John Dukeman, II v. Dylon Wyatt

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 25-1632

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John Phillip Wright Dukeman, II

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ste. Genevieve County; Genevieve County Sheriff’s Department; Gary Stolzer;

Richard Placke; Charles Ochs; Trevor Green

Defendants

Dylon Wyatt

Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau

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Submitted: November 19, 2025

Filed: February 12, 2026

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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.

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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

John Phillip Wright Dukeman, II, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against several Ste. Genevieve County sheriff’s deputies and a Missouri

Highway Patrol trooper, alleging the officers used excessive force when a Ste.

Genevieve County police canine was utilized to facilitate his arrest. Trooper Dylon

Wyatt appeals the district court’s interlocutory order denying his motion to dismiss

based on qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order

denying qualified immunity to the extent the appeal turns on issues of law. Arnold

v. McClinton, 112 F.4th 598, 601 (8th Cir. 2024). Reviewing the denial of qualified

immunity de novo, we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the claims

against Trooper Wyatt.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 8, 2020, Sergeant Charles Ochs and other Ste. Genevieve

County sheriff’s deputies pursued Dukeman for stealing a school bus, in violation of

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.080.1(2).1 Trooper Wyatt responded to assist the sheriff’s

deputies in their search for Dukeman. Officers eventually spotted Dukeman in a

wooded area behind the house he shared with his mother in Bloomsdale, Missouri.

To facilitate the arrest, Sergeant Ochs released Ares, his police canine, which bit

Dukeman’s right arm, right leg, and groin. Dukeman claims the officers acted in

concert to violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force.

In his petition, Dukeman repeatedly alleges that during his arrest the

“Defendants” violated the Ste. Genevieve County Sheriff’s Department’s written

guidelines for apprehension, use of force, and K-9 use (“County’s Force

Guidelines”) as well as federal law. According to Dukeman, the officers collectively

used excessive force when they acted recklessly in the deployment of Ares, failed to

properly command and control Ares, failed to provide a clear audible warning

announcing the use of a police canine, and failed to intervene and remove Ares once

Dukeman surrendered. Dukeman’s petition fails to identify any specific display of

force used by Trooper Wyatt. Instead, Trooper Wyatt allegedly failed to intervene

1

A jury acquitted Dukeman of tampering with a school bus and found him

guilty of resisting arrest by flight.

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to prevent other officers from a different agency from using excessive force, and he

allegedly failed to command or “out” Ares once Dukeman surrendered.

The district court determined that Trooper Wyatt was not entitled to qualified

immunity because it was clearly established that officers must provide an adequate

canine warning and allow the suspect “an opportunity for peaceful surrender.”

Adams v. City of Cedar Rapids, 74 F.4th 935, 940 (8th Cir. 2023). The district court

also found that, although the allegations were “relatively scant,” they were sufficient

at the initial review stage to state a failure-to-intervene claim against Trooper Wyatt.

Trooper Wyatt invokes our limited jurisdiction to review the court’s interlocutory

order. See Faulk v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 30 F.4th 739, 742 (8th Cir. 2022).

II. DISCUSSION

At the motion to dismiss stage, an officer may be granted qualified immunity

“only when the immunity is established on the face of the complaint.” Carter v.

Ludwick, 139 F.4th 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting Weaver v. Clarke, 45 F.3d

1253, 1255 (8th Cir. 1995)). Once qualified immunity is asserted, the plaintiff bears

the burden of demonstrating the law confirming his constitutional right was clearly

established. Hanson, as Trustee for Layton v. Best, 915 F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir.

2019). “This inquiry does not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent

must have placed the constitutional question beyond debate.” Carter, 139 F.4th at

990 (cleaned up).

A law enforcement officer may be held liable under § 1983 only for his own

misconduct. See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1081 (8th Cir. 2017) (“To prevail

on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show each individual defendant’s personal

involvement in the alleged violation.”). When multiple officers are named in an

action, the district court must review each officer’s actions separately. See Handt v.

Lynch, 681 F.3d 939, 944 (8th Cir. 2012) (explaining the district court must engage

in a fulsome qualified immunity analysis by examining the facts pertaining to each

defendant for each alleged constitutional violation).

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An officer who was not personally involved in the use of force is entitled to

qualified immunity. See Torres v. City of St. Louis, 39 F.4th 494, 504-05 (8th Cir.

