Anderson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

ZACHERY LEE ANDERSON, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00292-AN

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

TIFFANY DAVIDSON and JOHN DOE COURT

STAFF 1-5,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Zachery Lee Anderson, who is self-represented and thus proceeding pro se, filed a civil

rights complaint; an application to procced without paying filings fees, (i.e., in forma pauperis or “IFP”);

and a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction (the “motion for TRO”).

For the reasons stated below, the Court grants plaintiff’s IFP application, finds that the complaint does not

state a claim on which relief may be granted, and denies plaintiff’s motion for TRO with leave to renew.

The complaint is therefore dismissed with leave to amend, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). If plaintiff

wishes to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified by this Order, he must do so by

March 13, 2026. Plaintiff may also choose to renew his motion for TRO or file a new motion for TRO

alongside any amended complaint.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. In Forma Pauperis

District courts are authorized by statute to permit a party to commence litigation “without

prepayment of fees or security therefor” if that party submits an affidavit showing that, in light of the assets

of that party, they are “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Section

1915 “applies to all persons notwithstanding” its references to incarcerated litigants. Andrews v. Cervantes,

493 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Lister v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th

Cir. 2005)). When determining what, if any, filing fee a plaintiff must pay, “‘the court may consider the

plaintiff’s cash flow in the recent past, and the extent to which the plaintiff has depleted his savings on

nonessentials.’” Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 768 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Alexander

v. Carson Adult High Sch., 9 F.3d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1993)).

In addition to permitting litigants to proceed without paying filing fees, Section 1915 also requires

a court to dismiss a complaint on its own accord, even before service of process, if it determines that the

complaint is “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an

arguable basis either in law or in fact,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), meaning it does not

“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Watison v. Carter, 668

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”). When this standard is not met, “section 1915(e)

not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” Lopez,

203 F.3d at 1127. Additionally, a court must dismiss a complaint on immunity grounds once it has

“sufficient information to make a determination” that defendants are entitled to absolute or qualified

immunity. Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016).

B. Pro Se Pleadings

In determining whether a pro se complaint lacks merit, courts must use “less stringent standards

than” those used for “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(internal citations omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Further, “[u]nless it is

absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect,” an unrepresented litigant proceeding IFP is

“entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the

action.” Garity v. APWU Nat’l Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lucas v. Dep’t of

Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).

C. Temporary Restraining Orders

TROs are subject to substantially the same factors as preliminary injunctions. See Stuhlbarg Int’l

Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A TRO is an “extraordinary

remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v.

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Generally, a party seeking a TRO must show (1) they

are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in the favor of the party; and (4) an injunction is in the

public interest. Id. at 20-22. In the Ninth Circuit, “serious questions going to the merits and a hardship

balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two

elements of the Winter test are also met.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th

Cir. 2011).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 provides that a court “may issue a preliminary injunction only

on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). A court may issue an ex parte TRO without notice

to the adverse party only if “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly shows that

immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be

heard in opposition” and “the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the

reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). The issuance of ex parte TROs is

“extremely limited” because “‘our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken

before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.’“ Reno

Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc.

v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70 of Alameda Cnty., 415 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974)).

Courts have recognized that issuance of an ex parte TRO may be appropriate in limited circumstances

“where notice to the adverse party is impossible either because the identity of the adverse party is unknown

or because a known party cannot be located in time for a hearing” or “because notice to the defendant would

render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A TRO issued without notice to the opposing party may not exceed fourteen days and may be

extended by the issuing court one time for an additional fourteen days if good cause is shown. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65(b)(2). If the parties do not consent to an extension, then the court must schedule a preliminary

injunction hearing that occurs within twenty-eight days after the date that the TRO is first issued. Id.

BACKGROUND

On February 13, 2026, plaintiff Zachary Lee Anderson filed a civil rights complaint against

defendants Tiffany Davidson and John Doe Court Staff 1-5. Compl., ECF 1. Plaintiff additionally filed an

IFP application, ECF 2, and a motion for TRO, ECF 3. The motion for TRO is supported by plaintiff’s

declaration, ECF 4. Plaintiff primarily alleges that defendants violated his due process rights by depriving

him of his fundamental right to familial association. Compl. 1, 9-10. More specifically, he alleges that

defendants interfered with his ability to interact with his two minor children. Id. at 1.

Plaintiff’s allegations appear to stem from Washington County Circuit Court Case No. 25DR00133,

a state court case in which Davidson, the lone named individual defendant in this case, acted “in a court-

appointed ‘best interest’ role.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges the following: On December 8, 2025, Davidson

misrepresented to the circuit court at a hearing that plaintiff had “failed to enroll the children in public

school and failed to maintain medical compliance.” Id. at 3. On February 2, 2026, “Davidson initiated

administrative communications with court staff regarding judgment processing and signature,” and the

“[c]ourt staff processed the proposed judgment the same day.” Id. Sometime shortly thereafter, Davidson

“initiated or participated in an ex parte request asserting ‘immediate danger’” that was noticed for February

9. Id. at 4. At that proceeding, Davidson “invoke[d] emergency procedures” despite having made an

“incomplete review of relevant materials.” Id. at 4. Davidson also “selectively disclosed information

adverse to Plaintiff” and “omitted material child-safety information.” Id. at 5. These actions caused

plaintiff to experience “loss of familial association, procedural deprivation, and ongoing exposure to

repeated emergency mechanisms.” Id. at 8-9. Based on these allegations, plaintiff brings claims for

(1) violation of procedural due process; (2) violation of substantive due process; (3) civil conspiracy;

(4) pattern, practice, or custom; and (5) deliberate indifference to child safety. Id. at 10-11. He seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and

costs. Id. at 11-12.

The motion for TRO motion relies heavily on the complaint. First, regarding likelihood of success

on the merits, plaintiff writes that he “plausibly pleaded violations of procedural due process and familial

association rights” in his complaint. TRO Mot. 2. Second, regarding irreparable harm, he writes that he

“faces a real and immediate risk of continued constitutional injury” absent immediate injunctive relief,

including “[l]oss of parenting time, interference with familial relationships, and exposure to repeated

emergency or ex parte actions without due process.” Id. at 2-3. Third, regarding the balance of equities,

plaintiff writes that he “seeks only to preserve the status quo” and that defendants will “suffer no cognizable

prejudice” from the requested relief. Id. at 3. Lastly, regarding the public interest, he writes that “[t]he

public interest strongly favors protection of constitutional rights, integrity of court proceedings, and

prevention of non-judicial procedural shortcuts that undermine due process and child welfare.” Id. As

relief, he asks the Court to “enjoin Defendants from invoking emergency or ex parte procedures affecting

Plaintiff or the minor children absent evidentiary completeness and disclosure of material temporal facts”;

to “[p]rohibit non-judicial administrative routing, queue manipulation, or expedited processing of filings”;

to “[o]rder Defendants to preserve all documents . . . relevant to this action”; and to “[m]aintain the status

quo.” Id. at 3-4.

DISCUSSION

A. IFP Application

Plaintiff has satisfied the economic eligibility requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, see Appl. to

Proceed IFP, and his IFP application is granted accordingly. However, as described below, the complaint

must be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

B. Complaint

Plaintiff does not state a claim on which relief may be granted because he appears to challenge a

family court determination. Federal courts, including this Court, are prohibited from “review[ing] final

judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.” D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482

(1983). This rule is known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136,

1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and Feldman, 460 U.S. 462).

“Rooker-Feldman prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit

that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Id. District courts must also refuse to hear cases

where “the parties do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision” but the “‘claims raised in the

federal court action are inextricably intertwined with the state court's decision such that the adjudication of

the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of

state laws or procedural rules.’” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). Rooker-Feldman is a narrow

doctrine, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005), but it is also “a

powerful doctrine that prevents federal courts from second-guessing state court decisions.” Bianchi, 334

F.3d at 898.

Although plaintiff alleges that he “does not challenge judicial decision-making or seek appellate

review of state rulings,” Compl. 8, the complaint seems to do just that. By all appearances, all of plaintiff’s

claims seek to challenge a child custody proceeding in Washington County Circuit Court Case

No. 25DR00133. Id. at 2; see id. at 3 (describing plaintiff’s appearance in Washington County Circuit

Court); see also id. at 5 (challenging “emergency state enforcement”). This Court does not have

jurisdiction to hear that challenge. See Moore v. County of Butte, 547 F. App’x 826, 829 (9th Cir.

2013) (finding that claims challenging the outcome of a child custody case were properly dismissed);

see also Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 900 (“Stated plainly, Rooker-Feldman bars any suit that seeks to disrupt

or ‘undo’ a prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the

federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims.” (citation and quotation marks

omitted)).

To the extent that plaintiff challenges ongoing state court proceedings, that challenge is barred by

Younger abstention. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “Younger abstention applies to actions

seeking to enjoin pending state administrative proceedings (as well as state court proceedings) if an

important state interest is involved.” Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 2003).

“Child support and custody proceedings implicate such important state interests that, even independent of

Younger, federal courts are generally prohibited from interfering.” Nixon v. Div. of Child Support, No.

3:25-cv-01969-AN, 2025 WL 3466355, at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 2, 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Lakhouiri v.

Wolke, No. 1:24-cv-1305-CL, 2024 WL 3791479, at *1 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 2024)). Accordingly, plaintiff’s

complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

C. Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff’s motion for TRO is also denied with leave to renew. “‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary

injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction

is in the public interest.’” Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 876 (2015) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).

For the same reasons that plaintiff has not stated a viable claim, he has also not demonstrated a likelihood

of success on the merits. As to the other factors, plaintiff states that he will face “[l]oss of parenting time,

interference with familial relationships, and exposure to repeated emergency or ex parte actions”; that

defendants will “suffer no cognizable prejudice” from the requested relief; and that “[t]he public interest

strongly favors protection of constitutional rights, integrity of court procedures, and prevention of non-

judicial procedural shortcuts that undermine due process and child welfare.” Mot. for TRO 2-3. Those

conclusory statements are insufficient to show that a TRO is warranted at this time.

Furthermore, plaintiff has not met the procedural requirements for requesting a TRO without notice,

i.e., ex parte. Plaintiff’s motion for TRO does not include either a certificate of service or a showing of

efforts made to give notice and the reasons that notice should not be required in this case. Plaintiff does

not indicate that he is unable to contact defendants, particularly the named defendant Tiffany Davidson,

such that he could not provide notice. And plaintiff has not alleged that defendants would take any steps

to frustrate the purpose of this action if given notice. In light of the deficiencies described thus far, the

Court is unwilling to make the series of assumptions that would be necessary to reach the merits of the ex

parte relief that plaintiff seeks. As such, plaintiffs motion for TRO is denied.

D. Leave to Amend

Although plaintiff has not stated a sufficient claim at this time, it does not appear that it would be

impossible for plaintiff to correct many of the identified deficiencies on amendment. Plaintiff is therefore

granted leave to amend. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he is advised to first review the

District of Oregon's website, which contains a webpage titled “Information about Representing Yourself in

Court” and which is available to the public at https://ord-uscourts.gov/index.php/representing-

yourself/information-about-representing-yourself.

Plaintiff is also cautioned that, as a pro se litigant, he may not bring any claims on behalf of his

children in the amended complaint. Self-represented litigants may not bring claims on behalf of other

people, even their own children. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1997)

(“[A] non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her

child.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff may not reallege claims on behalf of his minor

children in an amended complaint unless he retains counsel.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Count GRANTS plaintiff’s application to proceed in

forma pauperis. The Court DISMISSES plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e), with leave to amend. Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED

with leave to renew. Any amended complaint must be filed by March 13, 2026. Plaintiff may also choose

to renew his TRO motion or file a new TRO motion alongside any amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 13th day of February, 2026.

United States District Judge