Martin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

BRADLEY EARL MARTIN, )

AIS # 194886, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:25-CV-206-WKW

) [WO]

ANTONIO McCLAIN, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Bradley Earl Martin, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2003

convictions for second-degree burglary and first-degree burglary and his concurrent

sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, handed down by the

Circuit Court of Russell County, Alabama. As ordered (Doc. # 10), Respondent,

through the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Alabama, timely filed an

Answer (Doc. # 15) to the petition, as well as records of the state-court proceedings.

Petitioner filed a reply. (Doc. # 16.)

Based upon a review of the parties’ submissions, an evidentiary hearing is not

warranted. See Rule 8, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts [hereinafter Rules Governing § 2254 Cases]. For the reasons set

forth below, Petitioner is not entitled to relief because his petition is time-barred

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Therefore, the petition will be dismissed with

prejudice. Furthermore, Petitioner will be denied a certificate of appealability.

II. JURISDICTION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), federal district courts have the authority to

consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of an individual in state

custody pursuant to a state-court judgment but “only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”

This provision limits authority, rather than conferring it, with habeas jurisdiction

established by 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 787 (11th

Cir. 2004). Under § 2241, federal district courts have the power to grant writs of

habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions,” § 2241(a), when a state-

convicted prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution, ” § 2241(c)(3).

The “in-custody” requirement mandates that the habeas petitioner must “be ‘in

custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is

filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1989) (per curiam).

Petitioner was in custody under a state-court judgment when he filed this

petition. Furthermore, since Petitioner was incarcerated in a state prison located in

the Middle District of Alabama at the time of filing and also was convicted and

sentenced by a state court in this district, this court has jurisdiction to consider his

petition. See § 2241(d).

III. BACKGROUND

A. State Court Trial Proceedings (Convictions and Sentences) and Failure

to Appeal

On October 20, 2003, Petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary

(CC-2000-275) and first-degree burglary (CC-2003-584) in the Circuit Court of

Russell County, Alabama. See State v. Martin, Case Nos. CC-2000-275, CC-2003-

584 (Russell Cnty. Cir. Ct.). On the same day, the circuit court sentenced Petitioner

as a habitual felony offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole, with the

sentences to run concurrently. (See Doc. # 15-1, 15-2, 15-3 (Respondent Exs. A, B,

C).)

Petitioner had 42 days after the pronouncement of sentence to file a direct

appeal. Ala. R. App. P. 4(b)(1) (“In a criminal case a notice of appeal by the

defendant shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (six weeks)

after pronouncement of the sentence . . . .”). The forty-second day after October 20,

2003, and thus, the deadline for Petitioner to file a notice of appeal, was December

1, 2003. See Ala. R. App. P. 26(a) (defining how to compute “any period of time

prescribed by these rules” and, as relevant here, “the day of the act . . . from which

the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included” but “[t]he last day

of the period shall be included”). Petitioner did not appeal his October 20, 2003

guilty-plea convictions and sentences.

B. Post-Conviction Remedies in State Court

Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure governs post-conviction

remedies in state court. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.1–32.10. Because Petitioner did not

file a direct appeal, any Rule 32 petition had to be filed “within one (1) year after the

time for filing an appeal lapse[d].” See Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c). That one-year

period ended on or about December 1, 2004.

It was not until September 13, 2021, more than sixteen years past this

deadline, that Petitioner filed his first Rule 32 petition for postconviction relief.1

(Doc. # 15-7 (Respondent Ex. G).) In this untimely petition, Petitioner argued that

his guilty plea was involuntary. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel,

asserting that his trial attorney failed to review the evidence, neglected to investigate

and subpoena witnesses, and altered and forged Petitioner’s initials on the

explanation-of-rights form. Additionally, Petitioner contended that newly

discovered evidence showed that a statute enacted in March 2016 established a three-

year statute of limitations for first-degree burglary. He argued that this statute

1 Although the Rule 32 petition was stamped as filed with the circuit clerk’s office on January 13,

2022, Petitioner stated in his petition that he placed it with prison officials for mailing on

September 13, 2021. (Doc. # 15-7 at 1, 7.) See Ex parte Allen, 825 So. 2d 271, 272 (Ala. 2002)

(“Alabama courts have held that a pro se incarcerated petitioner/appellant is considered to have

‘filed’ a Rule 32 petition, a notice of appeal, or a petition for a writ of certiorari when those

documents are given to prison officials for mailing.”).

deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction to prosecute him in 2003 for a crime

committed in 1999.2 (Doc. # 15-7.)

After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying

Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition on May 17, 2022. (Doc. # 15-6 (Respondent Ex. F).)

