Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MICHAEL BROWN, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-1454

)

PETERS, et al., )

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Illinois River Correctional Center

(“Illinois River”), filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his

constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint, and through such

process, identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations

as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649

(7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels are insufficient, however. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721

F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff files suit against Dietary Managers Peters and Willis, Dietary Supervisors

Wilcoxen, Harmon, Knowles, Reneau, and Smithers, Chaplain Thousand, Grievance Officer

Lynette Boughan, and Counselor Hubbard.

Plaintiff alleges he is a Hebrew Israelite and is required to abstain from consuming yeast

or leaven during Passover and to remove all food items containing yeast or leaven from his

dwelling.

Plaintiff states he submitted a request to an unidentified chaplain at Illinois River to

participate in Passover in April 2025 and received approval to receive the Passover meals.

Plaintiff alleges he went to Dietary for the Passover meals on April 12-19, 2025. During

each meal, Plaintiff alleges the Hebrew Israelite and Jewish inmates were separated into two

groups. Plaintiff claims the Jewish inmates received commercially prepared Passover meals, but

he and the other Hebrew Israelite inmates received meals containing yeast or leaven. For instance,

on April 12, 2025, Plaintiff was served two breaded chicken patties and saltine crackers. On April

13, 2025, Plaintiff was served cornbread and saltine crackers. Plaintiff alleges he informed

unidentified Dietary Supervisors that his meals contained yeast or leaven.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Counselor Hubbard and Grievance Officer Boughan did not

provide proper responses to the grievances he filed about the Passover meals.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Dietary Managers Peters and Willis and Dietary Supervisors

Wilcoxen, Harmon, Knowles, Reneau, and Smithers violated his First Amendment rights and the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) by serving meals containing

yeast or leaven during Passover. Plaintiff claims Defendant Chaplain Thousand failed to ensure

Dietary provided meals that complied with the dietary requirements for Passover.

ANALYSIS

Individuals in custody have a First Amendment right to reasonable opportunities to practice

their religion, subject to the legitimate penological concerns of the prison. Maddox v. Love, 655

F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2011); Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009). The Free Exercise

Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from imposing a “substantial burden” on

a “central religious belief or practice.” Isby-Israel v. Lemmon, No. 13-172, 2016 WL 3072177, at

*4 (S.D. Ind. June 1, 2016) (internal quotation omitted). “[A] substantial burden on the free

exercise of religion . . . is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously

motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central tenet of a

person’s religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.” Id.

(quoting Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2008)). Denying an inmate access to a

diet that is required by his religion places a substantial burden on the inmate’s free exercise rights.

Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 2016); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 879 (7th

Cir. 2009) (“[A] prisoner’s religious dietary practice is substantially burdened when the prison

forces him to choose between his religious practice and adequate nutrition.”).

Under RLUIPA, officials may not substantially burden an individual’s religious exercise

unless there is a compelling government interest at stake. RLUIPA provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition

of the burden on that person--

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Sovereign immunity shields state officials from monetary damages in

their official capacity. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011). RLUIPA allows for

declaratory and injunctive relief, but not compensatory damages, and may be asserted against

defendants in their official, but not individual capacities. Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451

(7th Cir. 2012).

Although Plaintiff alleges violations of RLUIPA and his constitutional rights, Plaintiff did

not include specific allegations to demonstrate that Chaplain Thousand, Dietary Managers Peters

and Willis, and Dietary Supervisors Wilcoxen, Harmon, Knowles, Reneau, and Smithers were

personally involved in any constitutional deprivation. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th

Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon

fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a

constitutional deprivation.”). There is no respondeat superior under § 1983. In other words,

Defendants cannot be liable based only on their supervisory roles as a Chaplain, Dietary Manager,

or Dietary Supervisor. See Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff must

allege that the official personally participated in the deprivation or was deliberately reckless as to

the misconduct of subordinates or was aware and condoned, acquiesced, or turned a blind eye to

it. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). Defendants Thousand, Peters,

Willis, Wilcoxen, Harmon, Knowles, Reneau, and Smithers are dismissed without prejudice for

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

While Plaintiff is critical of how his grievances were handled, this is not enough to plead

personal liability under § 1983 against Defendants Grievance Officer Boughan and Counselor

Hubbard. “[T]he alleged mishandling of [Plaintiff’s] grievances by persons who otherwise did not

cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950,

953 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Defendants Boughan and Hubbard are dismissed without

prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to

state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

The Court will allow Plaintiff a final opportunity to file an Amended Complaint within 30

days of this Order. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint will replace Plaintiff's Complaint in its

entirety. The Amended Complaint must contain all allegations against all Defendants.

Piecemeal amendments are not accepted. If Plaintiff fails to file a timely Amended

Complaint, or if the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for relief, his case will be

dismissed with prejudice.

2) The Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff a blank Section 1983 complaint form.

ENTERED: 2/18/2026

s/ Michael M. Mihm

Michael M. Mihm

United States District Judge