Martinez

1

2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 MARCELLA ELIZABETH MARTINEZ, Case No. 23-cv-04247-SI

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

9 v. DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

DISMISS TAC

10 CINDY BLACK, et al.,

Re: Dkt. Nos. 77, 78

11 Defendants.

12

13 Now before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. This

14 matter came on for hearing on January 9, 2026.

15

16 BACKGROUND

17 I. Factual Background

18 The Court assumes that the allegations of the complaint are true for purposes of deciding the

19 motion to dismiss. Plaintiff Marcella Elizabeth Martinez was an involuntarily committed patient at

20 Napa State Hospital when the relevant events occurred. Dkt. No. 64 (“TAC”) ¶ 1. Upon plaintiff’s

21 arrival on February 24, 2020, she was assigned to Unit T-11, which “consists of a series of

22 dormitory-style rooms connected by a hallway with a single bathroom and shower facilities for all

23 patients housed in the unit.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 17. Each room contains four beds, and plaintiff was assigned

24 to a bedroom that was also occupied “by an individual presently known to the state of California as

25 Lynnsey Eva Karla Braun (‘Braun’).” Id. ¶¶ 13, 18. According to the complaint, “Braun has male

26 genitalia, and Braun’s original birth certificate identified Braun’s gender as male. However, Braun

27 self-identifies as female.” Id. ¶ 19. Braun had been admitted to Napa State Hospital after being

1 Upon plaintiff’s placement in the same bedroom with Braun, “Braun began making sexual

2 and romantic advances toward Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 30. Within a week of her placement, plaintiff made

3 her first report complaining about Braun’s behavior to defendants Daniel Ferster, Hameed Jahangiri,

4 and Elia Real (referred to in the TAC as the “Martinez Treatment Team”). Id. ¶¶ 6, 31. Defendants

5 took no action in response to the first report, and plaintiff informed Braun she did not want a

6 romantic or sexual relationship. Id. ¶¶ 36-37. Braun then became verbally aggressive, called

7 plaintiff names, and made a hand gesture as if firing a handgun at plaintiff. Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiff

8 reported these comments and actions to the Martinez Treatment team and they arranged a meeting.

9 Id. ¶¶ 39-40. Braun found out about the meeting and, in the hallway shortly before the meeting,

10 Braun “cast threatening looks at Plaintiff and called Plaintiff a ‘fucking bitch[,]’” conduct which

11 plaintiff also reported. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. In response, defendant Veronica Inocencio moved plaintiff to

12 a different bedroom. Id. ¶ 44. However, Braun still “had unlimited access to Plaintiff’s bedroom

13 via the unlocked dormitory doors during the time when patients were present in Unit T-11” and

14 “continued to utilize the shared bathroom and shower facilities at Unit T-11.” Id. ¶ 46.

15 About three weeks later, in the shared bathroom facilities, Braun asked plaintiff for sex. Id.

16 ¶ 48. After plaintiff responded, “no,” Braun then asked plaintiff if she wanted to see Braun’s penis

17 while plaintiff was dressing after a shower. Id. ¶ 49. Plaintiff again said “no” and told Braun to

18 leave her alone. Id. The following day, Braun told plaintiff “that Braun had been sifting through

19 the garbage to view Plaintiff’s used feminine products.” Id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff reported these most

20 recent incidents to her treatment team. Id. ¶ 52. The report was also known to other defendants,

21 including Napa State Hospital Executive Director Cindy Black, but no investigation or further action

22 took place. Id. ¶¶ 52-55.

23 On or about April 4, 2020, at about 5:20 p.m., Braun approached plaintiff in the Unit T-11

24 hallway. Id. ¶ 57. Braun directed plaintiff into Braun’s bedroom, saying Braun “wanted to talk

25 with” plaintiff, and then attacked plaintiff with a makeshift shank. Id. ¶¶ 57-65. Although plaintiff

26 grabbed Braun’s wrist as Braun attempted to stab plaintiff in the neck, Braun punched plaintiff

27 several times in the face and then used the weapon to strike plaintiff on the back of the head several

1 Id. ¶ 67. Braun was arrested and charged with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon.

2 Id. ¶ 72. In later interviews with law enforcement, “Braun admitted that Braun had been planning

3 the attack all day and that Braun’s aim was to kill Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 71.

4

5 II. Procedural Background

6 On November 6, 2020, plaintiff (represented by counsel) filed suit in Napa County Superior

7 Court against defendants Napa State Hospital, the California Department of State Hospitals

8 (“DSH”), Cindy Black, and Does 1-50. Martinez v. Napa State Hosp., Case No. 20-cv-08631-SI,

9 Dkt. No. 1 at 8. Defendants removed the action to federal court on December 7, 2020. See generally

10 id., Dkt. No. 1. The case was assigned to the undersigned Judge. Id., Dkt. No. 6. The parties

11 stipulated to a stay while plaintiff sought her release from DSH custody. On December 5, 2022,

12 plaintiff (through her counsel) voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice, “pursuant to joint

13 agreement to toll the statute.” Id., Dkt. No. 33.

14 On August 21, 2023, plaintiff (representing herself) filed the current suit against the same

15 defendants: DSH, Black, and Does 1-50. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants answered the complaint. Dkt.

16 No. 9. On June 21, 2024, the Court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for

17 judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. No. 32. The Court denied defendants’ bid for Eleventh

18 Amendment immunity, finding they had waived immunity when they removed the original case

19 from state court to federal court in December 2020. The Court dismissed, with leave to amend,

20 certain claims against DSH because plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged an exception to the

21 immunity granted by California Government Code section 845.8. Citing the parties’ tolling

22 agreement, equitable tolling, and statutory tolling, the Court rejected defendants’ arguments that the

23 claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were untimely. The Court granted judgment on the

24 pleadings as to certain claims against defendant Cindy Black, Executive Director of Napa State

25 Hospital, with leave to amend. In the Order, the Court further advised that “[a]n important next step

26 in this case will be for Martinez to identify the Doe defendants.” Id. at 15. The Court then stayed

27 the proceedings in order for plaintiff to be appointed counsel. Dkt. Nos. 33-34.

1 Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. Nos. 35-36. The FAC asserted ten claims for relief against the

2 same collection of defendants. Dkt. No. 36. Defendant Cindy Black answered the FAC, but

3 defendant DSH moved to dismiss the claims against it. Dkt. Nos. 41-42. After an initial round of

4 written briefing on the motion to dismiss, the parties stipulated to the filing of a Second Amended

5 Complaint (“SAC”). Dkt. Nos. 44-45. Defendant DSH again moved to dismiss. Dkt. No. 47.

6 On February 26, 2025, the Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part DSH’s

7 motion to dismiss the SAC. Dkt. No. 53. The Court found that plaintiff’s amendment still failed to

8 state an exception to DSH’s statutory immunity under Government Code section 854.8 and

9 dismissed with prejudice the claims brought against DSH. In the Order, the Court again advised

10 plaintiff to amend the complaint to identify the Doe defendants. Id. at 9.

11 On August 27, 2025, the parties stipulated to the filing of a Third Amended Complaint so

12 that plaintiff could “amend her complaint to allege the names of the various fictitious defendants

13 named in the SAC[.]” Dkt. No. 62. The Court approved the stipulation, and the TAC was filed the

14 following day. Dkt. Nos. 63, 64.

15 The TAC names the following defendants: Cindy Black, Executive Director of Napa State

16 Hospital (who has been named in this case from the beginning); Stephanie Clendenin, Director of

17 California Department of State Hospitals; Veronica Inocencio, Unit Supervisor of T-11 at Napa

18 State Hospital; members of Napa State Hospital’s Transgender Treatment Advisory Committee

19 (“TTAC”) Danielle Bryce, Adam Richardson, David Muchin, Amarpreet Singh, Eric Khoury, and

20 Laura Long; and members of plaintiff’s treatment team Daniel Ferster, Hameed Jahangiri, and Elia

21 Real. Plaintiff brings the following claims in the TAC: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Failure to Protect,

22 Fourteenth Amendment, against all defendants; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Supervisor Liability re:

23 Failure to Protect, against defendants Black and Inocencio; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Invasion of

24 Privacy, Fourteenth Amendment, against all defendants; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Supervisor Liability

25 re: Invasion of Privacy, against defendants Black and Inocencio; (5) Negligence, against all

26 defendants; and (6) Negligent Supervision, against defendants Black and Inocencio. Plaintiff seeks

27 damages, including punitive damages.

1 defendants, that the statute of limitations bars claims against the new defendants, and that certain

2 defendants have immunity from suit.1 Defendants also argue that the claims must be dismissed for

3 failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

4

5 LEGAL STANDARD

6 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if

7 it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

8 dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

9 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires

10 the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

11 unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened

12 fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

13 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.

14 In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the

15 court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences

16 in the plaintiff’s favor. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However,

17 the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted

18 deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Sciences Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049,

19 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

20

21 DISCUSSION

22 I. Statute of Limitations

23 Defendants argue that the statute of limitations bars all claims against the newly named Doe

24 defendants. In its prior Order on defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court found

25 that the current lawsuit against defendants DSH and Black was timely pursuant to the tolling

26

27

1 Defendants moved on behalf of all defendants except for Eric Khoury. Defense counsel

1 agreement the parties entered into in plaintiff’s earlier lawsuit. Dkt. No. 32 at 8-10. The Court also

2 found that, even apart from the tolling agreement, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims were entitled to

3 equitable tolling and were entitled to statutory tolling under California Civil Procedure Code section

4 352.1, which recognizes imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of limitations for a period

5 not to exceed two years.2 Id. at 10-12.

6 Plaintiff argues that this lawsuit is timely under the equitable tolling principles articulated in

7 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004). There, the Ninth Circuit held “that California’s

8 equitable tolling doctrine operates to toll a statute of limitations for a claim asserted by a

9 continuously confined civil detainee who has pursued his claim in good faith.” Id. at 930. While

10 acknowledging that “the literal language” of Section 352.1 does not cover civil detainees, the Ninth

11 Circuit found that the district court erred in failing to apply equitable tolling to Jones’s Section 1983

12 action. Id. at 927-28. The Court explained that “in the case of a civil detainee who has acted in

13 good faith to pursue his claims, the balance tips sharply in favor of equitably tolling the statute of

14 limitations ‘to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness’ . . . and ‘to soften the harsh impact of

15 technical rules which might otherwise prevent a good faith litigant from having a day in court.’” Id.

16 at 929-30 (citations omitted).

17 The Court agrees with plaintiff that the equitable tolling applied in Jones should apply to her

18 case with equal force.3 As in Jones, plaintiff here was committed for a continuous period during

19 which the statute of limitations—without tolling—would have run. Failing to apply tolling to

20 plaintiff’s action “would yield the arbitrary result” that plaintiff would have been able to bring her

21

2 The statute reads, in part:

22

If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3

23

(commencing with Section 335), is, at the time the cause of action

accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the

24

sentence of a criminal court for a term less than for life, the time of

that disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement

25

of the action, not to exceed two years.

26

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a).

27

3 The Court acknowledges that its prior Order did not address Jones and that the analysis of

1 claims (pursuant to statutory tolling) if she had remained in penal custody and if she had not instead

2 been found incompetent and involuntarily committed to the hospital. See id. at 929.

3 Defendants argue in reply that tolling does not apply because the newly added defendants

4 did not receive notice of the prior lawsuit that plaintiff filed and because plaintiff has not

5 demonstrated that she lacked the freedom and resources to pursue her claim while at Napa State

6 Hospital. Dkt. No. 87 (“Reply”) at 5-6. However, the notice requirement has no place with the type

7 of tolling the Court applies here. The Court previously applied the notice requirement to the type

8 of tolling that may apply due to the pendency of a prior lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 32 at 10-11 (citing

9 Lucchesi v. Bar-O Boys Ranch, 353 F.3d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 2003)). Section 352.1, which provided

10 the grounds for equitable tolling in Jones, contains no notice requirement; it simply extends the

11 relevant statute of limitations by up to two years. Moreover, defendants’ argument that plaintiff has

12 not shown she lacked access to resources or was unable to pursue her claims while at Napa State

13 Hospital ignores the record in the precursor case. The parties in that case—in which defendants

14 were represented by the same counsel as here—continuously sought stays of the litigation due to

15 the complications that arose from plaintiff’s commitment. See Martinez, Case No. 20-cv-08631-SI,

16 Dkt. Nos. 13, 17, 21, 23. Those same complications ultimately led the parties to negotiate an

17 agreement for plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the case, while tolling the statute of limitations,

18 pending her release from Napa State Hospital. For defendants now to claim that plaintiff was able

19 to litigate her claims and conduct an investigation into the identities of the Doe defendants is

20 disingenuous, given this procedural history.

21 The attack on plaintiff occurred on April 4, 2020, and plaintiff remained committed at Napa

22 State Hospital past April 4, 2022. See TAC ¶ 57; Dkt. No. 32 at 8-9 n.7. Plaintiff is entitled to the

23 standard two years for bringing her Section 1983 claim in California, plus two years of equitable

24 tolling as explained in Jones. Thus, plaintiff’s current lawsuit, filed August 21, 2023, is not barred

25 by the statute of limitations.

26

27 II. Specific Defendants

1 A. Dr. Ferster

2 Newly named defendant Daniel Ferster was a member of the treatment team assigned to

3 manage plaintiff’s treatment at Napa State Hospital. TAC ¶ 6. Defendants argue that Dr. Ferster’s

4 substitution for a Doe defendant is improper because plaintiff was not truly ignorant of his identity

5 when she filed her prior complaints. Indeed, the original complaint filed in 2020 in the earlier

6 iteration of this case brings two causes of action against a defendant “Doe Dr. Ferster.” Martinez,

7 Case No. 20-cv-08631-SI, Dkt. No. 1 at 7, 11; see also Dkt. No. 1 at 8, 14. Dr. Ferster was not

8 formally named as a defendant in the prior lawsuit or in any prior complaint here until the TAC, and

9 defendants say he was not aware of this litigation until he was named in August 2025. Dkt. No. 77

10 (“Mot.”) at 4.

11 Although defendants’ argument is not without force, the Court finds that Dr. Ferster may

12 properly be substituted into the Doe defendant placeholder under California law. For Section 1983

13 claims, federal courts apply the limitations period for personal injury claims in the forum state, here

14 California. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). The California relation-back rule for

15 Doe defendants applies as well. See Cabrales v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1463-64 (9th

16 Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1987 (1989), previous decision reinstated, 886 F.2d

17 235 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091 (1990). Under California procedure, there is no

18 requirement that the actual defendants receive notice of suit within the limitations period, unlike the

19 requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). See id. at 1463; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 474.

20 Under the California rule, an actual defendant may be substituted for a fictitious (Doe) defendant

21 within three years from the date the suit is commenced. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 583.210(a);

22 Cabrales, 864 F.2d at 1463; Lindley v. Gen. Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1986).

23 Moreover, the Court agrees with plaintiff that her allegations that she was ignorant of Dr.

24 Ferster’s true identity are sufficient, at least at this stage. California law provides, “When the

25 plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint . . . and such

26 defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name

27 is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly . . . .” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

1 litigating cases on their merits requires that the fictitious name statute be liberally construed.”

2 Lindley, 780 F.2d at 801. Although the plaintiff must have been “genuinely ignorant” of the Doe

3 defendant’s identity when she filed the original complaint, “the section 474 relation-back doctrine

4 applies even if that ignorance is the result of the plaintiff’s negligence.” See Woo v. Super. Ct., 75

5 Cal. App. 4th 169, 177 (1999); see also Ramirez v. City of Hayward, No. 14-CV-01264-MEJ, 2015

6 WL 4880976, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015) (denying defendant’s bid for summary judgment on

7 statute of limitations grounds) (citing Woo, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 177). Here, plaintiff has alleged that

8 she was ignorant of the true identity of Dr. Ferster when she filed this suit. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 1; see

9 also Dkt. No. 80 (“Opp’n”) at 8-9. Whether she was indeed “genuinely ignorant” of Dr. Ferster’s

10 identity is a factual dispute best left for another day. As explained above, plaintiff timely

11 commenced suit by filing this case on August 21, 2023. Because her August 2025 Third Amended

12 Complaint naming Dr. Ferster was filed within three years, the substitution of Dr. Ferster as a Doe

13 defendant was timely under California law.

14

15 B. Dr. Clendenin

16 The Court’s analysis differs, however, with respect to Dr. Clendenin. Defendants argue that

17 Dr. Clendenin’s identity as Director of DSH was publicly available information and so plaintiff

18 could not have been “ignorant” of Dr. Clendenin’s identity when she first filed the complaint.

19 The TAC, for the first time, describes DSH Policy Directive 3118 as a source of plaintiff’s

20 injury. See TAC ¶¶ 8-11. The directive instructed each hospital in the DSH system to establish a

21 Transgender Treatment Advisory Committee that would, among other things, “review cases for

22 appropriate housing recommendations.” Id. ¶ 9. The TAC names Dr. Clendenin as a defendant

23 because she is the one who issued the policy directive, in April 2019. See id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff argues

24 that she was previously ignorant of Dr. Clendenin’s involvement in setting the policies that plaintiff

25 alleges led to her injury. Opp’n at 9.

26 Looking to the original complaint itself, the Court agrees with defendants that Dr. Clendenin

27 is not properly substituted for a Doe defendant in the original complaint. The original complaint

1 Protective Services and Security” at Napa State Hospital; “Defendant Doe Dr. Fester [sic],

2 Psychologist (Health Facility Clinical Safety)” at Napa State Hospital; “Defendant Doe Dr. J, a

3 Psychologist (Health Facility Clinical Safety)” at Napa State Hospital; “Defendant Doe, Unit

4 Supervisor” at Napa State Hospital; and “Defendant Doe, Clinical Social Worker

5 (Health/Correctional Facility)” at Napa State Hospital. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 13-22. None of these fit the

6 description of Dr. Clendenin, Director of the statewide Department of State Hospitals. In her

7 opposition brief, plaintiff specifically points to the following paragraph from her original complaint:

8 “Upon information and belief, other administrators, supervisors and personnel of Napa State

9 Hospital, Does 1-50, also have responsibility for the development and implementation of policies

10 and procedures for security, including training and supervision of Napa State Hospital personnel.”

11 Opp’n at 9 (citing Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 15). However, this paragraph, like the others, focuses on Doe

12 defendants at Napa State Hospital, not on a statewide official setting statewide policy. Because Dr.

13 Clendenin is not properly substituted for any Doe defendant described in the original complaint,

14 plaintiff cannot avail herself of California’s relation-back doctrine for Doe defendants. Plaintiff

15 would have needed to file suit against Dr. Clendenin within four years after the April 2020 attack

16 (two years under the personal injury statute and two additional years for equitable tolling). Thus,

17 plaintiff’s addition of Dr. Clendenin as a defendant in the TAC filed in August 2025 is too late.

18 The Court additionally finds that the allegations against Dr. Clendenin are lacking on their

19 face. Plaintiff concedes that any suit against Dr. Clendenin in her official capacity would be barred

20 by Eleventh Amendment immunity and asserts in her opposition that Dr. Clendenin is sued in her

21 personal capacity.4 Opp’n at 9, 13. But there are no plausible allegations tying Dr. Clendenin to

22 the incident involving Braun and plaintiff. The TAC lumps Dr. Clendenin (the director of a

23 California statewide agency) with Napa State Hospital personnel. The TAC alleges, for instance,

24 that Dr. Clendenin was aware of the risk Braun posed and participated in the decision to place

25 plaintiff in Unit T-11 alongside Braun. See TAC ¶¶ 29, 79, 102-103, 121. As to Dr. Clendenin,

26 these allegations are simply implausible.

27

1 The claims against Dr. Clendenin are dismissed with prejudice. Leave to amend is not

2 granted because amendment could not cure the statute of limitations defect.

3

4 C. Transgender Treatment Advisory Committee

5 Defendants also argue that the six individual defendants who comprise the Napa State

6 Hospital Transgender Treatment Advisory Committee should be dismissed under Eleventh

7 Amendment immunity. In response, plaintiff states that she is suing these individuals in their

8 individual rather than official capacities and therefore Eleventh Amendment immunity does not

9 apply. Opp’n at 12-14. In the reply brief, defendants raise the new argument that the TTAC

10 defendants should be dismissed because the complaint does not “validly allege the ‘integral

11 participation’ of each defendant.” Reply at 8-9.

12 Typically, the Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.

13 And even setting that aside, the Court disagrees with defendants that the allegations regarding the

14 Transgender Treatment Advisory Committee’s actions are insufficient. The TAC alleges that the

15 defendants named as part of the Napa State Hospital Transgender Treatment Advisory Committee

16 “were aware that Braun posed a specific heightened risk of danger to other patients due to Braun’s

17 general history of violence and particular history of violence against women[,]” made the decision

18 to place Braun in Unit T-11, were aware of plaintiff’s three reports regarding Braun’s unwanted and

19 threatening conduct, and took no steps to investigate or otherwise protect plaintiff from Braun. TAC

20 ¶¶ 24, 29, 33, 43, 52-56. The Court finds these allegations sufficient to require the individual TTAC

21 members to remain as defendants at this stage. Although plaintiff will, at the end of the day, need

22 to prove liability as to each individual member of the TTAC, see Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292,

23 295 (9th Cir. 1996), the Court will not require such detailed factual allegations at this stage, with

24 discovery still underway.

25 The cases that defendants cite in their reply do not help them. See Reply at 8 (citing Barren

26 v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Chuman, 76 F.3d at 293; Boyd v. Benton Cnty.,

27 374 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 2004)). Those cases were: dismissed based on a total lack of allegations

1 jury instruction (Chuman); or decided on summary judgment (Boyd). None of them stand for the

2 proposition that a plaintiff must set forth in the pleadings each individual defendant’s precise

3 involvement, when the defendants comprise part of a team. Indeed, in the portion of Boyd relevant

4 to this issue, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the officers’ argument that

5 only the officer who threw the flash-bang device could be liable for a constitutional violation,

6 explaining that the “integral participation” requirement under the case law “does not require that

7 each officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 374 F.3d at 780.

8 The Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss the defendant TTAC members from the

9 case.

10

11 D. Psychotherapist Immunity

12 Defendants argue that Muchin, Singh, Inocencio, Ferster, Jahangiri, Long, and Real have

13 psychotherapist immunity from plaintiff’s claims that they failed to protect her against inpatient

14 Braun’s violence, under California Civil Code section 43.92. Of these defendants, Muchin, Singh,

15 and Long were members of the hospital’s Transgender Treatment Advisory Committee and Ferster,

16 Jahangiri, and Real “were members of the treatment team assigned to manage Plaintiff’s treatment.”

17 TAC ¶¶ 4, 6. Plaintiff argues that defendants misapply the psychotherapist immunity and that it

18 does not extend to situations such those alleged here.

19 California Civil Code section 43.92 provides, in part, that “[t]here shall be no monetary

20 liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any person who is a psychotherapist

21 as defined in Section 1010 of the Evidence Code in failing to protect from a patient’s threatened

22 violent behavior or failing to predict and protect from a patient’s violent behavior except if the

23 patient has communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a

24 reasonably identifiable victim or victims.” Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92(a).

25 Here, plaintiff is correct that defendants misapply the psychotherapist immunity. They

26 essentially seek “absolute immunity” for all the individual defendants who are psychotherapists.

27 But the statute stands for the proposition that “otherwise confidential information conveyed to a

1 the patient presents a significant danger to himself, herself or others.” Ewing v. Goldstein, 120 Cal.

2 App. 4th 807, 817 (2004). The statute is simply inapplicable to the facts presented here. There are

3 no allegations in the TAC that any therapist should have taken action based on something Braun

4 disclosed to them in therapy. Nor does plaintiff allege that she told the therapists anything in

5 confidence. Rather, she made reports to defendants of Braun’s concerning and threatening behavior

6 and expected them, as Napa State Hospital employees, to do something about it. See Brackin v. Cal.

7 Dep’t of State Hosps., No. C 15-03351 WHA, 2016 WL 3185021, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016)

8 (denying Napa State Hospital employees Section 43.92 immunity from negligence claim brought

9 by inpatient attacked by fellow inpatient). In an apparent concession, defendants do not address this

10 argument further in their reply brief.

11 The Court declines to dismiss any of the defendants based on psychotherapist immunity.

12

13 III. Failure to State a Claim

14 The remainder of defendants’ motion targets each of plaintiff’s claims as insufficient under

15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

16

17 A. Supervisory Liability (Claims Two and Four)

18 Defendants move to dismiss the claims for supervisory liability brought against defendants

19 Black and Inocencio under Section 1983. The TAC alleges supervisory liability under Section 1983

20 for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Failure to Protect (Claim Two) and Invasion of

21 Privacy (Claim Four). Defendants argue that these claims are based on a theory of vicarious liability

22 that is not allowed under the law and that the factual allegations of supervisory liability are

23 inadequate. Plaintiff argues in response that she “does not allege any claims based on a theory of

24 vicarious liability” but that she “has alleged that the supervisors themselves acted or failed to act

25 with a conscious disregard to Plaintiff’s rights.” Opp’n at 18. She argues that “[t]he actions and

26 failures to act of the hospital administrators create personal liability for them, not simply vicarious

27 liability.” Id.

1 of vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2001)

2 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Ninth Circuit has explained

3 that “[a] supervisor may be liable under § 1983 only if there exists either (1) his or her personal

4 involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the

5 supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

6 citations omitted). “In order to adequately plead such a claim, ‘allegations in a complaint . . . may

7 not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of

8 underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.’”

9 Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1004 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1216 (9th

10 Cir. 2011)).

11 The Court agrees with defendants that Claims Two and Four must be dismissed. Contrary

12 to the position plaintiff takes in her opposition brief, the allegations of the TAC themselves show

13 that Claims Two and Four are premised on a theory of vicarious liability. The TAC does not allege

14 any plausible facts showing Black or Inocencio’s involvement as supervisors but repeatedly focuses

15 on the conduct of their subordinates. See, e.g., TAC ¶¶ 89 (“the acts and/or failures to act of the

16 subordinates of Defendant Cindy Black and Defendant Veronica Inocencio deprived Plaintiff of

17 the right to safe conditions . . . through the subordinates’ decision to place Braun in Unit T-11

18 with Plaintiff . . .”); (emphases added), 112, 115 (“Defendant Cindy Black and Defendant Veronica

19 Inocencio engaged in conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the deprivation by

20 the subordinates . . .”). Any allegations directed to Black or Inocencio’s own conduct as

21 supervisors are conclusory. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 90-91, 113-114. To the extent plaintiff is alleging that

22 Black or Inocencio themselves engaged in conduct that deprived plaintiff of her constitutional rights,

23 those claims are already stated against Black and Inocencio in Claims One (Failure to Protect) and

24 Three (Invasion of Privacy), which are brought against all defendants.

25 Claims Two and Four are dismissed from the case with prejudice. Given the late stage of

26 this case, that plaintiff has already filed three amended complaints with the assistance of counsel,

27 and that defendant Black has been in this case from the beginning (indeed, since the earlier-filed

1 B. Failure to Protect (Claim One)

2 Defendants seek to dismiss Claim One, which alleges a constitutional failure to protect the

3 plaintiff, a patient involuntarily committed at a state hospital, from harm by another inpatient.

4 Defendants argue that Claim One fails because, they say, plaintiff “fails to allege any specific history

5 of violence” by Braun or any prior conduct to indicate that Braun “was a violent threat to Plaintiff.”

6 Mot. at 12. Defendants are incorrect.

7 At the outset, the Court notes that it is up for debate whether plaintiff must allege the facts

8 regarding Braun’s history of violence that defendants say she must. See Brackin, 2016 WL

9 3185021, at *4 (discussing Estate of Conners by Meredith v. O’Connor, 846 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir.

10 1988)). Even so, the allegations of the TAC are sufficient. The TAC alleges that Braun was

11 committed to Napa State Hospital “after being adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity on a

12 charge of second degree murder.” TAC ¶ 21. The TAC also alleges that plaintiff made three reports

13 of Braun’s concerning conduct in the weeks leading up to the April 2020 incident in which Braun

14 stabbed plaintiff. More specifically, plaintiff made reports: (1) after “Braun began making sexual

15 and romantic advances toward Plaintiff” that made plaintiff uncomfortable; (2) after Braun “became

16 verbally aggressive” when plaintiff rebuffed those advances, calling plaintiff epithets and

17 aggressively making “a hand gesture as if Braun was firing a handgun at Plaintiff[;]” and (3) after

18 Braun approached plaintiff in the shared shower facilities and “asked Plaintiff for sex, including

19 oral sex” and then—after plaintiff said “no”—“slid open the shower curtain and asked Plaintiff if

20 she wanted to see Braun’s penis.” Id. ¶¶ 30-32; 37-38; 47-49. Plaintiff alleges that the members of

21 her treatment team, the members of the Napa State Hospital Transgender Treatment Advisory

22 Committee (who placed Braun in Unit T-11), and supervisors Black and Inocencio were aware of

23 these three reports. Id. ¶¶ 33, 43, 52.

24 Thus, the facts alleged here are not so different from the case that defendants cite, Estate of

25 Conners. There, a Napa State Hospital inpatient was murdered by another inpatient who was

26 permitted to roam the grounds “despite his homicidal propensities[.]” See 846 F.2d at 1206-07.

27 Similar to Braun, who was committed following charges of second-degree murder, the attacker in

1 insanity to a charge of rape and murder of another young woman.” See id. at 1207 n.2; TAC ¶ 21.

2 And two to three weeks before the murder of the fellow inpatient, the attacker committed an assault

3 with a deadly weapon and attempted rape on another female inpatient. Id. The Ninth Circuit

4 explained, “The man’s character was thus well known to someone at the hospital, if not to these

5 named defendants.” Id. The district court had denied the motion by Napa State Hospital officials

6 for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, finding genuine issues of material fact

7 existed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

8 Here, the allegations regarding Braun’s known violent propensities, and that Braun’s threats

9 were directed at plaintiff in particular, are far from conclusory. Rather, they bear striking similarity

10 to the facts of the case in Estate of Conners. It does not reflect well on defendants to take the

11 position that a gesture of firing a handgun at someone does not constitute a “threat of violence” or

12 that an inpatient asking another inpatient for sex in the shower does not create “any indicia of a

13 safety concern.” See Mot. at 14-15.

14 The Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim One.

15

16 C. Invasion of Privacy (Claim Three)

17 Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation of her

18 right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment, both for lack of factual allegations and on

19 qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiff alleges that, at all relevant times, “it was clearly established

20 that patients committed in state hospitals have a right to privacy, including a right to bathroom,

21 shower, and sleeping conditions outside the view of patients of the opposite sex.” TAC ¶ 100. She

22 alleges defendants violated this right “through their decision to place Plaintiff in Unit T-11 alongside

23 Braun, where Plaintiff and Braun would share bathroom and shower facilities and where there was

24 no locked door preventing Braun from entering Plaintiffs [sic] room at any time the rooms were

25 occupied, and in their decision to initially place Braun in the same room as Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 102.

26 The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil

27 damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

1 The rule of “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

2 violate the law.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

3 335, 341 (1986)). A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must determine whether the

4 plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and whether such right was

5 clearly established such that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful

6 in the situation he confronted. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier,

7 533 U.S. at 201). The court may exercise its discretion in deciding which prong to address first, in

8 light of the particular circumstances of each case. Id. at 236.

9 Here, the Court finds that Claim Three fails at the outset because plaintiff has not shown that

10 the right she seeks to vindicate was clearly established in February to April, 2020, when the events

11 at issue took place. “A right is clearly established only if its contours are sufficiently clear that ‘a

12 reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ . . . In other words,

13 ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’”

14 Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 16 (2014) (citations omitted). Plaintiff cites no authority for her

15 position that it was clearly established as of spring 2020 that it would violate the constitutional rights

16 of a female patient committed to a state mental institution to house her with a male-to-female

17 transgender patient. The TAC, rather, asserts that Braun was placed in Unit T-11 pursuant to a

18 California statewide policy on treatment of transgender and gender-nonconforming patients. See

19 TAC ¶¶ 8-11. Plaintiff concedes in her brief that “the vast majority of case law” on the right to

20 bodily privacy “involves claims that state officials viewed the naked body of an institutionalized

21 person of the opposite sex[,]” and the cases she cites describe those scenarios. See Opp’n at 16-17

22 (citing Vazquez v. Cnty. of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2020); Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd.

23 of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2017)). Far from being clearly established, the question

24 whether transgender persons may use shared bathroom or locker facilities with non-transgender

25 persons is being actively litigated in the courts today, with some courts coming down on the opposite

26 side of the issue from what plaintiff advocates here. See, e.g., Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown

27 Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 526, 530-31 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction

1 rooms, finding “the appellants are unlikely to succeed in establishing a violation of their right to

2 privacy based on a transgender student potentially viewing them in a state of undress in a locker

3 room or restroom”); Magalengo v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 796 F. Supp. 3d 28 (E.D. Pa.

4 2025) (dismissing bodily privacy claim on same grounds). And even if the right has been established

5 in other contexts, it is far from clear that those contexts would map onto the relevant setting here,

6 that of a state-run hospital for civilly committed patients. See Boyertown, 897 F.3d at 528 (“The

7 constitutional right to privacy is not absolute. It must be weighed against important competing

8 governmental interests.”) (citations omitted).

9 The Court finds defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Claim Three and therefore

10 dismisses Claim Three with prejudice.

11

12 D. Negligence and Negligent Supervision (Claims Five and Six)

13 Finally, defendants move to dismiss the negligence and negligent supervision claims on

14 timeliness grounds. Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to submit a timely claim against the

15 individual defendants as required under California Government Code section 911.2. Plaintiff argues

16 that her claim was timely and that it was proper for her to name “Does” in her government claim

17 because their identities were unknown to her. Defendants do not further address this in their reply

18 brief.

19 The Court rejected a nearly identical argument by defendants over a year and a half ago

20 when ruling on defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. No. 32 at 13-14. The

21 Court rejects defendants’ argument for the same reasons now. As noted in the prior Order,

22 California Government Code section 910.6 allows a government claim for bodily injury to be

23 amended “at any time” before the expiration of six months after the accrual of the cause of action

24 “or before final action thereon is taken by the board, whichever is later, if the claim as amended

25 relates to the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise to the original claim. The amendment

26 shall be considered a part of the original claim for all purposes.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 910.6(a)

27 (emphasis added). Here, defendants’ own records show that plaintiff amended her government

1 D at 1. Because she amended her claim naming these defendants within six months of accrual of

2 || her claim, it was timely under Government Code sections 910.6 and 911.2. See id.; see also Cal.

3 Gov’t Code § 910(e) (providing that the claim shall state “[t]he name or names of the public

4 || employee or employees causing the injury, damage or loss, if known”) (emphasis added).°

5 The Court denies the motion to dismiss the claims for negligence (Claim Five) and negligent

6 supervision (Claim Six).

4

8 CONCLUSION

9 For the foregoing reasons, the claims against defendant Clendenin are dismissed from this

10 || case with prejudice. The supervisory liability claims (Claims Two and Four) are dismissed with

11 prejudice. The invasion of privacy claim (Claim Three) is dismissed with prejudice. The balance

12 || of the motion is denied.

5 13 Thus, what remain in this case are: Failure to Protect (Claim One), against all defendants

14 || except Clendenin; Negligence (Claim Five), against all defendants except Clendenin; and Negligent

3 15 Supervision (Claim Six), against defendants Black and Inocencio. Per plaintiffs briefing and the

16 || discussion on the record at oral argument, all claims are brought against all defendants in their

3 17 individual capacities, with the exception of defendant Black, who is sued in both her individual and

18 official capacities.

19

20 IT IS SO ORDERED.

21 Dated: January 13, 2026

73 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

24

25

26

27

28 > Defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice, Dkt. No. 78, is granted.