Golatt

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

KENDRICK T. GOLATT, SR. CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-0857

VERSUS JUDGE ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

CADDO PARISH SCHOOL BOARD MAGISTRATE JUDGE McCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM RULING

The Plaintiff, Kendrick T. Golatt, Sr., filed a complaint against his former

employers, the Caddo Parish School Board (“Caddo Parish”) and Kim Pendleton,

alleging discrimination and retaliation. R. Doc. 1. The Court has already dismissed

all claims against Pendleton. R. Doc. 24, at 1. Now before the Court is a motion for

partial summary judgment filed by Caddo Parish. R. Doc. 37. Although Golatt,

proceeding pro se, failed to file an opposition, the Court has considered the merits of

Caddo Parish’s pending motion. Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Administracion Cent.

Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985) (“A motion for summary

judgment cannot be granted simply because there is no opposition, even if the failure

to oppose violated a local rule.”). For the reasons below, the motion is GRANTED.

Background

Around August 2016, Golatt began work for Caddo Parish as a substitute

teacher at Southwood High School (“Southwood”). Pls.’ Depo. 18, R. Doc. 37-3. In the

following years, Golatt continued to receive training and certifications, eventually

becoming a part-time teacher and school disciplinarian. Id. at 20, 24. He held those

roles when Caddo Parish named Pendleton the principal of Southwood in late 2019.

Id. at 24-25. Not long after Pendleton became Southwood’s principal, the COVID-19

pandemic forced closure of the school. See id. at 25.

When in-person classes resumed at Southwood in August 2020, Pendleton

“changed some things up.” Pls.’ Depo. 24-25. Pendleton named Golatt the head coach

of the girls’ basketball team and removed his disciplinary responsibilities. Id. at 28-

29. As a coach, Pendleton allowed Golatt to wear casual clothing, including

sweatpants. Id. at 171. In the ensuing years, Pendleton made several vulgar

comments to Golatt, including ones about his genitals and attire.

In fall 2020, Golatt entered the band director’s office for a meeting where he

found Pendleton already seated inside. Pls.’ Depo. 154. Golatt had been wearing

sweatpants, and as he walked inside, Pendleton said: “I can see your little shrimp

through your pants.” Id. Pendleton laughed, and Golatt then tried to pull down his

shirt to cover himself. R. Doc. 37-3, at 43.

Around this time, in a separate incident, Golatt had a meeting with Pendleton

in her office. R. Doc. 1-2, at 4. Pendleton asked Golatt if they were speaking as “Dr.

Pendleton and Mr. Golatt” or “Kim and Kendrick” because “inquiring minds want to

know how big [his penis] is.” Id. Golatt felt uncomfortable at her question and

changed the subject. Id.

After the 2020 school year, during a summer administrative meeting between

Pendleton, Golatt, and others, they discussed who would have disciplinary duties for

the following year. See id. Pendleton said that Golatt would not handle discipline

because she needs “men with big nuts [and a] strong penis to work in discipline and

that’s not [him] according to what I saw on camera.” Id. Apparently Pendleton had

been referring to an incident from the previous year where Golatt tried to stop a fight

between students. Id. During the melee, one of the students struck Golatt in his

genitals, leaving him doubled over and breathless. Id.

During the following school year, 2021-2022, Pendleton made another vulgar

comment about Golatt’s genitals. Golatt and another male teacher had been standing

together when Pendleton told them that “she could see my dick through my pants[,]

and it wouldn’t [sic] be any dick swinging and to put my dick up.” Pls.’ Depo. 169.

Pendleton then made the other teacher, but not Golatt, change his clothing because

the other teacher’s pants were more tightly fitted. Id. at 170.

In October 2021, Pendleton held a meeting with four coaches where she

confronted them about an alleged rumor. Pendleton accused the coaches of having a

group bet “…on who would fuck [the assistant principal] first.” R. Doc. 1-2, at 5.

Pendleton then “went around the room” asking the coaches if they were “trying to

have sex with [the assistant principal.” Pls.’ Depo. 166. The coaches, including Golatt,

denied the accusation. Id.

In January 2022, Golatt approved a social media post about an upcoming

basketball game involving Southwood. R. Doc. 1-2, at 6. When a parent complained

about the post, Pendleton confronted Golatt, and their meeting became heated. R.

Doc. 37-3, at 48. Eventually, Pendleton told Golatt that he must be “mentally

unstable and doing cocaine.” Id. She then ordered him to visit with the employee

assistance program, or she would fire him. Id. Golatt did so, and within a few minutes

of the visit, the counselor said, “he saw nothing wrong with me” and told him to “go

back to my school.” Id.

Another incident occurred in spring 2022 when Golatt had a meeting with

Pendleton in her office. R. Doc. 1-2, at 7. During this meeting, Pendelton said that

Golatt “must be eating [and] using [his] tongue real [sic] good on women because [he]

surely don’t [sic] have anything down there.” Id. Once again, Golatt felt

uncomfortable and changed the subject as Pendelton laughed. Id.

In August 2022, Pendleton pressured Golatt to hire a female staff member as

his assistant coach of the girls’ basketball team. Pls.’ Depo. 95. When Golatt refused,

Pendleton removed him from the head coach’s position thereby taking away his

coaching stipend. Id. No later than August 31, 2022, Golatt filed a sexual harassment

complaint with Caddo Parish about Pendleton’s vulgar behavior. See R. Doc. 1-2, at 1.

In response, Caddo Parish reassigned Golatt to a different high school. R. Doc. 37-3,

at 60. Quite understandably, Golatt protested the reassignment because he felt

punished for someone else’s conduct. Pls.’ Depo. 125. Caddo Parish did not change its

decision, and Golatt remained at the other high school until he resigned on July 31,

2023. R. Doc. 37-3, at 31.

Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires a court to “grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” When the burden at

trial will rest on the nonmovant, the movant need not produce evidence to negate the

elements of the nonmovant’s case; rather, it need only point out the absence of

supporting evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the movant

satisfies its initial burden, the nonmovant must demonstrate a genuine dispute exists

by “going beyond the pleadings” and “designating specific facts.” Little v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). This burden requires more than

metaphysical doubt, conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations, or a mere scintilla of

evidence. Id.

Analysis

Golatt brought one claim for sexual harassment and another for retaliation

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.. He made a

separate claim for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a). Caddo Parish has not challenged Golatt’s Title VII retaliation

claim.

I. Sexual Harassment Claim

Under Title VII, harassment is “unlawful when it results in the employer

‘discriminating against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s…sex[.]” Gardner

v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C., 915 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2019). A violation of Title

VII occurs when “…discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive

working environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). To

establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove he:

(1) belongs to a protected group; (2) was subjected to

unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of

was based on [sex]; (4) the harassment complained of

affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; (5)

the employer knew or should have known of the

harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial

action.

Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2013). Harassment

only affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment when its “either severe or

pervasive.” Id. at 403.

In this case, Pendleton’s alleged behavior was unquestionably vulgar,

particularly in a school context. But her sexual comments occurred only six times in

two years, and “such infrequent conduct is not ‘pervasive’ enough to sustain a hostile

work environment claim.” Higgins v. Lufkin Industries, Inc., 633 F. App’x 229, 235

(5th Cir. 2015) (finding two comments in one year insufficient for a hostile work

environment claim); see also Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State

of Tex., 168 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that four instances of inappropriate

sexual remarks and several more instances of inappropriate touching over a two-year

period were insufficient).

Similarly, although Pendleton’s alleged behavior was inappropriate, it was not

“severe” enough to support a hostile work environment claim. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that “[a]n egregious, yet isolated,

incident can alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and satisfy the

fourth element necessary to constitute a hostile work environment.” Lauderdale v.

Tex. Dept. of Crim. Justice, Inst. Div., 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007).

For example, in Brandon v. Woodspring Suites Shreveport-Bossier City LLC,

the court held that a single incident altered the terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment. No. 18-848, 2020 WL 1862148, at *4 (W.D. La. April 13, 2020). There,

the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a coworker when he grabbed her arm, tried to

force her to touch his penis, attempted to kiss her, exposed his penis to her, and

showed her a naked photograph of himself. Id.

Here, although repugnant, none of Pendleton’s comments were severe enough

to alter the conditions of Golatt’s employment. Unlike Brandon, Golatt does not allege

that Pendleton touched or attempted to touch him inappropriately, nor does Golatt

allege that Pendleton tried to make him touch her. Pendleton’s comments were

explicit and crude, but courts have regularly found similar remarks do not prevent

the person “from succeeding in the workplace.” Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874

(“[Defendant’s] harassing actions, although offensive, are not the type of extreme

conduct that would prevent [Plaintiff] from succeeding in the workplace.”); see, e.g.,

Walker v. SBC Services, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 524, 539-40 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (finding

that five instances of “sexually explicit, crude and vulgar comments” in two years

were not severe enough to create a hostile work environment). The Court finds that

no genuine dispute of material fact exists that Pendleton and Caddo Parish altered a

term, condition, or privilege of Golatt’s employment, and therefore, his sexual

harassment claim under Title VII must fail.

II. Disability Discrimination Claim

The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits covered employers from

discriminating against a qualified individual because of that individual’s disability.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To prevail, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case

of discrimination. Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671-72 (5th Cir.

2004). The plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of

the ADA; (2) he is qualified and able to perform the essential functions of his job; and

(3) his employer’s adverse employment action was based on his disability. Id.

In his complaint, Golatt alleged that his employers regarded him as disabled

when Pendelton accused him of being using cocaine and being mentally unstable. R.

Doc. 37-3, at 48. However, an erroneous perception of illegal drug use qualifies as a

disability only if the employer regarded the perceived drug use as an impairment. See

Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions, L.P., 75 F.4th 469, 479 (5th Cir. 2023)

(“Determining whether a plaintiff has a disability requires an individual assessment

of the impact of the impairment on an individual’s major life activities.”); see also

Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 860 (5th Cir. 1999)

(explaining in a pre-ADAA decision how “even a plaintiff who suffers

from…alcoholism or drug addiction…must demonstrate that the condition

substantially limits…his ability to perform a major life function.”); Bailey v. Real

Time Staffing Servs., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 490, 500 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (“an erroneous

belief about drug use will only be a qualifying disability if the employer regarded the

perceived drug use as an impairment…”).

Here, Golatt has provided enough evidence that Pendleton regarded his

perceived drug use as an impairment to survive summary judgment. Specifically,

Pendleton took issue with Golatt’s decision to approve a social media post involving

Southwood. Blaming his perceived cocaine use, Pendleton said that Golatt had a

“mental issue” and had been “acting psycho.” Pls.’ Depo. 197-200. Pendleton then

threatened to fire Golatt if he did not attend the employee assistance program.

Pendleton’s alleged comments and accompanying actions signal that she believed

Golatt’s perceived drug use impaired his mental function and ability to perform his

job.

However, although Golatt can establish that Caddo Parish regarded him as

disabled, he cannot prove that his employer took an adverse employment action based

on that disability.1 In his complaint, Golatt alleged that Pendleton referred him to

the employee assistance program. R. Doc. 1. But referral to an employee assistance

program does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Wright v. Barr, No.

17-1081, 2020 WL 13598000, at *26 (D.D.C. June 8, 2020) (collecting cases). As one

court explained, requiring someone attend an employee assistance program does “not

rise to the level of adverse employment actions” and amounts to no more than “petty

slights or minor annoyances.” Robinson v. Fulton County, Ga., No. 05-2250, 2008 WL

78711, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2008); see also Dunn v. City of Tallahassee, No. 01-

228, 2002 WL 1979128, at *9 (N.D. Fla. July 5, 2020) (holding that a “mandatory

1 Caddo Parish does not dispute that Golatt had been qualified and capable of performing his

duties as a teacher and coach. See R. Doc. 37-2, at 10.

referral to the employee assistance program” does not “rise[] to the level of adverse

employment action.”).

In this case, the Court finds that Golatt’s mandatory referral to the employee

assistance programs does not constitute an adverse employment action. Golatt has

not alleged any negative consequences accompanied his program referral other than

the minor inconvenience of time. In fact, Golatt himself testified that the referral was

no more than a trivial annoyance, explaining that the program’s counselor “advised

me only after speaking with me a few minutes that he saw nothing wrong with me

[land to] go back to my school.” R. Doc. 37-3. Therefore, without an adverse

employment action, Golatt’s discrimination claim under the ADA fails.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s motion for partial summary

judgment is GRANTED, and the Plaintiffs discrimination claims under Title VII

and the ADA are dismissed. Only the Plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim survives.

DONE AND SIGNED at Shreveport, Louisiana, this 9th day of February,

2026.

Une ©. Vor Un

ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10