“[T]he open container violation was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. . . . [I]t was reasonable for them to extend the stop in order to investigate.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he open container violation was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. . . . [I]t was reasonable for them to extend the stop in order to investigate.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 25-60439 Document: 49-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/12/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
February 12, 2026
No. 25-60439 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Terrence Lee Wogan, II; Heather Lee Wilkes,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
April Rose, Ridgeland Police Officer, Official capacity and Individual
capacity; Sergeant Hunter Bridges, Ridgeland Police Officer,
Official capacity and Individual capacity; K-9 Officer Ben Johnson,
Ridgeland Police Officer, Official capacity and Individual capacity,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:24-CV-431
______________________________
Before Jones, Duncan, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Pro se Appellees Terrence Lee Wogan and Heather Lee Wilkes sued
three police officers, alleging an unlawful search and detention after the
officers found them asleep in their car in a mall parking lot in the middle of
the night. The district court denied qualified immunity to the officers, finding
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 25-60439 Document: 49-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/12/2026
No. 25-60439
no reasonable suspicion for an extended stop that involved a dog sniff. On
appeal, the officers argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. We agree
and therefore REVERSE and RENDER judgment dismissing Appellees’
Fourth Amendment claims on the basis of qualified immunity.
I
At 2:38 a.m. on July 26, 2021, Appellant Officer April Rose was
performing a beat check at a mall in Ridgeland, Mississippi, when she noticed
Appellees Wogan and Wilkes asleep in their car in the mall parking lot.
Appellees explained to Officer Rose that they had pulled off the interstate
into the parking lot because they were getting sleepy. As Officer Rose was
asking questions, she noticed an empty Fireball whiskey bottle in the
backseat. Appellees denied drinking any whiskey that night. Several minutes
later, Appellants Officer Hunter Bridges and K-9 Officer Ben Johnson
arrived on the scene. Officer Johnson conducted a dog sniff, which led to a
positive alert for narcotics. The Officers then searched the car. When they
found drug paraphernalia in Wilkes’s purse, they arrested her. 1
Appellees sued Officers Rose, Bridges, and Johnson on various federal
and state law claims. The district court dismissed all claims except two
Fourth Amendment claims. First, the court held that the “facts alleged in the
complaint . . . are sufficient to state a claim against [Officers] Rose and
Bridges for unlawful detention in violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
rights and to overcome . . . qualified immunity.” The court explained that
Officers Rose and Bridges allegedly detained Appellees too long without
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, “which could reasonably be found
to be longer than was reasonably necessary.” Second, the court held that
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1
Wilkes was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, but that charge was
later dismissed.
2
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No. 25-60439
Officer Johnson was “obviously” not entitled to qualified immunity as to the
Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim because he allegedly
manufactured a “positive alert” during the dog sniff to find probable cause
to search the vehicle.
The Officers moved to dismiss those two remaining claims, arguing
they properly extended the stop because Officer Rose noticed an empty
alcohol bottle in the car in violation of Ridgeland’s open container ordinance.
The district court denied that motion.
The Officers appeal.
II
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity under
the collateral-order doctrine. Harris v. Clay Cnty., 47 F.4th 271, 275 (5th Cir.
2022); Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2015); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. Appellees dispute our jurisdiction, contending the collateral-order
doctrine does not apply because the district court’s ruling relied on
“unresolved” factual disputes. They are mistaken. We have repeatedly
explained that, even when factual disputes remain, we have jurisdiction to
determine whether those disputes are “material to the application of
qualified immunity.” Harris, 47 F.4th at 271 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Samples v. Vadzemnieks, 900 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2018)); Walton v. City of
Verona, 82 F.4th 314, 320 (5th Cir. 2023). Accordingly, we may consider
whether the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity “despite the factual
disputes in the record.” Walton, 82 F.4th at 320.
We review de novo the denial of qualified immunity on a motion to
dismiss. Edmiston v. Borrego, 75 F.4th 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2023). Qualified
immunity shields government officials from civil liability “unless the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the
time of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664
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No. 25-60439
(2012). Thus, to overcome a defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must
show that the official “violated a constitutional right” that was “clearly
established at the time of the official’s challenged conduct.” Bakutis v. Dean,
129 F.4th 299, 303 (5th Cir. 2025).
III
A stop violates the Fourth Amendment if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to resolve the matter that occasioned the stop.
