The opinion
USCA11 Case: 25-10694 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 02/19/2026 Page: 1 of 7
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-10694
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ELIEZER TAVERAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
YULEXIS LLUVET,
ALLIED PROPERTY GROUP, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees,
ALPINE TOWING, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-10694
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-23745-RNS
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eliezer Taveras appeals from the district court’s orders dis-
missing his second amended complaint and denying his motion to
vacate the judgment against him. He argues that the district court
erroneously dismissed his second amended complaint despite his
well-pleaded claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). He next argues that the district
court abused its discretion by denying him leave to file a third
amended complaint. Lastly, he asserts that the district court mis-
characterized his motion to vacate as a motion for reconsideration
and failed to address the substance of the fraud allegations con-
tained in the motion. We affirm.
I
First, the merits. Taveras appeals the dismissal of his claims
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the FDCPA, a decision we re-
view de novo. Newton v. Duke Energy Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1274–
75 (11th Cir. 2018). Even under the lenient standards afforded pro
se litigants, Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008),
Taveras failed to properly raise his objections below and on appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
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25-10694 Opinion of the Court 3
Under Eleventh Circuit Local Rule 3-1, a party who “fail[ed]
to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations con-
tained in a report and recommendation” may not challenge those
recommendations on appeal “if the party was informed of the time
period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to
object.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. But there’s one escape hatch—if it’s “nec-
essary in the interests of justice,” the appellate court “may review
[the objections] on appeal for plain error.” Id.
If the appellant fails to properly challenge one of the
grounds for the district court’s judgment on appeal, “he is deemed
to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that
the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian
Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). An appellant abandons
a claim when, for example, he: (a) “makes only passing reference to
it,” (b) “raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting argu-
ments and authority,” (c) refers to it only in the “statement of the
case” or “summary of the argument,” (d) refers to the issue as mere
background to his main argument, or (e) raises it for the first time
in his reply brief. Id. at 681–83.
Here, the district court did not err in dismissing Taveras’s
second amended complaint. First, Taveras’s objections to the mag-
istrate judge’s report and recommendation were untimely, so he
waived the right to challenge the district court’s order based on the
unobjected-to grounds articulated therein. Second, he voluntarily
dismissed his appeal as to two parties and failed to substantively
address in his opening brief the district court’s grounds for
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10694
dismissing his claims against the remaining parties. These claims
are now abandoned on appeal. Therefore, because he has not
“conform[ed] to [our] procedural rules,” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d
1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002), there are no remaining grounds for ap-
peal.
II
We review the district court’s denial of leave to amend a
complaint for abuse of discretion, Newton, 895 F.3d at 1275, and re-
view “the underlying legal conclusion of whether a particular
amendment to the complaint would be futile” do novo, Harris v.
Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 (11th Cir. 1999).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that—except
for two circumstances where a party can amend its complaint as a
matter of course—“a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave” where jus-
tice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). We have held that “a dis-
trict court may properly deny leave to amend the complaint under
Rule 15(a) when such amendment would be futile.” Hall v. United
Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dis-
missing Taveras’s complaint without granting him leave to file a
third amended complaint. Taveras was given two opportunities to
cure the deficiencies in his initial complaint, and neither of his
amended complaints did so. Additionally, leave to amend would
prejudice the defendants because Taveras indicated that, if given
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25-10694 Opinion of the Court 5
leave to file a third amended complaint, he intended to include new
claims against the parties.
III
We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion
for abuse of discretion. Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks,
Inc., 528 F.3d 839, 842 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court abuses its
discretion when it “applies the wrong law, follows the wrong pro-
cedure, bases its decision on clearly erroneous facts, or commits a
clear error in judgment.” McNair v. Johnson, 143 F.4th 1301, 1307
(11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). “[T]o overturn the district
court’s denial of [a Rule 60(b) motion], it is not enough that a grant
of the motions might have been permissible or warranted; rather,
the decision to deny the motions must have been sufficiently un-
warranted as to amount to an abuse of discretion.” Griffin v.
Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984).
Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief or reopen his case
based on the following limited circumstances: (1) mistake or excus-
able neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresen-
tation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been discharged; or (6) “any other rea-
son that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A motion filed under
Rule 60(b) must be filed “within a reasonable time,” which, for sub-
sections (1), (2), and (3), is “no more than a year after the entry of
the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(c)(1).
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Rule 60(d) provides that the rule “does not limit a court’s
power to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(d)(3). “[A] movant who seeks relief under [Rule 60(d)(3)]
must establish ‘fraud on the court’ by clear and convincing evi-
dence.” Mills v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 102 F.4th 1235, 1239
(11th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). This is a “demanding” standard
whereby “[t]he movant must establish that the alleged fraud is
‘highly probable.’” Id. at 1240 (citation and quotation marks omit-
ted). Fraud on the court “embraces only that species of fraud that
officers of the court perpetrate against the judicial machinery and
that defiles the court itself.” Id. (citation modified). There is no
time limit for setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(d)(3). Id. at
1239.
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed.” Bing-
ham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation modi-
fied). But pro se litigants must still comply with our circuit’s pro-
cedural requirements. Loren, 309 F.3d at 1304. Federal courts often
look beyond the label a pro se party applies to his motion and in-
stead determine whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable under
a different statutory framework. See, e.g., Castro v. United States, 540
U.S. 375, 381–82 (2003).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny-
ing Taveras’s motion to set aside the judgment. First, the district
court did not misconstrue his Rule 60(d) motion as a Rule 59(e)
motion; Taveras moved to set aside the court’s judgment under
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25-10694 Opinion of the Court 7
Rule 60(b)(1), (2), (3), and (6), and the district court analyzed his
motion accordingly. Second, Taveras failed to establish how his
allegations of fraud and misrepresentation would impact the
court’s ultimate dismissal on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment
immunity, duplicative claims, and failure to state a claim for injunc-
tive relief. Therefore, Taveras failed to show that the district court
erred.
AFFIRMED.