Primus

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

VonEric Primus, ) Case No. 8:25-cv-01958-DCC

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Plaintiff, )

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v. ) ORDER

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Ms. Allen, )

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Defendant. )

________________________________ )

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s complaint alleging a violation of his

civil rights pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1999). ECF No. 1. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and

Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this matter was referred to United States Magistrate

Judge William S. Brown for pre-trial proceedings and a Report and Recommendation

(“Report”). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary

judgment. ECF No. 21. On January 14, 2026, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report

recommending that the motion be construed as one for summary judgment and that it be

granted. ECF No. 34. The Magistrate Judge advised Plaintiff of the procedures and

requirements for filing objections to the Report and the serious consequences if he failed

to do so. Plaintiff filed objections. ECF No. 36.

APPLICABLE LAW

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The

recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final

determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The

Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the Report of the

Magistrate Judge to which a specific objection is made. The Court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or

recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

The Court will review the Report only for clear error in the absence of an objection. See

Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating

that “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo

review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the

record in order to accept the recommendation.” (citation omitted)).

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, the Magistrate Judge provides a thorough recitation of the

applicable law and relevant facts, which the Court incorporates by reference. The

Magistrate Judge recommends granting summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff

failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies and because there is no Bivens

remedy available. Because Plaintiff has filed objections, the Court’s review has been de

novo.

The Court will begin with a brief discussion of Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Plaintiff objects and asserts that the grievance

procedure is unavailable. It is clear from the evidence in the record that Plaintiff did not

properly comply with the grievance procedure, which is a prerequisite to filing suit.

However, regardless of whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies,

summary judgment is still appropriate.

In Bivens, the Supreme Court established a direct cause of action under the

Constitution of the United States against federal officials for violations of constitutional

rights. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388. To state a Bivens claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege

that: (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and

laws of the United States and (2) the defendant did so under color of federal law. See

Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted) (setting forth requirements for a § 1983 claim under color of state law);

see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389 (“In [a previous case], we reserved the question whether

violation of [the Constitution] by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives

rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct.

Today we hold that it does.”).

In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied private action for damages

against federal agents alleged to have violated a plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights from

unreasonable search and seizure when the agents handcuffed the plaintiff in his own

home without a warrant. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. Since then, the Supreme Court has

only extended Bivens claims in two additional contexts: (1) under the Fifth Amendment's

Due Process Clause for gender discrimination when a Congressman fired his female

administrative assistant (Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)); and (2) under the

Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause against prison officials for

failing to treat an inmate's asthma (Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)).

Bivens is a judicially created remedy, and further extension is disfavored. Ziglar v.

Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). Accordingly, a court must first examine whether a

case presents a new Bivens context and, if so, conduct a special factors analysis to

decide whether the extend Bivens. The context is new “[i]f the case is different in a

meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided” by the Supreme Court. Abbasi,

137 S.Ct. at 1859. The Bivens remedy should not be expanded “if there are special

factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” Id. at

1857 (quoting Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court's

special factors inquiry “must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent

congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of

allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id. at 1857–58.

Plaintiff’s claim here is that he has been experiencing severe chest pains since

December 2023 and has had a persistent cough since 2019, which have caused serious

medical problems. He attempts to analogize this claim to that in Carlson and, thus, argues

that it is not a new context. However, Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficiently similar to

those in Carlson. See Bulger v. Hurwitz, 62 F.4th 127, 138 (4th Cir. 2023) (“Nonetheless,

even if Appellant could make out a claim for an alleged failure to provide constitutionally

adequate medical treatment, a lack of competent medical care did not cause Bulger’s

death. Given this meaningful difference, we conclude that Appellant’s [Bivens claims] are

not authorized by Carlson but instead present a new context.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claim arises in a new context, and special factors counsel against extending a Bivens

remedy. See, e.g., Bulger, 62 F.4th at 137, 139–42.

Finally, the Court will address Plaintiff’s remaining request and Defendant’s

remaining arguments. To the extent Plaintiff asserts this claim against Defendant in her

official capacity, she is entitled to sovereign immunity. Morrison v. Holding, 539 F. App’x

272, 273 (4th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant in her individual capacity is

further barred by qualified immunity as Plaintiff has not stated a constitutional violation.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (noting that qualified immunity protects

government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as

the conduct in question does not “violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.”). Likewise, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is denied.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (“Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison

conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right of a particular plaintiff . . . .”).

Therefore, upon de novo review, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the

Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [21] is

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Donald C. Coggins, Jr.

United States District Judge

February 17, 2026

Spartanburg, South Carolina