Brian Coblentz v. Tractor Supply Company

02/20/2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

January 4, 2024 Session

BRIAN COBLENTZ ET AL. V. TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lincoln County

No. 2013-CV-85 M. Wyatt Burk, Judge

No. M2023-00249-COA-R3-CV

This is a premises liability case brought by a sales representative for a product vendor who

was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The trial court entered

summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial

court’s decision based upon the conclusion that Tractor Supply was the statutory employer

of the sales representative under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113(a) and was, therefore,

shielded by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. The

Tennessee Supreme Court granted permission to appeal, concluded that Tractor Supply

was not the sales representative’s statutory employer, and remanded the case to this Court

to consider the pretermitted issues. We have determined that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment to Tractor Supply on the issue of whether Tractor Supply owed a duty

of care to the sales representative. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Vacated and

Remanded

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,

JR., P.J., M.S., joined, and JEFFREY USMAN, J., joined.

William Bliss Hicky and Sarah Michelle Ingalls, and Morgan Juliana Hartgrove, Nashville,

Tennessee, for the appellants, Brian Coblentz and Cayce Coblentz.

Richard Colten Jones and Marshall T. Cook, Hendersonville, Tennessee, for the

appellee, Tractor Supply Company.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Brian Coblentz worked as an outside sales representative for Stanley National

Hardware (“Stanley National” or “National”). On August 29, 2012, Mr. Coblentz visited

Tractor Supply’s store in Fayetteville, Tennessee. Mr. Coblentz was injured when a 12-

foot steel barn door track fell out of the Stanley National display and struck him on the

head.

Mr. Coblentz and his wife (“Plaintiffs”) filed a personal injury suit against Tractor

Supply Company on August 12, 2013, asserting that Tractor Supply “was negligent and

created an unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition by failing to either properly install

and/or maintain its display rack as well as properly stock its merchandise.” The complaint

also alleged that Tractor Supply “failed to adhere to proper safety procedures” and “failed

to implement and/or enforce reasonable policies calculated to prevent its invitees from

suffering injury.” Further, according to the complaint, Tractor Supply was negligent in

failing to warn Mr. Coblentz of the danger presented by the steel track display and failing

to inspect the area where he was injured. In its answer, Tractor Supply raised the defense

that Mr. Coblenz was injured while in the course and scope of his employment and that his

exclusive remedy was under the workers’ compensation statutes. The company also raised

the defense of contributory negligence.

The parties agreed to stay discovery until Mr. Coblentz’s workers’ compensation

case against Stanley National had concluded. The workers’ compensation case was settled

in February 2020, and the parties proceeded with discovery. In May 2022, Plaintiffs were

permitted to file an amended complaint, which contained all of the allegations of the

original complaint and added allegations that Tractor Supply’s actions were wanton,

willful, and/or reckless.

In October 2022, Tractor Supply filed a motion for summary judgment asserting

that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’

compensation act and that Plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie case of negligence.

Tractor Supply’s submissions in support of its motion included excerpts from the

depositions of Mr. Coblentz; excerpts from the deposition of Tractor Supply employee

Brian Spears; excerpts from the depositions of former Tractor Supply employees Jody

Boaz and Leah Holcomb; and a Vendor Agreement executed by Tractor Supply and

Stanley National. Plaintiffs responded in opposition to Tractor Supply’s motion for

summary judgment and filed supporting exhibits, including an affidavit of Mr. Coblentz as

well as excerpts from the depositions of Mr. Coblentz, Ms. Boaz, Ms. Holcomb, and Mr.

Spears.

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The trial court heard the motion for summary judgment on November 21, 2022. On

January 26, 2023, the trial court entered an order granting Tractor Supply’s motion. The

court determined that Tractor Supply was a principal contractor within the meaning of

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113 and immune from tort liability for Mr. Coblentz’s injury.

Further, the court found that Mr. Coblentz could not establish a prima facie case for

negligence under Tennessee premises liability law.

Plaintiffs appealed, presenting the following issues for our consideration: (1)

whether the trial court erred in relying on inadmissible evidence in ruling on the motion

for summary judgment; (2) whether the trial court erred in determining that Tractor Supply

was the principal contractor for purposes of the workers’ compensation act; (3) whether

the trial court erred in finding that there were no issues of material fact in dispute; and (4)

whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Tractor Supply on the

premises liability claim. In Coblentz v. Tractor Supply Company, No. M2023-00249-COA-

R3-CV, 2024 WL 1828677 at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2024), rev’d, 2025 WL 3704465

(Tenn. Dec. 22, 2025), this Court determined that Plaintiffs waived the evidentiary issue

and that Tractor Supply was Mr. Coblentz’s statutory employer; we, therefore, affirmed

the trial court’s decision. Judge Usman filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at *8.

