holding argument regarding weight of evidence was not improper
How later courts described this case
- holding argument regarding weight of evidence was not improper
- “[W]e may infer a defendant’s intent to distribute from the large quantity of narcotics seized.”
- concluding wife retained common authority over home where almost all her belongings, including her pets, remained in the home
- stating evidence “pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive[,] and set-up of the crime” may be admitted (quoting United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11061
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOAN MANUEL ESTADELLA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20374-RKA-1
____________________
Before JORDAN, HULL, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
Following a jury trial, defendant Joan Estadella appeals his
convictions and 96-month sentence on an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
felon in possession of a firearm count and a 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine count. On
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
appeal, Estadella challenges (1) the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence; (2) the admission of parts of the government’s evidence;
(3) the denial of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion
for judgment of acquittal as to his § 841(a)(1) drug conviction;
(4) the overruling of his prosecutorial misconduct objection; (5) all
of these rulings as cumulative error; and (6) the calculation of his
base offense level at sentencing.
After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, and
with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm Estadella’s convictions
and sentence.
I. INDICTMENT
An indictment in the Southern District of Florida charged
Estadella with (1) possessing a Taurus 9mm pistol with serial
number TLZ57339 and its ammunition as a convicted felon
between November 28, 2020, and December 1, 2020, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count 1); (2) possessing a
Springfield Armory .380 caliber pistol with serial number
CC121963 and its ammunition as a convicted felon between
November 30, 2020, and December 1, 2020, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count 2); (3) possessing
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 3); and (4) possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count 4). Estadella pled not guilty and proceeded
to trial.
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II. TRIAL EVIDENCE
During a four-day jury trial, the government called eleven
witnesses. Multiple members of the Hialeah Police Department
testified, including: Detectives Kinshun Mui and Daniel Gato,
Crime Scene Technicians Amber Perez and Genesis Prescott, and
Sergeant Gene De Lima. Three members of the Miami-Dade Police
Department’s crime laboratory testified: Tyler Brown as a firearms
identification expert, and Jonathan Lawrence and Cara Lopez as
DNA analysts. From the Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”), forensic chemist Manuel Febo testified and described lab
results for narcotics seized, and Special Agent Shaun Perry testified
as an expert in street-level drug trafficking. Dianellys
Estadella—the defendant’s fraternal twin sister—also testified.
Collectively, their testimony showed as follows.
A. Star Motel Shooting and Arrest
On November 28, 2020, a shooting and possible abduction
occurred at the Star Motel, located in Hialeah, Florida. Two days
later, Detective Mui of the Hialeah Police Department began
investigating the incident. As part of his investigation, Mui
collected surveillance video from the Star Motel and surrounding
businesses. Surveillance videos were played for the jury, and Mui
described their contents at length.
The suspects arrived at the Star Motel in a white work van
with two ladders on the roof. Two men wearing distinctive
clothing exited the van and walked to the rear of the building. The
taller man had on a neon yellow-green mask, while the shorter
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
man wore a dark olive-green shirt, dark mask, Jordan brand
sneakers, rubber-coated work gloves, and a blue hat with “Miami”
in white, cursive font embroidered on the front.
The two men approached one of the guest rooms of the
motel and drew their pistols. The taller man wielded a medium-
framed silver and purple pistol, while the shorter man bore a small,
black pistol. The suspects tried to force their way into the room.
During the ensuing struggle, the taller man fired a shot into the
room.
The two men then departed, escorting a woman from the
motel room. The assailants and their apparent captive drove away
in the white work van.
During his review of the surveillance footage, Detective Mui
observed an occupational license number on the white work van.
The number was associated with J and M Electric LLC (“J&M
Electric”), an entity whose registered agent and manager was listed
as Defendant Estadella. J&M Electric’s principal place of business
was a residential address on West 17th Street in Hialeah, Florida
(the “West 17th property”).
Shortly after performing a “drive through” of the residential
neighborhood where J&M Electric was based, Sgt. De Lima
spotted the white work van from the surveillance footage and
initiated a traffic stop. Officers identified Estadella, whom Sgt. De
Lima described as “very short and stocky,” as the driver of the van.
Estadella’s girlfriend, Yoana Quevedo, was riding along as a
passenger. Based on their possible connection to the Star Motel
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23-11061 Opinion of the Court 5
incident, both Estadella and his girlfriend were taken into custody,
and the van was impounded.
B. The West 17th Property
In addition to being J&M Electric’s listed address, the West
17th property served as Estadella’s residence. Acquired in 2011, the
property initially functioned as a “family home” for multiple
generations of the Estadella family, including Estadella, his sister
Dianellys, their mother and stepfather, Estadella’s son, and
Dianellys’s two daughters. The West 17th property was owned by
Estadella’s (1) mother and (2) stepfather, Lazaro Soriano.
Later in 2011, Dianellys and her daughters moved out.
Estadella then took possession of the main bedroom with a
connected bathroom. Estadella also converted a back bedroom
into an office and placed a keypad lock on the door. Around 2017,
shortly after Estadella’s mother passed away, Estadella’s girlfriend
moved into the property with Estadella.
After the mother’s passing, Soriano became the sole owner
of the house. At the time Estadella was arrested, Detective Mui and
Sgt. De Lima believed Soriano owned the residence.
C. Searches of the West 17th Property
On November 30, Soriano gave detectives verbal and
written consent to search the West 17th property. At the home,
Soriano even used his key to allow officers into the house.
Once inside, Detective Mui saw the same Jordan shoes and
“Miami” baseball cap that he had observed in the surveillance
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
footage from the Star Motel. These items were in Estadella’s
bedroom and the connected bathroom. Later on, DNA in the
baseball cap matched a sample taken from Estadella.
Based on their observations, the officers withdrew, and
Detective Mui applied for a search warrant allowing officers to
search the residence for evidence related to the Star Motel
shooting. On December 1, while the application for a search
warrant was pending, Mui allowed Soriano to enter the residence
under police escort to retrieve his dogs and medicine. The search
warrant on the residence was issued later that day.
After obtaining the search warrant, officers continued their
search of the West 17th property. In common areas, officers found
an olive-green shirt and gardening gloves with rubberized
palms—items believed to have been worn by the shorter suspect in
the Star Motel incident. Within Estadella’s bathroom, officers
found the firearm and ammunition charged in Count 2: a black,
compact pistol manufactured by Springfield Armory with serial
number CC121963 and loaded with five rounds of ammunition.
