Evans

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

CHARLES J. EVANS,

Plaintiff, Case No.: 5:25-cv-00654-KCD-PRL

v.

PAMELA J. HELTON, ROXANN E.

EVANS/OLIVER, GARY J. COONEY,

Defendants,

___________________________________/

REPORT AND RECCOMENDATION1

Plaintiff, Charles Evans, who is proceeding pro se, initially filed this action against

Defendants Pamela Helton, Roxann Evans/Oliver and Gary Cooney by filing both an initial

complaint and then later an amended complaint. (Docs. 1 & 3). Plaintiff seeks to proceed in

forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). Due to deficiencies in the amended complaint and in an abundance

of caution, the Court took Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in formal pauperis under advisement

and provided Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend the complaint. (Doc. 10).

Plaintiff then submitted a second amended complaint naming the above defendants,

and adding Jason J. Nimeth, a Circuit Judge for Lake County, Florida, as a defendant. (Doc.

11. Because Plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies in the original complaint and the second

1 Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party

may file written objections to the Report and Recommendation’s factual findings and legal

conclusions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). A

party’s failure to file written objections waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal any

unobjected-to factual finding or legal conclusion the district judge adopts from the Report and

Recommendation. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

amended complaint fails to establish a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction, the undersigned

recommends that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint be dismissed.

I. Legal Standards

An individual may be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis if he declares in an

affidavit that he is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

However, before a plaintiff is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is obligated to

review the complaint to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted[,] or ... seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint is deficient, the Court is required

to dismiss the suit sua sponte. Id.

The phrase “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” has the same

meaning as the similar phrase in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule

12(b)(6) standards in reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”). To survive both

section 1915 and Rule 12(b)(6) review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A claim is plausible on its face where “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plausibility means “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. In short, to survive this initial review a plaintiff must

allege something more “than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Further, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore, have an

obligation to inquire into their subject matter jurisdiction. See Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage

Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2001). Parties seeking to invoke the limited jurisdiction

of the federal court over a cause of action must show that the underlying claim is based upon

either diversity jurisdiction (controversies exceeding $75,000 between citizens of different

states) or the existence of a federal question (i.e., “a civil action arising under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the Unites States”) in which a private right of action has been created or is

implied by Congressional intent. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1332.

II. Discussion

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint consists of two pages of conclusory allegations

presented in letter format to the undersigned, and an attached order entered by Judge Nimeth

in Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in and for Lake County, Florida. (Doc. 11). As

evidenced by Plaintiff’s allegations and the attachment, Plaintiff’s claims in this case arise

from his dissatisfaction with apparently ongoing child support and alimony proceedings in

state court.

Though hardly a model of precision, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges

claims for emotional distress, mental anguish, defamation, as well as for “government

overreach.” In a conclusory fashion and without any well-pled factual allegations in support,

Plaintiff alleges bare bones claims for violations of civil rights, violations of due process,

violations of fair debt practices, and related claims. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff’s claims all appear to

arise directly from state court family law proceedings related to Plaintiff’s alimony and/or

child support obligations.

It appears that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.

Indeed, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

Fox v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 828 F. App'x 639, 640 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

“As a general rule, the federal courts refuse to hear suits for ‘divorce and alimony, child

custody actions, disputes over visitation rights, suits to establish paternity and to obtain child

support, and actions to enforce separation or divorce decrees still subject to state court

modification.’ ” Kirby v. Mellenger, 830 F.2d 176, 177–78 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)

(quoting Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978)) (additional citations omitted).

Further, district courts lack jurisdiction over final state-court judgments under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Fox, 828 F. App'x at 640. The doctrine applies to

cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” The doctrine applies not only to federal claims actually

raised in the state court, but also to claims that were not raised in the

state court but are inextricably intertwined with the state court's

judgment. A claim is inextricably intertwined if it would effectively

nullify the state-court judgment or if it succeeds only to the extent the

state court wrongly decided the issues.

Id. (quoting Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009); citing Casale v. Tillman,

558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009)). Rooker-Feldman has been applied to, among other

types of cases, those concerning child-custody and family law proceedings. Fox, 828 F. App'x

at 640 (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s claims in this case amount to an improper collateral

attack on the state court proceedings. Exercising jurisdiction over this kind of collateral attack

on state-court proceedings would require the Court to improperly interfere with either

ongoing proceedings or final judgments entered by Florida’s courts—exactly what the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is designed to protect against.

To the extent that the state court proceedings are ongoing, Plaintiff’s claims are also

barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. The abstention doctrine established in Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) “bars federal court intervention in state noncriminal proceedings

where the proceedings constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding, the proceedings

implicate important state interests, and there is an adequate opportunity in the state

proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Adams v. Florida, 185 F. App'x 816, 816-17

(11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir.

2003)). See also Narciso v. Walker, 811 F. App'x 600, 601-03 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)

(citing Younger in affirming the dismissal of a plaintiff's federal court challenge under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 to child custody proceeding pending in state court).

Further, Plaintiff’s allegations are vague, conclusory, non-specific, and lack well-pled

facts. In short, Plaintiff’s allegations are far from sufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff’s second

complaint does not meet the pleading requirements set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not contain a short plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, as required by Rule 8. Although

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is “still required to conform to procedural rules, and the court

is not required to rewrite a deficient pleading.” Washington v. Dept. of Children and Families,

256 F. App’x 326, 327 (11th Cir. 2007).

Moreover, and significantly, Plaintiff has also not alleged any viable basis for claims

under federal law or otherwise. Rather, the amended complaint appears to reallege the same

claims that are tantamount to an improper collateral attack on state court proceedings. Also,

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Nimeth are barred by judicial immunity. Indeed, “[j]udges are

entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting

in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’ ” Bolin v.

Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). “This immunity applies even

when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id.

Whether a judge's actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether:

(1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the

judge's chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the

judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial

capacity. Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.1983). Here, Plaintiff’s own allegations

and the attachment to his complaint establish that the doctrine of judicial immunity applies.

Notably, Plaintiff was previously granted an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the

prior complaints. Plaintiff was advised:

Plaintiff must provide the Court with sufficient information and

in a coherent manner so that it can perform the review required

under § 1915. The amended complaint must clearly state the

legal theory or theories upon which Plaintiff seeks relief and

explain with factual allegations how defendant(s) are

responsible. Plaintiff should carefully consider whether he can

allege a claim in good faith because pursuing frivolous claims

could lead to the imposition of sanctions.

(Doc. 10 at 5). Plaintiff was also thoroughly cautioned that despite proceeding pro se, he is

required to comply with this Court’s Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and

the Federal Rules of Evidence, and he was directed to resources regarding proceeding in court

without a lawyer. (Doc. 10 at 6). In other words, Plaintiff was given ample opportunity to

cure the deficiencies in the complaint but has failed to do so.

I. Recommendation

Accordingly, and for the reasons explained above, I recommend that Plaintiff motion

to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) should be denied and the second amended complaint

dismissed without prejudice. I further submit that allowing Plaintiff further opportunities to

amend the complaint would be an exercise in futility.

Recommended in Ocala, Florida on December 19, 2025.

f . CF iii i

PHILIP R. LAMMENS

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies furnished to:

Presiding District Judge

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Party

Courtroom Deputy