JONES

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

YOLANDA T. JONES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:26CV149

)

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case came before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to

Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket

Entry 1 (the “Application”)), submitted with a form Complaint

(Docket Entry 2). (See Docket Entry dated Feb. 10, 2026 (referring

Application to undersigned Magistrate Judge).) The undersigned

Magistrate Judge granted the Application to allow consideration of

a recommendation of dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (see

Text Order dated Feb. 11, 2026) and now enters this Recommendation.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff brought this action against the Internal Revenue

Service and/or its Commissioner, as well as at least two and up to

four of its employees (two in their official capacity). (See

Docket Entry 2 at 1 (listing in caption as “Defendant(s)” “Internal

Revenue Service,” individual denoted as “Commissioner,” and two

individuals sued “in official capacity”), 2 (identifying

(A) “Defendant No. 1” as individual with title of “Commissioner,”

(B) “Defendant No. 2” and “Defendant No. 3” as same two individuals

named in caption as sued in their official capacity, and

(C) “Defendant No. 4” and “Defendant No. 5” as two other

individuals with titles of “Territory Manager” and “General

Manager,” respectively); see also Docket Entry 1 at 1 (naming only

“Internal Revenue Service” in space for “Defendant”); Docket Entry

3 at 1 (same).)1 According to the Complaint, this action presents

a “[f]ederal question.” (Docket Entry 2 at 3.) However, in

response to a directive to “[l]ist the specific federal statutes

. . . and/or provisions of the United States Constitution that are

at issue in this case” (id. (emphasis added)), Plaintiff offered

only this vague listing: “442 Civil Rights Jobs, 440 Due Process

Violations[,] 890 Privacy Act, 320 Assault[,] Libel[,] Slander.”

(Id. (parentheses omitted).)2 The Civil Cover Sheet, in turn,

“[c]ite[s] the U.S. Civil Statute under which [Plaintiff is]

filing” (Docket Entry 3 at 1) as “5 U.S.C. § 1221; FRCP 65” (id.;

see also id. (giving “[b]rief description of [that] cause [of

action]” as “Emergency TRO to Stay Retaliatory Removal based on

Fraudulent Saturday Record & Whistleblowing”)).

1 Quotations from Plaintiff’s filings apply standard

capitalization conventions and omit any bold font or italics.

2 The four items in that listing appear to correspond to

general descriptions of claims on the Civil Cover Sheet Plaintiff

filed with the Complaint. (See Docket Entry 3 at 1 (setting out

“Nature of Suit” categories/codes, including “320 Assault, Libel,

Slander,” “440 Other Civil Rights” and “442 Employment” (both under

heading “Civil Rigts”), and “890 Other Statutory Actions”).)

2

The Complaint contains a section for Plaintiff’s “Statement of

Claim” (Docket Entry 2 at 4), with directions to “[w]rite a short

and plain statement of the claim” (id.), which “[s]tate[s] as

briefly as possible the facts showing that [ P]laintiff is entitled

to the . . . relief sought” (id.) and “[s]tate[s] how each

[D]efendant was involved and what each [D]efendant did that caused

[ P)laintiff harm or violated [her] rights, including the dates and

places of that involvement or conduct” (id.); see also id. (“If

more than one claim is asserted, number each claim and write a

short and plain statement of each claim in a separate paragraph.

Attach additional pages if needed.”)). In the blank for Plaintiff

to provide that statement, she wrote “See Claim.” (Id.) Yet,

Plaintiff did not append to the Complaint any additional page(s)

with any such “Claim” (id.). (See id. at 1-5.)

Plaintiff did file a document entitled “Verified Complaint and

Petition for Emergency TRO” (Docket Entry 4 at 2), which asserts

that she “brings this action for Whistleblower Retaliation,

Fraudulent Record-Keeping, and Defamation (Stigma-Plus) under the

First and Fifth Amendments and the Whistleblower Protection Act”

(id.; see also id. at 3 (identifying Plaintiff’s claims as “Count

I: Retaliation for Protected Disclosures[, ] Count II: Violation of

Due Process (Stigma-Plus)[, and] Count III: Civil Conspiracy and

Document Fraud”)). In support of those asserted claims, Plaintiff

stated, inter alia, under penalty of perjury (see id. at 1):

1) “Plaintiff is a 4-year federal employee” (id. at 2);

2) “Plaintiff was physically assaulted twice by [Defendant

General] Manager” (id.; see also id. at 4 (“I was a victim of a

physical battery by a manager on December 10, 2025.” (internal

parenthetical omitted)));°

3) another Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) “{[a]cting

[m]anager formally notified [Defendant] Territory Manager (TM) of

the assault via email” (id. at 2), but “[Defendant] TM and [one of

the official-capacity Defendants] colluded to protect the aggressor

and target [] Plaintiff” (id.; see also id. at 5 (“My [computer]

access has been blocked to prevent me from communicating internally

while forcing me to travel back and forth to an environment with

the accused.”));

4) “({Defendant ] TM intentionally falsified Plaintiff’s

[disability retirement f]lorm . . . to sabotage Plaintiff’s medical

benefits and interfere with Department of Labor claims” (id. at 2),

by “fabricating a removal date of Saturday, October 18, 2025” (id.;

see also id. at 4 (“[Defendant IRS] submitted a retirement

application claiming [Plaintiff] retired on October 18,

° According to an e-mail sent by Plaintiff which she appended

to the above-quoted document, the first “physical[] assault[]”

(Docket Entry 4 at 2) occurred on March 7, 2024, when Defendant

General Manager, during a disagreement in the workplace, “touch[ed]

[Plaintiff’s] right arm approximately 6 to 8 times consistently

invading [her] personal space” (id. at 15; see also id. (“I did not

consent to it and told her I do not want her to touch me again

under any circumstances.”)).

2025. . . . The October 18 signature is a fabrication. . . . By

back-dating my retirement, [Defendant IRS] is attempting to strip

me of medical coverage for injuries sustained while on duty in

December.”), 5 (“[The Office of Personnel Management] has ‘fast-

tracked’ this forged application in under 30 days. If not stayed

today, my health insurance will lapse, halting treatment for my

battery-related injuries.” (internal parentheses omitted)));

5) “[i]n a further act of retaliation, [] Defendants have

intentionally blocked the processing of Plaintiff’s Workers’

Compensation [] claim, forcing [] Plaintiff into Leave Without Pay

(LWOP) status under the FMLA” (id. at 2-3; id. at 3 (“By holding

the claim hostage, Defendants are intentionally depriving Plaintiff

of her income and medical benefits as a direct result of this

workplace assault. This financial coercion is designed to force

Plaintiff’s resignation . . . .”), 4 (“[Defendant IRS] is refusing

to process my Workers’ Compensation forms, falsely claiming I am

‘retired’ or ‘denied based on a prior unrelated claim.’” (internal

parentheses omitted))); and

6) “Defendants . . . have engaged in a coordinated campaign to

defame Plaintiff’s professional character” (id. at 3; see also id.

(“Despite actual notice of physical assaults, [Defendant IRS’s

human resources and labor relations] departments have refused to

move Plaintiff from the dangerous management chain and have instead

disseminated false and malicious labels characterizing Plaintiff as

5

a ‘problem employee’ and ‘unstable.’ This ‘poisoning of the well’

by [Defendant IRS’s departments] proves that all internal

administrative remedies are exhausted and futile, as [Defendant

IRS’s] departments tasked with oversight are actively participating

in the retaliatory scheme.”)).

DISCUSSION

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892

[and now codified at Section 1915], is intended to guarantee that

no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because his

poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the costs.”

Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th Cir.

1995) (en banc) (italics and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its

problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining

relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.

FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this

concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt

shall dismiss the case at any time if . . . (B) the action

. . . (i) is frivolous or . . . (ii) fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

As to the first of those two grounds for dismissal, the United

States Supreme Court has explained that “a complaint . . . is

frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

6

fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also

Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256 (“The word frivolous is inherently elastic

and not susceptible to categorical definition.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).* The second, above-quoted ground for dismissal

attaches if a complaint fails “to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard “demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id.; see also id. (“Nor does a complaint suffice if

it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”

(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)).°

“Notably, the Court bears “an independent obligation to

determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists,” Hertz Corp.

