Yitzchak Simon v. Tishaura Jones

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 25-1717

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Yitzchak Simon

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Tishaura O. Jones, in her individual capacity; Yusef Scoggin, in his individual

capacity

Defendants - Appellants

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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Submitted: January 15, 2026

Filed: February 13, 2026

[Published]

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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Yitzchak Simon brought constitutional and state law claims against two

former officials of the City of St. Louis (the “City”). Simon brought these claims

against the former mayor of the City, Tishaura Jones, and the former director of the

City’s Department of Human Services, Dr. Yusef Scoggin. Mayor Jones and

Director Scoggin moved for summary judgment, invoking qualified and official

immunity. The district court denied their motion in part, determining that there were

genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Mayor Jones and Director Scoggin

were entitled to immunity against certain claims. We vacate and remand for the

district court to complete its qualified and official immunity analyses by construing

the disputed facts in the light most favorable to Simon.

I. Background

Simon was an outreach worker at St. Patrick Center (“SPC”). SPC is a

nonprofit organization that is dedicated to combatting homelessness and that

receives City funding. In March 2023, the City partnered with SPC to decommission

a homeless encampment near the City’s riverfront. Simon participated in multiple

protests against the decommissioning, including a protest at City Hall that was

covered by local media. According to Simon, he was a well-known opponent of the

decommissioning. On March 24, 2023, Simon arrived at the encampment as City

workers were attempting to decommission it. The parties disagree on what happened

next.

As Simon tells it, he did “a lot of standing around” and “that’s pretty much

it.” Simon also recalls that he spoke with a couple of City workers and a few of the

encampment’s residents to say hello and to ask what was happening. In contrast,

Mayor Jones and Director Scoggin allege that they received reports that Simon made

offensive hand gestures to City workers and interfered with the City’s efforts by

telling the encampment’s residents that they did not need to leave.

One week later, SPC sent Simon a termination letter. The letter stated: “Your

actions on March 24th, 2023 resulted in the threat of Saint Patrick Center losing

funding and created conflict with our funders and supporters and is the primary

reason for termination.” Simon alleges that he was terminated because Mayor Jones

called SPC’s CEO and threatened to cut City funding for SPC on account of Simon’s

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behavior. Simon also alleges that Director Scoggin “assisted” Mayor Jones in

making this threat and lied to SPC about Simon’s conduct.

Simon sued Mayor Jones and Director Scoggin. Simon brought claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against them in their official and individual capacities, alleging

First Amendment retaliation, civil conspiracy, and violations of due process. Simon

also brought a tortious interference claim under Missouri law. Mayor Jones and

Director Scoggin moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other grounds, that

they had (1) qualified immunity against Simon’s individual-capacity First

Amendment and due process claims and (2) official immunity against his tortious

interference claim.

The district court granted summary judgment to Mayor Jones and Director

Scoggin on some of Simon’s claims, but not on his individual-capacity First

Amendment and due process claims or his tortious interference claim. The district

court reasoned that the law is clearly established that government officials may not

retaliate against an individual for exercising First Amendment rights and that they

may not arbitrarily interfere in an individual’s private employment relationship. The

district court then determined that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to

whether Mayor Jones and Director Scoggin could receive qualified immunity on

Simon’s First Amendment and due process claims, “including but not limited to”:

the details of Simon’s conduct and the nature of his statements made at

and during the decommissioning of the Riverfront encampment on

March 24, 2023; the truthfulness of Scoggin’s representations to Jones

and other City officials regarding Simon’s conduct and statements at

and during the Riverfront decommissioning; whether Jones threatened

funding to SPC if it did not take adverse employment action against

Simon, the information upon which Jones relied in making the alleged

threat, and SPC’s understanding of Jones’s ability and/or authority to

affect its funding; and who at SPC made the decision to terminate

Simon’s employment, the reason(s) for termination, and the extent to

which the information Jones conveyed to SPC influenced that decision.

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The district court concluded that, because these facts were disputed, it could not

grant qualified immunity.

The district court also determined that there were genuine disputes of material

fact as to whether Mayor Jones and Director Scoggin had official immunity against

Simon’s tortious interference claim, specifically:

whether Scoggin acted in bad faith or with malice in his representations

of Simon’s behavior at and during the Riverfront decommissioning, and

whether Jones acted in bad faith or with malice in her alleged threats to

SPC that public funding would be withheld if it did not take adverse

employment action against Simon . . . .

The district court therefore concluded that it could not grant official immunity.

Mayor Jones and Director Scoggin appeal the denial of qualified and official

immunity.

II. Discussion

A.

“While we ordinarily lack jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal

challenging the denial of a motion for summary judgment, we have jurisdiction when

summary judgment is denied on the issue of qualified immunity.” Kelley v. Pruett,

163 F.4th 1130, 1134 (8th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). But that jurisdiction is

limited. Id. We “may not review the district court’s determination about what

factual issues are genuine.” Quraishi v. St. Charles Cnty., 986 F.3d 831, 835 (8th

Cir. 2021). Instead, we may only review the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Id. Thus, “we accept as

true the district court’s findings of fact to the extent they are not blatantly

contradicted by the record, and review the district court’s conclusions of law de

novo.” Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1116 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation modified).

And if the district court “fails to make a factual finding on an issue relevant to our

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purely legal review, we determine what facts the district court, in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed.” Id. (citation modified).

“Occasionally, [however,] a district court provides such scant factual analysis that

this task is impossible, and we must remand for additional explanation.” Id. at 1117.

“Whether the district court upheld its threshold duty to make a thorough

determination of [an official’s] claim of qualified immunity is a legal question that

we may review even under our limited jurisdiction.” Watson v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106,

1110 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). To uphold that threshold duty, a district

court “must take a careful look at the record, determine which facts are genuinely

disputed, and then view those facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party

as long as those facts are not so blatantly contradicted by the record that no

reasonable jury could believe them.” Kelley, 163 F.4th at 1134 (citation modified).

The court should then “determine if those facts demonstrate a constitutional

violation that is clearly established.” Id. “[C]learly established law must be

‘particularized’ to the facts of the case . . . .” Boudoin v. Harsson, 962 F.3d 1034,

1039 (8th Cir. 2020); see Scott v. Tempelmeyer, 867 F.3d 1067, 1070-72 (8th Cir.

2017).

Here, the district court asserted that there were certain genuine disputes of

material fact, but it then failed to view those facts in the light most favorable to

Simon. To take one example, the district court stated that “the details of Simon’s

conduct” on March 24 were genuinely disputed—but never explained what Simon’s

conduct actually was when viewed in the light most favorable to him. To take

another example, the district court stated that “the information upon which Jones

relied in making the alleged threat [to SPC]” was genuinely disputed, but again did

not explain what that information actually was when viewed in the light most

favorable to Simon. To take a third example, the district court stated that “the

truthfulness of Scoggin’s representations to Jones and other City officials” was

genuinely disputed, but never explained what Director Scoggin’s alleged

representations actually were when viewed in the light most favorable to Simon.

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Ordinarily, we would simply determine what facts the district court, in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed when denying qualified

immunity to Mayor Jones and Director Scoggin. See Dawson, 752 F.3d at 1116.

But here, this task is impossible. See id. at 1117. The district court might have taken

one of several avenues to determine that the facts could reveal First Amendment and

due process violations. To illustrate, perhaps Simon’s conduct on March 24 was

protected expression, and Mayor Jones called SPC’s CEO because of that conduct.

Perhaps Simon’s conduct on March 24 was not protected expression, but some of

his conduct from an earlier protest was, and Mayor Jones had that conduct in mind.

Perhaps Mayor Jones called SPC’s CEO because of information that Director

Scoggin shared about Simon, information which may or may not have been true.

Possibilities abound. To be clear, we are not opining as to whether any of those sets

of assumed facts would indicate a constitutional violation. We are simply

illustrating that the district court left us “only able to speculate about rather than

review” its decision. See Boyd, 2 F.4th at 1111.

And because the district court never adopted a set of assumed facts, the district

court never “conduct[ed] a legal analysis based upon assumed facts.” See Franklin

for Est. of Franklin v. Peterson, 878 F.3d 631, 638 (8th Cir. 2017). Although the

district court asserted that it had identified genuine disputes of material fact, it “did

not test [Simon’s] version of the facts against the substantive law” to determine that

those disputes were, indeed, material. See Boyd, 2 F.4th at 1111. Further, the district

court never explained why the facts here, viewed in the light most favorable to

Simon, reveal a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. The district

court did not explain “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly

established . . . . in light of the specific context of [this] case.” See Shultz v.

Buchanan, 829 F.3d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 2016). Nor could it do so, because it did not

assume any facts regarding Mayor Jones and Director Simon’s conduct. “The

district court should have identified the disputed facts, construed them in the light

most favorable to [Simon], and then considered, on those facts, whether [Simon] had

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shown a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of

the incident.” See Kelley, 163 F.4th at 1134. 1

B.

Under Missouri law, official immunity protects “public officers acting within

the scope of their authority” from liability for “injuries arising from their

discretionary acts or omissions.” State ex rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443,

444 (Mo. 1986); see also id. (adding that officers “may be held liable for torts

committed when acting in a ministerial capacity”). But officers are not entitled to

this immunity if they act with malice or bad faith. Id. at 446. Our review of a denial

of official immunity, like our review of a denial of qualified immunity, is limited to

“abstract issues of law.” See Dreith v. City of St. Louis, 55 F.4th 1145, 1148 (8th

Cir. 2022).

Again, however, the district court did not make sufficient findings of fact to

permit meaningful appellate review. See Dawson, 752 F.3d at 1116-17. The district

court determined that there were genuine issues of material fact as to “whether

Scoggin acted in bad faith or with malice in his representations of Simon’s behavior

[to SPC]” and whether “Jones acted in bad faith or with malice in her alleged threats

to SPC that public funding would be withheld.” But “[n]owhere did the court say

which facts would allow a reasonable jury to conclude” that Mayor Jones and

Director Scoggin “acted with malice or in bad faith.” See N.S. v. Kansas City Bd. of

Police Comm’rs, 933 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2019). The district court’s analysis is

1

For instance, suppose that the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to

Simon, reveal that Mayor Jones retaliated against Simon for perceived, as opposed

to actual, expressive conduct. The district court would then need to determine

whether such retaliation amounted to a constitutional violation, and if so, whether

the violation was clearly established. We do not suggest any resolution to that

hypothetical here; instead, we offer it simply to illustrate the importance of defining

a clearly established right with the requisite particularity.

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thus “too cursory” for us to say whether the facts justify denying official immunity.

See id.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s denial of qualified and official

immunity and remand for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.

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