Our Supreme Court granted Mr. Coblentz’s application for permission to appeal and

determined that Tractor Supply was not Mr. Coblentz’s statutory employer. The Court held

that the term “subcontractor” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-113(a) does not apply to a vendor-

vendee relationship. Coblentz v. Tractor Supply Co., --- S.W.3d ----, 2025 WL 3704465,

at *12 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2025). Further, the Court adopted the predominant purpose test to

determine whether a vendor-vendee relationship that includes services beyond the sale and

delivery of merchandise is governed by that provision. Id. at *14. The Supreme Court

reversed the judgment of this Court and remanded the case to this Court for consideration

of pretermitted issues. Id. at *17.

The only remaining issue for determination by this Court on remand is whether the

trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Tractor Supply on the premises liability

claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s summary judgment determination de novo, with no

presumption of correctness. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d

235, 250 (Tenn. 2015). This means that “we make a fresh determination of whether the

requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.”

Id. We “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

must draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692,

695 (Tenn. 2002); see also Acute Care Holdings, LLC v. Houston Cnty., No. M2018-

01534-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2337434, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2019).

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Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.04. When a party moves for summary judgment

but does not have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must either submit evidence

“affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim” or

“demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is

insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264.

Once the moving party has satisfied this requirement, the nonmoving party “‘may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading.’” Id. at 265 (quoting TENN. R. CIV.

P. 56.06). Rather, the nonmoving party must respond and produce affidavits, depositions,

responses to interrogatories, or other discovery that “set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.06; see also Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265.

If the nonmoving party fails to respond in this way, “summary judgment, if appropriate,

shall be entered against the [nonmoving] party.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.06. If the moving

party fails to show he or she is entitled to summary judgment, however, “‘the non-movant’s

burden to produce either supporting affidavits or discovery materials is not triggered and

the motion for summary judgment fails.’” Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 83

(Tenn. 2008) (quoting McCarley v. W. Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn.

1998)).

ANALYSIS

We must determine if the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Tractor

Supply on the premises liability claim.

Tractor Supply’s motion for summary judgment regarding the premises liability

claim was based upon the position that Plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie case of

common law negligence. In support of this position, Tractor Supply argued that (1)

Plaintiffs could not prove that Tractor Supply created the alleged danger or had actual

constructive notice of the alleged danger, and (2) Tractor Supply was “not liable because

[its] knowledge of the alleged danger was not superior to Plaintiff’s.” The trial court agreed

with Tractor Supply and determined that Mr. Coblentz had not presented sufficient

evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence.

On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that there are material facts in dispute, that Tractor

Supply had at least constructive notice that the barn door display was dangerous, and that

the trial court erroneously applied a comparative fault analysis at the summary judgment

phase.1

1

Plaintiffs also make the argument that the trial court defined the dangerous condition too narrowly.

While not expressly identified as such by the trial court, the dangerous issue under consideration was the

alleged absence of a safety bar on the barn door track display on the day of the accident. Plaintiffs attempt

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I. Undisputed facts

Most of the facts in this matter are undisputed. Mr. Coblentz’s job as an outside

sales representative required him to visit various hardware stores, including Tractor Supply

stores, in his region every four to six weeks. At each hardware store, Mr. Coblentz took

inventory of the Stanley National merchandise and wrote orders for needed items. He

would also move products that had been misplaced to their proper place, remove

inappropriate items, and clean up trash around the National displays. If he saw an unsafe

condition in the display, Mr. Coblentz would notify the store manager and contact the

appropriate National representative. During the four-to-six-week period between Mr.

Coblentz’s visits to the Fayetteville Tractor Supply store, Tractor Supply employees would

receive the National products ordered by Mr. Coblentz and place them in the displays.

The display at issue in this case was a “track and hanger rack” that held National

products, including barn door tracks. The barn door tracks came in sizes of eight, ten, or

twelve feet and could be round or square. When received at the store, sets of two round

tracks or four square tracks would be banded together. Tractor Supply employees were

instructed to remove the bands before placing the barn door tracks in the display. The barn

door tracks were heavy and were placed at the end of the display rack, standing up and

leaning against the back of the rack between dividers. There was a safety bar at the top of

the display rack (parallel to the floor) that hooked into the shelving on both sides. There

was also a bar, or “latch,” that ran across the middle of the barn door track display; this

latch held a cautionary sign asking customers to seek assistance with the barn door tracks.

Tractor Supply admits that it was aware that barn door tracks had fallen and caused

injuries in other stores. When originally installed by National, the display rack did not

include a safety bar. The safety bars were added in 2005 or 2006, after more than five

incidents in Tractor Supply stores in which barn door tracks fell, injuring employees or

customers. At that point, Tractor Supply and National discussed the problem, and National

implemented the safety bar and installed it in all of its barn door track displays.

On August 29, 2012, Mr. Coblentz was working in the Fayetteville Tractor Supply

store. He was standing near the National rope and chain display when a barn door track fell

on him from about ten or twelve feet away. No one observed the accident. The store

manager and a team leader came to the accident site after hearing a loud noise. Both

observed a barn door track lying near Mr. Coblentz; neither saw a safety bar on the floor

near him. Mr. Coblentz sustained a head injury and could not remember what occurred

after he arrived at the store that day.

to draw a distinction between the state of the barn door track display on the day of the accident and “the

overall nature of the display without a safety bar in place.” We have determined that we need not explore

this alleged distinction in light of our analysis of Plaintiffs’ other arguments.

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In the discovery process, Tractor Supply produced two photographs taken around

the time of the accident that show a yellow sheet of paper with the word “STOP” on it

posted near the National display area. Such a sign indicated that a third party was preparing

to conduct or was just completing an inventory on behalf of Tractor Supply. It is undisputed

that, during the inventory process, Tractor Supply would “get[ ] as much product down on

the floor so they can get a better count.”

Tractor Supply admitted the following facts for purposes of the summary judgment

motion only:

26. The pegboard that the barn door rail tracks are supposed to lie against are

generally flimsy, usually a quarter inch thick, and there’s nothing between

the front of the board and the back board, except for maybe one or two braces.

27. The aisle directly behind the barn door track display contained welding

equipment from metal shapes to arc welders to compressors to sand blasting

materials to sinks, parts cleaners, to blowtorches some of which are “a couple

hundred pounds” (arc welders) and bags of blasting sand which are 40-50

pounds apiece.

28. Mr. Coblentz has seen the pegboard shift or move when items on the

welding aisle are moved around.

29. At the time of the incident, Mr. Coblentz was in front [of] the display

containing metal grab hooks, quick links, cable clamps, chain hooks, and

snaps all of which make a clanking sound.

...

44. [Leah Holcomb] did not see the safety bar on the display on the day of

the incident.

45. Neither Ms. Holcomb nor Jodie Boaz saw a safety bar on the ground on

the date of the incident.

46. In the entire time that she worked at Tractor Supply Company, [Leah

Holcomb] never see safety bar [sic] in place on the barn door rail display.

...

50. Mr. Coblentz was first seen by Jodie Boaz in front of the chain section,

approximately 10-12 feet away from the barn door track display.

51. Jodie Boaz had seen the safety bar on the barn door track display, and

she has also not seen it on the display, but could not recall whether she saw

it on the display when the incident occurred.

52. When the display was being stocked or after it had been stocked, the

safety bar would not be in place despite [Tractor Supply] stating it was to

stay in place during stocking.

53. The Fayetteville, Tennessee [Tractor Supply] store received “4 bundles

of twelve foot rails on 8/20/12.”

54. The safety bar would be attached to two (2) brackets.

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55. Sometimes only one (1) bracket would be removed with the safety bar

and bracket dangling.

56. Sometime all three (3) pieces would fall down completely and never get

put back up.

57. With this particular safety bar, it would be taken down and put back up a

lot and the hanging bends the safety bar, so it does not fit properly.

58. As a result of it not fitting properly, the safety bar would not be latched

securely sometimes or it would not be done correctly because TSC

employees could not “figure it out.”

II. Premises liability

Premises owners have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect persons legally

on their property from unreasonable risks of harm. Easley v. Baker, No. M2003-02752-

COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 697525, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2005) (citing Basily v.

Rain, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 879, 883-84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Rice v. Sabir, 979

S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tenn. 1998). A premises owner’s duty arises from the “‘position of

control’” possessed by the premises owner, who is “‘normally best able to prevent any

harm to others.’” Trentham v. Mid-Am. Apartments, LP, 705 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Tenn. 2025)

(quoting McCormick v. Waters, 594 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tenn. 1980)). In other words, the

premises owner’s liability “‘stems from superior knowledge of the condition of the

premises.’” Trentham, 705 S.W.3d at 160 (quoting Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d

761, 764 (Tenn. 2004)). The duty of a premises owner includes the duty to “maintain[ ] the

premises in a reasonably safe condition either by removing or repairing potentially

dangerous conditions or by helping persons avoid injury by warning them of conditions

that cannot, as a practical matter, be removed or repaired.” Bowman v. State, 206 S.W.3d

467, 473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); see also Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587, 593-94 (Tenn.