During execution of the search warrant, officers discovered
Estadella’s locked office with a keypad code at the back of the
house. Without the code, officers forced their way into the room.
The room contained a large J&M Electric poster, a desk, business
files, and computers. A bulletin board had J&M Electric flyers and
business cards pinned to it. A small Scarface movie poster sat atop a
mess of files on the desk. Instead of depicting Al Pacino as the
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23-11061 Opinion of the Court 7
fictional drug kingpin Tony Montana, the poster was altered, with
Estadella’s face superimposed over Pacino’s.
In a file box underneath the desk, officers uncovered a black
bag with suspected narcotics inside. This prompted the officers to
withdraw and obtain a search warrant allowing them to search for
and seize narcotics-related evidence.
After obtaining the additional warrant, Detective Gato of
the narcotics unit continued searching the office. Gato described
the black bag as a narcotics “trafficking kit” containing “basically
everything that someone would need to sell or distribute
narcotics,” including: spoons, a measuring cup, digital scales,
empty plastic baggies, and several baggies of suspected narcotics.
Gato collected thirty baggies of suspected narcotics from the back
office. Lab tests showed the substances recovered contained 31
grams of methamphetamine with 93% purity, or 28.8 grams of
pure methamphetamine. Special Agent Shaun Perry opined that
the packaging and quantity of methamphetamine was consistent
with the distribution and sale of narcotics, rather than personal use.
Other officers returned to Estadella’s bedroom and found
the firearm and ammunition charged in Count 1: a loaded silver
and purple Taurus 9mm pistol with serial number TLZ57339. The
government’s firearm identification expert testified that a shell
casing recovered from the Star Motel was ejected from this Taurus
9mm.
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
D. Search of Estadella’s Van
Pursuant to a separate search warrant, Detective Mui and
others searched the white van Estadella was driving at the time of
his arrest. Within a bag stored in the center console, they found a
Smith and Wesson pistol. This pistol was not charged in the
indictment. The district court instructed the jury to consider it only
for the purpose of determining Estadella’s state of mind. See Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b).
E. YouTube Music Video
The government played a YouTube music video filmed
within the West 17th property. As one individual freestyle raps in
Spanish, the video depicts Estadella and others playing poker at a
table covered in poker chips and firearm magazines. Detective Mui
viewed the video and (1) identified Estadella based on his
distinctive tattoos; and (2) stated the video took place inside the
West 17th property. The singer repeatedly bears a pistol. At one
point, the camera focuses on a plate covered by small baggies of
suspected narcotics. Dianellys testified that the hands holding the
plate belonged to her brother, Estadella.
The district court provided a limiting instruction both times
the YouTube video was mentioned. The district court told the jury
they must consider the video “only . . . to determine whether or
not the defendant had the state of mind to commit the crimes that
are charged in the indictment.”
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23-11061 Opinion of the Court 9
F. Stipulations
The parties stipulated that Estadella (1) was convicted of a
felony offense prior to November 28, 2020; and (2) knew he was
convicted of a felony offense.
The parties also stipulated that the Springfield Armory .380
caliber pistol, Taurus 9mm pistol, and associated ammunition
qualified as “firearms” and “ammunition” as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(3) and (17). The parties agreed the firearms and
ammunition described “were all manufactured outside of the State
of Florida and thus have moved in interstate or foreign commerce
prior to November 28, 2020.”
G. Verdict and Sentence
The jury found Estadella guilty (1) of the felon in possession
of a firearm charges in Counts 1 and 2; and (2) of the possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine charge in Count 3. The
jury found Estadella not guilty of the possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime charge in Count 4.
After his conviction, Estadella moved to dismiss Count 2,
which charged him with possessing the Springfield Armory .380
caliber pistol as a convicted felon. Estadella argued his conviction
on Count 2 and for the Taurus 9mm pistol in Count 1 created a
double jeopardy problem because “[t]he ‘simultaneous possession
of several weapons constitutes only one offense under Section
[922(g)].’” United States v. Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d 253, 255 (11th Cir.
1989) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Smith, 591 F.2d 1105,
1107 (5th Cir. 1979)), abrogated in part on other grounds by, United
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
States v. Clarke, 822 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
Estadella’s motion indicated that the government joined the
request to dismiss Count 2.
The district court granted Estadella’s unopposed motion
and dismissed Count 2 of the indictment. The district court
sentenced Estadella to concurrent 96-month terms of
imprisonment on Counts 1 and 3.
Estadella timely appealed.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed
standard, reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear
error and the application of the law to those facts de novo. United
States v. Graham, 123 F.4th 1197, 1238 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing United
States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1391 (11th Cir. 2015)).
We review evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Akwuba, 7 F.4th 1299, 1313 (11th Cir.
2021). “Because we recognize a significant range of choice for the
district court on evidentiary issues, our review of such rulings is
very limited[,] and we defer to the district court’s decisions to a
considerable extent.” Id. (citation modified).
Generally, we review de novo the denial of a motion for a
judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence.
United States v. Hano, 922 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2019). “This
Court views the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the
government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices
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23-11061 Opinion of the Court 11
made in the government’s favor.’” United States v. Anderson, 326
F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Miles, 290
F.3d 1341, 1355 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). “But when a
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on a ground
not argued before the district court, we review for plain error.”
United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310, 1322 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing
United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 664 (11th Cir. 2016)).
We typically review de novo a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct. Id. (citing United States v. Horner, 853 F.3d 1201, 1206
(11th Cir. 2017)).
We review de novo claims of cumulative error. United States
v. Green, 158 F.4th 1347, 1365 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing United States
v. Pendergrass, 995 F.3d 858, 881 (11th Cir. 2021)).
“We review de novo the interpretation and application of the
Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Kluge, 147 F.4th 1291, 1296
(11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1272
(11th Cir. 2023) (en banc)). The district court’s factual findings at
sentencing, however, are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. United States v. Bergman, 852 F.3d 1046, 1070 (11th Cir.
2017) (citing United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 959 (11th Cir.
2015)).
IV. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Estadella contends that the district court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress all evidence discovered during
search of his residence. Particularly, Estadella argues Soriano was
neither a co-occupant nor owner of the West 17th property as of
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12 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
November 30, 2020, meaning Soriano could not provide valid
consent to the initial search of the residence.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Estadella’s
motion and heard testimony that provided more detail regarding
both (1) ownership and possession of the West 17th property and
(2) the events leading to the search. We summarize the relevant
testimony and the district court’s findings.
A. Evidentiary Hearing
1. Move Out and Quitclaim Deed
By November 2020, Estadella, his son, Quevedo, and
Soriano lived in the West 17th property. Around a week before
Estadella’s arrest, near Thanksgiving of 2020, Soriano and Estadella
had a disagreement over Estadella’s use of Soriano’s car. Estadella
escalated the disagreement by punching Soriano in the face,
breaking his nose.
Estadella’s violence caused Soriano to move temporarily to
Dianellys’s nearby home. Soriano testified that he feared Estadella,
but felt safe with Dianellys, who took “very good care of” the
elderly Soriano. A relative and her boyfriend helped Soriano move
his bed to Dianellys’s home.
Nonetheless, Soriano’s other furniture, clothing, personal
objects, and even his dogs remained in the West 17th property.
During his testimony, Soriano emphasized that he only intended
to stay with Dianellys “temporarily.”
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23-11061 Opinion of the Court 13
On November 23, 2020, Soriano executed a quitclaim deed
conveying his interest in the West 17th property to Dianellys and
one of Dianellys’s daughters. Execution of the deed was witnessed
by two people, and the deed was notarized. Dianellys filed the deed
with Miami-Dade County. As of November 30, the deed was not
yet processed and recorded. Dianellys believed the deed was not
legally effective until it was recorded. Soriano similarly believed he
retained title to the property after his execution of the quitclaim
deed.
2. Obtaining Search Consent on November 30
Detectives Mui, Joseph Elosegui, and Daniel Pelaez testified
and described the events of November 30, 2020, which led to them
seeking and receiving Soriano’s consent to search the West 17th
property. During his initial traffic stop and arrest, Estadella told
Mui that he lived at the West 17th property with his girlfriend, son,
and Soriano. Back at the station, Estadella refused to consent to the
search of the West 17th property. Estadella told the detectives that
his stepfather, Soriano, owned the home.
Detective Pelaez traveled to the West 17th property and was
greeted by Estadella’s juvenile son. Estadella’s son informed Pelaez
that the home belonged to Soriano, who was at a nearby residence.
Pelaez, now joined by Detective Elosegui, went to Dianellys’s
nearby home. The two detectives found Soriano and Dianellys.
While en route, Elosegui searched Miami-Dade County records
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
and verified that Soriano was listed as the owner of the West 17th
property. 1
Soriano informed the two detectives that he owned the
West 17th property, although Soriano mentioned he was
transferring the property to Dianellys via quitclaim deed. Soriano
gave the detectives verbal and written consent to search the entire
West 17th property. Dianellys too gave verbal consent to search
the home.
Soriano accompanied Detectives Elosegui and Pelaez back
to the West 17th property. There, Detective Mui reunited with the
group. Soriano used his key to open the door to the residence and
allow the detectives to enter.
As recounted previously, the discovery of distinctive
clothing seen in the Star Motel surveillance footage caused the
detectives to stop and go obtain several search warrants and
uncover most of the remaining evidence in this case.
B. District Court’s Findings
The district court denied Estadella’s motion to suppress for
at least three alternative reasons. First, the district court found
Soriano had actual authority to consent to a search of the West
17th property as a co-possessor of the property. The district court
credited Soriano and Dianellys’s testimony that Soriano
1 As we noted earlier, the quitclaim deed conveying the West 17th property to
Dianellys and her daughter was not yet recorded. It is not disputed that under
Florida law the deed was effective at the date of execution.
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23-11061 Opinion of the Court 15
temporarily left the property only because of Estadella’s physical
attack. The district court reasoned that a defendant could not force
a co-occupant out of a property and then successfully claim the
former co-occupant had lost their co-possessory interest and ability
to consent to search of that property.
Further, the district court found ample evidence supported
a finding that Soriano still resided at and co-possessed the West
17th property, including (1) Estadella’s own statement that Soriano
resided at the property; and (2) testimony that most of Soriano’s
belongings remained at the property. In the district court’s view,
Soriano remained a co-possessor of the West 17th property with
actual authority to provide consent to search on November 30,
2020.
Second, the district court found Soriano’s consent to search
was effective since Soriano had apparent authority over the
property as the purported owner. The district court explained that
officers reasonably believed Soriano owned the West 17th property
based on several facts, including: (1) Estadella, his son, Soriano, and
Dianellys all told the detectives that Soriano owned the property;
(2) Soriano possessed a key to the home and opened the home for
the officers; and (3) Miami-Dade County property records listed
Soriano as the owner of the home.
Third, the district court found Dianellys had consented to
the search as the true owner of the property. In this regard, the
district court concluded that, under Florida law, the quitclaim deed
was effective at the date of execution, regardless of whether the
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16 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
deed was recorded. As of November 30, 2020, Dianellys thus
owned the West 17th property and had actual authority to consent
to the search.
As to both Soriano and Dianellys’s consent, the district court
found that their consent to search the property was unlimited.
Even assuming their consent could not extend to parts of the
house, such as Estadella’s locked office, the district court noted the
detectives obtained a search warrant before entering the locked
office inside the property.
C. The Fourth Amendment and Consent Searches
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people
to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. “As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’” United
States v. Harden, 104 F.4th 830, 833 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014)). The Fourth Amendment
evinces a “strong preference” that searches be performed pursuant
to a warrant, and warrantless searches of a home are presumptively
unreasonable. United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 10–11 (11th Cir.
2022) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
While the “Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the
warrantless entry of a person’s home[,] . . . [t]he prohibition does
not apply . . . to situations in which voluntary consent has been
obtained, either from the individual whose property is
searched . . . or from a third party who possesses common
authority over the premises.” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181
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23-11061 Opinion of the Court 17
(1990) (citations omitted); see also Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S.
292, 298 (2014) (providing that law enforcement may carry out a
warrantless search when they obtain consent from the sole owner
or occupant of a home).
A consent to search “must be voluntary—not the ‘product
of duress or coercion.’” Dukes v. Sheriff of Levy Cnty., 155 F.4th 1291,
1297 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 227 (1973)). The permissible reach of a consent search is
limited by the scope of the given consent, as understood by a
reasonable person. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
D. Consent and Co-occupants
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has analyzed the
constitutionality of a warrantless search when one occupant
consents to a search of a space shared with another occupant who
(1) objects to the search and (2) later moves to suppress evidence
discovered during the search. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164 (1974); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006); Fernandez, 571
U.S. at 301–07. We review these decisions.
In United States v. Matlock, the Supreme Court held
voluntary consent to search may be “obtained from a third party
who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship
to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” 415 U.S. at 171
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained that “common
authority” was not based upon a person’s property interest and,
instead, reasoned:
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18 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
Common authority . . . rests rather on mutual use of
the property by persons generally having joint access
or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable
to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the
right to permit the inspection in his own right and
that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit the common area to be
searched.
Id. at 171 n.7; see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 110 (summarizing
Matlock). The Supreme Court later clarified that common
authority could be actual or apparent, and a consent search was not
impermissible if law enforcement reasonably, but mistakenly,
believed the person providing consent had common authority over
the property. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186.
Next came Georgia v. Randolph, where law enforcement
searched a couple’s marital home after the wife “readily gave”
consent for the search, but the physically present husband
“unequivocally refused” to give consent. 547 U.S. at 107. The
Supreme Court turned to “widely shared social expectations” to
assess the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of the search and
noted that a visitor would not feel confident entering a home on
one occupant’s invitation when the “fellow tenant stood there
saying, ‘stay out.’” Id. at 111, 113. Because neither co-occupant had
a superior right vis-à-vis the other, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the objected-to consent was akin to “the absence of any
consent at all.” Id. at 114. The Supreme Court therefore held “that
a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the
express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be
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23-11061 Opinion of the Court 19
justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the
police by another resident.” Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
Then, in Fernandez v. California, the Supreme Court clarified
that Randolph applied only to situations where the objecting
co-occupant is physically present at the premises. Fernandez, 571
U.S. at 294. In other words, a co-occupant’s objection to a search
does not vitiate another co-occupant’s consent when the objecting
occupant is not physically present at the premises. Id. The Supreme
Court also reasoned that it did not matter that the objecting
co-occupant’s absence was caused by an objectively justifiable
arrest. Id. at 302–03.
E. Discussion
We readily conclude, as the district court found, that the
evidence demonstrated that Soriano had actual authority to
consent to the search of the West 17th property.
At the time he consented to the search, Soriano qualified as
a co-occupant with common authority over the West 17th
property. Estadella himself told detectives on November 30, 2020,
that Soriano resided at the property. Soriano possessed a key to the
property. Nearly all of Soriano’s possessions—even his
dogs—remained at the West 17th property. Cf. United States v.
Backus, 349 F.3d 1298, 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding wife
retained common authority over home where almost all her
belongings, including her pets, remained in the home). And
Soriano had moved his bed from the property only days earlier.
Soriano testified that his absence from the property was only
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intended to be temporary. Everyone involved—including
Estadella—believed Soriano owned the property.
These facts clearly show Soriano retained the type of joint
access and control of the West 17th property to provide him with
“common authority” over the property. Cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at
181–82 (stating no common authority over apartment was had by
person who moved out a month prior, left some furniture behind
but was not on the lease, had stolen a key to the apartment, and
never accessed the premises without the leaseholder present). And,
as the district court found, Soriano’s consent was unlimited in
scope and given voluntarily.
Estadella argues that Soriano lacked common authority
over the property because he no longer resided there. That
argument fails because one occupant cannot force a co-occupant
out of a property through physical violence and then successfully
claim the co-occupant lacks common authority over the property.
This Court held as much in United States v. Backus, where a wife
and child fled the marital home due to the husband’s abuse. 349
F.3d at 1304. We refused to “condone and reward violent, abusive
behavior” and, instead, concluded that the wife, who had fled six
months prior, had maintained sufficient common authority over
the marital home to consent to a search of the home. Id. at 1302,
1304–05. Backus applies with equal force here, where the district
court found the elderly Soriano would not have departed the West
17th property but for Estadella’s violence against him.
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Estadella’s argument also fails because Soriano (1) moved
his bed but kept his other possessions, furniture, and dogs at the
West 17th property; (2) retained his key to the property; and
(3) testified he only intended to stay at Dianellys’s temporarily.
Given this evidence, the district court did not err in its finding
Soriano remained a co-resident at the West 17th property.
We conclude that Soriano retained common authority over
the West 17th property despite his brief departure from the
property.
We recognize that Estadella declined to give consent to
search the property before detectives sought out Soriano. But
Estadella’s objection was made at the police station. When Soriano
consented to the search and opened the home for detectives,
Estadella was not physically present at the West 17th property.
Under Fernandez, therefore, Estadella’s objections were ineffectual
and did not prevent detectives from permissibly acting on Soriano’s
consent. That Estadella’s absence was caused by his arrest matters
not, because his arrest was objectively justified for his suspected
role in the Star Motel incident. See Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 302–03.
In sum, we conclude that law enforcement (1) obtained
consent from Soriano, who had common authority over the
property, and thus (2) carried out an initial warrantless search of
the West 17th property consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
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We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Estadella’s motion
to suppress. 2
V. ADMISSION OF STAR MOTEL, MOVIE POSTER, AND
YOUTUBE VIDEO EVIDENCE
Estadella argues the district court erroneously admitted
evidence regarding the Star Motel incident, Scarface poster, and
YouTube music video. We disagree and explain why.
A. Background
Pretrial, the government filed an omnibus motion in limine
which, in relevant part, sought to confirm the admissibility of
(1) evidence about the Star Motel incident, (2) the Scarface poster,
and (3) the YouTube music video. Estadella opposed the motion.
At a hearing, the district court granted the part of the motion
relevant here.
The district court first reasoned that evidence relating to the
Star Motel shooting was admissible as intrinsic to Count 1’s felon
in possession of a firearm charge. That count alleged Estadella had
possessed the silver and purple 9mm pistol from November 28,
2020—the date of the Star Motel shooting—to December 1, 2020.
2 Because we conclude that Soriano had actual authority and provided valid
consent to search as a co-occupant with common authority, we need not
address whether (1) Soriano had apparent authority to provide valid consent
as the supposed owner of the property; or (2) Dianellys could provide valid
consent to the search as the true titleholder of the property.
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The district court found that the shooting evidence was
inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses.
Next, the district court found the Scarface poster depicting
Estadella as Tony Montana and displayed in Estadella’s back,
locked office was admissible to show (1) Estadella’s control over
the room where the methamphetamine was found; and (2) that
Estadella, like drug kingpin Tony Montana in Scarface, intended to
distribute the methamphetamine.
The district court also found the YouTube music video,
which showed Estadella surrounded by guns, ammunition, and
drugs in the West 17th property itself, was admissible under Rule
404(b) to show Estadella’s knowledge of drugs in the property,
control over the property, intent, and absence of surprise or
mistake.
B. Star Motel
For starters, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of the Star Motel incident as intrinsic to the
firearm charges against Estadella.
“Evidence is admissible as intrinsic if it is either ‘(1) an
uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or
series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to
complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined
with the evidence regarding the charged offense.’” United States v.
Beasley, 160 F.4th 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States
v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2013)).
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Evidence of the Star Motel incident was inextricably
intertwined with evidence relevant to Estadella’s firearm charges.
See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (providing that evidence is relevant when it
has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less
probable). Surveillance video from the motel depicted an
individual suspect who resembled Estadella wielding a small
firearm of similar appearance to the Springfield Armory .380 caliber
pistol later discovered in his home and charged in Count 2. And
that suspect’s partner carried and discharged the silver and purple
Taurus 9mm charged in Count 1. Other evidence about the white
van tied Estadella to the shooting. The Star Motel evidence thus
was probative of when and how Estadella came to possess one or
both of the firearms charged in the indictment. The events at the
Star Motel could not be separated from evidence regarding the
firearms.
Additionally, the Star Motel incident was both (1) the first
step in the “chain of events” of this case and (2) necessary to
complete the story of how and why detectives zeroed in on
Estadella, took him into custody, searched his home, and
discovered almost all the evidence in this case. See United States v.
Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating evidence
“pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive[,]
and set-up of the crime” may be admitted (quoting United States v.
McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998))).
Contrary to Estadella’s arguments, the Star Motel evidence
was not unduly prejudicial nor unnecessarily cumulative. Evidence
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may be excluded when “its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Here, the district court made a finding that the probative
value of the Star Motel evidence was not substantially outweighed
by the risk of unfair prejudice. As the district court reasoned, the
risk of undue prejudice was somewhat low because the Star Motel
incident did not involve an injury or death of a victim or any
graphic crime scene evidence. The district court further mitigated
the risk of unfair prejudice by instructing the jury (1) not to
consider the shooting to determine Estadella’s guilt; and
(2) disregard one witness’s characterization of the incident as a
“kidnapping.” We also reject Estadella’s claim that the government
presented needlessly repetitive evidence of the Star Motel incident.
For all these reasons, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting evidence of the Star Motel incident.
C. Movie Poster
Estadella primarily argues that the movie poster lacks
probative value and is extremely prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Estadella is wrong on both fronts. The district court did not abuse
its discretion when it admitted the Scarface poster.
As noted, a small Scarface poster sat atop a mess of files on
the desk in the locked back office of the West 17th property.
Estadella’s face was superimposed over the face of Al Pacino, who
portrayed the fictional drug kingpin Tony Montana.
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The poster depicting Estadella was highly relevant.
Estadella’s defense rested, in part, on the lack of evidence that
Estadella actually possessed the methamphetamine during the
timeframe charged in the indictment. The poster helped show
Estadella controlled the back room where the methamphetamine
was found. Like signage for Estadella’s business or documents
bearing his name, the placement of such personalized décor on the
desk demonstrated (1) it was Estadella who controlled the locked
back office; and (2) Estadella controlled the methamphetamine
therein. Cf. United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1105 (11th Cir.
2019) (concluding presence of defendant’s phone, identification
cards, and travel papers was sufficient evidence to support finding
defendant controlled a shared residence’s bedroom and
constructively possessed ammunition found therein). The Scarface
poster had relevant probative value on a key factual dispute
presented to the jury.
The Scarface poster’s probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. As Estadella contends,
it may be true that the movie Scarface contains (1) gruesome
violence; (2) offensive portrayals of Cuban-Americans; and (3) a
huge amount of violent drug trafficking. None of that violence is
on the poster itself. While the poster may be damaging to
Estadella’s innocence claims, its prejudicial effect was not “unfair.”
See United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009)
(stating that “[d]emonstrating that a piece of evidence is prejudicial
is not enough to warrant exclusion under Rule 403” because
evidence must create risk of unfair prejudice). The risk of prejudice
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from the movie’s contents, if any, was slight since its contents were
not shown. Plus, as the district court reasoned, many people today
are not familiar with that 1983 movie.
The district court even indicated it was willing to entertain
giving a cautionary instruction regarding at least some of
Estadella’s concerns, but Estadella never requested such an
instruction.
Estadella has shown no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s admission of the Scarface poster.
D. YouTube Music Video
Estadella contends that the YouTube music video was
irrelevant to the crimes charged and extremely prejudicial. As
explained earlier, the music video depicts Estadella and others
playing poker at a table covered in poker chips and firearm
magazines. Detective Mui identified Estadella as in the video. The
singer raps in Spanish and holds a pistol. The video includes a
close-up shot of a plate covered by suspected narcotics. Dianellys
testified that Estadella’s hands held the plate, although Estadella’s
body and face were not visible at that point in the video.
Evidence of a defendant’s “other crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But, among other permissible
purposes, such evidence may be admitted to prove a defendant’s
intent. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). To be admissible, other acts
evidence
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must satisfy a three-part test: “(1) it must be relevant
to an issue other than defendant’s character; (2) there
must be sufficient proof to enable a jury to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
committed the act(s) in question; and (3) . . . the
evidence must satisfy Rule 403.”
United States v. Cenephat, 115 F.4th 1359, 1365 (11th Cir. 2024) (per
curiam) (quoting Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344).
The music video meets all three criteria. First, as the district
court found, the music video was relevant for permissible,
non-character purposes, including Estadella’s knowledge of guns
and drugs in the West 17th property, intent, and absence of surprise
or mistake.
Second, the government introduced sufficient evidence to
allow a reasonable jury to conclude that (1) Estadella appeared in
the music video; (2) the music video was filmed in the West 17th
property; and (3) the music video contained ammunition and
narcotics. The government played the music video for the jury.
Detective Mui testified that he recognized Estadella in the video
based on distinctive tattoos. Mui also identified the house in the
video as the West 17th property he searched with other detectives.
Mui said the video showed rifle magazines and “suspected
narcotics.”
Third, turning to Rule 403, the probative value of the music
video was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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Estadella’s brief cursorily contends that the music video is
irrelevant and could cause the jury to be “misled.” This Court has
considered rap music videos in prior cases, two of which we
discuss. See United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 494 (11th Cir.
2011); United States v. Jones, 166 F.4th 92, 104-05 (11th Cir. Jan. 22,
2026).
Consider Gamory, a cocaine and marijuana distribution and
money laundering case. 635 F.3d at 485. The rap music video
introduced at that trial contained lyrics that (1) “deal[t] with drugs,
sex, profanity, degradation of women, firearms, and threats of
violence against the police and public”; and (2) “could reasonably
be understood as promoting a violent and unlawful lifestyle.” Id. at
488, 493. Critically, the defendant (Gamory) did not appear in the
video, which meant it therefore lacked probative value of the
defendant’s guilt. Id. at 493. Our Court also pointed out that there
was no evidence “that Gamory authored the lyrics or that the views
and values reflected in the video were, in fact, adopted or shared
by Gamory.” Id.
Although holding the music video in Gamory should have
been excluded under Rule 403, this Court affirmed the defendant’s
convictions because other evidence established the defendant’s
guilt, the video was cumulative, and the error was harmless. Id. at
494.
Now consider Jones, where the defendant was in the music
video. The district court admitted (1) a 29-second video showing
the defendant rapping and wielding a gun; (2) screenshots from a
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video showing cash, drugs, and the defendant handling various
firearms; and (3) a note from the defendant’s phone featuring
violent rap-music lyrics. Jones, 166 F.4th at 104. The defendant
argued the government had not shown the guns, drugs, and cash
depicted were even real. Id. The Jones Court agreed with the
government that the evidence met the low bar of relevancy under
Rule 401 to make a fact more or less probable. Id. But the Court
emphasized that the video’s relevance was limited because the
government’s witnesses could not tell whether the firearms
depicted were real or props. Id.
Ultimately, as to Rule 403’s balancing test, our Court
said: “We needn’t definitively decide the Rule 403 issue, though,
because we hold that any error in admitting the rap-related
evidence was harmless.” Id. The Court reasoned that (1) “the
government presented substantial proof, rap-related items aside,
that [the defendant] knowingly possessed the two [firearms] at
issue here”; and (2) “the jury was presented with ample evidence
to convict” the defendant. Id. at 105.
In this case, however, Estadella not only appears in the
music video, but also is shown handling narcotics and sitting in
near proximity to guns and ammo at the West 17th property where
guns and drugs were later found. This video is highly probative for
showing Estadella knowingly possessed both the guns and drugs at
the West 17th property as charged in the indictment. See United
States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2003) (collecting
cases to conclude prior possession of a weapon can show the
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defendant knowingly possessed a weapon on later occasion),
abrogated in part on other grounds by, Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S.
225 (2019).
The district court also limited the jury’s consideration of this
music video to “whether or not the defendant had the state of mind
to commit the crimes that are charged in the indictment.” That
instruction, which we “presume that [the] jurors follow[ed],”
limited the risk that the video would be used for impermissible
character or propensity purposes. United States v. Macrina, 109 F.4th
1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2024).
At bottom, we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion in admitting the YouTube music video under Rule 403
and 404(b).
VI. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Estadella argues that the district court erred by denying his
Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal as to Count 3’s charge
of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.
Estadella contends the government introduced insufficient
evidence to prove that Estadella (1) knowingly possessed
methamphetamine found in the West 17th property, and
(2) intended to distribute the methamphetamine. Estadella’s
arguments wholly lack merit. Table setting is helpful first.
A. Standard of Review
The appellate standard of review of a denial of a Rule 29
motion for judgment of acquittal depends on whether a defendant
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32 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
raised that specific ground for acquittal before the district court. See
Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th at 1322.
The parties do not dispute that Estadella’s Rule 29 motion
as to Count 3 argued there was insufficient evidence that he
possessed the methamphetamine found in the West 17th property.
Estadella advances that same argument on appeal, and we
accordingly review it de novo. See Hano, 922 F.3d at 1283; United
States v. Green, 158 F.4th 1347, 1364 (11th Cir. 2025) (“[W]e review
a preserved challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.”
(citing United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1035 (11th Cir. 2015))).
The parties dispute, however, whether Estadella’s Rule 29
motion argued there was insufficient evidence that he had an intent
to distribute methamphetamine. We need not resolve that
disagreement. Regardless of the standard of review—de novo or
plain error—we conclude that the district court properly denied
Estadella’s Rule 29 motion as to proof of his intent to distribute the
methamphetamine. We discuss possession and then intent.
B. Possession
The evidence amply supported the jury’s finding that
Estadella possessed the methamphetamine charged in the
indictment.
Estadella stresses that, at the time of his arrest during a traffic
stop, he was not physically present at the West 17th property
where the drugs were found. This matters not because the
evidence proved Estadella constructively possessed the drugs at
that property by having “dominion and control over . . . the
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premises on which the drugs [were] concealed.” United States v.
Butler, 117 F.4th 1309, 1321 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States
v. Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999)). Multiple witnesses
testified that Estadella resided at the West 17th property.
Distinctive clothing seemingly worn by Estadella at the Star Motel
shooting two days earlier was found at the property, including a
“Miami” baseball cap that contained Estadella’s DNA.
Moreover, Estadella exercised unique control over the back
room and the methamphetamine within. Dianellys testified that
Estadella placed a keypad lock on the door and used the space as
an office. Estadella’s office contained (1) signage and records for
Estadella’s business, J&M Electric; and (2) the Scarface poster
depicting Estadella over the face of Al Pacino as Tony Montana.
The jury could have reasonably, and easily too, concluded
Estadella controlled the back office and, therefore, knowingly
possessed the drugs therein.
C. Intent to Distribute
Similarly, the evidence fully supported the jury’s finding that
Estadella intended to distribute the methamphetamine in his office.