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354–55 (2015). But if the officer
“develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity, . . . he may
further detain the occupants of the vehicle for a reasonable time while
appropriately attempting to dispel this reasonable suspicion.” United States
v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 833 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Reasonable
suspicion exists when the officer “can point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant the search and seizure.” United States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276, 281
(5th Cir. 2017).
Applying Rodriguez, the district court ruled that the Officers
unreasonably prolonged the stop by conducting a dog sniff. The Officers
disagree. They argue they properly extended the stop because Officer Rose
had reasonable suspicion to believe Appellees had violated Ridgeland’s open
container ordinance. That ordinance makes it unlawful “for the driver
and/or passenger of a motor vehicle . . . to have on his person or in his
possession, beer, light wine or an alcoholic beverage in an open
container. . . .” Ridgeland Ordinance No. 200119, § V, Sec. 6-5. 2 To support
_____________________
2
The ordinance can be found at https://library.municode.com/ms/ridgeland/
codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CO_CH6ALBE_S6-5OPCO [https://perma.cc/
V453-ZTBM].
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No. 25-60439
their argument, they point to two facts: (1) the empty liquor bottle in the car,
and (2) Wogan’s admission that he had parked at the mall because he was
getting sleepy.
We agree with the Officers. Even where it is not part of the initial stop,
a dog sniff does not unreasonably prolong the stop if reasonable suspicion of
additional criminal activity justifies it. Cf. United States v. Spears, 636 F.
App’x 893, 901 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 353–57) (waiting
to conduct dog sniff permissible if supported by reasonable suspicion of
further criminal activity). It was reasonable for Officer Rose, after hearing of
Wogan’s drowsiness and upon discovering a liquor bottle in the vehicle, to
suspect that Appellees had violated Ridgeland’s open container ordinance.
See, e.g., United States v. Agena, 138 F.4th 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he
open container violation was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. . . . [I]t was reasonable for them to extend the stop in order
to investigate.”); United States v. Patterson, 852 F. App’x 1004, 1007 (6th
Cir. 2021) (officer “certainly had reasonable suspicion to justify further
detention of the vehicle” after seeing open alcohol container in backseat).
It makes no difference that the whiskey bottle was empty, as Appellees
argue. Adopting the district court’s reasoning, they argue that an empty
liquor bottle could not have raised reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
because the ordinance requires liquid to be in the bottle. The ordinance’s text
does not support that counterintuitive reading. Regardless, it was reasonable
for Officer Rose to believe that Appellees had recently consumed the whiskey
or that more bottles may have been in the car. And Officer Rose could have
reasonably extended the stop to investigate whether the bottle contained
alcohol anyway. See Agena, 138 F.4th at 1068. Officer Rose thus had
reasonable suspicion that additional criminal activity may have been afoot,
justifying a prolonged stop.
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No. 25-60439
Officer Rose’s reasonable suspicion extends to Officer Bridges, who
helped search Appellees’ car, and Officer Johnson, who conducted the dog
sniff, under the doctrine of collective knowledge. Zuniga, 860 F.3d at 283.
Under that doctrine, “an officer initiating the stop or conducting the search
need not have personal knowledge of the evidence that gave rise to the
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, so long as he is acting at the request
of those who have the necessary information.” Ibid. Appellees do not deny
that the Officers could have relied on the collective knowledge doctrine to
transfer reasonable suspicion, and the cases they cite do not dispute this.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Officers did not subject Appellees to an
unlawful detention or search in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
This means that Appellees cannot satisfy the first prong of qualified
immunity, namely that they suffered a constitutional injury. But even if they
could, they have not carried their burden of pointing us to any cases showing
the Officers’ conduct violated clearly established law. Nor did the district
court cite any such precedent. The Officers were therefore entitled to
qualified immunity.
We REVERSE the district court’s judgment and RENDER
judgment dismissing Appellees’ Fourth Amendment claims on the ground of
qualified immunity.
6