Gavilan-Cruz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PEDRO LUIS GAVILAN-CRUZ, : No. 3:24-CV-1945

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Munley)

V. :

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ss:

CORRECTIONS, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Pedro Luis Gavilan-Cruz initiated the above-captioned pro se action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' alleging that Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections officials and medical personnel at a state prison violated his

constitutional rights. The court will dismiss Gavilan-Cruz’s Section 1983 claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and grant him one final opportunity to

amend.

I. BACKGROUND

During all times relevant, Gavilan-Cruz was confined at the State

Correctional Institution, Mahanoy (SCI Mahanoy), located in Frackville,

Pennsylvania. (Doc. 14 2). He initially filed an abbreviated complaint seeking

' Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed □□

state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves as a mechanism fo

vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273

284-85 (2002).

a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. (Doc. 1). That complaint

was screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and dismissed without prejudice.

(See generally Docs. 12, 13).

Gavilan-Cruz then filed a lengthy amended complaint, which spans 46

pages and contains more than 364 paragraphs. (See generally Doc. 14). The

gravamen of his amended complaint is that he was experiencing urinary retentior

issues and allegedly did not receive proper medical care from SCI Mahanoy

medical providers. He alleges that from August 2024 through November 2024,

he experienced problems emptying his bladder, including what he believes to be

“urethral collapse,” but that he did not receive appropriate treatment and was not

afforded a consultation with an outside specialist. (See id. J] 32-90). His claims

sound predominantly in Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs, but he also alleges First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection claims. He additionally asserts multiple state-law

torts, including but not limited to battery, fraudulent misrepresentation, lack of

informed consent, negligence, medical malpractice, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Gavilan-Cruz sues the following defendants: the Pennsylvania Department

of Corrections (DOC), SCI Mahanoy, Wellpath LLC (Wellpath), the Bureau of

Health Care Services, Dorina Varner, Keri Moore, Superintendent B. Mason, J.

Mahallay, L. Banta, Christina Hauser, Rachael Mosells (incorrectly identified in

the amended complaint as “Rachel Howells”), J. Eyer, Michele Donovan, E.

Gower, Nicholle Boguslaw, Catherine Fisher, Lynda Hiltner, C. Toms, and three

unidentified SCI Mahanoy medical providers (John Doe, Jane Doe #1, and Jane

Doe #2, collectively ‘Doe Defendants”). (See id. J] 4-23). He sues all

Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Id. at p. 1). He seeks

retrospective declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and

prospective injunctive relief in the form of better medical care. (Id. at p. 45).

In November 2024, defendant Wellpath filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. (See Doc

10; Doc. 10-1). This case was subsequently stayed pursuant to the automatic

stay entered by the bankruptcy court. (See Doc. 15). Following the lifting of the

automatic stay, the court reopened this case. {See Doc. 18).

Wellpath then moved for dismissal of the claims against it, as those claims

had been discharged in bankruptcy. (See Doc. 20). The court granted that

motion, dismissing all claims against Wellpath. (See Doc. 22). The court

additionally directed counsel for Wellpath to identify any named defendants who

were current or former Wellpath employees, as claims against those employees

may have been released as part of the Chapter 11 plan. (See Doc. 23). Counse

for Wellpath identified Nicholle Boguslaw, Rachael Mosells, and Catherine Fisher

as current or former Wellpath employees. (See Doc. 24).

The court then ordered Gavilan-Cruz to show cause as to whether he had

affirmatively opted out of the Third-Party Release contained in Wellpath’s

confirmed Chapter 11 plan so that he could pursue pre-petition claims against

Boguslaw, Mosells, and Fisher. (See Doc. 25). Gavilan-Cruz did not offer any

allegation or evidence that he had opted out of the Third-Party Release or □□□□□□

any other relief in the Chapter 11 proceeding, and therefore all claims against

Boguslaw, Mosells, and Fisher were dismissed without prejudice to Gavilan-

Cruz’s right to pursue relief in the bankruptcy court. (See Doc. 27).

Presently before the court are the remaining claims in Gavilan-Cruz’s

amended complaint. Upon screening as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), he

fails to state a claim under Section 1983.

ll. ©STANDARD OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,”

unrepresented prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or

employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). One basis for dismissal at the screening

stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted[.]” Id. § 1915A(b)(1). This language closely tracks Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to screening a

pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as they

utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Grayson v.