Estadella possessed a large quantity of
methamphetamine—over 30 grams. See United States v.
Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 596 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e may
infer a defendant’s intent to distribute from the large quantity of
narcotics seized.”). Detective Gato and Special Agent Shaun Perry
testified that amount was consistent with distribution, rather than
personal use.
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34 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
Estadella also possessed what Gato described as “basically
everything that someone would need to sell or distribute
narcotics”: numerous small baggies, spoons, and scales. All this
evidence suggests that Estadella intended to traffic the drugs he
possessed.
In his briefing, Estadella tries to portray the
methamphetamine recovered as a small amount for personal use
by Estadella and his girlfriend, who are both methamphetamine
addicts. The jury heard that argument during closing arguments
and rejected it by returning a guilty verdict on Count 3. At this
stage, we need not conclude that the evidence refutes every one of
Estadella’s possible theories of his innocence because our only task
on sufficiency-of-the-evidence review is to determine “whether a
jury reasonably could have found guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Moran, 57 F.4th 977, 981 (11th Cir. 2023)
(citation modified); United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 570 (11th
Cir. 1995). A jury could have reasonably done so here.
In short, sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that
Estadella possessed methamphetamine with the intent to
distribute, and we discern no error in the district court’s denial of
Estadella’s Rule 29 motion as to Count 3.
VII. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Estadella contends that the district court erred by overruling
his objection to a comment made by the prosecutor during the
government’s rebuttal argument. Again, we disagree.
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During the government’s rebuttal argument to the jury, the
prosecutor highlighted that Estadella’s closing argument was
devoid of a detailed argument that Estadella had not possessed the
guns underlying Counts 1 and 2. In full, the prosecutor said:
Now, let’s start with what didn’t get covered a lot,
although at the end, counsel talked a little bit about
the guns, and only a little I suspect because try as he
might to try to cast some doubt on what you saw with
your own eyes, what was scientifically proven to you,
forensically, photographically, through surveillance
videos, it’s impossible to defend the indefensible.
Estadella’s counsel objected to “personal innuendos,” but the
district court overruled the objection.
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor makes
remarks that “(1) were improper and (2) prejudiced the defendant’s
substantive rights.” United States v. Spila, 136 F.4th 1296, 1306 (11th
Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 637 (11th Cir.
2007)). “A prosecutor’s remarks, suggestions, insinuations, and
assertions are improper when they are calculated to mislead or
inflame the jury’s passions.” Azmat, 805 F.3d at 1044 (citing United
States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1560 (11th Cir. 1985)). A
defendant’s substantial rights are prejudicially affected by an
improper remark “when there is a reasonable probability that, but
for the improper comments, the result of the trial would have been
different.” Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1256 (11th
Cir. 2009)).
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36 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
We comfortably conclude the prosecutor’s comment during
rebuttal argument was a permissible comment on the weight of the
evidence. See Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th at 1329 (reasoning that prosecutors
“may state conclusions drawn from the evidence” (quoting United
States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400 (11th Cir. 1997))); United States
v. Tisdale, 817 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding argument
regarding weight of evidence was not improper). Contrary to
Estadella’s strained interpretations, the prosecutor’s comment was
neither an attack on defense counsel nor an affront to Estadella’s
right to present a complete defense. Simply put, the prosecutor’s
comment was not improper.
Even if the prosecutor’s comment was improper—and we
do not mean to suggest it was—the comment did not create a
reasonable possibility of a different outcome in Estadella’s trial.
The jury had ample evidence of Estadella’s guilt on Counts 1, 2,
and 3. Plus, the district court instructed the jury that the lawyers’
statements were neither evidence nor binding on their decision.
The comment did not prejudice Estadella’s substantial rights.
Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court
overruling Estadella’s objection to the prosecutor’s comments.
VIII. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Estadella argues that the cumulative error doctrine applies
to his case. “The cumulative-error doctrine calls for reversal of a
conviction if, in total, the non-reversible errors result in a denial of
the constitutional right to a fair trial.” Green, 158 F.4th at 1365
(quoting Pendergrass, 995 F.3d at 881). Of course, there can be no
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cumulative error where there is no error or only a single error. Id.
at 1373. Because Estadella has shown no error in any of the district
court’s rulings, there is no cumulative error.
IX. SENTENCE
Estadella contends the district court applied an incorrect
base offense level by holding him responsible for a quantity of “ice”
methamphetamine, rather than merely a mixture containing
methamphetamine. We do not agree.
A. Presentence Investigation Report
A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation
report (“PSI”) using the 2021 Sentencing Guidelines Manual.
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, the PSI grouped Estadella’s firearm
and drug convictions on Counts 1 and 3 together. The PSI then
used the higher base offense level for Count 3’s 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) drug conviction to determine Estadella’s total offense
level.
The PSI calculated a total offense level of 28, consisting of:
(1) a base offense level of 26 based on between 20 and 35 grams of
“ice”, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5) and (c)(7); and (2) a
two-level increase for possession of a dangerous weapon, pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). With a total offense level of 28 and a
criminal history category of I, the PSI calculated Estadella’s
advisory guidelines imprisonment range to be 78 to 97 months.
Estadella objected to the PSI’s application of a base offense
level of 26. Estadella countered that the 28.3 grams of narcotics
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38 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
described in the PSI should be treated as a mixture containing
methamphetamine, as opposed to actual methamphetamine or ice.
If sustained, the objection would lower Estadella’s base offense
level from 26 to 18, since § 2D1.1’s drug quantity table provides
higher base offense levels for actual methamphetamine or ice as
compared to equal quantities of a less pure methamphetamine
mixture. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7), (11). 3 “Ice” is a purer form of
methamphetamine and “means a mixture or substance containing
d-methamphetamine hydrochloride of at least 80% purity.” Id.
§ 2D1.1(c).
Estadella also moved for a downward variance, reasoning
that the Sentencing Commission’s rationale for assigning higher
offense levels to higher purity methamphetamine no longer serves
its intended purpose. Estadella took issue with the commentary to
§ 2D1.1 that suggested upward departures may be appropriate
based on drug purity because:
The purity of the controlled substance . . . may be
relevant in the sentencing process because it is
probative of the defendant’s role or position in the
chain of distribution. Since controlled substances are
often diluted and combined with other substances as
they pass down the chain of distribution, the fact that
a defendant is in possession of unusually pure
narcotics may indicate a prominent role in the
3 Estadella also objected to the PSI’s application of a two-level increase for
firearm possession, but he does not raise any issues on appeal as to that
two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
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23-11061 Opinion of the Court 39
criminal enterprise and proximity to the source of the
drugs.