2022) (concluding that two of the officers, while on scene, did not fire their weapon

or use force against the plaintiff and were entitled to qualified immunity). The

district court erred when it found Dukeman’s general allegations regarding the use

of Ares were applicable to all officers, without reviewing the facts underlying each

officer’s conduct. See Smith v. City of Minneapolis, 754 F.3d 541, 547-48 (8th Cir.

2014) (reiterating that an officer may be held liable only for his or use of excessive

force); Handt, 681 F.3d at 944 (remanding for the district court to consider each

officer’s actions separately).

Dukeman acknowledges that Trooper Wyatt himself did not use any force. In

response to Trooper Wyatt’s arguments regarding the insufficiency of Dukeman’s

group pleading, Dukeman asserts in his brief that Trooper Wyatt can be held liable

as a participant in the unconstitutional conduct because he “could have intervened

and restrained the K-9 and/or stopped the attack.” Dukeman’s assertion is

unsupported by any factual allegation and premised on mere speculation. Further,

the cases Dukeman relies on are inapposite. Dukeman cites three Ninth Circuit

cases: Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357 (9th Cir. 1994); Watkins v. City of Oakland,

Cal., 145 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1998); and Miller v. Clark Cnty., 340 F.3d 959 (9th

Cir. 2003). None of these cases confront or address an officer’s obligation to warn,

command, intervene, or otherwise stop another officer’s dog—let alone a different

law enforcement agency’s police canine—from biting a suspect.

Similarly, Dukeman’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Adams, 74 F.4th

935, is unavailing. The decision in Adams was issued after the events giving rise to

Dukeman’s arrest. But, more importantly, while Adams confirmed that a canine

handler is required to provide an adequate warning when searching with his police

dog trained to bite and hold, Adams did not announce that the duty extended to all

officers at the scene. Ares was brought to the scene by his handler, Sergeant Ochs,

an employee of the Ste. Genevieve County Sherriff’s Department. Trooper Wyatt,

a highway patrolman, aided in the search for Dukeman. Dukeman has not pointed

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us to any authority establishing that an officer from a different law enforcement

agency and without a police canine on scene should have understood that, as part of

his role in assisting in a search for a suspect, he had a duty to intervene and issue a

canine warning on behalf of the handler. Dukeman’s collective allegation that all

officers on scene used excessive force, without some showing that Trooper Wyatt

used force and violated a clearly established right, is insufficient to satisfy his

burden. Trooper Wyatt is entitled to qualified immunity on Dukeman’s claim that

he violated a clearly established right by not issuing a canine warning prior to the

sheriff’s deputy’s decision to deploy his police canine.

Dukeman’s claim that Trooper Wyatt had a duty to intervene to prevent injury

suffers from the same shortcomings. To be liable, a police officer must have (1)

“observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used,”

and (2) “had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from

occurring.” Robinson v. Payton, 791 F.3d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Nance

v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 612 (8th Cir. 2009)). The duty to intervene must be clearly

established in the specific context of the case. Id.

Dukeman insists that Trooper Wyatt should have issued verbal commands to

control Ares or he should have physically attempted to stop and remove Ares.

Dukeman does not allege that Trooper Wyatt had any specific knowledge or

experience in handling a police canine. Nor has Dukeman pointed us to any factual

allegation or authority demonstrating an officer with no known relationship to a

police canine has a clearly established obligation to intercept the canine or physically

remove the canine trained to bite and hold a suspect. Likewise, there is no allegation

or indication that verbal commands from a non-deploying officer would have had

any effect on Ares or otherwise mitigated the situation. Without some allegation or

showing that Trooper Wyatt had the opportunity and the means to prevent Ares from

harming Dukeman, Dukeman cannot satisfy his burden of showing the violation of

a clearly established right.

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An officer standing in Trooper Wyatt’s position would not have been on

notice that he was required to verbally command or physically attempt to intercept

or remove a police canine belonging to another law enforcement agency or risk

violating a suspect’s constitutional rights. Without such a showing, Trooper Wyatt

is entitled to qualified immunity on Dukeman’s failure-to-intervene claim. See

Robinson, 791 F.3d at 829 (stating the duty to intervene must be clearly established

in the specific context of the case).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order denying qualified

immunity to Trooper Wyatt is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to

dismiss the claims against Trooper Wyatt.

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