Luedtke

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

JOHN LUEDTKE PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 5:24-CV-5188

NORTHWEST ARKANSAS

COMMUNITY COLLEGE DEFENDANT

ORDER

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 25) of the

Honorable Christy Comstock, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of

Arkansas, submitted on January 30, 2026, concerning the Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 15) filed by Defendant Northwest Arkansas Community College (“NWACC”).

Plaintiff John Luedtke, a sixty-six-year-old man, sued his former employer NWACC for

retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), sex discrimination under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and age discrimination

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The Magistrate Judge

recommends dismissing the case on summary judgment.

On February 11, 2026, Mr. Luedtke filed Objections to the R&R (Doc. 26), which

triggered this Court’s de novo review of the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Mr.

Luedtke only objects to the dismissal of his Title VII and ADEA claims. For purposes of

summary judgment, the R&R assumed that Mr. Luedtke satisfied his prima facie burden

as to both claims but determined that NWACC had set forth legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for firing Mr. Luedtke, and he, in turn, had failed to point to evidence that such

reasons were pretextual and the real reason for firing him was his age, his sex, or both.

Mr. Luedtke’s Objections focus on defending or explaining his on-the-job behavior.

He contends he did nothing to warrant termination and characterizes the decisionmakers

at NWACC as overly sensitive or predisposed to find fault—which is unfair, given his long

tenure at NWACC. However, courts do not “sit as super-personnel departments reviewing

the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by employers,” Guimaraes v.

SuperValu, Inc., 674 F.3d 962, 977 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The question is not

whether Mr. Luedtke deserved to be fired but whether NWACC’s reasons for terminating

him “had no basis in fact.” Huber v. Westar Foods, Inc., 139 F.4th 615, 628 (8th Cir. 2025)

(quoting Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1047 (8th Cir. 2011)).

Mr. Luedtke fails to explain why NWACC’s termination decision had no basis in

fact. For example, one reason why NWACC fired Mr. Luedtke was supposedly because

he over-promised scholarship funds to prospective students, which then required upper

management to approve institutional tuition waivers to cover the deficit. Mr. Luedtke does

not dispute that NWACC actually approved tuition waivers to cover the deficit, see Doc.

15-1, pp. 47–48 (Luedtke Dep.); instead, he attempts to justify his beliefs at the time,

explaining that NWACC’s accounting software was unreliable and “had some glitches”

and that his department “usually had a surplus of money,” id. at p. 48. In another example,

NWACC accused Mr. Luedtke of using an unofficial school logo (which his nephew had

created for him) for official school business. Once again, Mr. Luedtke does not dispute

that he actually used the unapproved logo, see id. at p. 31; instead, he explains that he

only used it as a “sample” or “demonstration” because the school was taking too long to

officially approve it, id. at p. 32.

Since Mr. Luedtke cannot demonstrate that NWACC’s termination decision lacks

any basis in fact, he is left with the task of showing a reasonable jury could conclude “that

a prohibited reason more likely motivated the employer” to fire him. Brown v. Diversified

Distrib. Sys., LLC, 801 F.3d 901, 909 (8th Cir. 2015). His only affirmative evidence of sex

or age discrimination is that NWACC ultimately hired a thirty-two-year-old woman as

athletic director—a job Mr. Luedtke wanted for himself. The problem with this argument,

however, is that Mr. Luedtke never competed against this woman for the job. NWACC

advertised for the athletic director position while Mr. Luedtke was still employed, and

though he applied, he never made it past the initial interview. On June 26, 2023, NWACC

offered the position to a fifty-eight-year-old man. Though in the end this man declined the

offer, Mr. Luedtke cannot possibly suggest that discriminatory motives were at play in the

selection process—since NWACC’s first choice was similarly situated to Mr. Luedtke in

terms of both age and sex. After the male candidate declined the position, Mr. Luedtke

was fired for multiple non-discriminatory reasons. And after that, NWACC reopened the

job search and, about a month later, selected the thirty-two-year-old woman. No jury could

reasonably infer that Mr. Luedtke was the victim of intentional discrimination on these

facts.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Objections to the R&R are OVERRULED

and the R&R (Doc. 25) is ADOPTED IN FULL. NWACC’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 15) is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A separate

judgment will follow.

IT IS SO ORDERED on this 18'" day of sf 2026.

IMOTHY E*BROOKS

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE