Spann

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

COLUMBIA DIVISION

KRISTY SPANN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-00005

) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTION, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM

After amending her Complaint once as a matter of course, plaintiff Kristy Spann sought

and was granted leave to file her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. No. 31). The SAC

asserts claims of employment discrimination on the basis of sex and retaliation under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §2000e et. seq. Now before the court is the Motion

to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 32) filed by defendant Tennessee Department

of Correction (“TDOC”) (Doc. No. 32). The motion is actually a motion for partial dismissal, as

TDOC concedes that Count II of the SAC states a colorable claim for retaliation. The defendant

argues only that the sex discrimination claim in Count I and the constructive discharge claims

asserted in both Count I and Count II should be dismissed as a matter of law under Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As set forth herein, the motion will be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI

Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Such a motion is

properly granted if the plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Marvaso v. Sanchez, 971 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2020). To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57

(2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556). The complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain

more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007). A complaint that “tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement’” will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in

the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Courtright v.

City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016).

II. FACTS

Plaintiff Spann became employed by TDOC as an Administrative Assistant 2 in May 2022.

(SAC ¶ 9.) She was allegedly “forced to resign” on February 2, 2024. (Id. ¶ 45.) Based on the

allegations in the SAC, the plaintiff consistently complained about the workload she was assigned

and other matters.

Shortly after being hired, the plaintiff was asked to take on additional duties and given the

title of Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) Compliance Manager, as TDOC was preparing for

an audit by the Tennessee Department of Justice. (Id. ¶ 11.) Around June 1, 2022, the plaintiff

complained to her supervisor, Brad Cotham, Associate Warden of Treatment, that she did not feel

properly trained for the Compliance Manager position. Cotham assured her that she would receive

the “training she needed.” (Id. ¶ 12.)

While she was Compliance Manager, male managers failed to report incidents or provide

documentation to Spann in a timely manner. Some stated they “did not want to work with a

female.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Spann complained about these issues to her supervisors, but nothing was done.

(Id.)

In September 2022, Cotham asked Spann to fill in Library Supervisor shifts three days a

week under a “bonus incentive program,” and Spann agreed to do so temporarily until the role of

Library Supervisor was filled by someone else. (Id. ¶ 15.) The library job was a “security position”

rather than an administrative position. (Id.)

Meanwhile, Spann was still fulfilling her Administrative Assistant 2 and Compliance

Manager duties, “working on the audit,” during her regularly scheduled shifts. (Id. ¶ 16.) She

“consistently” complained to Cotham and other supervisors that she could not perform both of

these jobs at the same time and still complete the audit duties well. (Id. ¶ 17.)

Spann reduced her library shifts to two per week by 2023. She did not want to work in the

library at all but kept doing so because Cotham asked her to. (Id. ¶ 18.) In June 2023, she

“mentioned” again to Cotham that she did not want to keep working in the library, but “nothing

changed,” and she kept working there two days per week. (Id. ¶ 19.)

During the summer of 2023, Spann complained (she does not say to whom) about anxiety

resulting from continuing to work library shifts while also working as Compliance Manager and

“back-up Compliance Manager” for another employee, in addition to “rising conflicts” between

her and the third-party auditor employed by the Tennessee Department of Justice, Deborah

Dawson. (Id. ¶ 20.)

After a full-time Library Supervisor was hired in September 2023, Spann reduced her

library shifts to one per week. (Id. ¶ 23.) However, Spann was responsible for different tasks than

those performed by the new Library Supervisor. (Id. ¶ 21.)

In October 2023, Spann met with Warden Chris Brun and asked for “guidance and

clarifications,” because she had never experienced a state audit. She also discussed her increased

anxiety and difficulties working with the auditor. TDOC “took no action.” (Id. ¶ 23.)

Spann’s difficulties in working with the auditor increased over the months from October

2023 through January 2024, further increasing Spann’s anxiety. The warden ignored Spann’s

request for “guidance or an accommodation for her anxiety.” (Id. ¶ 24.)

Spann’s job as Compliance Manager required her to do security rounds of various areas of

the prison. She was required to “do these reviews alone as the only female” on the audit team that

included six men. (Id. ¶ 26.) She was also required to complete “Inmate Retaliation reviews,”

which required her to be alone with prison inmates in a room with a closed door. She was subjected

to “inappropriate sexual harassment by inmates while doing reviews alone.” (Id. ¶ 28.) She

complained about this “harassment,” too, but “[n]o action was ever taken.” (Id. ¶ 29.)1 She does

not allege continued sexual harassment after she reported it, however.

