Feaster

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

TERRANCE J. FEASTER, : Case No. 1:23-cv-98

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Matthew McFarland

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

:

WALTER SAMMONS, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS1

This matter is currently before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. #36), Defendant’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #43-1), and Plaintiff’s

Response in Opposition (Doc. #50). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned

RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure to intervene claims and GRANT

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims.

I. Background

In February 2023, Terrance J. Feaster (“Plaintiff”) filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights while incarcerated at the Southern

Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) in Lucasville, Ohio. (Doc. #s 5, 23). Plaintiff is proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis.

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendations.

Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendants Sergeant Walter Sammons and Corrections

Officers R. Jackson, T. Sherman, R. Carver, and Norman, asserting claims of “Retaliation,”

“Emotional Distress,” and “Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of Pain,” in violation of his rights

under the First and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Doc. #s 1, 5). Upon

initial review, the undersigned recommended the majority of Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, leaving only Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation claim and Eighth Amendment excessive-force and/or failure to intervene claims against

Defendants Norman and Sammons. (Doc. #8, PageID #152). United State District Judge Matthew

W. McFarland adopted the Report and Recommendation on January 8, 2024. (Doc. #16).

Plaintiff’s surviving claims allege that, on or about the afternoon of September 14, 2021,

Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Norman about his cell being excessively searched. (Doc. #5, 23).

Defendant Norman allegedly became visibly angry and took Plaintiff to Defendant Sammons’s

office, leading him through an area of the prison that was under renovation, in violation of prison

policy. Id. Once in Defendant Sammons’s office, Defendants allegedly yelled at Plaintiff for filing

grievances; after some “back and forth,” Plaintiff avers that Defendant Sammons jumped out of

his chair and told Plaintiff to turn around and “cuff-up” because he was going to segregation. Id.

Immediately afterward, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sammons yanked and pushed him, forcing

Plaintiff against the office door and causing it to slam shut. Id. Plaintiff alleges that a non-party

case manager attempted to open the door but could not. Id. As a result, Plaintiff alleges he suffered

injury to his shoulder. Id. Plaintiff requests punitive and compensatory damages in the amount of

$1 million due to physical and emotional injuries. Id.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 14, 2024. (Doc. #23). In addition to the

allegations in the initial complaint, Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that Defendant

Corrections Officer G. Hardinger conducted a shakedown of Plaintiff’s cell, knowing that

Plaintiff’s friends and family had called about incidents within the correctional facility involving

Plaintiff. Id. During the shakedown, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hardinger “noticed the []

complaints, took them, discarded them and ‘retaliated’ by writing the plaintiff a falsified conduct

report for a substance that was never in the plaintiff’s cell or possession . . ..” Id. The Court allowed

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant Harbinger to proceed for further development. (Doc.

#’s 20, 22). Defendant Harbinger has yet to be served, and as such, Defendants’ Motions for

Summary Judgment do not encompass claims against him.

II. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Summary

judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when it has the capacity to affect an action’s

outcome. Beans v. City of Massillon, No. 5:15-cv-1475, 2016 WL 7492503, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec.

30, 2016) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A genuine issue of

material fact generally does not exist where the record could not “lead a rational trier of fact to

find for the non-moving party . . ..’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986). This is true even when opposing parties allege two different sets of facts but one

is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it . . . .” Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (emphasis added). A court may use “pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” in deciding

whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Satterfield v. Tennessee, 295 F.3d 611, 615 (6th

Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56) (internal quotations omitted). The court must evaluate

evidence and view any facts that are not blatantly contradicted by the record in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Id.; Coble v. City of White House, Tenn., 634 F.3d 865, 870

(6th Cir. 2011). Where there are contradictory facts, the non-moving party must “present some

significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve the parties’ differing versions

of the dispute at trial.” Maston v. Montgomery Cnty. Jail Med. Staff Pers., 832 F. Supp. 2d 846,

849 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting Sixty Ivy St. Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.

1987)).

The movant bears the initial burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of

material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The movant must inform the court of the basis of its

motion by identifying the portions of the record it believes “demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact” with specificity. Id. at 322. The court must review the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Pittman v. Experian Info.

Solutions, Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 628 (6th Cir. 2018); Satterfield, 295 F.3d at 615; Little Caesar

Enters., Inc. v. OPPC, LLC, 219 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has successfully

supported its motion, the burden shifts and the non-moving party must demonstrate that genuine

issues of a material fact remain. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Zinn v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d

866, 871 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (citing Fulson v. City of Columbus, 801 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D. Ohio 1992)).

The non-moving party cannot solely rely on their allegations but rather “must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968).

Filings submitted by pro se plaintiffs are liberally construed. Spotts v. United States, 429

F.3d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boswell v.

Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999)). However, a plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant does

not alter their burden to support their factual assertions with admissible evidence. Maston, 832 F.

Supp. 2d at 851–52 (citing Viergutz v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 375 F. App’x 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2010)).

III. Discussion

Defendants ask this Court to grant summary judgment in their favor, pursuant to Fed. Civ.

R. 56. (Doc. #43-1, PageID #537). Defendants Sammons and Norman assert that their actions do

not satisfy the standard for an Eighth Amendment claim for use of excessive force or failure to

intervene because no force was employed. Id. at 532. Defendants contend that, on the day in

question, Plaintiff approached Defendant Norman about his cell being searched. Id. at 526. The

search of Plaintiff’s cell, according to Defendants, was part of the correctional facility’s

randomized searches that “are designed to uncover contraband items, and therefore deter the

possession of contraband by inmates.” Id. at 527. During the search, Defendants assert that

Defendant Norman discovered minor contraband, which caused Plaintiff to become agitated and

use “disrespectful and profane language at an elevated tone.” Id. Defendant Norman took Plaintiff

to Defendant Sammons’s office to discuss the suspected contraband and give Plaintiff the option

to dispose of it or accept a formally issued conduct report. Id. “This was the singular purpose for

[Plaintiff] being brought to [Defendant] Sammons’ office,” according to Defendants. Id. During

the discussion, Defendants contend that Plaintiff became visibly agitated, and Defendant Sammons

“ordered Plaintiff to cease his disrespectful behavior and return to his cell.” Id. at 529. Defendants

aver that physical force was not employed. Id. at 528. Non-party Case Manager Charles R.

O’Connor witnessed the exchange and reported that “no force [was] used or witnessed.” (Doc.

#36-2, PageID #473). Plaintiff was examined by a nurse less than twenty-four hours after the

alleged altercation, and the nurse’s report indicated that the Plaintiff had “no difficulty raising [his]

arms above his [head] and removing shirts,” that he “ha[d] full range of motion with no difficulty

in reported affected right shoulder,” and no “deformity, redness, swelling, bruising, [or]

tenderness.” (Doc. #43-1, PageID #528) (quoting Doc. #36-3, PageID #477–78). Defendants

contend that a non-party investigator assessed Plaintiff’s claims and determined they were

unfounded. Id.

With permission from the Court, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s

Motions for Summary Judgment on September 8, 2025. (Doc. #50). This Court ordered Defendants

to file a reply to Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

on or before January 16, 2026. (Doc. #52). Defendants did not file a reply in support of their

motions for summary judgement.

A. Excessive Force Under the Eighth Amendment

A convicted prisoner has a Constitutional right to be free from the use of excessive force

under the Eighth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327

(1986). To determine whether a violation occurred, the court must determine whether the force

was used in good faith to maintain discipline or whether it was employed to maliciously or

sadistically cause harm. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). There are two prongs to this analysis: (1) the subjective element of the prison

officer’s state of mind and (2) the objective element of the pain the prisoner experienced, which is

evaluated under the standard of “sufficiently serious.” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580

(6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)).

The subjective element requires that the intent of the prison officer rise above “deliberate

indifference” and instead be “maliciously and sadistically to inflict pain.” Johnson v. Sootsman,

79 F.4th 608, 616 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5–7). As maintaining general order

and prison security may require physical force that would amount to assault under common law,

Cordell, 759 F.3d at 580, prison officer’s use of force does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth

Amendment right so long as he believed it was necessary, even if that belief is unreasonable.

Johnson, 79 F.4th at 616. Prison officials do, however, violate the Eighth Amendment when their

action “reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Cordell, 759 F.3d at 580 (quoting

Williams, 631 F.3d at 383). Courts have generally considered several factors to determine the

prison officer’s intent, including the extent of the prisoner’s injury, the nature of the threat that

justified the use of force, the amount of force and its proportionality to the threat, and whether the

officer took any actions to reduce the required amount of force. Id. at 618 (citations omitted).

The objective element requires the harm to a prisoner “rise to a sufficiently serious level

because the Eighth Amendment prohibits only ‘cruel and unusual’ deprivations.” Johnson, 79

F.4th at 615. Courts measure whether conduct is “cruel and unusual” using “contemporary

standards of decency.” Id. at 616. The Eighth Amendment is not typically violated by “‘de minimis

uses of physical force’ so long as this force does not repulse ‘the conscience of mankind.’” Id. at

616 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10). The court must look to the nature of the force instead of

the extent of the injury, though the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of

force used. Wilkins, 559 U.S. 34, 34–37 (“Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any

physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary

quantity of injury.”). However, the absence of serious injury is a relevant factor. Id. at 37 (finding

that the absence of serious injury may suggest the force used was proportional or reasonably

necessary given the individual circumstances).

Both parties agree that Plaintiff’s cell was searched on September 14, 2021. (Doc. #s 5, 43-

1). They also agree that Plaintiff approached Defendant Norman to speak about the most recent

searches of his cell. Id. Further, both parties agree that Defendant Norman led Plaintiff to

Defendant Sammons’s office on September 14, 2021. Id. Both parties agree that Plaintiff and

Defendants engaged in a “back and forth” while in Defendant Sammons’s office. Id. However, the

parties contest what transpired in Defendant Sammons’s office, what force, if any, was used, and

who was present at the time of the alleged use of force. On its face, it seems the parties’

contradictory stories cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Id. However, when opposing

parties allege two different sets of facts, the court must determine whether one story is “blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it . . . .” Scott, 550 U.S. 372,

380.

To support the assertions in their Motions for Summary Judgment, Defendants provided

declarations from Defendant Norman, non-party Case Manager O’Connor, and a non-party

investigator; Investigatory Question and Answer documents from Defendant Norman, Defendant

Sammons, and non-party Case Manager O’Connor; incident reports filed September 15, 2021,

from Defendant Norman, Defendant Sammons, and non-party Case Manager O’Connor; an Inmate

Confidential Statement written by Plaintiff, dated September 15, 2021; Plaintiff’s medical

examination report from the SOCF infirmary, dated September 15, 2021; the Report of Inspector

to the Warden dated September 16, 2021; and a declaration from the healthcare administrator, who

acts as the custodian of Plaintiff’s health records at SOCF. (Doc. #s 36–36-3; 43-1–43-2). To

support the assertions in his complaint and in opposition of Defendants’ motions for summary

judgment, Plaintiff provided various Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction (ODRC)

policies; grievances and findings regarding the September 14, 2021 incident, as well as various

grievances that are unrelated to use of force and/or pre-date the alleged use of force on September

14, 2021; appeals to the chief inspector; various court documents, including Plaintiff’s requests

for production of evidence and Defendants’ responses to such requests; the Report of Inspector to

the Warden dated September 16, 2021; and an Inmate Property Record that Plaintiff alleges

contains his forged signature. (Doc. #s 50–50-30).

Looking first at the subjective element, Defendants have provided evidence that no use of

force occurred in Defendant Sammons’ office on September 14, 2021. Plaintiff asserts that non-

party Case Manager O’Connor witnessed the use of force through the door as Plaintiff was forced

against it, which also kept Case Manager O’Connor from accessing the room. (Doc. #s 5, 23, 50-

10, PageID #638). Defendants, however, contend non-party Case Manager O’Connor was present

in the room during their conversation with Plaintiff. (Doc. #43-1, PageID #528). Case Manager

O’Connor asserts that he was present in Defendant Sammons’ office during Defendants’

conversation with Plaintiff and that no use of force occurred (Doc. #43-2). Additionally, Defendant

Norman, who Plaintiff agrees was present during the alleged use of force, also indicated she did

not witness any use of force. (Doc. #36-1). During an investigation, Defendant Sammons attested

that, while he was in his office on the afternoon of September 15, 2021, he did not throw Plaintiff

against the door nor has he “use[d] force on [Plaintiff] at anytime.” (Doc. #36-2). Viewing the

record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, no reasonable jury would be able to find that

Defendants employed force; without a finding that Defendants used force against Plaintiff, no

reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ use of force was extreme and outrageous or employed

in a manner meant to maliciously or sadistically cause pain.

Even if Defendants had employed force, Plaintiff asserts that this force occurred after he

“became combative” while in Defendant Sammons’s office. (Doc. #50, PageID #577). An Eighth

Amendment violation does not occur where prison officials believe, even unreasonably, that use

of force is required to keep the peace or maintain prison security. Cordell, 759 F.3d at 580;

Johnson, 79 F.4th at 616. Plaintiff has failed to establish in his response that any alleged use of

force on September 14, 2021, especially following the allegation that he became combative, was

done so maliciously or with a sadistic intent to cause pain. (Doc. #50).

Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff could establish (1) force was employed, (2) that force

was extreme or outrageous, and (3) Defendants’ employed such force with malice or a sadistic

intent to cause pain, the court must still assess the objective prong of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

excessive force claim. In the instant case, Plaintiff’s injuries are not sufficiently serious to offend

contemporary standards of decency. Plaintiff asserts that he sustained injuries to his shoulder as a

result of the alleged use of force. (Doc. #5, 23). However, a report detailing a medical examination

of Plaintiff on September 15, 2021, indicates Plaintiff showed no sign of injury or bruising, no

indication of pain when lifting his arm above his head, and that he was initially confused as to why

he was present for the medical assessment in the first place. (Doc. #36-3, PageID #476). In fact,

the medical report is devoid of any evidence of injury, bruising, lacerations, or any other indication

of harm anywhere on Plaintiff’s body. Id. Even in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no

evidence of physical force, let alone evidence of force that rises beyond de minimis or that would

“repulse ‘the conscience of mankind.’” Johnson, 79 F.4th 608, 616 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at

9–10).

Accordingly, Defendants have met their initial burden of establishing there are no genuine

issues of material fact regarding the Eighth Amendment use of excessive force claim. Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. Once Defendants successfully supported their Motions, it became

Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 257. However, Plaintiff has failed to do more than assert already dismissed claims or rely

on the original allegations that survived initial review. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 288.

This is not sufficient to meet Plaintiff’s burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

Additionally, at present, the record so flagrantly contradicts Plaintiff’s assertions that, even in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is unlikely that a rational trier of fact could find for him.

Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574, 587.

Therefore, as Defendants’ actions do not satisfy the standard for an Eighth Amendment

claim as a matter of law, Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment should be granted as it

pertains to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims for use of excessive force against Defendant

Sammons and Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims for failure to intervene against Defendant

Norman.

B. Retaliation under the First Amendment

To succeed on a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must establish

that (1) he engaged in protected conduct, (2) he was the subject of an adverse action that would

“deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct,” and (3) there is a

causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action—or more plainly, that the

adverse action was motivated, even if only in part, by the plaintiff’s engagement in the protected

conduct. Brown v. Gray, 2022 WL 961246, ¶ 8 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2022), citing Thaddeus-X v.

Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Regarding the first element,

as relevant in this case, “incarcerated people have a First Amendment right to file non-frivolous

grievances and lawsuits against prison officials.” Brown v. Mahlman, 2024 WL 248580, ¶ 10 (S.D.

Ohio 2024) (Litkovitz, M.J.) (adopted by Brown v. Mahlman, 2024 2024 WL 1340261 (S.D. Ohio

2024)), (citing Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 264 (6th Cir. 2018)). To meet the second element,

a plaintiff must establish that defendants undertook an adverse action taken that would “deter a

person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected conduct.” Id.; Bell, 308

F.3d at 606 (“The relevant question is whether the defendants’ actions are ‘capable of deterring a

person of ordinary firmness;’ there is no requirement that the plaintiff show actual deterrence.”)

(quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 398). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must establish

that such adverse action is more than “inconsequential.” Maben, 887 F.3d at 266 (quoting Bell v.

Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2002)); Reynolds-Bey v. Harris-Spicer, 428 Fed. App’x 493,

503 (6th Cir. 2011) (listing a number of “[e]xamples of adverse actions that [the 6th Circuit] has

held sufficient to meet the ‘person of ordinary firmness’ standard.”). “Retaliatory cell searches and

seizure or destruction of an inmate’s legal papers or property satisfy the adverse action

requirement.” Brown, 2024 WL 248580, at ¶ 13 (citing Maben, 887 F.3d at 267; Bell, 308 F.3d at

604). However, a “single search of a prison cubicle would not deter a person of ‘ordinary firmness’

from pursuing constitutional grievances.” Williams v. [Unknown] Stevenson, P.C., 2020 U.S. App.

