Bolivar

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

RADHA BOLIVAR, et al., )

) Case No. 1:24-cv-155

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Travis R. McDonough

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Michael J. Dumitru

HMD Trucking, Inc., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants HMD Trucking, Inc. and Antonio Wortham’s motion for

partial summary judgment (Doc. 74). For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT

Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment (id.).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This action arises from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on March 1, 2023. On that

day, both Defendant Antonio Wortham (“Wortham”) and Plaintiff Radha Bolivar (“Bolivar”)

were driving westbound on Interstate 24. (Doc. 75, at 2; Doc. 87, at 6.) Plaintiff Bolivar had

one passenger in his vehicle, Plaintiff Angelica Goatache. (Doc. 75, at 2.) Wortham moved to

the left lane to pass Bolivar. (Id.) Later, Wortham attempted to move back to the right lane, but

collided with Bolivar. (Doc. 75, at 2; Doc. 87, at 6.) Bolivar sought medical care after the

accident. (Doc. 75, at 3; Doc. 87, at 6.)

Wortham began working for HMD Trucking Inc. (“HMD”) in October 2021. (Doc. 74-5,

at 2.) Before hiring Wortham, HMD conducted background checks on him and communicated

with his previous employers. (Doc. 102-1, at 45–48, 60–68.) Wortham had one accident in

2020, prior to working at HMD, where “a motor vehicle hit [Wortham’s] trailer tire, and [the

other driver] took 100 percent fault in the accident.” (Doc. 74-1, at 8.) The company Wortham

worked for during the 2020 accident continued to employ him after this accident and noted to

HMD that he passed all DOT-regulated testing for drugs and alcohol. (Doc. 102-1, at 67.)

While employed at HMD, Wortham had four incidents that caused damage to his vehicle.

Three of these incidents did not involve any other vehicle but caused damage to Wortham’s

vehicle. (Doc. 74-5, at 5–8; Doc. 102-7, at 1.) The first incident occurred when Wortham was

backing in to a dock at a low speed and dented his air deflector. (Doc. 74-5, at 5; Doc. 102-7, at

1.) His second incident happened when he was parking his vehicle and scratched his rim. (Doc.

74-5, at 6; Doc. 102-7, at 1.) The third incident occurred when another vehicle struck

Wortham’s hood, and there was no fault attributed to Wortham. (Doc. 74-5, at 7; Doc. 102-7, at

1.) The fourth incident caused damage to the plastic cover on the driver’s side step—air

fairing—and resulted from road debris. (Doc. 74-5, at 8; Doc. 102-7, at 1.) Wortham did not

report these incidents immediately to HMD. (Doc. 74-1, at 28–29; Doc. 74-4, at 22.) After these

four incidents, in August 2022, Wortham completed an in-person safety training at HMD’s

orientation room. (Doc. 102-7, at 1; Doc. 74-6, at 7–10; Doc. 90-4, at 74–81.) In August 2023,

Wortham completed an online “space management” training through Tenstreet. (Doc. 102-5, at

6; Doc. 74-6, at 7–10; Doc. 90-4, at 74–81).

Vehicles operated under HMD contain a recording device that have four lenses; one lens

faces the driver’s sleeping area, and another lens faces the driver when in the driving position.

(Doc. 90-4, at 20–21.) To further monitor its drivers, HMD vehicles have a real-time monitoring

system that analyzes drivers’ safety, and HMD is provided with a monthly report with drivers’

safety metrics. (See Doc. 74-5, at 3–4.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed suit on February 26, 2024, in the Circuit Court for Marion County,

Tennessee. (Doc. 1-2, at 3.) Defendants timely removed the case to this Court. (See Doc. 1.) In

their complaint, Plaintiffs assert claims against HMD for direct negligence—entrustment, hiring,

supervision, retention, and training. (Doc. 1-2, at 5–8.) Plaintiffs also assert negligence claims

against Wortham. (Id. at 8–10.) Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against both HMD and

Wortham. (Id. at 10.) On December 9, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for partial summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims against both Defendants and Plaintiffs’ direct

negligence claims against HMD. (Doc. 74.) Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment

is ripe for the Court’s review.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc.,

253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001).

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Leary v. Daeschner, 349

F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may meet this burden either by affirmatively

producing evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact or by pointing out

the absence of support in the record for the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

Once the movant has discharged this burden, the nonmoving party can no longer rest upon the

allegations in the pleadings; rather, it must point to specific facts supported by evidence in the

record demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285

F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).

At summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence; its role is limited to

determining whether the record contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably

find for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). A mere

scintilla of evidence is not enough; the Court must determine whether a fair-minded jury could

return a verdict in favor of the non-movant based on the record. Id. at 251–52; Lansing Dairy,

Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). If not, the Court must grant summary

judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Direct Negligence Claims Against HMD

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ “direct negligence claims against HMD, claiming that

HMD negligently hired, trained, retained, entrusted, and supervised Mr. Wortham” fail as a

matter of law because “Plaintiffs cannot establish any of the necessary requirements for the

direct claims of negligence.” (Doc. 75, at 15–16.) Plaintiffs contend that there are questions of

material fact as to whether HMD negligently hired, trained, retained, supervised, and entrusted

Wortham. (See Doc. 87, at 19–29.)

As an initial matter, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party

asserting a fact to “support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the

record . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Brown v. FCA US LLC, No. 25-1405, 2025 WL 3657226,

at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025) (“the non-moving party, must ‘cite specific portions of the record’

to show that a material dispute of fact exists.” (citing U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc.,

130 F.3d 1185, 1191 (6th Cir. 1997)). In opposing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

Plaintiffs fail to cite evidence that establishes the facts they are asserting or generally cite to

exhibits that do not correspond to the facts they are asserting. For example, Plaintiffs state, “Yet

HMD’s corporate representative testified: ‘I cannot identify any investigation into the Publix

crash.’” (Doc. 87, at 20.) Yet, Plaintiffs provide no citation to admissible evidence to support

this fact or even provide the name of the person who allegedly made such a statement. (See id.)

Plaintiffs also claim that Wortham had a violation for improper backing in July 2019 and cites

“Alabama MVR (Exhibit E).” (Id. at 21.) However, the document listed as “Exhibit E” does not

show any such violation, and even states, in what appears to be the section where such violations

would be noted, that there is “No Incident History to Report”. (Doc. 102-2, at 1.) Conclusory

representations unsupported by evidence fail to demonstrate that disputes of material fact remain.

1. Negligent Entrustment

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ negligent-entrustment claim fails because there is no

evidence suggesting that Wortham was an incompetent driver or that HMD had knowledge of

any incompetence. (Doc. 75, at 19–21.) Plaintiffs respond that Wortham’s crash prior to his

hiring at HMD and his failures to report four incidents while employed at HMD made him unfit

to operate HMD’s vehicles.1 (Doc. 87, at 27.)

In Tennessee, negligent-entrustment claims consist of four elements: “(1) an entrustment

of a chattel, (2) to a person incompetent to use it, (3) with knowledge that the person is

1 Plaintiffs also argue that HMD’s federal safety scores should have made it aware of that there

were elevated risks for its drivers generally, which put HMD on notice not to entrust its drivers

with vehicles. (See Doc. 87, at 27.) However, negligent-entrustment claims are based on the

entrustor’s knowledge about the entrustee. Harper v. Churn, 83 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2001). An entrustor’s federal safety scores are not the type of information that can be

attributed to an individual entrustee’s competency for a negligent-entrustment claim.

incompetent, and (4) that is the proximate cause of injury or damage to another.” Harper v.

Churn, 83 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Negligent-entrustment is based on the

entrustor’s “direct negligence in entrusting the chattel to an incompetent user[,]” and “is

committed at the moment when control of a chattel is relinquished by an entrustor to an

incompetent user.” West v. E. Tenn. Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W.3d 545, 555 (Tenn. 2005) (citing

Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d 557, 564 (Tenn. 2004)); Rimer v. City of Collegedale, Tenn., 835

S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (“it must be affirmatively shown that the entruster had at

that time knowledge of such facts and circumstances relating to the incompetency of the

entrustee to operate the motor vehicle as would charge the entruster with knowledge of such

incompetency”). Tennessee courts will find negligent-entrustment when an entrustor had

knowledge that an entrustee was “addicted to habits of intoxication” and still entrusted the

chattel to the entrustee. V.L. Nicholson Const. Co. v. Lane, 150 S.W.2d 1069, 1070 (Tenn.

1941). However, if there is no evidence that shows the entrustor had knowledge that the driver

was incompetent, the entrustor cannot be held liable for negligent-entrustment. See Hamrick v.

Spring City Motor Co., 708 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tenn. 1986); Rimer, 835 S.W. 2d at 25.

In this case, there is no evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that HMD knew Worthman was incompetent. Wortham’s 2020 accident was an

accident in which “a motor vehicle hit [Wortham’s] trailer tire, and [the other driver] took 100

percent fault in the accident.” (Doc. 74-1, at 8.) Furthermore, Wortham’s employer at the time

of the 2020 accident noted that Wortham passed all DOT-regulated testing for drugs and alcohol.

(Doc. 102-1, at 67.) One accident for which another driver was at fault is insufficient to create a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether an entrustee is incompetent.

Plaintiffs also argue that Wortham’s failure to report four incidents proves he was

“unfit[]”. (Doc. 87, at 27.) Three of these incidents were minor incidents: (1) denting an air

reflector while backing up; (2) scratching a rim while parking; and (3) damaging a plastic cover

to a step by hitting road debris. (Doc. 74-5, at 5–8; Doc. 102-7, at 1.) The fourth incident

occurred when another vehicle struck Wortham’s hood, and there was no fault attributed to

Wortham. (Doc. 74-5, at 7; Doc. 102-7, at 1.) These incidents are not the type on which a

reasonable jury could base a finding of incompetency.

Plaintiffs’ next argument, that Wortham’s failure to immediately report these incidents

makes him dishonest and, thus, incompetent, is also unavailing. Even viewing in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiffs, dishonesty about minor incidents does not make someone incompetent

as a driver. Plaintiffs fail to cite—and the Court cannot find—any precedent suggesting

dishonesty about minor vehicle incidents makes a driver incompetent. Accordingly, there is

insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Wortham was an

incompetent driver, and thus, insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude

that HMD knew he was an incompetent driver. As a result, the Court will grant HMD’s motion

for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent-entrustment.

2. Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Retention, or Training

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not established “any of the necessary requirements

for the direct claims of negligence.” (Doc. 75, at 16.) Plaintiffs contend that HMD was

negligent because: (1) it did not conduct an adequate background check on Wortham; (2) it

retained Wortham after he had five incidents; (3) it allegedly falsified training records; and (4) it

did not adequately supervise Wortham. (See Doc. 87, at 20–26.)

In Tennessee, a negligence claim requires proof of the following elements: “(1) a duty of

care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant falling below the

standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact;

and (5) proximate or legal cause.” Hale v. Ostrow, 166 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tenn. 2005). Claims

for negligent training, hiring, supervision, or retention of an employee requires a plaintiff to

establish, “in addition to the elements of a negligence claim, that the employer had knowledge of

the employee’s unfitness for the job.” See Binns v. Trader Joe’s East, Inc., 690 S.W.3d 241, 254

(Tenn. 2024) (citation modified).

As discussed above in Part II.A.I, there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable

jury could conclude that Wortham was an incompetent driver, and thus, Wortham was fit for the

job. As a result, there is also insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude

that HMD knew Wortham was unfit for the job. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring,

supervision, retention, and training claims also fail.

Additionally, Plaintiffs’ argument that HMD negligently hired Wortham because it did

not conduct an adequate background check is contradicted by the evidence, which shows that

HMD ran several background checks on Wortham and communicated with Wortham’s previous

employers to get information about Wortham’s work history. (Doc. 102-1, at 45–48, 60–68.)

There was nothing in the background checks that would give an employer pause to hire

Wortham. (See id.) Also, the evidence does not support Plaintiffs’ argument that HMD should

have terminated or enhanced its monitoring of Wortham after his four incidents and discovery

that he did not promptly report those incidents, and thus, Plaintiffs negligent retention and

supervision claims fail. Plaintiffs’ assertions that “HMD negligently trained Wortham by

falsifying training records”2 because there are two different dates cited for trainings (Doc. 87, at

2 Plaintiffs cite “Exhibit G” for the HMD training records from August 2022 training, but

“Exhibit G” appears to be an internal system for HMD to keep track of communications with

Wortham and does not note any trainings completed by Wortham. (See Doc. 102-4). Although

23) is also unsupported by the evidence. Documents produced by HMD show that Wortham

attended two separate trainings—not one—an in-person training and an online training through

Tenstreet. (Doc. 74-4, at 11; Doc. 74-5, at 9; Doc. 74-6, at 7–10; Doc. 90-4, at 74–81). There is

no evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that HMD was negligent

in its hiring, supervision, retention, or training of Wortham. Accordingly, the Court will grant

HMD’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ direct negligence claims, and those claims

against HMD will be dismissed.

B. Punitive Damages

In Tennessee, punitive damages are appropriate only if the claimant can show, by clear

and convincing evidence, that the opposing party engaged in “intentional, fraudulent, malicious,

or reckless conduct.” Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992). Punitive

damages are only to be awarded “in the most egregious of cases.” Id. “A person acts recklessly

when the person is aware of, but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk of

such a nature that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an

ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances.” Id.

1. Punitive Damages Against Wortham

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages from Wortham because

his action of “not see[ing] Plaintiffs’ vehicle prior to the lane change” was a “mistake or ordinary

negligence,” which they argue does not satisfy the requirements for a punitive damages award.

(Doc. 75, at 25.) Plaintiffs argue that Wortham “ha[s] a pattern of dishonesty and concealment . .

. ,” and “a driver who repeatedly hides collisions and misrepresents fault is a driver who knows

his conduct creates risks . . . .” (Doc. 87, at 11–12.)

not entirely clear, Plaintiff may have meant to cite Exhibit J, which notes the four incidents and

the damage incurred to Wortham’s truck. (See Doc. 102-7.)

The Sixth Circuit has observed that, in cases “arising out of an automobile-truck accident

in Tennessee[,] . . . poor judgment and lack of ordinary care are not the stuff of which punitive

damages awards are made[.]” Leap v. Malone, 106 F.3d 401, 1996 WL 742306, at *2 (6th Cir.

1996) (table) (citation modified); Womack v. Gettelfinger, 808 F.2d 446, 453–54 (6th Cir. 1986)

(holding that punitive damages could not be sustained against a truck driver who made a wide-

turn onto a highway in heavy fog); see also Anderson v. U.S.A. Truck, Inc., No.

W200601967COAR3CV, 2008 WL 4426810, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2008) (listing

automobile crash cases where Tennessee state courts have found that punitive damages did or did

not apply and noting that a case where the driver “was negligent in his failure to see the

plaintiff’s vehicle just before impact” did not justify punitive damages).

Here, it is undisputed that Wortham caused the accident because he changed lanes

without seeing Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Doc. 75, at 25; Doc. 87, at 12; Doc. 74-1, at 16.) Even if

viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Wortham’s failure to report prior accidents to

his employer is insufficient to show that he engaged in “intentional, fraudulent, malicious, or

reckless conduct” in connection with the accident in this matter. See Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at

901. Also, the four incidents relied on by Plaintiffs involved three incidents where Wortham’s

vehicle was the only vehicle involved and one incident where “another driver back[ed] into

[Wortham’s] vehicle.” (Doc. 87, at 12.) These incidents are not ones that create a substantial or

unjustifiable risk—the requirement for punitive damages. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ prayer for

punitive damages against Wortham is denied.

2. Punitive Damages Against HMD

Plaintiffs argue that HMD’s conscious disregard of Wortham’s unfitness for the job and

its policy that allowed drivers to cover the inward cameras in the vehicles makes HMD liable for

punitive damages. (Doc. 87, at 13–18.) As discussed earlier, HMD was not reckless in hiring,

retaining, supervising, or training Wortham (see supra Part II.A.2), and Wortham was competent

for the job (see supra Part II.A.1).

Plaintiffs also argue that HMD’s policy of allowing drivers to cover their inward facing

camera shows that HMD “conscious[ly] disregarded” public safety. (Doc. 87, at 13.) For a

claim that a party was reckless, punitive damages are only awarded “in the most egregious of

cases” and when a conscious disregard “constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care

that an ordinary person would exercise.” Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 901. Here, the evidence does

not establish that HMD’s policy of allowing drivers to cover their inward cameras, the lens that

would face a driver’s sleeping area, is a “gross deviation,” especially considering that the

recording device had four lenses including a side lens that could capture a driver. (Doc. 90-4, at

20–21.) HMD also utilized a system with real-time monitoring that analyzed drivers’ safety and

provided HMD metrics monthly for HMD to evaluate drivers’ safety performance. (Doc. 74-5,

at 3–4.) There is insufficient evidence that HMD’s policy of placing recording devices in its

vehicles that record drivers’ activities but allows drivers to cover the one lens that captures their

sleeping area is reckless conduct to warrant punitive damages. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ prayer for

punitive damages against HMD is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment (Doc.

74) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ direct negligence claims against HMD—negligent entrustment,

hiring, supervision, retention, and training—are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs’

prayer for punitive damages against both Wortham and HMD is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Travis R. McDonough

TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE