BROWN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

TIFFANY BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:25-cv-356-AW/MJF

WARDEN GABBY, et al.,

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before this court on Plaintiff’s three motions for a

preliminary injunction, Docs. 3, 9, 15, and her motion for temporary

restraining order, Doc. 18. Because Plaintiff failed to show a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits, the District Court should deny

Plaintiff’s motions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff—a federal inmate proceeding pro se—filed a civil rights

complaint against Defendants, who are employees of the Bureau of Prisons.

Plaintiff asserts a variety of claims, including an Eighth-Amendment

conditions of confinement claim, an Eighth-Amendment deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need claim, and frivolous claims asserting

violations of four criminal statutes—18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 1040, 1343, 1957.

Doc. 7 at 7.

The undersigned reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint and identified two

important defects: (1) the complaint was a “shotgun pleading” and (2)

Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief. Therefore, consistent

with Eleventh Circuit precedent, the undersigned struck Plaintiff’s

complaint and required Plaintiff to replead the claims. Est. of Bass v.

Regions Bank, Inc., 947 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2020).

DISCUSSION

Preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining order are

extraordinary remedies. Bloedorn v. Grubs, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir.

2011). The chief function of temporary restraining orders and preliminary

injunctions “is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy

can be fully and fairly adjudicated.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen.

Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir. 1990);

see Granny Goose Foods Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439

(1974) (discussing TROs); All Care Nursing Serv. v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp.,

887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989). To establish entitlement to a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, a movant must

demonstrate:

(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying

claim;

(2) a substantial likelihood of suffering irreparable injury if the

TRO/injunction is not granted;

(3) that the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs any injury

the nonmovant might suffer from the injunction; and

(4) the injunction would not disserve the public interest.

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); In re Gateway

Radiology Consultants, P.A., 983 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th Cir. 2020); Ingram

v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff’s complaint violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and is a so-called “shotgun pleading.” Plaintiff asserted multiple claims

against multiple Defendants without specifying which of the defendants

are responsible for specific acts or omissions and against which of the

defendants particular claims are asserted. Plaintiff plainly failed to state a

plausible claim for relief.

When courts strike complaints that violate the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, they should not “entertain the extreme remedy of a TRO.”

KOVA Com. of Naples, LLC v. Sabin, No. 2:23-CV-614-JES-KCD, 2023 WL

5334550, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2023); see Freeman v. Bay Equity LLC,

2020 WL 4700767, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2020) (noting that the court

could not issue a TRO because the “Court could not even reach the merits

of Plaintiff’s underlying claims because his Complaint [was] a shotgun

pleading.”); Raja v. Englewood Cmty. Hosp., Inc., No. 12-cv-2083, 2013 WL

12157136, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2013) (dismissing amended complaint as

shotgun pleading, granting leave to amend, and denying preliminary

injunction as moot); accord Michael Westbrook, v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp.,

No. CV-25-01061-PHX-DWL, 2025 WL 1677892, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 13,

2025) (“The incomprehensible nature of the complaint, alone, undermines

any likelihood of success on the merits.”).

Plaintiff obviously has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits. When a movant “is unable to demonstrate a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits,” courts “do not need to

address the remaining preliminary injunction requirements.” See Keister

v. Bell, 879 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2018). For this reason alone, the

District Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice. See Valdes

v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 806 F. App’x 722, 724 (11th Cir. 2020).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully

RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY Plaintiff’s motions for

preliminary injunction, Docs. 3, 9, 15, and her motion for a temporary

restraining order, Doc. 18, without prejudice.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 22nd day of January 2026.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

The District Court referred this case to a magistrate

judge to address preliminary matters and to make

recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See

N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed findings and

recommendations must be filed within fourteen days of

the date of the report and recommendation. Any

different deadline that may appear on the electronic

docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not

control. A party who fails to object to the magistrate

judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a

report and recommendation waives the right to

challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir.

Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.