LEXIS 31183, ¶ 4 (6th Cir. 2020), quoting Tate v. Campbell, 85 F. App’x 413, 417 (6th Cir. 2003).

Finally, turning to the third element, a plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the

retaliatory conduct and plaintiff’s protected activities. Maben, 887 F.3d at 264. Causation may, in

part be inferred from close temporal proximity. Brown, 2024 WL 248580, at ¶ 14 (quoting Maben,

887 F.3d at 268) (“[T]he timing alone may be ‘significant enough to constitute indirect evidence

of a causal connection so as to create an inference of retaliatory motive.’”). The plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing the causal connection. Maben, 887 F.3d at 267. Once satisfied, the burden

shifts to defendants to establish that “he would have taken the same action in the absence of the

protected activity . . ..” Id. (quoting Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399).

Plaintiff has adequately alleged the first element of his retaliation claim because filing a

grievance is protected conduct. See Brown, 2024 WL 248580, at ¶ 10. However, Plaintiff has

failed to satisfy the second and third elements.

As to the second element, while Plaintiff has alleged several cell searches in quick

succession, he has not established that cell searches of this nature (1) would deter a person of

ordinary firmness from pursuing constitutional grievances nor that (2) the searches were not part

of SOCF’s standard cell search procedures. An “inmate cannot immunize himself from adverse

administrative action by prison officials merely by filing a grievance or a lawsuit and then claiming

that everything that happens to him is retaliatory.” Brown, 2024 WL 248580, at ¶ 10 (quoting Spies

v. Voinovich, 48 F. App’x 520, 525 (6th Cir. 2002)) (internal citations omitted).

Regarding the third element, Plaintiff asserts that the cell searches leading up to September

14, 2021, were a direct result of grievances he had filed against SOCF officials. However, Plaintiff

does not aver that Defendants told him the searches were a result of his grievances; Plaintiff does

not allege that Defendants promised to cease the searches if Plaintiff stopped filing grievances;

Plaintiff does not adequately establish that these cell searches occurred in close temporal proximity

to his grievances. In fact, Plaintiff’s exhibits indicate that many of his grievances were filed five

to six months prior to September 14, 2021, and many of his appeals to the Chief Inspector were

filed three to four months prior to September 14, 2021. (Doc. #s 5, 23, 50). Even if Plaintiff

sufficiently met his burden to establish a causal connection between Plaintiff’s protected activity

and Defendants’ alleged retaliatory conduct, Defendants assert that, during “every shift at SOCF,

one Corrections Officer is required to randomly search three (3) cells on each housing block.”

(Doc. #36, PageID #432) (quoting Doc. #36-1, PageID #444). These random searches have a

facially neutral, untargeted purpose—to discover and deter possession of contraband. Id. With this,

Defendants have established that “that [they] would have taken the same action in the absence of

the protected activity.” Maben, 887 F.3d at 267.

Accordingly, while Plaintiff successfully established the first element of retaliation, even

in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, no rational trier of fact could find for Plaintiff regarding the

second and third elements of his claim. Even if Plaintiff were to successfully establish that he

suffered adverse actions at the hands of Defendants and that such action is a direct result of

Plaintiff’s protected activity, Defendants have met their burden of establishing that any adverse

action would have occurred in the absence of Plaintiff’s protected activity. Plaintiff is not shielded

from any adverse administrative action at the hands of prison officials simply because he filed

grievances or lawsuits before the adverse actions were taken. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment should be granted as it pertains to Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation

claims.

IV. Conclusion

The undersigned Magistrate Judge, having considered Defendant’s Motions for Summary

Judgment, RECOMMENDS that:

1. Defendant Walter Sammons’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #s 36,

43-1) be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force

and failure to intervene claims; and

2. Defendant Walter Sammons’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #s 36,

43-1) be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims.

January 30, 2026 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections

to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after being served with

this Report and Recommendations. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report

objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If

the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at

an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or

such portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless

the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.

Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir.

1981).