1994) (holding that premises owners owed a duty “to maintain the premises in a reasonably

safe and suitable condition” by “either removing or warning against any latent dangerous

condition on the premises of which [the premises owners] were aware or should have been

aware through the exercise of reasonable diligence”).

To establish a prima facie case of negligence in a premises liability claim, a plaintiff

must prove five essential elements: “‘(1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the

plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant that was below the standard of care, amounting to a

breach of a duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate causation.’”

Singletary v. Gatlinburlier, Inc., No. E2015-01621-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 1644475, at

*2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2016) (quoting Williams v. Linkscorp Tenn. Six, L.L.C., 212

S.W.3d 293, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)). For a premises owner to owe a duty of care, the

plaintiff must prove either that “‘the condition was caused or created by the owner,

operator, or his agent,’” or “‘if the condition was created by someone other than the owner,

operator, or his agent, that the owner or operator had actual or constructive notice that the

condition existed prior to the accident.’” Trentham, 705 S.W.3d at 160 (quoting Blair, 130

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S.W.3d at 764). Constructive notice may be shown by “proof that the dangerous or

defective condition existed for such a length of time that the defendant, in the exercise of

reasonable care, should have become aware of the condition.” Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 764.

Moreover, as recently reaffirmed by our Supreme Court, “a plaintiff may prove a premises

owner had constructive notice of a dangerous condition by showing ‘that the dangerous

condition was part of ‘a pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, or a general or continuing

condition’ such that its presence was reasonably foreseeable to the premises owner.”

Trentham, 705 S.W.3d at 166 (quoting Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 766).

A. Notice

The trial court concluded that “Plaintiffs cannot prove [Tractor Supply] had actual

or constructive notice of the alleged danger prior to Plaintiff’s injury.”

Plaintiffs argue that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the

evidence is sufficient to establish that Tractor Supply had at least constructive knowledge

that the barn door rail display was dangerous. We agree. Leah Holcomb, who worked as a

team leader at Tractor Supply and had been working at the store for about two months at

the time of the accident, testified in her deposition that she never stocked the National

display and that she avoided the barn door tracks because she considered them

“precarious.” In Ms. Holcomb’s experience, if she tried to straighten the bars, they would

fall “every which way.” Ms. Holcomb testified that, on the day of the accident, she did not

see the safety bar on the display or on the floor. She further stated that, during the three

months that she worked at Tractor Supply, she never saw the safety bar in place on the

display.

The trial court disregarded Ms. Holcomb’s testimony on the ground that it was

contradicted by Mr. Coblentz’s testimony. There are two problems with this reasoning.

First, Mr. Coblentz testified that he did not recall finding any problems with the National

display in his previous visits to the Tractor Supply store in Fayetteville, but that he would

have reported any such problems to National and Tractor Supply. This testimony does not

necessarily conflict with Ms. Holcomb’s testimony. Second, resolving a conflict between

two witnesses’ statements hinges, at least in part, on the relative credibility of the witnesses,

and that assessment is not appropriate at the summary judgment stage. See Munoz v.

Sepulveda, No. M2024-01002-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 2603041, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Sept. 9, 2025); Knapp v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 682 S.W.2d 936, 942 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)

(stating that “doubt as to the credibility of material witnesses will create a genuine issue of

material fact sufficient to render granting a summary judgment improper”).

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as we must do on a

motion for summary judgment, there is evidence that the safety bar had been missing for a

sufficient period of time that Tractor Supply, in the exercise of reasonable care, should

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have been aware of the problem. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that Plaintiffs

could not establish actual or constructive notice.

B. Superior knowledge

The court further found that, even if there were sufficient evidence regarding notice,

Tractor Supply’s “knowledge of the alleged danger was not greater than Plaintiff’s.”

Tractor Supply asserts that, under the undisputed facts, it was part of Mr. Coblentz’s job to

inspect the condition of the display, including the safety bar, when he was in the store and

that, therefore, he had superior knowledge of the alleged danger. Plaintiffs argue that the

trial court improperly applied a comparative fault analysis at the summary judgment stage.

As discussed below, we have concluded that the trial court erred in relying solely upon Mr.

Coblentz’s “superior knowledge” and failing to consider all of the factors relevant to the

determination of whether Tractor Supply had a duty of care to Mr. Coblentz.

Because premises liability is imposed partly because of the owner’s superior

knowledge of a dangerous condition, the rule developed that “a premises owner has no

liability for injuries sustained from dangers that were ‘obvious, reasonably apparent, or as

well known to the invitee [or licensee] as to the owner.’” Coln v. City of Savannah, 966

S.W.2d 34, 40 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne, 293 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tenn.

1955)), overruled on other grounds by Cross v. City of Memphis, 20 S.W.3d 642 (Tenn.

2000). In Coln, our Supreme Court examined the viability of the open and obvious doctrine

in light of our state’s adoption of comparative negligence. Id. at 42. The Court adopted the

majority position, limiting the traditional open and obvious rule in favor of the approach

set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. Section 343A of the Restatement

provides:

A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to

them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or

obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such

knowledge or obviousness.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343A.

As our Supreme Court noted, the word “known” “denotes not only knowledge of

the existence of the condition or activity itself, but also appreciation of the danger it

involves.” Coln, 966 S.W.2d at 41 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343A,

cmt. B). Furthermore, section 343A provides that a premises owner’s duty exists “if the

harm can or should be anticipated notwithstanding the known or obvious danger.” Id. In

adopting the Restatement approach, the Court explained:

We also agree that attempting to analyze the duty issue simply by labeling

some conditions “open and obvious,” without consideration of any

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surrounding circumstances, promotes arbitrary and inconsistent results.

Moreover, the open and obvious rule is inconsistent with our cases which

analyze duty by balancing foreseeability and gravity of harm with feasibility

and availability of alternatives that would have avoided the harm.

We deem the Restatement approach to be the better reasoned and

more persuasive analysis. The principles stated in the Restatement (Second)

of Torts, § 343A relate directly to foreseeability and facilitate consideration

of the duty issue. Whether the danger was known and appreciated by the

plaintiff, whether the risk was obvious to a person exercising reasonable

perception, intelligence, and judgment, and whether there was some other

reason for the defendant to foresee the harm, are all relevant considerations

that provide more balance and insight to the analysis than merely labeling a

particular risk “open and obvious.” In sum, the analysis recognizes that a risk

of harm may be foreseeable and unreasonable, thereby imposing a duty on a

defendant, despite its potentially open and obvious nature.

Id. at 42. In summary, the Supreme Court held that the open and obvious rule did not

automatically relieve the defendant of a duty of care. Id. at 43. Rather, a court must analyze

the duty issue as in any other premises liability case, “balancing of the foreseeability and

gravity of the potential harm against the burden imposed in preventing that harm.” Id. at

39. The Court specified that, “if the foreseeability and gravity of harm posed from a

defendant’s conduct, even if ‘open and obvious,’ outweighed the burden on the defendant

to engage in alternative conduct to avoid the harm, there is a duty to act with reasonable

care.” Id. at 43. Once a duty has been established, “the circumstances of the case are then

analyzed under comparative fault.” Id.

A more recent case applying the principles announced in Coln is Vaughn v. DMC-

Memphis, LLC, No. W2019-00886-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 274761 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.

27, 2021). Tina Vaughn filed suit against DMC for injuries she sustained when she fell on

standing water in the bathroom of a restroom in DMC’s building, which housed Delta

Medical Center. Vaughn, 2021 WL 274761, at *1. The trial court granted summary

judgment in favor of DMC, citing the undisputed facts that Ms. Vaughn saw the water on

the floor prior to her fall and, nevertheless, voluntarily proceeded into the restroom and

then fell. Id. at *11. On appeal, this Court reviewed the abrogation of the open and obvious

doctrine by the Supreme Court in Coln and the current requirement that courts “apply the

general duty analysis to even those cases that involve an allegedly open and obvious

danger.” Id. at *8. The “‘central component’ of the duty analysis” is foreseeability. Id.

(quoting Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 366 (Tenn. 2008)). At the

duty stage of the analysis, “‘the courts are simply ascertaining whether the defendant was

obligated to be vigilant of a certain sort of harm to the plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Satterfield,

266 S.W.3d at 367). The duty analysis requires a court to weigh many factors:

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“When the existence of a particular duty is not a given or when the

rules of the established precedents are not readily applicable, courts will turn

to public policy for guidance. Doing so necessarily favors imposing a duty

of reasonable care where a defendant’s conduct poses an unreasonable and

foreseeable risk of harm to persons or property. When conducting this

analysis, the courts have considered, among other factors: (1) the foreseeable

probability of the harm or injury occurring; (2) the possible magnitude of the

potential harm or injury; (3) the importance or social value of the activity

engaged in by the defendant; (4) the usefulness of the conduct to the

defendant; (5) the feasibility of alternative conduct that is safer; (6) the

relative costs and burdens associated with that safer conduct; (7) the relative

usefulness of the safer conduct; and (8) the relative safety of alternative

conduct.

With these factors firmly in mind, Tennessee’s courts use a balancing

approach to determine whether the particular risk should give rise to a duty

of reasonable care. A duty arises when the degree of foreseeability of the risk

and the gravity of the harm outweigh the burden that would be imposed if

the defendant were required to engage in an alternative course of conduct

that would have prevented the harm. The foreseeability and gravity of the

harm are linked insofar as the degree of foreseeability needed to establish a

duty is inversely proportional to the magnitude of the foreseeable harm. The

greater the risk of harm, the less degree of foreseeability is required. During

the balancing process, it is permissible for the courts to consider the

contemporary values of Tennessee’s citizens.”

Id. at *9 (quoting Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 365-366) (citation modified).

In Vaughn, this Court found no error in the trial court’s conclusion that, under the

undisputed facts, the dangerous condition was open and obvious. Id. at *11. However,

under the applicable law, this fact was not sufficient to end the inquiry. Id. We determined

that the trial court failed to engage in the required analysis of foreseeability and gravity of

harm and the other applicable factors in order to decide if a duty was owed. Id. In finding

the trial court’s ruling deficient, this Court stated:

[T]he trial court also has a duty to ensure that its rulings are adequately

explained. See Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, 439 S.W.3d at 314 (noting that in

addition to being a product of the trial court’s independent judgment, the trial

court’s decision must be “adequately explained”). This has been described

as requiring an explanation as to “why a particular result is correct based on

the applicable legal principles[.]” Id. at 313 (citing Chad M. Oldfather,

Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 Geo. L.J.

1283, 1334 (2008)). The trial court’s order contains many factual “findings,”

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a detailed discussion of the general law surrounding premises liability, a

thorough discussion of the proof presented, but very little discussion of the

trial court’s actual legal reasoning regarding its ultimate conclusion.

Importantly, although foreseeability is the touchstone of the duty analysis,

see Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 366, this factor is simply not mentioned in any

way by the trial court. The trial court’s order leads this court to believe that

once the trial court concluded that the danger allegedly posed by the water in

this case was open and obvious, this fact negated the essential element of

duty. Clearly, however, a determination that a danger is open and obvious is

only the tip of the iceberg in determining the legal issue of duty. See id.

(setting forth a detailed and multi-factored test for determining duty); Coln,

966 S.W.2d at 36-37 (stating that duty should at least consider foreseeability,

gravity of harm, and the burden to engage in alternative conduct).

Id. This Court also found DMC’s efforts to support the result reached by the trial court

deficient, noting that DMC relied upon caselaw related to comparative fault, not duty, and

emphasizing that “the question of comparative fault only becomes relevant once a duty is

found.” Id. at *12. DMC argued, in part, that it was not foreseeable that Ms. Vaughn would

walk into the restroom despite the obvious danger. We disagreed:

The problem with this argument is that it does little more than attempt to

resurrect the open and obvious doctrine. Indeed, at least one Tennessee legal

scholar has cautioned against allowing this exact type of analysis: “[The]

court might be tempted to conclude that a defendant could not have foreseen

a plaintiff’s injury because the obviousness of the danger alone rendered the

plaintiff’s behavior unreasonable. If such reasoning is accepted, the obvious

danger doctrine will survive in the duty portion of the analysis despite the

Coln majority’s claims that the doctrine has been abrogated.” Brian P.

Dunigan & Jerry J. Phillips, Comparative Fault in Tennessee: Where Are We

Going, and Why Are We in This Handbasket?, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 765, 817

(2000) [hereinafter Dunigan & Phillips] (arguing that “it will rarely be

appropriate to conclude as a matter of law that the defendant could not

foresee the plaintiff’s injury because of the obviousness of a danger” because

such “a conclusion effectively would resurrect the ‘open and obvious danger’

doctrine rejected by Coln”). Tennessee courts have likewise rejected similar

attempts to argue a “somewhat veiled version” of the “open and obvious”

doctrine. Powell, 2000 WL 987301, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 2000)

(rejecting the defendant’s argument that no duty of care was owed to the

plaintiff because he acted unreasonably). Indeed, the Tennessee Supreme

Court has held that a defendant’s assertion that a plaintiff confronted a known

and obvious danger is properly analyzed under the principles of comparative

fault, rather than duty. See Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 900 & 906

(Tenn. 1994) (“Secondary implied assumption of risk applies when the

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plaintiff, either reasonably or unreasonably, decides to encounter a known

risk. . . . [W]e do not consider it necessary or desirable to retain the doctrine

of secondary implied assumption of risk as a separate defense. Rather, the

reasonableness of a party’s conduct in confronting a risk should be

determined under the principles of comparative fault.”) (footnote omitted).

Id. at *12. In the end, this Court vacated the trial court’s ruling that Ms. Vaughn could not

establish that DMC owed her a duty of care.2 Id. at *14.