Id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.27(C) (2021). In essence, Estadella says high
purity methamphetamine has become cheaper and widely
available, making purity a poor indicator of culpability. Estadella
thus sought a sentence below his advisory guidelines range.
B. Sentencing Hearing
At Estadella’s sentencing hearing, the district court
overruled Estadella’s objection to the base offense level used in the
PSI. Estadella’s counsel tried to clarify that his argument rested on
the fact the indictment charged Estadella with possessing a
“mixture” of methamphetamine, rather than “actual” or “ice”
methamphetamine. The district court found the net weight of
actual methamphetamine or ice could nonetheless determine the
base offense level since the indictment charged “the general
crime,” and trial evidence showed Estadella had possessed 31
grams of methamphetamine with 93% purity. Therefore, the
substance qualified as ice and weighed between 20 and 35 grams,
within § 2D1.1(c)(7)’s range that called for a base offense level of
26.
The district court declined to vary from the advisory
guidelines range of 78 to 97 months of imprisonment. The district
court rejected Estadella’s argument that drug purity should not
affect the sentence, reasoning that a higher purity drug is more
potent, more dangerous, more addictive, and more lethal. The
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40 Opinion of the Court 23-11061
district court found no reason to disregard the advisory guidelines
range and vary downward.
The district court sentenced Estadella to concurrent
96-month terms of imprisonment on Counts 1 and 3.
C. Discussion
As to drug quantity, the district court properly applied a base
offense level of 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7).
Guidelines section 2D1.1 determines the offense level for
possession with intent to distribute convictions under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). U.S.S.G. app. A. Section 2D1.1’s drug quantity table, in
turn, sets base offense levels for different controlled substances and
substance quantities. Id. § 2D1.1(a)(5). As relevant here, a
defendant possessing between 20 and 35 grams of actual
methamphetamine or ice receives a base offense level of 26.
Id. § 2D1.1(c)(7). As opposed to these pure forms of
methamphetamine, a defendant possessing between 20 and 35
grams of a “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount
of” methamphetamine receives a base offense level of 18.
Id. § 2D1.1(c)(11), n.(A).
Estadella has not shown that the district court’s finding he
possessed between 20 and 35 grams of ice was unsupported by the
evidence. To the contrary, the district court recounted DEA
forensic chemist Manuel Febo’s trial testimony that the substances
recovered from Estadella’s office were 31 grams of 93% pure
methamphetamine. The purity causes the substance to qualify as
“ice,” and the quantity falls within the range set out in
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23-11061 Opinion of the Court 41
§ 2D1.1(c)(7). The district court did not err by applying
§ 2D1.1(c)(7) and assigning Estadella a base offense level of 26.
Estadella’s policy argument that the Guidelines unjustifiably
provide for harsher sentences for higher purity methamphetamine
has no bearing on the calculation of his base offense level. Estadella
made that argument to the district court in his motion for a
downward variance, and the district court rejected it. Estadella
does not challenge the denial of a variance. So, we do not review
that decision here. We decline to disturb Estadella’s 96-month
sentence.
X. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM Estadella’s two convictions and his sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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1 JORDAN, J., Concurring 23-11061
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
I join all of Judge Hull’s opinion for the court with the ex-
ception of Parts IV.E and VII, as to which I concur in the judgment.
I would reject Mr. Estadella’s challenge to the denial of his motion
to suppress the evidence found at the West 17th Street property on
a different ground. As for Mr. Estadella’s challenge to the prosecu-
tor’s comment during rebuttal closing, I would hold only that the
comment, if error, was harmless given the evidence presented by
the government.
The district court denied Mr. Estadella’s motion to suppress
based on alternative rationales. First, Mr. Soriano had the actual
authority to consent to a search because he was a co-possessor of
the property. Second, the officers reasonably relied on Mr. So-
riano’s apparent authority over the property. Third, Dianellys had
authority to consent to a search because under Mr. Soriano’s quit-
claim deed—which became effective on the date of execution—she
was the owner of the property.
In the Eleventh Circuit, “[t]o obtain reversal of a district
court judgment that is based on multiple, independent grounds, an
appellant must convince us that every stated ground for the judg-
ment against him is incorrect.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). “When an appellant fails to chal-
lenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district
court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any
challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due
to be affirmed.” Id. (citing Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302,
USCA11 Case: 23-11061 Document: 74-1 Date Filed: 02/20/2026 Page: 43 of 43
23-11061 JORDAN, J., Concurring 2
1306 (11th Cir. 2012)). In his initial brief, Mr. Estadella did not chal-
lenge the district court’s third rationale—that Dianellys had author-
ity to consent to a search. Because that rationale stands, Mr. Es-
tadella’s suppression argument fails.
Moving on to the prosecutor’s statement during rebuttal
closing that “it’s impossible to defend the indefensible,” it is an
open question whether that type of remark should be viewed as a
fair comment on the evidence or an implicit attack on defense
counsel. Cf. United States v. Nunez, 532 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2008)
(reviewing a prosecutor’s statement “that defense counsel had a dif-
ficult job, but that ‘he’s stuck with his client in the case,’” for plain
error and finding no impropriety because, when taken in context,
the statement “struck at the weakness of the defense” rather than
attacking defense counsel); Demirdjian v. Gipson, 832 F.3d 1060, 1070
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding, in a habeas corpus case, that the prosecu-
tor’s statements calling the defense’s theory “smoke and mirrors”
“arguably were ‘directed to “the strength of the defense on the
merits”’ and thus were not an impermissible ‘ad hominem attack on
defense counsel’” but describing it as a close case). My preference
is to hold, as the court ultimately does, that the statement was at
most harmless error due to the strength of the evidence presented
by the government. Cf. Tarpley v. Duer, 841 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir.
1987) (holding, in a habeas corpus case, that the prosecutor calling
a defense theory “unbelievable” and asking how low defense coun-
sel would go did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial under due
process principles, in part because of the trial court’s curative in-
structions).