She took a week of sick leave in December 2023. When she returned to work, she told

Cotham she would no longer cover any library shifts. (Id. ¶ 30.)

On December 21, 2023, the associate warden praised Spann’s work on the audit. (Id. ¶ 31.)

On January 8, 2024, Spann sought to meet with the warden again to remind him of the difficulties

she was facing with the audit, but he did not respond other than to tell her to put her other work

1 Spann does not identify the TDOC facility at which she worked. The court presumes,

based on her allegations, that it housed male inmates.

aside and focus on the audit.2 (Id. ¶ 32.) She requested additional guidance in a response email.

(Id. ¶ 33.) At some point she complained again to the associate warden of her increased anxiety

due to her Compliance Manager duties, and she met with both the warden and associate warden

on January 8, 2024 to complain some more about her conflicts with the auditor. (Id. ¶ 35.)

The same day, on January 9, 2024, Spann was “stripped” of her Compliance Manager and

Administrative Assistant 2 duties and told to report to the library. (Id. ¶ 36.) She was told she

would work as Library Supervisor until further notice, unless she wanted to use leave for the

remainder of the week. (Id.) She was told that the transfer was “due to her mental health condition.”

(Id. ¶ 38.) Her audit duties were given to Karen Coble, another Compliance Manager. (Id. ¶ 37.)

The library position was a “security” position, requiring direct contact with and monitoring

of inmates, rather than an administrative position like the one Spann had initially been hired to fill.

(Id. ¶ 39.)

On January 11, 2024, Spann submitted a formal complaint to TDOC alleging

discrimination and retaliation. (Id. ¶ 40.)

Spann reported for work at the library on January 22, 2024 (apparently having taken leave

instead of reporting to work at the library on January 9, 2024). However, at the end of that day,

she received an email directing her to “return to working on the audit” on January 24, 2024. (Id. ¶

41.) Spann went to a doctor’s appointment on January 23, 2024. Her doctor directed her to take

leave from January 23, 2024 to January 30, 2024, “due to the condition of her mental health.” (Id.

¶ 42.) She provided the doctor’s note upon her return to work. (Id.)

2 Confusingly, the SAC asserts that the audit was already completed and submitted by this

time. (See SAC ¶ 31.)

While the plaintiff was on leave, Stephanie Hendrix, who filled in during the plaintiff’s

absence, requested help; unlike Spann, Hendrix was provided help from “experienced counselors.”

(Id. ¶ 53.)

On January 31, 2024, when Spann returned to work on the audit, the warden issued her a

written warning for past performance and conduct issues, charging her with inefficiency,

incompetence, negligence, and insubordination. (Id. ¶ 44.) Spann refused to sign the warning and

objected to its being placed in her personnel file. (Id.)

Spann claims she was “forced to resign” on February 2, 2024, “[d]ue to the unknown status

of her job moving forward, illegal discrimination and retaliation, and other conditions she was

subjected to.” (Id. ¶ 45.) She characterizes her resignation as a constructive discharge. After

resigning, she applied for over a dozen open TDOC positions in various counties, but received no

job offers. (Id. ¶ 46.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sex Discrimination

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any employee on the basis of

sex, among other protected characteristics. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “[A]t the motion-to-dismiss

stage, a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim need only satisfy the plausibility

standard of Twombly.” Menge v. City of Highland Park, No. 21-10152, 2022 WL 54544, at *8

(E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2022) (citing Smith v. Wrigley Mfg. Co., 749 F. App’x 446, 448 (6th Cir.

2018)). And, as set forth above, a complaint has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other

words, to avoid dismissal of her Title VII claim, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts from

which an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex could be drawn, including that there is

some causal connection between her sex and any adverse employment action she suffered. Accord,

e.g., Smith, 749 F. App’x at 448 (“The district court found that Smith’s complaint did not plausibly

link her age and her termination because it merely recited the elements of an age discrimination

claim. We agree.”).

Based on the facts alleged above, the plaintiff claims that she faced “disparate treatment in

the workplace because of her gender,” insofar as she was “treated less favorably than her male

coworkers and treated differently by the Warden due to her gender.” (SAC ¶ 48.) She also claims

that she was “discriminated against, harassed, demoted, and constructively discharged due to her

gender.” (Id. ¶ 49.)

TDOC points out that the “sole factual references” to Spann’s gender in the SAC are when

she alleges that unnamed co-workers “did not want to work with a female,” that she was the only

woman on a seven-person audit team, and that she was subjected to sexual harassment by inmates.

(Doc. No. 32 at 3 (citing SAC ¶¶ 13, 26, 28.) TDOC argues that none of these allegations suggests

that Spann was treated differently or less favorably than her male colleagues; that harassment by

prison inmates is an expected job hazard for individuals employed at prisons (see Doc. No. 32 at

4 (citing Slayton v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 206 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2000))); and that, in

any event, she does not allege continued harassment by inmates after she reported it.

In her Response to the Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiff asserts that the SAC “sets forth

specific facts demonstrating that Spann was subjected to ongoing disparate treatment and

harassment after raising concerns—treatment that her male counterparts did not endure.” (Doc.

No. 33 at 5.) As an example, she claims that she was required to do inmate reviews alone, while

“male colleagues . . . were not placed in similarly vulnerable positions.” (Id. at 6.) But she does

not actually make such an allegation in the SAC. She complains that the defendant could have

assigned a male employee to accompany her or reassign the task, but she does not make that

allegation in the SAC either. She points to her complaints of anxiety and requests for

accommodations as being followed by a reassignment to a lower-status position, but these

allegations are irrelevant to her sex discrimination claim, and she has expressly abandoned any

disability-related claims.

The court finds that the SAC, whose well pleaded allegations are accepted as true and

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, does not contain “factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that TDOC is liable for

discriminating against Spann based on sex. Although the plaintiff alleges that she is female, she

does not allege facts from which the court may reasonably draw the inference that similarly

situated male employees were treated better than she was or that there is a causal connection

between her gender and any adverse employment action.3

Finally, Spann also asserts that she expects “[d]iscovery will further show” that male

employees were not burdened by being called upon to “simultaneously perform multiple high-

responsibility roles.” (Id.) However, a plaintiff is not entitled to discovery to unearth facts that

might support her claims. See Hall v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 626 F. App’x 114, 116 (6th Cir. 2015)

(recognizing as a “well settled principle” that “a plaintiff who fails to state a claim is not entitled

to further discovery” (citing Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2007)).

The SAC tenders nothing more than the “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement’” that Twombly and Iqbal prohibit. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

3 The plaintiff alleges facts suggesting that other female employees were treated better than

she was (see, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 37 (the plaintiff’s audit duties were given to Karen Cable), 43 (Stephanie

Hendrix received help when she requested it, but the plaintiff did not)), but these allegations do

not support the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.

550 U.S. at 557). The plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim will be dismissed for failure to state a

claim.

B. Constructive Discharge

For both retaliation and discrimination claims under Title VII, “one essential element that

the plaintiff must prove is that he suffered an adverse employment action.” Gorbe v. City of

Lathrup Vill., No. 21-1532, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 11685, at *12 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2022) (citing

Mitchell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 389 F.3d 177, 181 (6th Cir. 2004)). A voluntary resignation “is not

an adverse employment action unless the plaintiff can prove that he was constructively

discharged.” Id. (citing Nance v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 527 F.3d 549, 554–55 (6th Cir.

2008).

In this case, the plaintiff claims that she was “discriminated against, harassed,4 demoted,

and constructively discharged due to her gender.” (SAC ¶ 49.) She also claims that she was

retaliated against when TDOC “constructively discharge[ed] her from her employment.” (Id. ¶

55.)5 TDOC moves for dismissal of both the discrimination and retaliation claims insofar as they

are premised upon constructive discharge as the alleged adverse employment action.

Constructive discharge occurs when an employer creates “an objectively intolerable work

environment to deliberately force [an] employee to resign.” Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc.,

951 F.3d 805, 814 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “[I]ntolerability is a demanding standard.”

4 In her Reply to the defendant’s Response in Opposition to the plaintiff’s Motion for Leave

to File [Second] Amended Complaint, Spann specifically disavowed any intention to bring a stand-

alone hostile work environment claim. (Doc. No. 28 at 3.) Her “harassment” allegation is

apparently intended only to “add[] support [for] the broader pattern of discriminatory treatment

that led to Spann’s constructive discharge.” (Id.)

5 The plaintiff also asserts that TDOC retaliated against her by “transferring/demoting [her]

to a different position.” (SAC ¶ 55.) While denying liability, TDOC acknowledges that the SAC

plausibly states a claim for retaliation, based on Spann’s allegations that she was transferred shortly

after she engaged in protected conduct.

Id. The conditions must be “so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s

shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Id. (citation omitted). “[C]riticism and negative

feedback do not suffice.” Id. (citations omitted).

The Sixth Circuit has identified a non-cumulative list of factors that may be considered,

alone or in combination, when deciding whether an employee’s working conditions were

“objectively intolerable,” including

(1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4)

reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a

younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer

calculated to encourage the employee’s resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement

or continued employment on terms less favorable than the employee's former status.

Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d

776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also Tchankpa, 951 F.3d at 814 (“[W]e have said that demotion,

reduction in salary, badgering, harassment, humiliation, and sexual assault suggest an objectively

intolerable workplace.”). The court has also observed that “a demotion in itself does not constitute

a constructive discharge,” but it may be “significant when coupled with the other factors.” Logan,

259 F.3d at 571; see also Russell v. CSK Auto Corp., 739 F. App’x 785, 795 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding

no constructive discharge, even where the employee showed that he had suffered “a reduction in

salary and continued employment on terms less favorable than the employee’s former status”).

Harassment alone is also not sufficient. In Brister v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., the

plaintiff alleged harassing conduct by her supervisor, including being targeted for humiliation and

criticism during meetings, being called stupid and other degrading terms during daily coaching

sessions, being told that “everyone in the office hated her and did not want her there,” and being

told that she “needed to seek psychiatric help.” Brister, 705 F. App’x 356, 360 (6th Cir. 2017).

The Sixth Circuit held that this conduct by the supervisor, while “shameful and highly

inappropriate for a workplace,” “by itself, [was] insufficient to establish a claim of constructive

discharge,” particularly because it only lasted three to four months. Id.

Similarly, in Tchankpa, the Sixth Circuit, noting that constructive discharge requires proof

that employment conditions are “indeed hellish, or close to it,” found that the plaintiff’s proof that

his employer had “(1) forc[ed] him to lift heavy laptops despite his shoulder injury; (2) den[ied]

his work-from-home request; (3) threaten[ed] to fire him; (4) g[ave] other employees preferential

treatment; and (5) g[ave] him unwarranted negative feedback” did not show that his workplace

was “objectively intolerable.” Tchankpa, 951 F.3d at 815.

In this case, Spann asserts that she was constructively discharged “[d]ue to the unknown

status of her job moving forward, illegal discrimination and retaliation, and other conditions she

was subjected to.” (SAC ¶ 45.) Regarding the “unknown status of her job,” the plaintiff seems to

be alleging that it was unclear whether she was going to continue to work on the audit or to continue

working in the library. Regardless, the SAC does not allege that conditions in either position were

objectively intolerable; nor, as set forth above, does the SAC allege facts showing that the plaintiff

suffered sex discrimination. Even if the plaintiff perceived the library position as a demotion, a

demotion, does not give rise to a constructive discharge claim, even when considered in

conjunction with the disciplinary write up and the plaintiff’s claim that other (female) employees

received preferential treatment.

The court finds, in short, that the allegations in the SAC, accepted as true for purposes of

the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, do not allege truly “hellish” conditions so “objectively

intolerable” that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. Tchankpa v, 951 F.3d

12

at 814. The plaintiff's Title VII claims premised upon constructive discharge to provide the

necessary adverse employment action, therefore, will be dismissed.°

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 32), which

is actually a motion for partial dismissal, will be granted. The plaintiff's sex discrimination claim

will be dismissed in its entirety. Her retaliation claim premised on constructive discharge will be

dismissed. Her retaliation claim premised on the plaintiffs transfer/demotion remains to be

resolved.

An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

Meleg—

United States District Judge

6 To be clear, the plaintiff fails to state a claim for discrimination based on sex under Title

VII, irrespective of which adverse employment action she seeks to attribute to discrimination.