In the present case, the trial court did not engage in an analysis of foreseeability and

the gravity of harm to determine whether a duty was owed. The court determined that,

under the undisputed facts, “Plaintiff’s knowledge of the alleged danger was likely greater

than anyone else’s, given his job duties and the number of times he inspected National’s

track and hanger displays.” Under the Coln teachings, a court must first determine duty by

considering foreseeability and the gravity of harm, even where the plaintiff has knowledge

of the danger at issue. We agree with Plaintiffs that the trial court jumped to a comparative

fault analysis in comparing the fault of Mr. Coblentz with that of Tractor Supply. As

Tractor Supply emphasizes, it was part of Mr. Coblentz’s job responsibilities to inspect the

safety bar when he was in the store.3 At the same time, it is undisputed that Mr. Coblentz

2

The Court, in Vaughn, went on to consider the question of comparative fault and concluded that

reasonable minds could differ “as to whether Ms. Vaughn was presented with a reasonable alternative to

using the flooded restroom.” Vaughn, 2021 WL 274761, at *16. Therefore, we concluded that the trial court

erred in granting summary judgment to DMC on the issue of comparative fault. Id.

3

Another line of cases relates to a premises owner’s duty to create a reasonably safe work

environment for an independent contractor. In Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1996), our Supreme

Court established what is often referred to as the contractor exception to premises liability. Sarah Campbell

hired Jack Blair to perform repair work on a duplex she was preparing for rental or sale. Blair, 924 S.W.2d

at 76. After Mr. Blair had done some initial repairs, Ms. Campbell asked him to “repair or replace the roof

over the porch of the duplex because ‘it was leaking.’” Id. Mr. Blair had total control over how he would

accomplish these repairs. Id. As Mr. Blair stepped out onto a ladder propped against the gutter by one of

Mr. Blair’s employees, “the wood supporting the gutter collapsed, causing the ladder to turn.” and Mr. Blair

“was thrown to the ground.” Id. Mr. Blair then brought a negligence action against Ms. Campbell, asserting

that she failed to provide a reasonably safe place for him to work. Id. The trial court granted summary

judgment in favor of Ms. Campbell. Id.

The Supreme Court, in Blair, expressly adopted the contractor exception recognized in Shell Oil Co. v.

Blanks, 330 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959), and quoted the following description of the rule:

“An exception to the general rule is recognized where the risks arise from, or are intimately

connected with, defects of the premises or of machinery or appliances located thereon

which the contractor has undertaken to repair. As to contracts for such repair work, it is

reasoned that the contract is sufficient in itself to impart notice of a defect, the extent of

which the repairman must discover for himself. This is merely to say that one assumes the

risk of a known danger or of an undertaking which is inherently dangerous.”

Blair, 924 S.W.2d at 76-77 (quoting Shell, 330 S.W.2d at 571). It was undisputed that Mr. Blair was hired

to repair the porch roof, and the Court found that “the repair contract itself is sufficient to put the contractor

on notice of a defect in the premises, and it is the contractor’s responsibility to determine the extent of the

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defect.” Id. at 77. The Court determined that, under the contractor exception, Ms. Campbell had no duty to

provide a reasonably safe workplace to Mr. Blair. Id. In reaching this result, the Supreme Court stated that

“the policy of placing the risk of incurring physical harm during a repair job on a contractor holding himself

or herself out as an expert in that work, as opposed to the lay premises owner, is not unjustified, at least as

long as the owner does not willfully or intentionally harm the contractor.” Id. at 78.

There have been subsequent cases involving independent contractors working in a plant or factory. In

Miranda v. CSC Sugar, LLC, No. W2017-01986-COA -R3-CV, 2018 WL 3302035, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.

July 5, 2018), a construction worker fell from a scaffolding while working on a renovation at a factory. The

worker was employed by an independent contractor hired by CSC Sugar, LLC to renovate its warehouse.

Id. At the time of the accident, the worker was using an electric screw gun powered by a long extension

cord, which had to be placed across a doorway in order to access an outlet. Id. One of CSC Sugar’s

employees drove a forklift through the doorway; the forklift became entangled with the extension cord,

pulling the scaffolding down and causing the worker to fall and sustain injuries. Id. The trial court granted

summary judgment in favor of the premises owner on the ground that the company had no duty to warn of

the dangerous condition that the worker or his co-employee created and knew about. Id.

In reversing the grant of summary judgment, this Court emphasized the principle that, “‘An owner of

premises who employs a contractor to perform work on the property, but who remains in control of the

premises where the work is being done, owes to the employees of the contractor a duty to exercise ordinary

care in the management of the premises in order to avoid exposing the employees to an unreasonable risk

of harm.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Johnson v. EMPE, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)). This Court

found that there was a material factual dispute as to whether the worker or his co-employee “were in control

of the environment in which they were working.” Id. Further, the court noted the Supreme Court’s

abrogation of the open and obvious doctrine in Coln, thereby making the proper analysis “whether the

foreseeability and gravity of harm posed by Appellee’s conduct, even if ‘open and obvious,’ outweigh the

burden of [the premises owner] to engage in alternative conduct.” Id. at *5. There were conflicts in the

testimony as to whether the premises owner’s employees were aware of the potential problems with the

extension cord and whether the forklift driver stopped and honked his horn before backing through the

doorway. Id. at *6. This Court determined that such factual disputes were relevant to the question of whether

the premises owner satisfied its duty of care to ensure a safe work area. Id.

Similar issues are presented in a premises liability case now pending before the Supreme Court, Lowe

v. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, No. M2023-01774-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 4850697

(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. May 29, 2025). In that case, Mr. Lowe was

employed as a millwright by Cumberland Machine Company, which was an independent contractor of

Bridgestone and had “dedicated space inside the Bridgestone plant.” Id. at *1. The vent holes in a 2200-

pound tire mold were clogged with rubber, “and the mold was brought to Cumberland’s mold-repair shop

(within the Bridgestone facility) so that [Mr. Lowe] could clear the vent holes.” Id. The tire mold, which

was suspended in the air by a crane with two straps and two bolts, fell and landed on Mr. Lowe, fatally

injuring him. Id. The trial court granted Bridgestone’s motion for summary judgment, finding that

Bridgestone owed no duty of care to Mr. Lowe. Id. Evidence presented at the summary judgment stage

showed that Cumberland was required to follow Bridgestone’s safety protocols and that Bridgestone

provided at least some of the equipment used for the lifting and turning of the molds. Id. at *6. There was

also evidence that Bridgestone had implemented other safety measures, including a D-ring capture system

for lifting the molds, in other shops within the plant, but not in the Cumberland shop. Id. at *8. This Court

concluded that there were material disputes of fact as to whether Bridgestone undertook a duty to inspect

Cumberland’s repair shop and whether the accident was foreseeable. Id. at *9-10. Therefore, the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment was reversed. Id. at *11.

The contractor exception may not apply directly here since Mr. Coblentz was a product vendor and was

not hired to repair the safety bar. However, one of his job duties was to check whether the safety bar was

in place and to report any problems with it. These cases are instructive in their focus upon the importance

of the contractor’s control of the work environment to the application of the exception. In its decision in

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visited the store every six to eight weeks and that it was the responsibility of Tractor Supply

to restock the National display. In order to restock the barn door rails, it was necessary to

open the safety bar and then replace it. Further, as stated above, there is evidence that the

safety bar may not have been in place prior to Mr. Coblentz’s arrival at the store on the day

of the accident.

In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we must make a fresh

determination as to whether the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been met.

Vaughn, 2021 WL 274761, at *14. Tractor Supply had the burden “to either affirmatively

negate an essential element of [Mr. Coblentz’s] claim or demonstrate that [Mr. Coblentz’s]

evidence is insufficient” to establish his claim. Id. In order for Tractor Supply to meet its

burden at the summary judgment stage on the duty of care element, “Tennessee law sets

forth a complex, multi-step analysis that must be undertaken.” Id. Tractor Supply did not

provide undisputed proof to show that the harm was unforeseeable or to address the gravity

of harm or the burden of engaging in alternative conduct. Taken in the light most favorable

to Mr. Coblentz, some of the evidence suggests that the absence of the safety bar was

foreseeable. We cannot conclude that Tractor Supply met its burden to establish that it was

“not ‘obligated to be vigilant of [the type] or harm’” that befell Mr. Coblentz. Vaughn,

2021 WL 274761, at *13 (quoting Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 367). Therefore, we vacate

the trial court’s ruling.4

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is vacated and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the

appellee, Tractor Supply, for which execution may issue if necessary.

/s/ Andy D. Bennett

ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

this case, our Supreme Court determined that, for purposes of the workers’ compensation analysis, Mr.

Coblentz’s primary role was to provide products to Tractor Supply. Coblentz, 2025 WL 3704465, at *17.

He did, however, have ancillary duties, including checking the display’s safety bar. The extent to which

Mr. Coblentz was or was not required to comply with Tractor Supply’s related safety policies would be

relevant to the duty analysis.

4

Unlike in Vaughn, the trial court in this case did not reach the issue of comparative fault, a question

of fact. See Vaughn, 2021 WL 274761, at *14.

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