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 &n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O'Brien v.

U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(nonprecedential); cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The court must

accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v.

County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). In addition to the facts

alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits

attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly

authentic documents” attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's

claims are based upon these documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230

(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998

F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct 4

three-step inquiry. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d

Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). At

step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to

state a claim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)

(alterations in original)). Second, the court should distinguish well-pleaded

factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal conclusions,

which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be disregarded. ld.

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Finally, the court must review the presumed-

truthful allegations “and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Deciding plausibility is

a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

Because Gavilan-Cruz proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally

construed and his amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). This is particularly true

when the pro Se litigant, like Gavilan-Cruz, is incarcerated. See Dooley v.

Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

lll. DISCUSSION

Gavilan-Cruz asserts Section 1983 claims under the First, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. He additionally asserts a host of state-law tort claims.

The court will address, in turn, his multiple pleading deficiencies that require

dismissal of his federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

A. Personal Involvement

It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556. U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens

context). Rather, a Section 1983 plaintiff must plausibly plead facts that

demonstrate the defendant’s “personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.”

Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). Personal involvement can

include direct wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated

through evidence of “personal direction” or “actual knowledge and

acquiescence’; however, such averments must be made with particularity. Id.

(quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). Furthermore, it is equally settled that

involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does not give rise to

Section 1983 liability. See id. (affirming dismissal of claims against prison

officials for lack of personal involvement when officials’ “only involvement” was

“their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s grievance”); Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp.

3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x

923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x

>

924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s claims

against certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations

against them “merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance

process’).

First, any Section 1983 claims against defendants Varner, Moore,

Mahallay, Gower, and Donovan must be dismissed for lack of personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional misconduct. These Defendants’ only

involvement appears to be the handling of Gavilan-Cruz’s grievances. (See Doc.

14 Jf] 71-76). Yet involvement in the post-incident grievance process does not

plausibly allege personal involvement in a constitutional violation.

Second, Gavilan-Cruz attempts to assert supervisory liability claims against

Varner, Moore, Mason, Mahallay, Eyer, Banta, Hauser, Toms, Gower, and

Hiltner. (See id. J] 204-222). His allegations, however, fall woefully short of

plausibly alleging personal involvement, as he lumps all Defendants together and

does not assert what each particular Defendant did or did not do that would

establish supervisory liability for a constitutional violation. As just one example,

he alleges that these Defendants should be liable for Fourteenth Amendment

equal protection violations because they “directly or indirectly acting under color

of state law[] approved or ratified the unlawful . . . conduct of [djefendants

[Mosells], Fisher, Boguslaw, John Doef[], [and] Jane Does #1 and 2 as heretofore

described.” (Id. 220). In no way does this sentence plausibly allege personal

involvement for supervisory liability for a constitutional tort claim. Consequently,

all Section 1983 claims must be dismissed against Varner, Moore, Mason,

Mahallay, Eyer, Banta, Hauser, Toms, Gower, Donovan, and Hiltner pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for lack of personal involvement.

B. “Person” for Section 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (emphasis

supplied) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983)). Only “persons” are subject to suit under Section 1983; state agencies

such as the DOC do not qualify. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 64-65, 71 (1989) (explaining that a state is not a “person” for Section 1983

purposes); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (noting that a state

agency may not be sued under Section 1983 because it is not a “person”); Foye

v. Wexford Health Sources Inc., 675 F. App’x 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2017)

(nonprecedential) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against prison and

Department of Corrections because they “are not persons subject to suit under”

Section 1983).

Gavilan-Cruz cannot sue the DOC, SCI Mahanoy, or the Bureau of Health

Care Services under Section 1983 because these state entities are not “persons”

subject to Section 1983 liability. See Fischer, 474 F.2d at 992; Foye, 675 F.

App’x at 215. Additionally, any claim against a state agency, entity, or

department is akin to suing the state itself, and such claims are generally barred

by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d

281, 284 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that any Section 1983 action by prisoner

against Pennsylvania Parole Board is barred by Eleventh Amendment); Laskaris

v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The eleventh amendment’s bar

[against civil rights suits in federal court targeting a state] extends to suits against

departments or agencies of the state having no existence apart from the state.”);

Foye, 675 F. App’x at 215. Accordingly, to the extent that any Section 1983

claim is asserted against the DOC, SCI Mahanoy, or the Bureau of Health Care

Services, that claim will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”

Gavilan-Cruz asserts a Section 1983 claim against Wellpath pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of

Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for an alleged unlawful policy. (See Doc. 14

{1 223-28). This constitutional tort claim (along with any other claim against Wellpath) was

Doo 3), in the court's September 25, 2025 order, as it was discharged in bankruptcy. (See

C. Official Capacity Claims

Gavilan-Cruz sues all prison-official Defendants in their individual and

official capacities. However, any official capacity claim seeking monetary

damages from state officials is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents

federal courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of

foreign states—brought against a state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur

d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.

1, 10 (1890). This immunity from private suit extends to state agencies as well

as state officials acting in their official capacity because such lawsuits are

essentially civil actions “against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). States may waive this immunity if they choose,

but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its immunity with respect to claims

brought under Section 1983. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8521(b); Downey v.

Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth

Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42 Pa. CONS. STAT.

§ 8521(b)). There are two exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to

private suits against nonconsenting states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s

immunity” and (2) “parties may sue state officers for prospective injunctive and

declaratory relief.” Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa.,

141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

Gavilan-Cruz’s official capacity claims, to the extent they seek monetary

damages, are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. And his

request for declaratory relief is retrospective in nature, so it does not meet the

exception to sovereign immunity noted above. Insofar as he requests

prospective injunctive relief (i.e., being provided different or additional medical

care), his official capacity claims potentially could move forward against

appropriate SCI Mahanoy officials capable of granting relief. However, as

explained below, Gavilan-Cruz fails to plausibly allege an underlying Section

1983 violation, so there is no basis for prospective injunctive relief and any

official capacity claim seeking such relief fails.

D. First Amendment Retaliation

Gavilan-Cruz alleges that Mosells, Fisher, Boguslaw, John Doe, Jane Doe

#1, and Jane Doe #2 retaliated against him for filing grievances by providing

deficient medical care. (Doc. 14 Ff} 80, 137-43). First, Mosells, Fisher, and

Boguslaw have been dismissed from this action and require no further

discussion. Second, Gavilan-Cruz’s retaliation claim against the unidentified Doe

Defendants fails because he has not plausibly alleged causation.

Although a prisoner's constitutional rights are necessarily circumscribed, an

inmate still retains First Amendment protections when they are “not inconsistent”

with prisoner status or with the “legitimate penological objectives of the

corrections system.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017)

(quoting Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010)). To state a First

Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly plead that (1) “he was

engaged in constitutionally protected conduct,” (2) he suffered an “adverse

action” by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from

exercising his First Amendment rights, and (3) the plaintiff's protected conduct

was a “substantial or motivating factor’ in the prison officials’ decision to take the

adverse action. Id. (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001));

Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Rauser, 241 F.3d at

333).

There are a variety of ways to establish causation for a First Amendment

retaliation claim. One method is to show “unusually suggestive” timing between

the protected conduct and the adverse action. See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.

DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). When a plaintiff relies solely on

circumstantial evidence of temporal proximity, the time between the protected

conduct and the adverse action is often measured in days rather than weeks or

months. See Conard v. Pa. State Police, 902 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2018).

However, there is no “bright line rule limiting the length of time that may pass

between a plaintiffs protected speech and an actionable retaliatory act by a

defendant.” Id. Another approach is to demonstrate “a pattern of antagonism

coupled with timing.” DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267. Finally, causation can be

inferred “from the evidence gleaned from the record as a whole.” Watson v.

Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 424 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers

Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)). Logically, a plaintiff asserting retaliation

“will have to show... that the decision maker had knowledge of the protected

activity[.]” Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 351 (3d Cir. 2006)

(citation omitted).

Gavilan-Cruz’s allegation that he filed grievances is sufficient to plead

protected First Amendment conduct. And at screening, the court assumes—

without deciding—that intentionally providing deficient medical care could rise to

the level of an adverse action. However, Gavilan-Cruz has not plausibly alleged

the third retaliation element: that the Doe Defendants were substantially

motivated by his protected conduct to take an adverse action against him.

