Gladding

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHAEL A. GLADDING,

Plaintiff,

1:25-CV-1702

V. (BKS/DJS)

RACHEL ROUNDS, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

MICHAEL A. GLADDING

Plaintiff, Pro Se

Clifton Park, New York 12065

HON. LETITIA JAMES SHAWN C. GRAHAM, ESQ.

New York State Attorney General Assistant Attorney General

Attorney for Defendants

300 South State Street — Suite 300

Syracuse, New York 13202

DANIEL J. STEWART

United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER

The Clerk has forwarded for review a civil complaint filed by Plaintiff. The filing

fee in this action has not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. That application has been granted. The matter has been referred

to the undersigned for an initial review pursuant to L.R. 72.3.

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I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT

A. Governing Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma

pauperis, “(2) ... the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that

—...(B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (11) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).!

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro

se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should

exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint

before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)

have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.

1983) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if

the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

' To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 us 319, 325 (1989).

Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Jd. “Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts

do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Jd.

at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Thus, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement” will not suffice. /d. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

B. Factual Background

The Complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 1, Compl., {| 1.

Plaintiff names three Defendants, the New York State Department of Corrections and

«|Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), as well as a Parole Officer and Senior Officer

employed by the agency. /d. at §§ 5-6; Dkt. No. 1-1 48.2 In August 2022, Plaintiff was

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two to six years following his conviction on a

? Plaintiff has filed two documents identified as his Complaint. Dkt. Nos. 1 & 1-1. For purposes of this Report and

Recommendation, the Court has considered both documents. Plaintiff is advised that, should he be permitted to file

any further pleadings under FED. R. C1v. P. 8, the Complint should be a single document.

charge of promoting a sexual performance by a minor. Dkt. No. 1-3 at pp. 2-3 & 5.

Plaintiff was subsequently released to parole supervision in August 2024. Dkt. No. 1-5.

Plaintiff alleges that, as part of his release conditions, numerous special conditions were

imposed upon him, including, but not limited to, restrictions on use of the internet and

° social media, access to email accounts, and the possession of electronic devices. Dkt. No.

1-199 2 & 14. Plaintiff alleges that these conditions were not imposed by the judge that

sentenced him in state court. /d. at 12 & 15. Asa result, he alleges that his due process

rights have been violated. /d. at §§] 22-25; see also Compl. at p. 2.

II. DISCUSSION

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The section 1983 claim against DOCCS is subject to dismissal on Eleventh

Amendment immunity grounds. The Eleventh Amendment provides states immunity in

federal court. Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236

(2d Cir. 2006). The immunity applies both to the State itself and state agencies. Feingold

v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2004); McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 95

| (2d Cir. 2001) (“The Eleventh Amendment extends immunity not only to a state, but also

to entities considered ‘arms of the state.’”). As a state agency, DOCCS is covered by that

immunity. Salvana v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 621 F. Supp.

3d 287, 300 (N.D.N.Y. 2022). “As a general rule, state governments and their agencies

may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment

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immunity or there has been a valid abrogation of that immunity by Congress.” Jackson

v. Battaglia, 63 F. Supp. 3d 214, 219-20 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (citation omitted). “It is well-

established that New York has not consented to § 1983 suits in federal court and that §

1983 was not intended to override a state’s sovereign immunity.” Mamot v. Bd. of

Regents, 367 F. App’x. 191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against DOCCS under section 1983 should be

dismissed without prejudice. Kelsey v. Kessel, 2025 WL 1324213, at *3 (2d Cir. May 7,

2025).

2. Merits of Plaintiff's Claims

The Complaint alleges that the special conditions to which Plaintiff objects were

imposed by the individual Defendants pursuant to 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8003.3. Dkt. No. 1-1

{| 16. That section provides:

A special condition may be imposed upon a releasee either prior or

subsequent to release. The releasee shall be provided with a written copy of

each special condition imposed. Each special condition may be imposed by

a member or members of the Board of Parole, an authorized representative

of the Division of Parole, or a parole officer.

N.Y.C.R.R. § 8003.3.

