Preston Lewis v. Aldi Inc.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-11913

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

PRESTON JERMAIN LEWIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ALDI INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:24-cv-00622-TKW-ZCB

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Preston Lewis, proceeding pro se, appeals the District

Court’s sua sponte dismissal of his claims and its denial of his mo-

tion for recusal. We affirm.

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-11913

I.

Lewis alleged that an ALDI employee, Kathleen Mary Bridg-

man, denied him service twice in 2024 on account of his race and

disability. 1 The first time, Bridgman called a manager, and the man-

ager ultimately had another employee serve Lewis. The second

time, Bridgman called another employee, who also refused to serve

Lewis, stating that Lewis was yelling and being aggressive. Accord-

ing to Lewis, another customer then approached him, yelled at him

to deal with it or leave, and pulled his shirt. In response, Lewis

pushed the customer away and yelled for someone to call the po-

lice.

Officers, including Sheriff Sherri Leann Stovall, arrived. Ac-

cording to Lewis, other customers gave Stovall an account of what

happened that matched Lewis’s version of events, but Stovall hur-

ried them out of the store without writing down their statements.

Stovall then asked Lewis for his identification. Lewis refused and

walked away. At this point, officers grabbed Lewis and pushed him

to his knees with his head and neck to the floor. They handcuffed

him and put their knees on his back and neck. Lewis sustained in-

juries, and he told the officers that he had a disability and that he

could not breathe. One of the officers then pulled Lewis up to his

feet and told him to sit on a bench.

1 All facts are taken from Lewis’s amended complaint, as he alleges them.

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Officer Ramirez Badge 213 2 then told Lewis that they were

responding to a 911 call about a fight and that Lewis fit the descrip-

tion of a person involved. Ramirez also read Lewis his Miranda3

rights. After Lewis stated that he wanted his lawyer, Ramirez told

him he would go to jail if a witness made an incriminating state-

ment about him.

Lewis complained that his handcuffs were too tight and that

his arms were numb. He also told the officers that he had a pending

civil rights complaint against the Santa Rosa County Sheriff’s Of-

fice. Officers then tightened his handcuffs. Lewis tried to get his

phone from his pocket, and the officers reacted as if he were reach-

ing for a weapon.

At some point, Sherriff Stovall reviewed a surveillance video

of the fight and stated that it showed that Lewis was the initial ag-

gressor. The other customer declined to press charges, but ALDI

decided to trespass Lewis from the store. Officers gave Lewis the

trespassing papers and told him to leave the store.

When Lewis got to his truck, an officer told him to exit the

truck and that he would be arrested for driving without a license if

he tried to drive it. Lewis presented his driver’s license, and the of-

ficer told him to leave the parking lot and leave his car behind. Two

officers then parked their cars in front of Lewis’s truck until some-

one arrived to move it.

2 This is the name Lewis used in his amended complaint.

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-11913

Lewis filed suit. In his amended complaint in forma pau-

peris, Lewis brought claims against ALDI for violating the Ameri-

cans with Disabilities Act (ADA), for negligence, and for premises

liability. He also brought claims against the Santa Rosa County

Sheriff’s Office (Office), Santa Rosa County Board of Commission-

ers (Board), Sheriff Stovall, and Officer Ramirez for violating his

Fourth 4 and Fifth Amendment rights. And, finally, he brought a

claim against Stovall and Ramirez for violating the ADA. 5 He re-

quested money damages and injunctive relief.

The Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation

(R&R) to sua sponte dismiss Lewis’s federal claims because Lewis

failed to state plausible claims for relief. He stated that the ADA

4 Lewis titled this claim “14th Amendment violation” and stated that the de-

tention violated the “procedural due process rights guaranteed by the four-

teenth amendment and incorporated fourth amendment protections.” How-

ever, the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation stated that it did not

appear that Lewis intended to bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim and that,

even if he did, it would be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted as the “factual allegations provide no basis for believing

that any Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lewis did not ad-

dress this issue on appeal, so any argument to the contrary is abandoned. See

Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we read briefs

filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant

are deemed abandoned.” (emphasis removed) (internal citations removed)).