v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010), and, to that end, “[a]ls part of

thle] frivolity review under § 1915(e) (2), the Court may consider

whether it has subject matter jurisdiction,” Gateway Plaza

Greensboro, LLC v. Spigner, No. 1:22CV1047, 2022 WL 22839643, at *1

(M.D.N.C. Dec. 29, 2022) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.),

recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2023) (Eagles,

J.}; accord, e.g., Glenn v. Glenn, No. 1:21CV510, 2021 WL 12157701,

at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2021) (unpublished) (Webster, M.J.),

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 21828633 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 11, 2022)

(unpublished) (Biggs, J.). Put another way, “[a]n in forma

pauperis complaint that fails to establish subject matter

jurisdiction lacks an arguable basis in law, and therefore may be

dismissed sua sponte.” Hill v. United States, No. 1:12CV92, 2013

WL 1192312, at *4 n.5 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 22, 2013) (unpublished);

accord, e.g., Utley v. Utley-Frye, No. 5:23CV14, 2023 WL 3775069,

at *3 (W.D. Va. June 2, 2023) (unpublished), recommendation

adopted, slip op. (W.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2023).

° Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal

(continued...)

Here (as documented in the Introduction), the Complaint

purports to invoke the Court’s federal-question jurisdiction, see

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States.”), but fails to clearly

identify any federal statute or constitutional provision which

provides a basis for relief, instead vaguely adverting to general

categories of claims, i.e., “Civil Rights Jobs” (Docket Entry 2 at

3), “Due Process Violations” (id.), “Privacy Act” (id.), and

“Assault[,] Libel[, and] Slander” (id.). In other filings (again,

detailed in the Introduction), Plaintiff more precisely invoked “5

U.S.C. § 1221” (Docket Entry 3 at 1; see also id. (describing claim

under said statute as concerning “Retaliatory Removal based on

Fraudulent Saturday Record & Whistleblowing”)), as well as “the

First and Fifth Amendments and the Whistleblower Protection Act”

(Docket Entry 4 at 2; see also id. at 2-3 (describing claims under

said provisions first as “Whistleblower Retaliation, Fraudulent

Record-Keeping, and Defamation (Stigma-Plus)” and later as

“Retaliation for Protected Disclosures,” “Violation of Due Process

(Stigma-Plus),” and “Civil Conspiracy and Document Fraud”)).

5(...continued)

citation, quotation marks, and italics omitted), the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to

undermine [the] requirement that a pleading contain more than

labels and conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304

n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

8

Accepting all of Plaintiff’s non-conclusory, factual allegations as

true, she has not stated a viable federal claim.

The lone federal statute actually cited by Plaintiff, “the

Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA), 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e),

[does] provide[] legal protection for whistleblowers within the

civil service,” Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 144

S. Ct. 445, 450 (2024); however, it does so in conjunction with

“[t]he Civil Service Reform Act (‘CSRA’) [which] governs judicial

and administrative review of personnel actions regarding federal

employees,” Coleman v. Pentagon Force Prot. Agency, No. 1:24CV1628,

2025 WL 2345819, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2025) (unpublished). See

De La Torre v. Fink, No. 8:23CV3201, 2025 WL 460757, at *4 (D. Md.

Feb. 11, 2025) (unpublished) (“‘The CSRA and the WPA are integrated

into a single statutory scheme.’” (quoting Kerr v. Jewell, 836 F.3d

1048, 1058 (9th Cir. 2016))). “Read together, the[se] statutes

prohibit[] certain federal employees from taking adverse personnel

actions against ‘any employee’ for reporting ‘any violation of any

law, rule, or regulation or . . . abuse of authority . . . .’” Id.

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)

(generally providing that, “in any case involving an alleged

prohibited personnel practice as described under section 2302(b)(8)

. . ., [the Merit Systems Protection] Board shall order such

corrective action as the Board considers appropriate if the

employee . . . has demonstrated that a disclosure or protected

9

activity described under section 2302(b)(8) . . . was a

contributing factor in the personnel action”).

But, “[t]o the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring original WPA

claims before this Court, this Court is precluded from reviewing

Plaintiff’s claims.” Coleman, 2025 WL 2345819, at *4. Indeed,

“[n]o courts have jurisdiction to hear WPA claims ‘in the first

instance.’” Id. (quoting Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 142 (D.C.

Cir. 2002)). Rather, “[p]ursuant to the CSRA, covered employees

must first bring their WPA claims before the Office of Special

Counsel (‘OSC’) and then the Merit Systems Protection Board

(‘MSPB’).” De La Torre, 2025 WL 460757, at *4; accord Coleman,

2025 WL 2345819, at *4. Moreover, “[a]fter [WPA] claims have been

[administratively] exhausted, only the Federal Circuit or ‘any

court of appeals of competent jurisdiction’ is authorized to review

the MSPB’s decision.” Coleman, 2025 WL 2345819, at *4 (quoting

Zachariasiewicz v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 48 F.4th 237,

243 (4th Cir. 2022)). Simply put, “for the WPA claim alone,

[Plaintiff’s] possible avenues of relief do not include review by

this Court.” De La Torre, 2025 WL 460757, at *4. As a result, the

Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s WPA claim under Section

1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous (for lack of jurisdiction).6

6 As discussed previously, the Complaint does also contain an

ambiguous reference to the “Privacy Act” (Docket Entry 2 at 3), but

it lacks any supporting facts and Plaintiff’s related filing, which

alleges some facts (as detailed in the Introduction), “contains no

(continued...)

10

“The claims raised against . . . Defendants under the United

States Constitution fare no better.” Housecalls Home Health Care,

Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F. Supp.

2d 616, 628 (M.D.N.C. 2007) (Elaison, M.J.), recommendation

adopted, id. at 618 (Osteen, J.). For starters, “direct causes of

action do not ordinarily exist under the United States

Constitution.” Id. at 628. “Exceptions have been made in

°(,..continued)

non-conclusory allegations that would support the reasonable

inference - or plausible conclusion - that [Plaintiff] is entitled

to relief under the Privacy Act,” Tracy v. United States, Civ.

Action No. 16-651, 2016 WL 7664716, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2016)

(unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 2017 WL

2348070 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 2017) (unpublished); see also Haywood

v. Owens, No. 8:19CV1025, 2019 WL 2292548, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Apr. 23,

2019) (unpublished) (reviewing limited causes of action afforded by

Privacy Act), recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2284931 (D.S.C. May

29, 2019) (unpublished). In other words, “[t]he allegations in

[P]laintiff’s [C]omplaint [and related filing] . . . are too vague

and conclusory to meet minimum pleading requirements for a Privacy

Act claim . . . .” Hinson-Gribble v. United States Off. Pers.

Mgmt., No. 5:16CV70, 2017 WL 9480265, at *5 (E.D.N.C. July 11,

2017) (unpublished), recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3948531

(E.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2017) (unpublished); see also id. (“The Privacy

Act may not be used to challenge the substantive decisions by an

agency reflected in its records.”). Lastly (for federal statutes),

Plaintiff has groused that Defendants (without specification) have

engaged in “[blad [flaith [u]se of FMLA [Family Medical Leave Act]”

(Docket Entry 4 at 2), by “block[ing] the processing of Plaintiff’s

Workers’ Compensation claim, forcing [her] into Leave Without Pay

status under FMLA” (id. at 2-3 (parentheticals omitted)). “Title

II of the FMLA covers leave for federal civil service employees who

have more than twelve months of service.” De La Torre, 2025 WL

460757, at *5 (internal citation omitted). As documented in the

Introduction, Plaintiff’s filings “make[] plain that [s]lhe has

served the [federal g]lovernment for more than twelve months,” id.

Some parts of the FMLA “provide[] a private right of action... .,

[but] Title II does not.” IZd. “Accordingly, . . . this Court

cannot hear [any FMLA] claim [from Plaintiff].” Id.

11

situations such as existed in Bivens[ v. Six Unknown Named Agents

of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)].” Housecalls,

515 F. Supp. 2d at 628. “However, a Bivens action is not available

against federal agencies such as [Defendant] IRS,” White v. United

States Internal Revenue Serv., No. 2:19CV9, 2019 WL 2413697, at *2

(E.D.N.C. June 6, 2019) (unpublished), aff’d, 785 F. App’x 168 (4th

Cir. 2019), or Defendants “sued in their official capacity,” Howard

v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 99-6708, 198 F.3d 236 (table),

1999 WL 798883, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 7, 1999) (unpublished).

At most then, “Bivens allows only claims based on tortious

conduct against [the remaining D]efendants sued in their individual

capacity.” Housecalls, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 624. And, “{[said

Djefendants must have directly and personally participated in the

tort. There is no respondeat superior liability in a Bivens

action.” Id. That principle precludes any Bivens claim against

Defendant Commissioner because (as documented in the Introduction)

“[t]here is simply no allegation that he personally played a role

in the [challenged] actions.” Id. The foregoing analysis leaves

only the possibility of Bivens claims against (A) Defendant General

Manager, who allegedly twice assaulted Plaintiff (see Docket Entry

4 at 2), and (B) Defendant TM, who allegedly (i) “colluded to

protect [Defendant General Manager] and target [] Plaintiff” (id.)

and (11) “intentionally falsified Plaintiff’s [disability

12

retirement florm” (id.), by “fabricating a removal date of

Saturday, October 18, 2025” (id.).

Those allegations cannot sustain Bivens claims. First,

Defendant General Manager’s alleged assaults preceded the acts of

retaliation and due process violations which form the basis of

Plaintiff’s claims under the First and Fifth Amendments;

Plaintiff’s reporting of the assaults (not the assaults themselves)

allegedly resulted in retaliatory actions and denials of due

process (as to which Plaintiff has alleged no direct participation

by Defendant General Manager). As such, Plaintiff has not stated

any possible Bivens claim against Defendant General Manager.’ Any

’ The allegations of assault cannot support the Court’s

exercise of jurisdiction because, apart from excessive-force-type

claims against law enforcement/detention officers under the Fourth,

Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments, “[t]here is no federal cause

of action for ‘assault.’” Bowman v. Canapp, No. 1:09CV149, 2010 WL

686368, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 23, 2010) (unpublished). Similarly,

“claims such as defamation .. . are state-based claims ... that

are cognizable in this Court under its supplemental jurisdiction,

but only if there is .. .a viable federal-gquestion claim... .”

Dickerson v. City of Charleston Police Dep’t, Civ. Action No.

1:10-1625, 2010 WL 3927513, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2010),

recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3909497 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2010);

accord, e.g., Harr v. WRAL-5 News, No. 5:20CV362, 2021 WL 141697,

at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 14, 2021), aff'd, 853 F. App’x 859 (4th Cir.

2021). A narrow exception exists to allow a plaintiff to assert a

due process claim “under what is sometimes referred to as [the]

‘stigma plus’ test, . . . [which requires a showing that], in the

course of defaming a person, a public official .. . subject[ed the

person] to a present injury such as termination of government

employment.” Ridpath v. Board of Governors Marshall Univ., 447

F.3d 292, 310 n.16 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original).

Regardless, Plaintiff’s allegations that, at unspecified times,

unspecified Defendants (and others not named as defendants)

“engaged in a coordinated campaign to defame Plaintiff’s

(continued...)

13

Bivens claim against Defendant TM likewise falls short, as the

collusion accusation does not “suffice [because] it tenders naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted), and the

falsification accusation does not suffice because a document

submitted by Plaintiff shows that someone other than Defendant TM

prepared the form listing Plaintiff’s retirement date as October

18, 2025 (see Docket Entry 4 at 13). In sum, Plaintiff has failed

to state a Bivens claim against Defendants General Manager and TM,

because Plaintiff has not alleged factual matter sufficient to show

that they committed any federal constitutional violation.

Alternatively, the Court should conclude that the Bivens

implied-cause-of-action-exception does not extend to the federal

constitutional claims asserted by Plaintiff. “In Bivens, the

[Supreme C]ourt permitted an implied cause of action for plaintiffs

whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by federal officers.”

Williams v. United States, Civ. Action No. 21-537, 2021 WL 1720230,

at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2021) (unpublished). Subsequently, “[t]he

[Supreme] Court allowed Bivens-type remedies twice more, in a Fifth

Amendment gender-discrimination case and in an Eighth Amendment

7(...continued)

professional character” (Docket Entry 4 at 3), by “characterizing

[her] as a ‘problem employee’ and ‘unstable’” (id.), constitute

nothing more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [which] do not

suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

14

Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause case.” Ziglar v. Abassi, 582

U.S. 120, 121 (2017) (internal citations omitted). “The Supreme

Court has refused to extend Bivens a number of times and expansion

of the Bivens remedy is now disfavored.” Williams, 2021 WL

1720230, at *3. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff had alleged facts

sufficient to show retaliation in violation of the First Amendment

and/or lack of due process in the handling of her retirement

application in violation of the Fifth Amendment, any Bivens claim

“would nevertheless be subject to dismissal,” id., as the “claims

asserted by [Plaintiff] . . . do not fit into any of the recognized

causes of actions to which Bivens has been extended,” id. See,

e.g., Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899, 904 (4th Cir. 1984) (“[I]n Bush

v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the Supreme Court declined to permit

a federal employee to bring a Bivens-type cause of action . . .

against his supervisors for alleged violations of his first

amendment rights.” (parallel citation omitted)).

Finally, the Court must note that Plaintiff has requested

injunctive relief, including presumably in relation to her claims

for retaliation for reporting workplace assaults (in violation of

the First Amendment) and for (related) denial of due process via

falsification of her retirement date (in violation of the Fifth

Amendment). (See Docket Entry 2 at 4 (stating “See Relief

Statement” in space for articulation of “relief [ P]laintiff asks

the [C]ourt to order”); Docket Entry 4 at 3 (seeking, under heading

15

of “Prayer for Relief,” order “stay[ing] the illegal removal [of

Plaintiff’s employment status], restor[ing] pay and benefits, and

enjoin[ing] Defendants from further interference with Plaintiff’s

career and health”).) “[U]nlike the Bivens remedy, which [the

Supreme Court] ha[s] never considered a proper vehicle for altering

an entity’s policy, injunctive relief has long been recognized as

the proper means for preventing entities from acting

unconstitutionally.” Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534

U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (emphasis added); see also Pinar, 747 F.2d at

909 (endorsing position “that federal courts have the authority to

grant injunctive relief to the victim of a constitutional violation

by virtue of their jurisdiction to decide all cases arising under

the Constitution”). The Court thus theoretically possesses

jurisdiction to order injunctive relief if Plaintiff can show that

Defendant IRS (through its supervisory personnel) violated her

federal constitutional rights.

The question remains “whether th[is C]ourt’s power to grant

injunctive relief should be exercised in light of the comprehensive

and constitutionally adequate remedial scheme Congress has

established in the CSRA [which includes the WPA].” Pinar, 747 F.2d

at 910. Fourth Circuit authority indicates that the Court should

answer that question in the negative:

A review of the remedial provisions of the CSRA supports

the finding that Congress clearly intended the

comprehensive remedies available to [federal employees]

to be exclusive. . . .

16

The absence of a provision for direct judicial review of

prohibited personnel actions[, i.e., retaliation barred

by the WPA,] among the carefully structured remedial

provisions of the CSRA is evidence of Congress’ intent

that no judicial review in district court be available

for the actions involved in this case.

Id.; see also id. at 912 (noting with approval decision in Hallock

v. Moses, 731 F.2d 754 (11th Cir. 1984), “affirm[ing] the

[district] court’s dismissal of a federal employee’s claims for

. . . injunctive relief grounded on the first and fifth

amendments,” alleging that supervisors “had harassed and retaliated

against her . . . because she filed a valid employee grievance and

spoke out in opposition to unlawful acts suffered by her”).8

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has asserted claims over which this Court lacks

jurisdiction (or should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction)

and otherwise has failed to state a claim.

8 In the alternative, the Court should deem Plaintiff’s

federal constitutional claims unripe, as her filings confirm that

administrative processes underlying her claims have not concluded

(see, e.g., Docket Entry 5 at 1 (“On 02/11/2026 Plaintiff accessed

personal email from [Defendant IRS] stating [her] retirement has

not been sent to [the Office of Personnel Management].”)). See

American Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Office of Special Counsel, 1 F.4th

180, 188 (4th Cir. 2021) (emphasizing “particular role ripeness

doctrine plays in the administrative context,” including

“prevent[ing] the courts, through avoidance of premature

adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract

disagreements,” as well as “protect[ing] agencies from judicial

interference until an administrative decision has been formalized”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

17

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

February 13, 2026

18