Kadhem

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

TUQA RAHIM KADHEM,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:26-cv-0011

Judge James L. Graham

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Preston

Deavers

CITY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Tuqa Rahim Kadhim, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing an

application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Motion (ECF No. 1) is

GRANTED. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs

had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute

her action without prepayment of fees or costs.

This matter is also before the Court for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Compl.,

ECF No. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to

recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. For the reasons below, the

Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the

statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may

have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the

court determines that–

(B) the action or appeal–

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, Section 1915(e) requires sua

sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or

malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

“A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim

with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law.” Brown v. Kruse, No. 1:15-CV-526, 2015 WL

5907557, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2015) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328–29), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-CV-526, 2015 WL 5836009 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2015). “An

action has no arguable legal basis when the . . . plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest

which clearly does not exist. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are

delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible.” Id. (citations and quotations

1 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

omitted). The Court does not need to accept as true factual allegations that are fantastical or

delusional. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards

to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the

authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502,

503 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

The Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th

Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits: “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

In addition, when it is evident from the face of the complaint that a court lacks federal

jurisdiction, the court may dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under both 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Williams v. Cincy Urban

Apts., No. 1:10-CV-153, 2010 WL 883846, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Carlock v.

Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)).

II. ANALYSIS

The Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed. Construing

Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, she alleges that Defendant Frojas, a City of Columbus police

officer, and Defendant Sprowl “acted under color of law for violating [her] constitutional rights .

. . .” (Compl. at PageID 6.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants Frojas and Sprowl created a

police report and included the false statement that she walked into the street. (Id.) Plaintiff sues

the City of Columbus as “the municipal entity responsible for Columbus [] Division of Police”

and seeks a Court Order directing Defendant City of Columbus to correct an official police

report. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendants Frojas and Sprowl for emotional distress

and harm to her reputation. (Id. at PageID 7.)

The Undersigned construes Plaintiff’s allegations as an attempt to bring a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under this statute, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he or she was

deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the

United States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155–57 (1978). Plaintiff, however, does not identify with

any specificity what constitutional rights she believes that Defendants Frojas and Sprowl

violated; nor does she provide more than a conclusory statement that Defendants Frojas and

Sprowl acted under color of law. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (A complaint will not “suffice if it

tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557); Frengler, 482 F. App’x at 976–77 (“‘[C]ourts should not have to guess at the nature

of the claim asserted.’”) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d at 594).

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to bring a § 1983 claim against Defendant City of

Columbus, that claim would be governed by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Monell “requires that, for liability to attach, a constitutional violation

‘occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.’” Westbrook v. City of Cincinnati, 667 F.

Supp. 3d 665, 670 (S.D. Ohio 2023) (quoting Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir.

2013)). To satisfy Monell, a plaintiff can assert one of four things: “(1) the existence of an

illegal official policy or enactment; (2) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or

supervision; (3) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence to federal rights

violations; or (4) that an official with final decision-making authority ratified the illegal actions.”

Id. Here, Plaintiff makes no detailed allegations of any official policy, failure to train, a custom

of tolerance or acquiescence to federal rights violations, or decision by a final policymaker that

might give rise to a claim under Monell. Plaintiff provides nothing more than a conclusory

statement that Defendant City of Columbus is responsible for the Columbus Division of Police.

(Compl. at PageID 6.)

In addition, Plaintiff frames her request for a Court Order directing Defendant City of

Columbus to correct the police report as “injunctive relief”: “I sue the city in its official capacity

solely for injunctive relief to correct the office report.” (Id. (cleaned up).) “When seeking . . .

injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show actual present harm or a significant possibility of future

harm in order to demonstrate the need for pre-enforcement review.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v.

Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff fails to allege an ongoing or a significant

possibility of future violations of her constitutional rights by any Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff

fails to cite any authority permitting a federal court to provide the relief she seeks. The

Undersigned finds none.

The Undersigned finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Accordingly, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed in

their entirety.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS

the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

The Undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the Court certify pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report

and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to

appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within 14 DAYS, file and serve on all parties any objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Responses to objections must be filed within 14 DAYS after being served with a copy. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge

and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. Even when timely

objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v.

Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report,

which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . .

. .” (citation omitted)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: January 27, 2026 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE