Goodlow

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

ETHAN GOODLOW, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:25-cv-597-DGK

)

BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF

KANSAS CITY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

This is a § 1983 civil rights action. Pro se Plaintiff Ethan Goodlow alleges violations of

his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising from a series of arrests and searches

in 2019. Plaintiff brings twenty-one claims against Defendants Board of Police Commissioners

of Kansas City (“the Board”); Board members Quinton Lucas, Dawn Cramer, Tom Whitaker,

Madeline Romious, and Ed Elder; the City of Kansas City, Missouri (“Kansas City”); Kansas

City Police Department (“KCPD”) Officers Don Stanze, Dave Barbour, Dave Middleton, Jamie

Fratres, Drew Pittenger, and John Does 1–10; Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey and

Assistant Missouri Attorney General Adam Morello. The claims include malicious prosecution,

false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful seizure and transport, conspiracy to violate civil rights,

retaliation for protected activity, failure to train, and excessive force. See Complaint, ECF No. 1-

1 at 34.

Now before the Court is Defendant Kansas City’s Motion to Dismiss Count IX

(Supervisory Liability/Failure to Train), Count XV (Pattern, Practice, and Custom of

Misconduct), and Count XIX (Failure to Train and Supervise) for failure to state a claim. ECF

No. 27. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. All claims against all

other parties remain.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” A claim may be dismissed if it

fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a

motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of the complaint’s factual allegations and view

them in the light most favorable to” the plaintiff. Stodghill v. Wellston School Dist., 512 F.3d

472, 476 (8th Cir. 2008).

To avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff need not demonstrate the claim is probable, only that it

is more than just possible. Id. Rule 8 “does not require detailed factual allegations” to show

facial plausibility, “but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me

accusation.” Id. “Asking for plausible grounds to infer [a defendant’s liable conduct] . . . simply

calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence”

thereof. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In reviewing the complaint, a court construes it liberally and draws all reasonable

inferences from the facts in the plaintiff’s favor. Monson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 589 F.3d

952, 961 (8th Cir. 2009). A court generally ignores materials outside the pleadings but may

consider materials that are part of the public record or materials that are necessarily embraced by

the pleadings. Miller v. Toxicology Lab. Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2012).

A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976), and “pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties,” Fed.

Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008). “However, this standard does not excuse

pro se complaints from alleging sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Gerstner v.

Sebig, LLC, 386 Fed. App’x 573, 575 (8th Cir. 2010) (modified, citation omitted).

Background

As alleged in the Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, Plaintiff was arrested by KCPD officers on

February 6, 2019, for possession of a firearm and marijuana. KCPD transported Plaintiff to

Plaintiff’s father’s residence, where KCPD was executing a search warrant. Pursuant to that

warrant, KCPD confiscated mail addressed to Plaintiff, a firearm, and ammunition. Plaintiff was

placed in custody. The charges were dismissed on February 8, 2023.

Plaintiff was arrested again by KCPD officers on October 23, 2019, for selling THC and

was placed in custody. This charge was also ultimately dismissed.

Plaintiff alleges numerous violations of his rights by KCPD with respect to the arrests,

searches, warrants, transport, and access to the Jackson County, Missouri, Courthouse, all of

which constitute “a pattern of unlawful conduct by the [KCPD], individual officers, supervisory

officials and members of the Board . . . .” ECF No. 1-1 at 2.

As to Defendant Kansas City, Plaintiff alleges Kansas City “fail[ed] to prevent the

unconstitutional conduct of the [KCPD].” Id. at ¶ 2. He alleges Kansas City is responsible for

the allocation of resources, risk management, and the legal defense of the Board [of Police

Commissioners] and the KCPD under Missouri law.” Id. Kansas City “adopt[ed], maintain[ed],

or fail[ed] to correct customs, policies and practices that were the moving force behind the

constitutional violations suffered by Plaintiff.” Id. at ¶ 132. And Kansas City is “responsible for

hiring, training, supervising, and disciplining officers and agents acting under their authority,

including those involved in the incidents giving rise to this complaint.” Id. at ¶ 202.

Plaintiff alleges Supervisory Liability/Failure to Train (Count IX), Pattern, Practice, and

Custom of Misconduct (Count XV), and Failure to Train and Supervise (Count XIX) against

Kansas City.

Discussion

Defendant Kansas City argues that its liability for the actions of the KCPD officers

depends upon the theory that Kansas City employs KCPD officers and is responsible for their

training and policies. ECF No. 28 at 3. But KCPD is not an agency of Kansas City; it is

governed exclusively by the Board of Police Commissioners, an independent entity created by

Missouri statute. Id. at 3–4. KCPD is “under the exclusive management and control of the

[Board of Police Commissioners], and [is] subject to no other control and entitled to receive

neither orders nor pay . . . from any other authority.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 84.460. The statute

empowers the Board to “[a]dopt rules and regulations . . . governing the conduct of [KCPD].” §

84.420.2(1). As to officer discipline, “[t]he board shall hear all complaints or charges filed

against any member of the police department.” § 84.430.1. The actions of KCPD officers

alleged in the complaint cannot create liability in Kansas City, so Plaintiff fails to state a claim

against Kansas City. ECF No. 28 at 4.

Plaintiff responds that “[n]ot all misconduct alleged in [the] Complaint arises from KCPD

officers.” ECF No. 30 at 2. Plaintiff also alleged that he was “physically denied access” to the

Jackson County Courthouse, which, he claims, “operat[es] within City-owned and City-

maintained facilities.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiff argues he has stated a claim for Denial of Due

Process (Count VII), Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights (Count VIII), and Supervisory

Liability/Failure to Train (Count IX) against Kansas City. Id. at 3.

In its reply, Kansas City notes that Counts VII and VIII are brought against KCPD

officers, not Kansas City, and that Count IX, which is brought against Kansas City, is brought

under the theory that Kansas City is responsible for KCPD, when, in fact, the Board is. ECF No.

33 at 1–2. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegation that Kansas City is liable for KCPD’s locking him out

of the Jackson County Courthouse because (for the sake of argument) Kansas City “owned” and

“maintained” the Courthouse, would have to be brought as a claim for premises liability, since

Kansas City is not responsible for the actions of the KCPD officers. Id. at 2. Plaintiff has not

done so but has rather relied upon a theory of supervisory liability in Count IX. Id.

Kansas City has the better argument. All three claims Plaintiff brings against Kansas

City arise from actions by KCPD officers and depend on failure-to-train or official-policy

theories of liability. Any allegation arising from KCPD officers’ actions fails to state a claim

against Kansas City, because, as Missouri law makes clear, and as Kansas City has adequately

demonstrated, Kansas City has no authority over, or responsibility for, KCPD. All authority and

responsibility for KCPD belong to the Board. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 84.460. Counts IX, XV, and

XIX therefore fail to state a claim against Kansas City. Moreover, with respect to the alleged

“locked doors incident,” even construing this pro se complaint, Plaintiff has not alleged

sufficient facts to support his claims for failure to train (Counts IX and XIX) against the City of

Kansas City for KCPD’s alleged actions at the Jackson County Courthouse (Counts IX and

XIX).

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant City of Kansas City’s motion is GRANTED.

Count IX (Supervisory Liability/Failure to Train), Count XV (Pattern, Practice, and Custom of

Misconduct), and Count XIX (Failure to Train and Supervise) are DISMISSED as to Defendant

City of Kansas City, Missouri. All claims against all other parties remain.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: February 16, 2026 /s/ Greg Kays

GREG KAYS, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT