Demian

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PARIS WILLIAMS, ; No. 3:26cv338

Plaintiff (Judge Munley)

v. :

DR. DEMIAN, et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Paris Williams (“Williams”), an inmate currently housed at the

Lackawanna County Prison, in Scranton, Pennsylvania, commenced this pro se

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Williams seeks to

proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2).

The complaint is presently before the court for preliminary screening. For

the reasons set forth below, the court will grant the motion to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

I. Allegations of the Complaint

In the complaint, Williams names as defendants Dr. Demian, a dentist at

the Lackawanna County Prison, and David Ramirez, Health Service

Administrator at the Lackawanna County Prison. (Doc. 1, at 1-2).

On January 13, 2026, Williams sought “to have [his] teeth repaired and

cleaned.” (Id. at 3). Dr. Demian treated Williams and allegedly informed

Williams that “the prison does not allow him to fix teeth [as] it is not in his contrac

to fix or clean teeth.” (Id.). Dr. Demian further advised Williams that his office is

only furnished with equipment to perform tooth extractions. (Id.).

Williams contends that he exhausted his administrative remedies with

respect to his present claims. (Id. at 2). Williams alleges that Health Service

Administrator Ramirez responded to his grievance and indicated that Williams’

tooth decay was beyond repair. (Id. at 4).

Williams contends that the actions of defendants amounted to malpractice

and negligence and violated his constitutional rights. (Id. at 3-5).

For relief, Williams seeks “700 million dollars” and requests that defendant:

be imprisoned and removed from their positions. (Id. at 6).

ll. Legal Standard

The court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma

pauperis and prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, o

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in

which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. §

1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), or 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) is

the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brodzki v. Tribune Co., 481 F. App’x 705, 706

(3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D.

Pa. 2010).

lll. Discussion

In order to establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff “must

show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that

indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty.

Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rouse v. Plantier,

182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). A serious medical need is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a

lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth

Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)

(citation omitted). In addition, “if unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain...results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate

medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the

eighth amendment.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious

medical needs when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A mere

difference of opinion between the prison’s medical staff and the inmate regarding

the diagnosis or treatment which the inmate receives does not support a claim of

cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1339

(M.D. Pa. 1988); see also McCracken v. Jones, 562 F.2d 22, 24 (10th Cir. 1977);

Smart v. Villar, 547 F.2d 112, 113 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041

(1981). Moreover, “[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts...a non-

medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in

capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

Assuming that Williams’ allegations qualify as a serious medical condition

for purposes of the Eighth Amendment analysis, the court must determine

whether he has established a deliberate indifference to that need.

Upon review of the complaint, Williams has not alleged that defendants

were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. In Gillespie v. Hogan,

182 F. App’x 103 (3d Cir. 2006), the defendant dentist negligently removed the

tooth of a prisoner, leaving part of the tooth in his gums for more than a year. Id.

at 104. As a result, the prisoner suffered significant pain and hardship while the

tooth fragment remained in his mouth. Id. at 105. The Third Circuit held that the

negligent oral surgery did not rise to the level of “deliberate indifference” required

for a Section 1983 claim. Id.

Here, Williams does not even allege that he underwent any procedures by

Dr. Demian. By Williams’ own account, he presented to Dr. Demian for dental

treatment on one occasion—on January 13, 2026. (Doc. 1, at 3). Williams

alleges that Dr. Demian informed him that prison policy “does not allow him to fix

teeth” and he did not have dental equipment to perform the procedures

requested by Williams. (Id.). There is no indication that the actions of Dr.

Demian were based on an ulterior motive beyond providing routine patient care.

See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 237 (noting that in order to state a deliberate indifference

claim, a plaintiff should in some way “connect ] his factual allegations to the

alleged mental states” of the defendants). Based on the allegations, Williams

has failed to allege that Dr. Demian had a culpable state of mind. Williams

claims that Dr. Demian’s actions amounted to negligent treatment. (Doc. 1, at 3-

5). It is well-settled that “mere allegations of malpractice do not raise issues of

constitutional import,” and Williams’ claim must fail. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346.

In addition, Williams’ complaints about the type of dental services renderec

amount to little more than disagreement with treatment methods, which is also

insufficient to state a constitutional violation. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235

(‘[m]ere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” is insufficient to state

a constitutional violation) (citations omitted). Although Dr. Demian’s dental care

may have been constrained by prison policy, Williams “does not have a

constitutional right to unlimited medical care of his choosing, free from all

considerations of cost.” Winslow v. Prison Health Servs., 406 F. App’x 671, 675-

76 (3d Cir. 2011).

Hence, the allegations of the complaint do not amount to deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. See, e.g., Isenberg v. Prasse, 433 F.2d

449 (3d Cir. 1970) (rejecting a claim that malpractice by a dentist while extracting

teeth constitutes unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment); Green v. Dep't

of Corr., 2012 WL 2354443, *3 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that the prisoner's claim

that the prison dentist accidentally broke his front tooth alleged mere negligence

and did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's needs).

There is no indication that the actions of Dr. Demian were deliberate or

intentional or that he possessed the requisite mental intent to sustain a deliberate

indifference claim. Williams appears to be dissatisfied with the treatment he

received, but his dissatisfaction does not support a deliberate indifference claim.

See Tillery v. Noel, 2018 WL 3521212, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 28, 2018) (collecting

cases) (“an inmate’s dissatisfaction with a course of medical treatment, standing

alone, does not give rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim.”). Such

complaints fail as constitutional claims because “prison authorities are accorded

considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners,” Durmer v.

O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted), and “the exercise by

a doctor of his professional judgment is never deliberate indifference,” Gindraw v

Dendler, 967 F. Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Brown v. Borough of

Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[A]s long as a physician

exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's

constitutional rights.”)).

With respect to Health Service Administrator Ramirez, Williams alleges tha

defendant Ramirez responded to his grievance. (Doc. 1, at 4). There are no

further allegations against defendant Ramirez. (See generally Doc. 1). To the

extent that Williams alleges that he submitted a grievance to Ramirez, and

Ramirez failed to intercede, this is insufficient, alone, to rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, especially since Williams was treated by a dental

professional. A defendant’s review and denial of a prisoner's grievance is not

sufficient to establish the defendant’s personal involvement in an underlying

violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights. Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366,

374 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 (nonmecdical prison officials’

failure to respond to inmate letters complaining of underlying conduct is not

unconstitutional). Thus, Williams’ attempt to establish liability against defendant

Ramirez based upon his response to a grievance is not sufficient to establish his

personal involvement in an underlying civil rights violation. See Simonton v.

Tennis, 437 F. App’x 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (“[A] prison □□□□□□□□□□

secondary review of an inmate’s grievance or appeal is not sufficient to

demonstrate the personal involvement required to establish the deprivation of a

constitutional right.”).

Further, the court acknowledges that Health Care Administrators, such as

defendant Ramirez, “are undisputably administrators, not doctors.” Thomas v.

Dragovich, 142 F. App’x 33, 39 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential). Based on the

allegations of the complaint, it is clear that Williams presented to a dental

professional for treatment. “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge)

that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner,

a non-medical prison official...will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment

scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236; see

also Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 (finding that failure by nonmedical prison officials to

respond to medical complaints from prisoner-plaintiff “already being treated by

the prison doctor” does not establish deliberate indifference). This claim against

defendant Ramirez likewise fails.

IV. Leave To Amend

When a complaint fails to present a prima facie case of liability, district

courts must generally grant leave to amend before dismissing the complaint.

See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane

v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals has admonished that when a complaint is subject to dismissal

for failure to state a claim, courts should liberally grant leave to amend “unless

such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). Williams’ claims against the

defendants are factually and legally flawed and thus incurable. Therefore, the

court concludes that curative amendment would be a futile endeavor.

V. Conclusion

Consistent with the foregoing, the court will dismiss the complaint for failure

to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

An appropriate order shall issue.

Date: February ae 2026 , | □□□

‘JUDGE JULIA K. MUN

United/States District Court

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