The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
DAVID MARTIN,
Case No. 3:26-cv-00298-AB
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
ODS COMMUNITY DENTAL
INSURANCE; OREGON HEALTH
AUTHORITY; CAREOREGON; and
SKYLINE ORAL AND DENTAL,
Defendants.
BAGGIO, District Judge:
Plaintiff David Martin brings this case against ODS Community Dental Insurance
(“ODS”), Oregon Health Authority, CareOregon, and Skyline Oral and Dental. Plaintiff claims
that he is being denied emergency oral surgery for a life-threatening condition.1 Compl. 4, ECF
1 All citations to the record refer to the PDF page number in the CM/ECF filing.
No. 1. On February 13, 2026, Plaintiff moved ex parte for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)
in which he asks this Court, among other things, to order Defendants to: (1) provide Plaintiff
with emergency oral surgery within twenty-four hours; (2) cover all costs related to surgery,
anesthesia, and follow-up; (3) preserve evidence of financial records and communications
between Plaintiff and Defendants; and (4) refrain from retaliating against Plaintiff.2 Pl.’s Mot.
TRO (“Pl.’s Mot.”) 32–33, ECF No. 3. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s
motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 authorizes courts to issue temporary restraining
orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the
status quo before a preliminary injunction hearing may be held. See W. Watersheds Project v.
Bernhardt, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1008-09 (D. Or. 2019). In deciding whether to grant a motion
for a TRO, courts look to substantially the same factors that apply to a court’s decision on
whether to issue a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.,
240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show
that: (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an
injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
The Ninth Circuit uses the “serious questions” test. All for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d
1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2011). Under this test, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a
2 In Plaintiff’s pending motion, Plaintiff also names “Dr. Mishaun Sahebi, DDS” and
“Jeffrey Van Orman, DMD” as defendants in this case. Pl.’s Mot. 3. The Court finds that
Doctors Sahebi and Van Orman are not defendants here because Plaintiff does not name them in
his operative Complaint.
hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction,
assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id. at 1132.
The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his
claim. As an initial matter, a plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction based on claims which they
do not plead in their complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810
F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]here must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the
motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint. This requires a
sufficient nexus between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set
forth in the underlying complaint itself.”); Baldwin v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., No. 2:24-CV-
03401-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1787480, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (“A plaintiff is not entitled
to an injunction based on claims not [pleaded] in his complaint.”). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint
only contains one allegation: “emergency motion for TRO due to life threatening denial of
emergency oral surgery beyond 72 hours.” Compl. 4. Plaintiff does not, however, include any
other allegations of Defendants’ conduct in his Complaint. Additionally, Plaintiff asks for
mandatory relief in the form of covering all related medical costs, but Plaintiff’s Complaint does
not list this form of relief in his Complaint. Pls.’ Mot. 32. Elsewhere, Plaintiff’s motion contains
arguments that Defendants violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, which
also do not appear in his Complaint. Pl.’s Mot. 10. Even if the Court were to consider these other
claims, the Court notes that many of Plaintiff’s citations to caselaw are inaccurate or contain
incomplete citations.3 To the extent that Plaintiff is using generative artificial intelligence to aid
3 For example, Plaintiff cites to Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968), for a quote
that does not exist on the cited page or anywhere else in the case. Pl.’s Mot. 14. Elsewhere,
Plaintiff appears to cite within rhymed verse Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), without full
citations supporting Plaintiff’s argument. Id. at 36–37, 76–77.
him in his briefing, Plaintiff is warned that the Court will not tolerate further inaccurate or
incomplete citations to legal authority.4
The Court finds that there lacks a “sufficient nexus between the claims raised in
[Plaintiff’s] motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying
complaint . . . .” Therefore, the Court currently “lacks authority to grant the relief requested.”
Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC, 810 F.3d at 636. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for TRO is
denied.
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4 The Court additionally has concerns whether Plaintiff is able to show a likelihood of
irreparable harm. As an initial matter, economic damages generally do not constitute irreparable
harm. Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202–03
(9th Cir. 1980); see also Johnson v. Brown, 567 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1262 (D. Or. 2021) (“Even if
the Court assumes that this possible harm is not speculative and is sufficiently imminent, it is an
economic injury and thus is not an irreparable injury because it can be compensated with money
damages.”); Royston v. Guar. RV, Inc., No. 6:20-CV-1611-MK, 2020 WL 7346613, at *1 (D. Or.
Dec. 14, 2020) (“Economic damages, which may be remedied with a later judgment for
monetary damages, do not constitute irreparable harm.”). Here, Plaintiff’s claim appears to arise
from Defendant ODS declining to provide coverage for emergency dental surgery, but Plaintiff
does not allege that Defendants are preventing him from accessing life-saving care entirely. See
Pl.’s Mot. 4. In other words, Plaintiff does not show that he is unable to access emergency
medical treatment unless ODS provides such authorization. See D.W. v. Fresenius Med. Care N.
Am., 534 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1288 (D. Or. 2021) (finding irreparable harm when “alternatives . . .
do not ameliorate the substantial risk of irreparable harm to [the plaintiff]”). Plaintiff also does
not show how monetary damages are inadequate. Indeed, Plaintiff cites as part of his requested
relief the associated costs of “surgery, anesthesia, and follow-up . . . .” Pl.’s Mot. 32. The Court
also notes that Plaintiff’s tooth causing the alleged infection had signs of deterioration as early as
July 2023. Pl.’s Mot. 5–6; see also Oakland Trib., Inc. v. Chron. Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377
(9th Cir. 1985) (“Plaintiff’s long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of
urgency and irreparable harm.”).
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success on the merits, one of the four
essential elements needed before the Court may issue a TRO, the Court DENIES Plaintiff David
Martin’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [3].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2026.
AMY M. BAGGIO
United States District Judge
5 — ORDER