explaining that Eleventh Circuit precedent has never required that, before making an arrest, an officer is required “to believe, or to rule out, a suspect’s innocent explanation”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that Eleventh Circuit precedent has never required that, before making an arrest, an officer is required “to believe, or to rule out, a suspect’s innocent explanation”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
USCA11 Case: 25-11869 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 02/19/2026 Page: 1 of 17
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-11869
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
GARRETT M. COOK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHEAL BROOKS,
Individually,
MARK DAINTY,
Individually,
DINA RUSSELL,
Individually ,
BRITT WILLIAMS,
LARRY WILLIAMS,
Individually, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
USCA11 Case: 25-11869 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 02/19/2026 Page: 2 of 17
2 Opinion of the Court 25-11869
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cv-02735-KKM-LSG
____________________
Before JORDAN, KIDD, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Garrett Cook, a former sheriff’s deputy, sued (1) the Sheriff
of Polk County, Florida, individually and in his official capacity,
and (2) six law enforcement officers, individually, who worked for
the Sheriff. Cook’s amended complaint asserted claims of false
arrest and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as
claims of false arrest under Florida law. The defendant officers
moved to dismiss Cook’s suit based on qualified immunity and
failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion to
dismiss the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Cook appealed. After careful
review, we affirm the district court’s order.
I. FACTS
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we accept the facts alleged
in Cook’s amended complaint as true and construe them in the
light most favorable to Cook. See Ounjian v. Globoforce, Inc., 89
F.4th 852, 856 (11th Cir. 2023). We recount what Cook’s amended
complaint alleged.
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25-11869 Opinion of the Court 3
A. The Traffic Stop
On December 21, 2020, three deputies with the Polk County
Sheriff’s Office conducted a traffic stop in Winter Haven, Florida.
Cook, at the time a sheriff’s deputy, assisted with the traffic stop.
Two other deputies were involved with the stop: Raczynski
and Lawson.
The traffic stop turned into a search of the suspect’s vehicle
after a K9 indicated the presence of narcotics. The vehicle search
uncovered a small bag of cannabis, a cell phone, and $723 cash.
After the suspect was arrested, Cook counted and verified the
amount of money and then handed it to Lawson. Cook had no
further contact with the money.
A few days later, on December 23, 2020, Raczynski
deposited thirteen pieces of evidence into a storage locker but did
not deposit or log the $723 cash. The traffic stop suspect was
arrested for possession with intent to sell. Charges against the
suspect were ultimately dismissed on March 22, 2021.
B. The Coverup
On March 15, 2021, Raczynski called a property and
evidence clerk and told her that, after he moved the evidence bag
from Lawson’s trunk, he could not find the $723 cash. Raczynski
told her “that the missing money was being handled by ‘floater
money.’” The clerk became suspicious after she could not find any
record of Raczynski submitting cash into evidence, and she
reported the conversation to her supervisor.
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-11869
The next day, Raczynski created a supplemental report that
listed the $723 cash. Without Cook’s permission, Raczynski used
Cook’s password to electronically notarize the
supplemental report.
C. The Investigation
On March 18, 2021, Detective Michael Brooks interviewed
Sergeant Anderson about the missing cash.1 Anderson relayed a
conversation he had with Raczynski. Per Anderson, Raczynski said
that he left all the evidence and the money at the scene of the traffic
stop with Lawson. Raczynski also stated that when he went to
retrieve the money from Lawson, the money was not there.
Raczynski also stated that he had planned to submit personal
money into evidence to replace the missing cash.
The story Raczynski told Sergeant Anderson was different
from what he told others in the sheriff’s office. Raczynski told
another detective that “he placed the money in a safe at the
Property and Evidence section because he had dropped it into
evidence without a label.”
On March 19, 2021, Detective Brooks interviewed
Raczynski. Raczynski admitted that he knew Cook’s password and
did not contact Cook before using Cook’s password to
electronically notarize his supplemental report. Raczynski also
told Detective Brooks that Lawson sent him $500 via CashApp to
1 Sergeant Anderson “took over for” Sergeant Taylor Plowden, the supervisor
who approved the supplemental report.
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25-11869 Opinion of the Court 5
replace the missing money, and he agreed to contribute the
remaining $223 himself.
The same day, Detective Brooks interviewed Lawson who
stated that he placed the cell phone, money, and small bag of
cannabis into an evidence bag. Lawson further stated that
Raczynski placed the evidence bag into Lawson’s car, and
Raczynski and Lawson then had an argument about who would
take custody of the bag.
Neither Lawson nor Raczynski made any allegation that
Cook ever had possession of the money after Cook counted it and
gave it to Lawson. Cook did not agree to assist in replacing the
money or otherwise plan to replace the missing currency.
Also on March 19, Detective Brooks and Sergeant Mark
Dainty interviewed Cook. Cook told the investigators that his sole
involvement with the money was counting it at the scene. Cook
stated that he did not notarize Raczynski’s supplemental report or
authorize Raczynski to use his credentials.
Cook told the investigators to go to the Sheriff’s IT
department “and look at his log in times, IP Address, location of
the log in, etc.” Cook said that the IT records would establish that
he did not notarize the supplemental report. Cook also advised
Brooks and Dainty to contact Cook’s supervisor who would
confirm that he was out of county at training on the day that the
supplemental report was submitted and, therefore, could not have
notarized the report.
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-11869
D. The Arrest
Detective Brooks discussed the evidence with several people
in his chain of command in the sheriff’s office: Sergeant Dainty,
Lieutenant Dina Russell, Major Britt Williams, and Chief Larry
Williams. This group collectively made the decision to arrest Cook
because of his apparent involvement in Lawson and Raczynski’s
scheme to cover up the missing money. They reached this decision
without looking into Cook’s computer records or talking to his
supervisor about his alibi.
On March 19, 2021, Brooks arrested Cook and charged him
with one count of conspiracy to commit tampering with or
fabricating evidence. 2 Because of his arrest, Cook spent one day in
jail. On May 14, 2021, the prosecutor’s office dropped the charges
against Cook. In his amended complaint, Cook made no
allegations about any legal process that took place between his
arrest and the dismissal of the charges.
On the day of his arrest, Cook resigned from his deputy
position with the Polk County’s Sheriff’s Office and, since then, has
lost out on other law enforcement job opportunities because of
his arrest.
2 Raczynski was arrested and charged with (1) conspiracy to commit
tampering or fabricating evidence, (2) forgery, and (3) uttering a forged
instrument. Lawson was charged with conspiracy to commit tampering or
fabricating evidence.
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25-11869 Opinion of the Court 7
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In his amended complaint, Cook sued (1) personnel in the
sheriff’s office Brooks, Dainty, Russell, Britt Williams, Larry
Williams, and Sergeant Taylor Plowden in their individual
capacities and (2) Sheriff Grady Judd in his individual and official
capacity. Cook raised claims of (1) false arrest and malicious
prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) false arrest under
state law.
All defendants moved to dismiss Cook’s amended complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that (1) the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because arguable
probable cause existed to arrest Cook; (2) Cook did not adequately
allege certain defendants’ personal involvement in his arrest; and
(3) Cook did not allege that he was arrested pursuant to a legal
process which defeated his malicious prosecution claims.
Cook filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
At the end of his response, in a conclusory fashion, Cook asked for
“a final chance to amend the pleadings.”
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss
as to Cook’s federal claims. For the false arrest claims, the district
court determined that the defendants had qualified immunity
because Cook’s arrest was supported by arguable probable cause.
As for the malicious prosecution claims, the district court
concluded that Cook failed to allege that his arrest was pursuant to
a legal process and did not identify any other seizure. Thus, Cook
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-11869
failed to allege one of the necessary elements of a malicious
prosecution claim.
The district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Cook’s state-law claims. As for Cook’s request for
a “final chance to amend” his complaint, the district court
determined that the request was procedurally improper and
denied it.
Cook moved for reconsideration, which the district court
denied, reasoning that Cook was merely attempting to relitigate his
prior arguments. Cook timely appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. False Arrest Claims
1. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open
legal questions.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 243 (2014) (quotation
marks omitted). If an official was acting within his discretionary
authority, the plaintiff must establish that the official is not entitled
to qualified immunity by showing the official’s conduct (1) violated
a constitutional right (2) that was clearly established at the time of
the official’s conduct. See Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 904
(11th Cir. 2011). For a constitutional right to be clearly established,
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question confronted by the official beyond debate.”
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25-11869 Opinion of the Court 9
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (quotation marks
omitted).
Ordinarily, “it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on
qualified immunity grounds when the complaint fails to allege the
violation of a clearly established constitutional right.” Corbitt v.
Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks
omitted). We review de novo the district court’s grant of qualified
immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Baker v. City of
Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2023).
Here, it is undisputed that the defendant officers were acting
within their discretionary authority when they arrested Cook. So
we evaluate whether Cook has shown that his arrest violated his
clearly established constitutional rights.
2. Fourth Amendment and Probable Clause
“Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Skop v. City of
Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks
omitted). “[A]n arrest is a seizure of the person.” Id.
“Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement
officials have facts and circumstances within their knowledge
sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had
committed or was committing a crime.” Id. (quoting United States
v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)).
“Probable cause does not require conclusive evidence and ‘is not a
high bar.’” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 899 (11th Cir. 2022)
(quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)).
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10 Opinion of the Court 25-11869
“An arresting officer is required to conduct a reasonable
investigation to establish probable cause.” Rankin v. Evans, 133
F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998). “Where it would appear to a
cautious man that further investigation is justified before
instituting a proceeding, liability may attach for failure to do so,
especially where the information is readily obtainable, or where
the accused points out the sources of the information.” Id. at
1435-36 (citation modified). That said, an officer “need not take
every conceivable step at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility
of convicting an innocent person.” Id. at 1436 (quoting Tillman v.
Coley, 886 F.2d 317, 321 (11th Cir. 1989)).
In the qualified immunity context, an officer need not have
actual probable cause; arguable probable cause is sufficient. See
Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137. “An officer has arguable probable cause if ‘a
reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time
of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the
arrests.’” Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 68). An officer may lack arguable
probable cause because: (1) “an existing precedent establishes that
there was no actual probable cause for an arrest on similar facts”;
(2) “the text of an applicable statute plainly precludes him from
making an arrest under that statute”; or (3) “the officer may have
been so lacking in evidence to support probable cause that the
arrest was obviously unconstitutional.” Id. at 1187.
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25-11869 Opinion of the Court 11
3. Criminal Conspiracy to Fabricate Evidence
Cook was arrested for conspiracy to tamper with or fabricate
evidence, in violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 918.13 and 777.04(3). The text
of the Florida statute criminalizing tampering with or fabricating
evidence states:
(1) It is unlawful for any person, knowing that a criminal
trial, proceeding, or investigation by a duly constituted
prosecuting authority, law enforcement agency, grand jury,
or legislative committee of this state is pending or is about
to be instituted, to:
(a) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record,
document, or other item with the purpose to impair its
verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation;
or
(b) Make, present, or use any record, document, or other
item, knowing it to be false.
Fla. Stat. § 918.13.
As to the conspiracy element, a person is guilty of criminal
conspiracy if he “agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with
another person or persons to commit any offense.” Fla. Stat.
§ 777.04(3). The Florida Supreme Court has explained the “crime
of conspiracy is defined as an agreement, express or implied,
between two or more people to commit an unlawful act.” Bradley
v. State , 787 So. 2d 732, 740 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam). “Conspiracy
can be proven by circumstantial evidence and thus a jury may infer
that an agreement existed to commit a crime from all the
surrounding and accompanying circumstances.” Id.
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12 Opinion of the Court 25-11869
“[U]nder Florida law, proof of an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy is not necessary to prove the crime of conspiracy.”
Williams v. State, 314 So. 3d 775, 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)
(citing Slaughter v. State, 301 So. 2d 762, 765 (Fla. 1974)). “A
defendant may be guilty of conspiracy even if []he played only a
minor role in the total operation.” Id. at 789 (quotation marks
omitted).
In this case, an officer would commit the crime of tampering
or fabricating evidence if he (1) knew that a criminal investigation
or prosecution was pending and (2) made a document or record
knowing it to be false. See Fla. Stat. § 918.13. An officer who
submitted a supplemental report falsely attesting that $723 cash
was entered into evidence, when the officer knew the cash was
evidence in ongoing criminal proceedings, would be guilty of
tampering or fabricating with evidence. See id.
Critically here, Cook could be guilty of the charged
conspiracy to tamper with or fabricate evidence if he entered an
agreement to make such a false record. See Fla. Stat. § 777.04(3);
Bradley, 787 So. 2d at 740. Specifically, Cook could be guilty so long
as he entered such an agreement, even if he personally took no
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and even if Raczynski
and Lawson were the main actors and Cook played only a “minor
role.” See Williams, 314 So. 3d at 788-89.
Importantly too, the officers did not need definitive proof
that Cook conspired to fabricate evidence before arresting him. See
Howard, 25 F.4th at 899. The officers only needed probable cause,
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25-11869 Opinion of the Court 13
or evidence “sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief” that Cook
had agreed to the scheme to submit a false report. See Skop, 485
F.3d at 1137. And to be protected from suit, the officers only
needed arguable probable cause, an even lower standard. See id.
4. Analysis
After review, we conclude the district court did not err in
concluding the defendant officers had arguable probable cause to
arrest Cook. As the district court pointed out (1) Cook conducted
the traffic stop and vehicle search with Raczynski and Lawson;
(2) Cook counted the money at the scene; (3) after suspicions arose
about the money, a supplemental report that appeared to be
notarized by Cook was submitted attesting to the entry of the cash
into evidence; and (4) the cash was never placed into evidence.
Based on these facts, the district court properly determined that a
reasonable officer could have believed that Cook entered an
agreement with Raczynski and Lawson to cover up the missing
cash by submitting a false report.