The Complaint alleges that the imposition of the conditions in this manner violated

Plaintiff's due process rights. See Dkt. No. 1-1 99 24-25. In the context of a due process

claim, the Court must undertake “fa two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff had a

protected liberty interest . . . and, if so, (2) whether the deprivation of that liberty interest

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occurred without due process of law.” Bedoya v. Coughlin, 91 F.3d 349, 351-52 (2d

Cir.1996) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1989)).

The Second Circuit has recognized that “parole officers are statutorily authorized

to impose special conditions” under section 8003.3. Peoples v. Leon, 63 F.4th 132, 144

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(2d Cir. 2023). “Because the imposition of special conditions is left to the discretion of

the Board of Parole and parole officers, plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest

in being free from special conditions.” Burdick v. Town of Schroeppel, 2017 WL

5509355, at *36 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017

WL 1284864 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2017), aff'd, 717 F. App’x 92 (2d Cir. 2018); see also

Maldonado v. Fischer, 2012 WL 4461647, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (“[C]ourts

have also consistently held that a parolee has no constitutionally protected interest in

being free from special conditions of release.’’) (citing cases).>

Even were the Court to assume the existence of a liberty interest here, Plaintiff has

not alleged that this interest was deprived without due process.

It is well established that, with regard to claims based on “random,

unauthorized acts by state employees,” “the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a state employee intentionally

deprives an individual of property or liberty, so long as the State provides

a meaningful postdeprivation remedy.”

3 Courts have recognized that “parolees have some liberty interest in being free from certain special conditions of

parole.” Rodriguez v. City of New York, 623 F. Supp. 3d 225, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing cases). “Therefore, as a

parolee, Plaintiff has a limited due process right that entitles him to conditions of parole that are reasonably related

to his prior conduct or to the government’s interest in his rehabilitation.” Singleton v. Doe, 210 F. Supp. 3d 359,

374 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). However, the Court does not read Plaintiff to allege here that the special conditions to which

he objects were inappropriate for some factual or offense-related reason, but that they are void ab initio based on

the manner in which they were imposed. See Dkt. No. 1-1 4 2-3.

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Eldars v. State Univ. of New York at Albany, 2020 WL 2542957, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. May

19, 2020) (quoting Hellenic American Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York,

101 F.3d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1996)). With respect to the form of post-deprivation remedy,

| courts have repeatedly recognized that “the mere availability of an Article 78 proceeding

is sufficient.” Eldars v. State Univ. of New York at Albany, 2020 WL 2542957, at *6

(citing cases); see also King v. New York City Emps. Ret. Sys., 212 F. Supp. 3d 371, 400

(E.D.N.Y. 2016). Under New York Law, an Article 78 proceeding is clearly available to

an individual seeking to challenge the imposition of special conditions. See, e.g.,

Maldonado v. New York State Div. of Parole, 87 A.D.3d 1231 (3d Dep’t 2011); People

“tex rel. DeFlumer v. Strack, 212 A.D.2d 555 (2d Dep’t 1995) (challenge to special

conditions “would be best reviewed in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to

determine whether . . . the conditions . .. were not made in accordance with the law”).

Though the record on this question is not clear, it appears that Plaintiff did in fact pursue

this remedy. See Dkt. Nos. 1-6 & 1-7. Given the availability of that remedy, Plaintiff

cannot demonstrate the denial of due process.

For these reasons, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's due process claim be

dismissed.

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3. Leave to Amend

“Ordinarily, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant

without granting leave to amend at least once ‘when a liberal reading of the complaint

gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.’” Bruce v. Tompkins Cnty. Dep't

of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Kephart, 2015 WL 151029, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (quoting

Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991)). To the extent that Plaintiff may

be able to cure pleading deficiencies identified here or to reallege his claims in light of

this analysis, it may be appropriate to permit Plaintiff to amend his Complaint as to the

individual Defendants.

If. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED without

prejudice; and it is

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-

Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)* days within

which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed

4 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the

fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and

file objections. FED. R. Crv. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal

holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). g.

with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN

FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v.

Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,

892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 72 & 6(a).

Dated: January 12, 2026

Albany, New York

US-Magistrate Judge

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