnecessary hurdles” in his legal proceedings.7

Hale then alleged that case manager Ms. Getz “made derogatory remarks” to

him, telling him to “suck a dick” when he attempted to discuss his possibilities of

3 See id.

4 See Doc. 10.

5 Doc. 1 at 3-4.

6 Id. at 4.

7 Id.

Second Chance Act placement.8 When Hale reported this conduct to the Warden,

Getz allegedly retaliated against him by placing him in “refusal status” for the

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP), which negatively affected his

ability to earn credits under the First Step Act, phone credits, and a $50 incentive

for completing 500 programming hours.9 Hale also alleged that Getz further

retaliated by intentionally miscalculating his finances in an effort to improperly

increase his IFRP payments.10

In his fourth claim, Hale alleged that psychiatrist Dr. S. Antonucci provided

deficient mental health care. He claimed that Dr. Antonucci improperly changed

Hale’s mental health diagnosis, declined to see him on several occasions when he

was having suicidal thoughts, gave him “self[-]care treatment” and internet

printouts from various websites instead of appropriate clinical advice, and would

log a full hour of treatment but only provide 30 minutes of care.11

Finally, Hale alleged that Dr. C. Schmidt, the “Drug Abuse Program

Coordinator,” also provided deficient mental health care. He claimed that Dr.

Schmidt refused to speak with him on several occasions even though he was aware

of Hale’s mental health diagnoses, kicked him out of a psychology program, put

him in program refusal status when Hale refused to return to the program, and

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 4-5.

retaliated against him when he challenged Dr. Schmidt’s refusal-status designation

by putting him in the Special Housing Unit through a fraudulent incident report.12

Hale additionally alleged that Warden J. Greene knew of the deficient

medical care and “did nothing about . . . the unlawful acts of his staff.”13 He thus

appears to contend that Warden Greene is equally responsible for the purportedly

unconstitutional medical treatment.

As reflected above, Hale’s complaint primarily concerns what he believed to

be constitutionally deficient medical care at FCI Allenwood Low. His claims

against Warden Greene, PA Stoltz, Dr. Antonucci, and Dr. Schmidt were therefore

properly joined together in the same lawsuit, as they concern the same “series of

transactions or occurrences” and contain a “question of law” that is common to all

four Defendants.14

Hale’s unrelated claims against Stroble and Getz do not provide a basis for

permissive joinder. The allegations underlying his Bivens claims against Stroble

and Getz are not part of the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions

or occurrences” underlying his medical care claims, nor is there a “question of law

or fact common to all defendants” such that these claims and defendants could be

permissively joined together in one action.15

12 Id. at 5.

13 Id. at 6.

14 See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2) (discussing requirements for permissive joinder of defendants).

15 See id.

Accordingly, the Court gave Hale the option of voluntarily dismissing his

claims against Stroble and Getz or severing the instant case into three separate

Bivens actions.16 Hale chose severance,17 so the Court severed the case into three

separate actions (4:25-cv-01242, 4:25-cv-01900, and 4:25-cv-01901).18

As such, the only claim in this case—4:25-cv-01900—is Hale’s Bivens

claim against Stroble regarding the handling of his incoming legal mail. Because

Hale’s claim represents an extension of Bivens and that extension is not warranted,

the Court will dismiss Hale’s complaint with prejudice.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.19 One

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted[.]”20 This language closely tracks Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).21

16 See Hale v. Greene, No. 4:25-cv-01242, Doc. 10 at 4-5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2025) (Brann, C.J.).

17 See id., Doc. 11 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2025) (Brann, C.J.).

18 See id., Doc. 13 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2025) (Brann, C.J.).

19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

20 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

21 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”22 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.23 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.24

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.25 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”26 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.27 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

22 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

23 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

24 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

25 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

26 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

27 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”28

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”29

Because Hale proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed and

his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”30 This is particularly true when the

pro se litigant, like Hale, is incarcerated.31

III. DISCUSSION

Upon review of the Bivens claim against Stroble, it is clear that dismissal is

required. Hale’s claim—which likely implicates the First Amendment32—

represents a clear extension of Bivens, and that extension is not warranted under

the present circumstances.

A. Bivens Claims

In 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, “even absent

statutory authorization, it would enforce a damages remedy” to compensate

individuals who experienced violations by federal officers of the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.33

28 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

29 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

30 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

31 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

32 See Doc. 1 at 7.

33 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130-31 (2017); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.

Subsequently, the Court extended the Bivens cause of action in two cases involving

other types of constitutional violations. First, in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,

248-49 (1979), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

provided an implied damages remedy to an administrative assistant claiming that a

Congressman had discriminated against her based on gender. Next, the Court

concluded that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment implied a cause of action for damages against federal prison officials

who had failed to provide adequate medical treatment to an asthmatic inmate.34

“These three cases—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson—represent the only instances in

which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the

Constitution itself.”35

Over the years that followed, the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to

expand Bivens actions beyond these three specific contexts.”36 The Supreme Court

has specifically noted that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’

judicial activity.”37

In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court provided a “restrictive, two-step framework

for courts to follow when analyzing Bivens claims.”38 First, courts must determine

34 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 n.1 (1980).

35 Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 131; see also Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022).

36 Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 318 (3d Cir. 2020).

37 Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 135 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).

38 Mack, 968 F.3d at 317.

whether the case presents a “new context,” i.e., if it is “different in a meaningful

way from previous Bivens cases decided by [the Supreme] Court.”39 The Supreme

Court has defined “new context” broadly,40 explaining that “even a modest

[Bivens] extension is still an extension.”41 A Bivens claim “may arise in a new

context even if it is based on the same constitutional provision as a claim in a case

in which a damages remedy was previously recognized.”42

If the case presents a new context, courts must then consider whether special

factors counsel against extending the Bivens remedy.43 If so, the court must reject

the requested extension.44 The Supreme Court has clarified that courts are required

“to ask whether ‘the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress’ to

weigh the costs and benefits of a damages action.”45 If the court “ha[s] reason to

pause before applying Bivens in a new context or to a new class of defendants,”

then special factors counseling hesitation exist.46 There may be many special

factors, but two are “particularly weighty: the availability of an alternative

remedial structure and separation-of-powers concerns.”47 Indeed, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the existence of an alternative

39 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 139).

40 See id.

41 Abassi, 582 U.S. at 147.

42 Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 103 (2020).

43 See Mack, 968 F.3d at 317 (citing Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 136).

44 See id. (citing Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102).

45 Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492).

46 Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102.

47 Mack, 968 F.3d at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted).

remedial structure—like the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy

Program (ARP)—is a “special factor” that can create a new context at step one of

the two-step analysis.48

Hale’s First Amendment claim against Stroble presents a new context and

special factors counsel against extending the Bivens remedy here. First, Hale’s

claim that Stroble opened his legal and copied its contents and additionally waited

two weeks to notify Hale of incoming legal mail is clearly a different context than

any of the Bivens trilogy set forth above. The Supreme Court of the United States

has never recognized an implied damages remedy for a First Amendment claim

involving incoming prisoner legal mail. Moreover, the availability of the BOP’s

administrative remedy program—which was not in existence when Bivens,

Carlson, and Davis were considered by the Supreme Court—implicates a new

Bivens context here.49

The second step in the Bivens analysis asks whether special factors counsel

against extending the Bivens remedy. The Court answers this question in the

48 See Muniz v. United States, 149 F.4th 256, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2025); Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th

311, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2024). But see Muniz, 149 F.4th at 266-67 (Restrepo, J., concurring)

(disagreeing with approach taken in Kalu v. Spaulding and observing that Seventh, Ninth, and

Tenth Circuits consider “alternative remedial structures” only at step two, not as part of step

one, which better aligns with the Supreme Court’s approach in Egbert and Goldey v. Fields,

606 U.S. 942 (2025)).

49 See Muniz, 149 F.4th at 263-64; Kalu, 113 F.4th at 327-28.

affirmative. Specifically, a Bivens extension is unwarranted here primarily

because there are alternative remedies available.

As the Third Circuit has repeatedly noted, the availability of the BOP’s

administrative remedy program often provides an alternative to a federal Bivens

lawsuit.50 Through the administrative remedy process, federal prisoners “can alert

the BOP to unconstitutional officer conduct and policies and prevent such

constitutional violations from recurring.”51 And even if Hale’s attempts to resolve

his mail-related disputes through the administrative process were ultimately

unsuccessful, he had access to at least “some redress,” and therefore the Court

finds—as in Mack—that the BOP’s administrative remedy program offers a

“convincing reason” to refrain from extending Bivens to a First Amendment claim

like the one asserted by Hale.52

In sum, Hale’s First Amendment prison-mail claim would extend Bivens to a

new context, yet special factors counsel against such an extension. The Court will

therefore dismiss Hale’s individual-capacity Bivens claim against Stroble pursuant

50 See Muniz, 149 F.4th at 264-65; Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2022); Mack,

968 F.3d at 320-21.

51 Mack, 968 F.3d at 321.

52 See id. (citations omitted); see also Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 137 (“[I]f there is an alternative

remedial structure present in a certain case, that alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to

infer a new Bivens cause of action.”); Muniz, 149 F.4th at 265 (“At bottom, Muniz’s Bivens

claim fails because an alternative remedy existed and was made available to him.”).

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

B. Official Capacity Claim

Hale purports to sue Stroble in both individual and official capacity.53

However, a suit against a federal officer in his or her official capacity is akin to a

suit against the United States itself.54 Such suits are barred by sovereign

immunity—and thus lack subject matter jurisdiction—unless the United States has

expressly waived its immunity and consented to be sued.55 Hale has not alleged or

shown that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity for Bivens claims,

and thus he has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction for any official

capacity Bivens claim asserted against Stroble.56 That claim, therefore, must be

dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) for seeking monetary relief from an

immune defendant and under Section 1915A(b)(1) as legally frivolous.

C. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

53 See Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 6.

54 See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 395-96 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,

538 (1980)).

55 See Treasurer of N.J., 684 F.3d at 395-96.

56 See Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 130 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986); Tucker v. Sec. Health &

Human Servs., 588 F. App’x 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential).

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”57 Here, leave to amend will be denied

as futile.58 Hale seeks an extension of Bivens that is both judicially disfavored and

unwarranted under the circumstances. His official capacity claim, moreover, is

legally frivolous, as the United States is plainly immune from his Bivens claim.

Finally, any claim seeking prospective injunctive relief against Stroble59 must be

dismissed as moot, as Hale has been transferred to a different federal institution.60

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Hale’s Bivens

complaint against Stroble pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because he fails to

plausibly state an individual-capacity claim for relief and because his official

capacity claim is legally frivolous. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

57 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.

58 See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (“‘Futility’ means that the complaint,

as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” (citation omitted));

Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1431 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he district court may properly deny

leave to amend where the amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss.”).

59 See Doc. 1 at 7.

60 See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An inmate’s transfer from the

facility complained of generally moots the equitable and declaratory claims.”); see also Abdul-

Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1993).