Cook argues that the district court erred by relying on the
fact that the supplemental report appeared to be notarized by him
because, taking his allegations in the amended complaint as true,
he did not notarize the report and did not allow Raczynski to use
his credentials to do so. Even without those allegations, Cook
asserts, the arresting officers at minimum had readily available
evidence that would show that Cook did not notarize the report.
Cook identifies two avenues of investigation that the
arresting officers chose not to pursue: (1) checking IT records to
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14 Opinion of the Court 25-11869
see that Cook was not logged on when the supplemental report
was submitted, and (2) talking to Cook’s supervisor who would say
that Cook was attending an out-of-county training when the
supplemental report was submitted. Cook notes that this potential
evidence was easily accessible to the arresting officers and pointed
to by Cook when the officers interviewed him.
But these avenues of investigation—the IT records and
Cook’s supervisor—would have shown only that Cook did not
personally notarize the supplemental report. Even with this
additional information, a reasonable officer could have believed
that (1) Cook gave Raczynski his password, (2) Cook authorized
Raczynski to use his password, and (3) Cook was working with
Raczynski and Lawson to cover up the missing money.
Granted, Raczynski and Cook told officers that Cook did not
permit Raczynski to use his password. Still, this does not
necessarily mean that the officers lacked arguable probable cause
and had to believe everything Raczynski said.
“Probable cause does not require officers to rule out a
suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts,” and an officer
“need not resolve conflicting evidence in a manner favorable to the
suspect.” Howard, 25 F.4th at 902 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61);
see also Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326, 1349 (11th Cir. 2023)
(explaining that Eleventh Circuit precedent has never required
that, before making an arrest, an officer is required “to believe, or
to rule out, a suspect’s innocent explanation”).
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25-11869 Opinion of the Court 15
In other words, an officer can infer that a suspect is lying, so
long as that inference is reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 60. And as Cook’s own
allegations show, Raczynski lied to officers several times. Because
Raczynski’s story kept changing, the officers had “reason to
discredit everything []he had told them.” Id. at 60.
In sum, considering all of the information and circumstances
known to the officers at the time of the arrest, an officer could have
reasonably believed that Cook conspired with the other
deputies—Lawson and Raczynski—to submit the false
supplemental report. See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137. This is true
notwithstanding Cook’s assertion of his innocence when
interviewed by the officers or any other evidence Cook points to in
his brief. See Howard, 25 F.4th at 902.
Even if the officers lacked actual probable cause, Cook fails
to show that they lacked arguable probable cause. Cook does not
point to “an existing precedent” with similar facts to his case. See
Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1187. Indeed, the district court’s order
thoroughly discussed this Court’s precedent and why our cases
finding no probable cause are distinguishable from Cook’s
situation. Cook does not argue that the officers were “plainly
preclude[d]” from arresting him under the text of the relevant
statutes, nor does he show that the arrest was so “obviously
unconstitutional” that the officers should not be entitled to
qualified immunity. See id.
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16 Opinion of the Court 25-11869
Because the defendant officers had at least arguable probable
cause to arrest Cook, the district court did not err by dismissing his
false arrest claims. See Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311. 3
B. Malicious Prosecution Claims
We first distinguish between false arrest and malicious
prosecution claims and the distinct seizures required for each
claim. Under the Fourth Amendment, a claim of false arrest
concerns a seizure without legal process, such as the warrantless
arrests here. Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir.
2020). In contrast, a claim of malicious prosecution requires a
seizure “pursuant to legal process.” Id. (quoting Black v. Wigington,
811 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2016)). Seizures pursuant to legal
process may include a warrant-based arrest and arrests following
arraignment, indictment, or a probable cause hearing. Id.
Here, the district court dismissed Cook’s malicious
prosecution claims because he failed to allege that his arrest was
pursuant to legal process and did not identify any additional
seizure. 4 Cook appears to concede that he did not allege seizure
pursuant to legal process. He argues that “discovery would reveal”
that he was subject to legal proceedings prior to his arrest. In a
footnote, Cook also notes that his request for leave to amend was
3 Because qualified immunity bars Cook’s false arrest claims, we do not
address the defendant’s alternative argument that Cook failed to adequately
alleged the involvement of the non-arresting defendants.
4 We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. Baker, 67 F.4th at 1276.
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25-11869 Opinion of the Court 17
denied, although he does not make any arguments about the denial
of leave to amend.
These arguments do not change that Cook’s amended
complaint failed to allege an essential element of a malicious
prosecution claim. See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s dismissal of the malicious
prosecution claims.
C. State Law Claims
Because the district court did not err in dismissing Cook’s
federal claims, it properly declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons we affirm the district court’s dismissal
of Cook’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the dismissal of his state-law false arrest claims.
AFFIRMED.