The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
JORDAN TALLEY-SMITH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) CAUSE NO. 2:25-CV-282-PPS-AZ
)
WEBB FORD INC, et al., )
)
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Representing himself, Jordan Talley-Smith brought this action against his former
employer and a woman named Kimberly Walcott who works for the Indiana
Department of Workforce Development. Walcott seeks dismissal of the complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [DE 9.] Because Talley-Smith has failed
to plausibly state claims for relief regarding any violation of a federal constitutional or
statutory right, the motion will be granted (but without prejudice and granting Plaintiff
leave to re-file Count III if he chooses, and cure the pleading deficiencies articulated in
this order).
Background
Here are the facts, as best I can tell, as described in the pro se complaint which is
(regrettably) a bit confusing. Generally speaking, Talley- Smith claims his former
employer, Webb Ford, Inc., discriminated against him when it forced him to resign after
Talley-Smith reported allegedly illegal and unsafe practices by Webb Ford. [DE 1 at 1.]
He sued Webb Ford, his previous manager Vince Shaughnessy, and the instant
defendant (whose motion to dismiss is before the court), Kimberly Walcott. Walcott is a
Claims Investigator with the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (DWD).
[Id. at 2.] She is being sued in her individual capacity for “engaging in retaliatory
conduct under color of state law in violation of Plaintiff’s federally protected rights.”
Id.
Talley-Smith alleges two separate ALJs ruled in his favor during unemployment
proceedings, confirming he was not terminated for cause and had been constructively
discharged. [Id. at 4.] He claims that after he received the ALJ rulings, he was
“contacted by DWD investigator Kimberly Walcott, who attempted to intimidate him
and undermine his eligibility” presumably for unemployment benefits. [Id. at 4.] He
claims that Ms. Walcott “contacted Plaintiff and engaged in coercive communication
intended to undermine those rulings” and “intended to deprive Plaintiff of federally
protected rights, including his right to fair administrative adjudication and freedom
from retaliation for protected workplace complaints.” [Id. at 5.]
The complaint states one count against Walcott for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Id. It seems that Plaintiff is trying to use Section 1983 to hold Walcott liable for violating
his 14th Amendment right to procedural due process, and is trying to show that she
also violated Title VII’s ban on retaliatory conduct.
Discussion
In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); accord Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While I
must accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
complainant’s favor, I don’t need to accept threadbare legal conclusions supported by
purely conclusory statements. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs must allege “more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Making the plausibility determination is
“a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
I am aware of the Supreme Court’s admonition that a document “filed pro se is to
be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted). But
while courts must give liberal construction to a pro se plaintiff's complaint, “it is also
well established that pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural
rules.” Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008).
Talley-Smith claims that Walcott called him to discuss his employment benefits
with him and then attempted to intimidate him and undermine his eligibility for
benefits. [DE 1 at 4-5.] This, he claims, violated his right to due process under the 14th
Amendment and violated Title VII.
First, Title VII only applies to an “employer” and there are no allegations that
Walcott is Talley-Smith’s employer. Title VII makes it unlawful for an “employer” to
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or to otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of that individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Barbera v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 906 F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 2018); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1);
see also Bronson v. Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children’s Hosp. of Chicago, 69 F.4th 437, 448 (7th
Cir. 2023) (“Only an employer can be liable under Title VII.”. As an investigator for the
Indiana Department of Workforce Development, Walcott does not qualify as Talley-
Smith’s employer.
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from depriving a person of
property or liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To make a
due process claim, it is first necessary to identify a protected property or liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; then, if such an interest has been deprived, I
must evaluate what process was due under the circumstances. See Malhotra v. Univ. of
Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, 77 F.4th 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Charleston v. Bd. of
Trustees of Univ. of Illinois at Chicago, 741 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2013)). In looking at the
second prong, the Court should consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected
by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, along with the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
In looking at the first question, whether Plaintiff has a property interest in his
unemployment benefits under Indiana law, the answer is unequivocally yes. See P.J. v.
Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dept. Of Workforce Dev., 243 N.E.3d 421, 425 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“It is
undisputed that P.J. has a property interest in receiving unemployment benefits.”).
However, the answer to the second question is equally elementary. Talley-Smith
has not alleged that Walcott’s phone call had any effect on the availability of his
unemployment benefits whatsoever, so he has not actually alleged that she violated his
procedural due process rights. He only states the call was “intended to deprive [him] . .
. his right to fair administrative adjudication.” [DE 1 at 5.] In the complaint, Talley-
Smith does not provide any facts whatsoever showing that the phone call led to a denial
of benefits.
Talley-Smith attached an exhibit to his complaint which (although not
authenticated) he purports is a transcript of the call with Walcott on October 7, 2024.
[DE 1-1 at 70.] During the call, Walcott seems to be checking in on the status of why
Talley-Smith filed some paperwork late. When Talley-Smith accuses the Department of
Workforce Development for not having released any unemployment benefits, Walcott
states: “[t]his conversation is meant to help clarify what’s happening, or at least part of
what’s going on.” Id. She then replies, “[o]ne of the reasons I’m calling is because the
voucher you filed for the week ending September 28 was filed late. It was filed
yesterday, on October 6. Why was the voucher filed late?” [Id. at 71.] Talley-Smith then
responded in part that he still hadn’t received his benefits and he “really [didn’t] have
much to say. [He’d] rather handle this through the courts. I’m tired of dealing with it.
You keep worrying about my work search requirements, but my benefits haven’t been
released.” Id. Ms. Walcott then went on to state the DWD received information from
the Hammond WorkOne office that he was scheduled to attend a university orientation
on September 25, but he did not attend, and Talley-Smith responded, “I’m not required
to attend anything.” Id. Walcott then cordially finished the phone call stating, “[t]hank
you for your time.” Id. Talley-Smith then retorted, “[t]his is astonishing. You keep
calling me about irrelevant issues but haven’t acknowledged my writ of mandamus or
my demand for the immediate release of my benefits. I’ll see you all in court. Have a
great day.” [Id. at 72.] Ms. Walcott answered, “[y]ou too” and then the call concluded.
Id.
Overall this phone call appears to be a check-in on the status of Talley-Smith. It
does not seem to be any kind of adjudicatory event that could terminate Talley-Smith’s
unemployment benefits. In his reply memorandum, Talley-Smith includes supposed
language from a later call that does not appear in his attached exhibit. [DE 1-1 at 70-72;
DE 11 at 1.] In addition, he claims for the first time that Walcott “later testified at the
December 6, 2024 hearing before ALJ Blakely, where her narrative was adopted to
justify adverse rulings issued on December 9, 2024, suspending and reversing benefits.”
[DE 11 at 2.]
Implicit in this argument is the fact that an adjudicative, evidentiary hearing
overseen by an administrative law judge occurred, at which Walcott allegedly provided
testimony. “On its face, such a hearing embodies the ‘fundamental requirement of due
process.’” Tucker v. City of Chicago, 907 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2018). After all, “[t]he
hallmarks of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Pugel
v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ill., 378 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 2004). Talley-Smith has not
claimed, or alleged any facts in support of a claim, that he was not allowed to attend
this hearing, that he lacked notice of it, or anything else that would allow the Court to
plausibly conclude that he lacked procedural due process with respect to the hearing
and Walcott’s participation in it.
Finally, although the parties did not brief this issue, even if Talley-Smith has
somehow stated a cognizable section 1983 claim, Walcott is sued in her individual
capacity and allegedly “acted under color of state law and within the scope of her
official duties” [DE 1 at 5], so she would also be immune from suit. See Mallum v.
Wisconsin Laborers’ Health Fund, No. 16-CV-1190, 2017 WL 1740302, at *3 (E.D. Wis. May
3, 2017) (finding DWD’s rulings, orders, and case-management directions were clearly
judicial in nature and within the scope of DWD’s jurisdiction, so protected by quasi-
judicial immunity).
Therefore, the claims against Ms. Walcott should be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6) because Talley-Smith has failed to state a plausible claim that Walcott violated
his rights under either Title VII or the 14th Amendment’s due process clause. I do
recognize that the Seventh Circuit has instructed when a plaintiff’s complaint is
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) the general rule is to give at least one opportunity to
amend the complaint before the action is dismissed. Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl
Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015). Count III will
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be dismissed, and while I have substantial doubts whether any claim would be viable
against Ms. Walcott, the dismissal will be without prejudice. Talley-Smith is granted
leave to re-file Count III if he chooses, and cure the pleading deficiencies, if he can, as
discussed in this opinion.
Conclusion
Defendant Kimberly Walcott’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 9] is GRANTED with
respect to Count III, which is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Talley-Smith is
granted leave to re-file and cure the pleading deficiencies within 30 days from the date
of this Order.
This complaint remains pending against Defendants Webb Ford, Inc. and Vince
Shaughnessy.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: February 12, 2026.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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