First, he does not allege that he named any of the Doe Defendants in his

grievances. Instead, he asserts that he “personally included defendants Mason,

Eyer, Banta, and Hauser.” (Doc. 14 J 71). Second, he does not plausibly plead

facts demonstrating how the Doe Defendants would even have knowledge of the

aA

grievances, as they were not identified in the grievances and it does not appear

that they took part in any investigation or response thereto. (See id. {| 71-76).

It is well settled that causation cannot be inferred simply by asserting that a

plaintiff pursued some protected activity (like a lawsuit or prison grievance)

against a defendant or nonparty prison official who is not the alleged perpetrator

of the retaliatory adverse action. See, e.g., Nunez v. Wetzel, No. 1:21-cv-01484,

2023 WL 2385931, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2023) (collecting cases); Kendrick v.

Hann, No. 1:19-cv-01642, 2021 WL 2914986, at *9 (M.D. Pa. July 12, 2021);

Murray v. Smithbower, No. 1:17-cv-0127, 2021 WL 1103524, at *7 (M.D. Pa.

Mar. 23, 2021); Horan v. Collins, No. 1:13-cv-00140, 2016 WL 5030468, at *6

(M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2016); Victor v. Lawler, No. 3:07-cv-2058, 2010 WL 5014555,

at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2010); Evans v. Rozum, No. 07-cv-230J, 2009 WL

5064490, at *22 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2009) (“[T]here is no apparent reason why

[the moving defendants] would want to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing a lawsuit

against others.” (second alteration in original)); Royster v. Beard, No. 1:06-cv-

0842, 2008 WL 2914516, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 24, 2008) (concluding that plaintiff

failed to satisfy the causal connection for his retaliation claim against defendant

because previous grievance did not name or impact that defendant), aff'd 308 F.

App’x 576 (3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential) (agreeing with district court analysis).

Such general allegations fail to establish or even infer knowledge of the protected

4c

conduct, and they likewise fail to show why a defendant would take the alleged

adverse action.

Gavilan-Cruz’s First Amendment claims against the Doe Defendants fail

because he has not plausibly alleged causation. Dismissal of these First

Amendment claims is thus required for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

E. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claims

Gavilan-Cruz asserts his equal protection claims against the same

Defendants: Mosells, Fisher, Bogusilaw, John Doe, Jane Doe #1, and Jane Doe

#2. (See Doc. 14 J] 144-50). As noted, Mosells, Fisher, and Boguslaw have

been dismissed from this action and require no further discussion. As to Gavilan-

Cruz’s equal protection claims against the Doe Defendants, those claims fall

short as well.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that

“[n]o State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state a Fourteenth Amendment

equal protection claim, a prisoner must allege “that he was treated differently

than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different treatment was the

result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected

class[.]” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016). An

equal protection claim can also be asserted under a “class of one” theory,

whereby a plaintiff alleges that a state actor intentionally treated him differently

than others who are similarly situated “and there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 243 (quoting Village of Willowbrook

v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)).

Gavilan-Cruz’s amended complaint fails to plausibly plead an equal

protection violation. He does not allege membership in a protected class and

thus appears to be attempting to raise a “class of one” claim. Yet he has failed to

identify others who are similarly situated to him and who received intentionally

different treatment by a Doe Defendant, and thus he has failed to plausibly plead

a class-of-one equal protection claim against any Defendant. Although he states

in conclusory fashion that Defendants “treat[ed] him different [sic] than the many

John Does similarly situated prisoners [sic] who suffer urinary issues, urinary

retention, and catheters with leg bags,” this allegation is a mere conclusion of law

and does not contain any specific facts. Thus, it is not entitled to the assumption

of truth and can be disregarded. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787.°

3 To the extent that Gavilan-Cruz’s amended complaint can be construed as attempting to assert

a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, that claim fails as well. Gavilan-Cruz

has not identified an interest protected by the Due Process Clause of which he was deprived.

See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (requiring plaintiff to establish “life, liberty, or

property” interest that is “at stake” to pursue a due process claim). His threadbare assertion that

he has “a liberty interest in his body to not be mistreated without notice, hearing, and due process

of law where [he] had no other alternative for care,” (see Doc. 14 J 145), attempts to shoehorn

an Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim into a procedural due process cause of action.