We, thus, treat his claim as only a Fourth Amendment claim.

5 All claims against the officers were brought against them in their individual

and official capacities.

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claim against ALDI for money damages failed because the only re-

lief available under Title III of the ADA is injunctive relief.6 He also

stated that the ADA claim against ALDI for injunctive relief failed

because Lewis had not shown a threat of future violation of the

ADA. The claims against the Board and Office failed because Lewis

did not allege that the officers followed a county custom or policy.

The Fourth Amendment claim against the officers failed because

the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Lewis and probable

cause to arrest him. And the Fifth Amendment claim against the

officers failed because it alleged only violations of Miranda proce-

dure, and such violations are not themselves violations of the Fifth

Amendment.

The Magistrate Judge also recommended dismissing the

state law negligence and premises liability claims, explaining that

the district court has discretion to dismiss state law claims when it

has dismissed all federal law claims in a case and the Eleventh Cir-

cuit has “encouraged” the exercise of this discretion.

Lewis objected to the R&R and filed a motion to recuse both

the District Judge and the Magistrate Judge assigned to the case. He

argued that the District Judge had failed to recuse a different Mag-

istrate Judge in a prior case, causing an appearance of partiality and

impropriety. He also stated that the Magistrate Judge in the instant

6 The Magistrate Judge explained that, though Lewis did not specifically state

that he brought his ADA claim under Title III of the ADA, the nature of the

allegations suggests that it was Lewis’s intent. Lewis does not challenge that

conclusion.

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-11913

case lacked jurisdiction over the case. The District Judge denied the

recusal motion, adopted the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, and dis-

missed all claims.7

Lewis timely appeals the dismissal of his ADA claim against

ALDI, his Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against the Board

and Office,8 and his state law negligence and premises liability

claims against ALDI. He also appeals the denial of his motion to

recuse the District Judge. 9 We address each issue in turn.

7 Though the Magistrate Judge’s R&R did not specifically discuss Lewis’s ADA

claims against the officers, these claims were dismissed as the District Judge’s

order dismissed all claims.

8 Lewis does not specifically state that he is appealing both claims against the

Board and the Office, but he argues that the Court erred in finding that he did

not allege a custom or policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the Magistrate

Judge’s discussion of § 1983 pertained to both claims against the Board and the

Office, we read Lewis’s argument to appeal the dismissal of both.

9 Lewis did not appeal the dismissal of his Fifth Amendment or ADA claims

against the officers, so any challenges to those dismissals are deemed aban-

doned. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Lewis also did not appeal the denial of the

recusal motion as it pertained to the Magistrate Judge. Therefore, any argu-

ment that the denial was improper is also abandoned. See id. Lewis does argue

that “[d]etention based solely on an uncorroborated 911 call” violates the

Fourth Amendment and Florida law. To the extent that this can be read as

challenging the dismissal of his Fourth Amendment claims against the officers,

it is rejected. Lewis’s detention was not based solely on an uncorroborated 911

call. Indeed, other customers in the store gave Stovall an account of what hap-

pened before she asked Lewis for his identification. According to Lewis, their

statements matched his version of events. Without any additional detail, we

are left to assume that this means they told the officers that a fight occurred

and was initiated by the other customer. Still, that would have given support

to the information in the 911 call that someone matching Lewis’s description

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II.

An in forma pauperis action shall be dismissed at any time if

the court determines that it fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review de novo

these dismissals, using the same standards that govern dismissals

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and viewing the al-

legations in the complaint as true. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,

1490 (11th Cir. 1997).

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2), and “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). This “does not require de-

tailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft, 556

U.S. at 678. And “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555,

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). The standard is met “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. Further, though a court is to liberally construe documents filed

by a pro se party, that duty “does not give a court license to serve

as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient

was involved in a fight. In other words, the other customers corroborated the

call.

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-11913

pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,

760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).

A.

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled

persons in public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). To make

a claim under Title III, a plaintiff must show (1) that he is disabled,

(2) that the defendant operates a place of public accommodation,

and (3) that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff within

the meaning of the ADA. Id.; see also Kennedy v. Floridian Hotel, Inc.,

998 F.3d 1221, 1231 (11th Cir. 2021). A grocery store is a public ac-

commodation, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E), and discrimination under

the ADA includes the denial of the opportunity to benefit from ser-

vices, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).

To have standing to sue, a plaintiff must show (1) that he

suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) that is traceable to the defendant’s al-

legedly unlawful action, and (3) that will be redressed by a favora-

ble decision. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323,

1328 (11th Cir. 2013). However, a plaintiff who seeks injunctive re-

lief—which is “the only form of relief available . . . under Title III

of the ADA”—must show that, in addition to suffering a past in-

jury, there is “a sufficient likelihood that he will be affected by the

allegedly unlawful conduct in the future.” Id. at 1328–29. To make

that showing, the plaintiff must establish that the threat of future

unlawful conduct is “real and immediate . . . as opposed to . . .

merely conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 1329.

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The Court below dismissed Lewis’s claim because he failed

to show a sufficient likelihood of future unlawful conduct. In his

brief on appeal, Lewis argues that a lifetime ban violates the ADA’s

guarantee of equal access. Reading this as an argument that he did

allege a sufficient likelihood of future unlawful conduct, we disa-

gree. First, while Lewis’s complaint did allege that he was tres-

passed from ALDI, it did not allege that he was trespassed for life.

He, therefore, did not allege a lifetime ban. Second, assuming that

the trespass was a lifetime ban, Lewis’s complaint did not allege

that he attempted to return to ALDI or that he intended to do so

in the future. “Absent such an allegation, the likelihood of future

discrimination remains conjectural, hypothetical, or contingent,

and not real and immediate.” Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1082

(11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,

Lewis failed to state an ADA claim against ALDI upon which relief

can be granted.

B.

“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person

acting under color of state law who subjects a person or causes a

person to be subjected to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Vega v.

Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 141, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2101 (2022) (alterations

adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). To impose § 1983 li-

ability on a local government entity, a plaintiff must show that (1)

his constitutional rights were violated, (2) the municipality had a

custom or policy that constituted a deliberate indifference to that

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10 Opinion of the Court 25-11913

constitutional right, and (3) the policy or custom caused the viola-

tion. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). A cus-

tom or policy can be “an officially promulgated county policy” or

“an unofficial custom or practice of the county shown through the

repeated acts of a final policymaker for the county.” Grech v. Clayton

Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). The municipality can

also be liable if “a subordinate public official ma[de] an unconstitu-

tional decision and . . . that decision [was] then adopted by some-

one who does have final policymaking authority.” Hoefling v. City

of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016).

1.

People have a constitutional right to be free from unreason-

able searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. An investigatory

detention is constitutional if it is supported by reasonable suspi-

cion, and an arrest is constitutional if it is supported by probable

cause. United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007).

Reasonable suspicion exists if, based on a totality of the circum-

stances, the officer had “a particularized and objective basis for sus-

pecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285,

1290 (11th Cir. 2007). “[P]robable cause exists when the facts, con-

sidering the totality of the circumstances and viewed from the per-

spective of a reasonable officer, establish a probability or substan-

tial chance of criminal activity.” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th

891, 898 (11th Cir. 2022).

In his complaint, Lewis did not plausibly allege that his sei-

zure was a result of a policy or custom. While he made conclusory

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statements that the Board had “[p]olicy customs” of unconstitu-

tional behavior and unlawful detentions, that is not enough to sup-

port a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678;

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, though he now argues that a

municipality can be liable for even one incident of unconstitutional

behavior, Lewis failed to allege that any official with final policy-

making authority adopted the unconstitutional decision of a subor-

dinate. Lewis failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim against the

Board or the Office upon which relief can be granted.

2.

People have a constitutional right against self-incrimination.

U.S. Const. amend. V. This right “permits a person to refuse to tes-

tify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant and

also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in

any other proceeding . . . where the answers might incriminate him

in future criminal proceedings.” Vega, 597 U.S. at 141 (internal quo-

tation marks omitted). It also “bars the introduction against a crim-

inal defendant of out-of-court statements obtained by compul-

sion.” Id. To protect this right, “custodial interrogation [must] be

preceded by the now-familiar [Miranda] warnings . . . , and . . . state-

ments obtained in violation of [that] rule[] may not be used by the

prosecution in its case-in-chief.” Id. However, “a violation of Mi-

randa is not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 152.

Indeed, the Miranda rules protect a constitutional right, but they

are not actually required by the Constitution. Id. at 149 (“The Mi-

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12 Opinion of the Court 25-11913

randa rules are prophylactic rules that the Court found to be neces-

sary to protect the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-

incrimination. In that sense, Miranda was a ‘constitutional decision’

and it adopted a ‘constitutional rule’ because the decision was

based on the Court’s judgment about what is required to safeguard

that constitutional right.”).

Here, as above, Lewis did not plausibly allege that any Fifth

Amendment violation was the result of a custom or policy. He

made conclusory statements that the county had customs for un-

constitutional practices, but that is not enough to give rise to a

claim for relief. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555. Further, though he argues now that a single incident can qual-

ify as a policy for purposes of municipality liability, he, again, does

not make any allegation that an official with final policymaking au-

thority adopted the unconstitutional decision of a subordinate. Be-

yond that, Lewis’s Fifth Amendment claim focuses solely on viola-

tions of Miranda procedure, which, in and of themselves, do not

constitute Fifth Amendment violations. Vega, 597 U.S. at 149.

Lewis failed to state a Fifth Amendment claim against the Board or

the Office upon which relief can be granted.

III.

We review a district court’s decision not to exercise supple-

mental jurisdiction over state law claims for abuse of discretion.

Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 738 (11th Cir.

2006). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court commits

a clear error of judgment, fails to follow the proper legal standard

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or process for making a determination, or relies on clearly errone-

ous findings of fact. Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 846 F.3d

1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 2017).

A district court has original subject matter jurisdiction over

claims arising under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and it has sup-

plemental jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Once it

has dismissed all federal claims in a case, the court has the discre-

tion to either continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

any remaining state law claims or dismiss them. Baggett v. First Nat’l

Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 1997); see also 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under [§ 1367(a)] if . . . the

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original ju-

risdiction.”). Factors that may be considered in that choice include

“judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Baggett, 117

F.3d at 1353. And concerns of federalism “counsel in favor of dis-

missing state-law claims after the federal claims are dismissed,” Si-

las v. Sheriff of Broward Cnty., 55 F.4th 863, 866 (11th Cir. 2022), es-

pecially when the federal claims are dismissed in the early stages of

the lawsuit, See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351, 108

S. Ct. 614, 619 (1988).

Lewis’s case is in its infancy. Indeed, the defendants have not

even responded to his complaint. The District Court was within its

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14 Opinion of the Court 25-11913

wide discretion in declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdic-

tion over the state law negligence and premises liability claims and

dismissing them.

IV.

We review a district court’s denial of a recusal motion for

abuse of discretion. Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th

Cir. 2004).

A district judge must recuse himself “in any proceeding in

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(a). Similarly, a party may seek recusal of a district judge by

filing an affidavit stating that the judge is biased or prejudiced and

the grounds for believing that. 28 U.S.C. § 144. “To warrant recusal

under § 144, the moving party must allege facts that would con-

vince a reasonable person that bias actually exists.” Christo v.

Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). “Under § 455, the

standard is whether an objective, fully informed lay observer

would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”

Id. In either case, the bias must stem from extrajudicial sources,

Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651

(11th Cir. 1983), and “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute

a valid basis” for recusal, Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555,

114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994).

Here, Lewis points only to the District Judge’s past ruling

against him as evidence of bias. This one ruling is not enough to

show bias against Lewis. The District Court did not abuse its dis-

cretion in denying the motion.

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V.

We affirm the dismissal of Lewis’s claims and the denial of

his recusal motion.

AFFIRMED.