A“)

F. Eighth Amendment Medical Indifference

The true essence of Gavilan-Cruz’s lawsuit is his claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. Although he attempts to assert five

different types of medical indifference claims, (see Doc. 14 Ff] 102-36), they

are—in actuality—one claim: that his medical treatment at SC] Mahanoy fell

below the constitutional minimum.

Once again, Gavilan-Cruz’s Eighth Amendment claims target Mosells,

Fisher, Boguslaw, John Doe, Jane Doe #1, and Jane Doe #2. But because

Mosells, Fisher, and Boguslaw are no longer part of this lawsuit, the court will

assess the sufficiency of his medical indifference claims against the remaining

Doe Defendants.

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment” to incarcerated individuals.

Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). To state an Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim regarding inadequate medical care, a

plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1) he had a serious medical need, (2) the

defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need; and (3) the deliberate

indifference caused harm to the plaintiff.”. Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 229

As such, any procedural due process claim that Gavilan-Cruz attempts to assert requires

dismissal under Section 1915A(b)(1).

(3d Cir, 2023) (citation omitted); see also Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility,

318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). A serious medical need is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a

lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”

Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir.

1987).

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical

treatment, and denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in

unnecessary suffering or risk of injury. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68

& n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346). Deliberate indifference

to serious medical needs is an exacting standard, requiring a showing of

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976) (citation omitted). Claims sounding in mere medical negligence will not

suffice. Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

Gavilan-Cruz has plainly identified a serious medical need. He plausibly

alleges urinary retention, catheterization, potential urethral “collapse,” and severe

pain.

His medical indifference claims, however, fail at the second element. That

is, he has not plausibly alleged that a Defendant (or Defendants) exhibited

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. This failure is primarily a

result of Gavilan-Cruz’s cryptic pleading. During the main section of his

complaint where he sets forth the facts related to his medical conditions and

treatment, he repeatedly alleges that “Jane Doe #1 or 2 or John Doe [] or

[Mosells] or Fisher or Boguslaw” took some action or failed to take some action

with respect to his medical care. (See, e.g., Doc. 14 Jf] 52, 56-60, 63, 65-67, 79,

80, 87). From this vague and imprecise style of pleading, it is simply impossible

to determine whether Gavilan-Cruz has plausibly alleged that any Defendant

knew of his serious medical needs and acted with deliberate indifference toward

them.

Moreover, for the few paragraphs of his amended complaint where he

provides more precise allegations about a specific Defendant, those allegations

do not rise to the level of constitutional misconduct. For example, he alleges that

on the first day of his symptoms, “Jane Does #1 and 2 and defendant [Mosells]”

negligently installed a catheter and prescribed Flomax to treat his urinary

retention symptoms. (See id. Jf] 37-39). In paragraph 42, he alleges that Jane

Doe #1 negligently inserted a Foley catheter to treat his urinary retention

symptoms several days later. (Id. ff] 41-42). In paragraph 45, he asserts that

an

Jane Doe #1 negligently installed another catheter to treat his urinary retention,

which catheter later failed. (Id. | 45). In paragraph 49, he alleges that his

catheter broke and he saw Jane Doe #1, who informed him that “it needed a

tube” and then told him to “learn how to use it” properly, which remark Gavilan-

Cruz alleges was offered in a “rude manner.” (Id. 49). These allegations of

treatment provided by Defendants in response to Gavilan-Cruz’s repeated

requests for medical care in no way satisfy the high bar of deliberate indifference

At most, they sound in medical negligence (a term which Gavilan-Cruz frequently

employs), which does not implicate a constitutional violation.

G. Supervisory Liability

As noted above, Gavilan-Cruz attempts to assert supervisory liability claims

against numerous Defendants. He has not done so.

“[A] supervisor may be personally liable . . . if he or she participated in

violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” A.M.

ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted). Allegations of direction or of actual knowledge and

acquiescence, however, must be made with particularity. See Dealey, 957 F.3d

at 374.

54

Gavilan-Cruz alleges, in conclusory fashion, that Defendants “directly or

indirectly[] approved or ratified the unlawful . . . conduct of’ the Doe Defendants

and Mosells, Fisher, and Boguslaw. (Doc. 14 213). He also states that they

“allowed an environment to develop in which there [was] an unreasonable risk

that a constitutional injury [would] occur and such injury did occur[.]” (Id. □□ 214).

In a later paragraph, he broadly alleges that Defendants had the authority “to

implement more effective policies or practices” but failed to do so. (Id. □□ 216).

Yet he does not explain what policies were ineffective, much less what policies o1

practices Defendants should have implemented. Gavilan-Cruz also cursorily

asserts that Defendants “failed to instruct, supervise, control and discipline” their

employees, (id. | 205), and failed to “properly train and manage’ them, (id.

207). The foregoing vague and conclusory allegations are a far cry from

pleading with particularity. The allegations are, in actuality, mere legal

conclusions that are bereft of facts, which simply restate different types of

supervisory liability. Therefore, they do not plausibly state a supervisory liability

claim against any Defendant.

Gavilan-Cruz’s pleading problems are multiplied by the fact that, as noted

above, he does not plead specific, individualized action in the alleged supervisory

violations. Rather, he lumps all Defendants together and claims that they

committed some vague, collective action (or inaction) to violate his rights. Such

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pleading does not meet Section 1983’s requirement for personal involvement.

For both reasons, Gavilan-Cruz’s supervisory liability claims must be dismissed

under Section 1915A(b)(1).

H. State-Law Claims

Gavilan-Cruz asserts numerous state-law claims, including battery,

fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, medical malpractice, lack of informed

consent, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of

emotional distress. However, because all federal Section 1983 claims must be

dismissed, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Gavilan-

Cruz’s numerous state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine

Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (explaining general rule that if all

federal claims are dismissed before trial, courts should likewise dismiss pendent

state-law claims); Shaffer v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. Albert Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 730

F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that, absent “extraordinary

circumstances,” supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims should be

declined “where the federal claims are no longer viable” (citation omitted)).

I. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

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amendment would be inequitable or futile.”. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114. The cour

will grant Gavilan-Cruz one final opportunity to amend.

When reviewing Gavilan-Cruz’s amended complaint, the court finds that it

is unnecessarily complicated, long-winded, and lacking in substance. The

essence of the federal portion of his lawsuit is Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. More specifically, Gavilan-Cruz appears

to assert an adequacy-of-care claim against a handful of defendants. He

maintains that although he received substantial treatment by SC] Mahanoy

medical staff in the second half of 2024, that treatment was inadequate and

ineffective to address his urinary issues and thus fell below the constitutional

minimum. Instead of focusing on this adequacy-of-care claim against the

medical personnel who actually treated him, Gavilan-Cruz attempts to sue nearly

two dozen defendants and to assert numerous (often frivolous) causes of action.

Nevertheless, based on the facts alleged in the body of his amended

complaint, (Doc. 14 Jf] 32-90), it is possible that he could plausibly allege an

adequacy-of-care claim if he corrects the material pleading errors identified in

this Memorandum. The court will give him one final pleading opportunity to

attempt to do so.

If Gavilan-Cruz chooses to file a second amended complaint, it should be é

stand-alone document, complete in itself and without reference to any previous

dA

pleadings. The second amended complaint should set forth his claims in short,

concise, and plain statements, and in sequentially numbered paragraphs.

Gavilan-Cruz is admonished that he may not submit an overly lengthy, prolix

pleading similar to his amended complaint. See Glover v. F.D.1.C., 698 F.3d 139

147 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint be presented with clarity

sufficient to avoid requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift

through its pages in search of the nature of the plaintiff's claim.”); Garrett v.

Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that “a district court

acts within its discretion when it dismisses an excessively prolix and overlong

complaint,” especially after the litigant has been given an opportunity “to better

tailor [his] pleading”).

Gavilan-Cruz must address the numerous pleading deficiencies identified ir

this Memorandum. He may not include claims against Defendants who have

been dismissed from this action. He must specify the offending actions taken by

a particular defendant, sign the second amended complaint, and indicate the

nature of the relief sought.

If Gavilan-Cruz does not timely file a second amended complaint, dismissa

without prejudice of his Section 1983 claims will automatically convert to

dismissal with prejudice and the court will close this case. If a second amended

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pleading is filed that violates the foregoing express directions, that document will

be summarily stricken from the record.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court will dismiss Gavilan-Cruz’s Section 1983

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), as more fully set forth herein. The

court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law tort claims.

Limited leave to amend will be granted. An appropriate Order follows.

Date:A/ © |, COURT: ()

JUDGE JULIA K. MUNLEY*

United States District