In its order, the circuit court found that

Petitioner’s testimony about the alleged twenty (20) year plea offer

from the State is not credible. There was no evidence presented to this

Court that the original Court was without jurisdiction to render

judgment or to impose the sentence in this case. All other grounds for

relief are either time bared by [Ala. R. Crim. P.] 32.2(c) or were not

sufficiently plead.

(Doc. # 15-6 (Respondent Ex. F).)

On May 27, 2022, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals (ACCA), appealing the circuit court’s denial of his Rule 32

petition for postconviction relief. (Doc. # 15-8 (Respondent Ex. H).) On April 28,

2023, the ACCA affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in a memorandum opinion.

(Doc. # 15-9 (Respondent Ex. I).) The ACCA held that Petitioner’s claims regarding

the involuntary nature of his guilty plea and ineffective assistance of counsel were

“procedurally barred because they were filed after the time limitation in Rule

32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., had expired.” (Doc. # 15-9 at 4.) The ACCA also found

2 The one-year limitation period in Rule 32.2(c) applies to Rule 32 petitions filed on the grounds

specified in Rule 32.1(a)––that “[t]he constitution of the United States or of the State of Alabama

requires a new trial, a new sentence, or other relief.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a).

that Petitioner’s claim concerning the allegedly illegal enhancement of his sentence

under Alabama’s Habitual Felony Offender Act was not raised in his Rule 32

petition but instead was introduced for the first time during the evidentiary hearing,

resulting in the claim being waived for review. (Doc. # 15-9 at 4–6.) The ACCA

further found that, even if Petitioner had properly raised his illegal-sentence claim

in the circuit court, that court made “no adverse ruling on this claim” and that,

therefore, it was “not preserved for appellate review and w[ould] not be considered.”

(Doc. # 15-9 at 6–7.) Furthermore, the ACCA found that “[t]he remaining claims

raised in Martin’s Rule 32 petition but not reasserted on appeal [were] deemed

abandoned.” (Doc. # 15-9 at 3.)

Petitioner did not file an application for rehearing with the ACCA or a petition

for a writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court. (Doc. # 15-12 (Respondent

Ex. L).) On May 17, 2023, the ACCA issued a certificate of judgment pursuant to

Rule 41 of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Doc. # 15-10 (Respondent

Ex. J).)

C. The Instant Federal Habeas Petition

On March 11, 2025,3 Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. # 1.) Petitioner alleges three grounds for

relief:

a. “Ineffective assistance of counsel: Counsel was ineffective for

failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into the facts and evidence

relative to the charges and prior convictions,” (Doc. # 1 at 5);

b. “Sentence is illegal, because ineffective assistance of counsel

resulted in prior convictions which were not valid to be used for

enhancement purposes,” (Doc. # 1 at 7); and

c. “Plea was involuntary due to failure to correctly inform Petitioner of

the minimum and maximum sentences which could be imposed.” (Doc.

# 1 at 8.)

On October 9, 2025, Respondent was ordered to file an answer to Petitioner’s

federal habeas petition. (Doc. # 10.) Respondent contends that the petition should

be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred.

Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s answer (Doc. # 16), reiterating his

grounds for relief on the merits and introducing additional arguments to challenge

the legality of his convictions and sentences. He also contends that his claims should

be considered under the miscarriage-of-justice exception, as his plea was involuntary

3 “Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is

delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2009). Absent evidence to the contrary, the court must “assume that a prisoner delivered a

filing to prison authorities on the date that he signed it.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310,

1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Petitioner signed his petition, declaring that March 11, 2025,

is the date he “placed [his petition] in the prison mailing system.” (Doc. # 1 at 15.)

and his sentence was improperly enhanced based on illegal prior convictions. He

argues that his challenges are jurisdictional and can be raised at any time. (See Doc.

# 16.) Furthermore, he asserts, without explanation, that the court should excuse the

timeliness bar based on a futility exception, stating that “there are no further

available state remedies under Alabama law.” (Doc. # 16 at 13.)

IV. DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

provides that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”4

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitation period begins when the state-court

judgment is considered final, as defined by the AEDPA, not state law. See Gonzalez

v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012). The AEDPA specifies two alternative dates on

which a state-court judgment becomes final: (1) at the “conclusion of direct review”

or (2) upon the “expiration of the time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A).

In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court established that § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s text

“consists of two prongs” with distinct applications:

For petitioners who pursue direct review all the way to th[e United

States Supreme] Court, the judgment becomes final at the “conclusion

of direct review”—when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits

or denies a petition for certiorari. For all other petitioners, the judgment

becomes final at the “expiration of the time for seeking such review”—

4 The petition contains no facts that trigger the application of § 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D).

when the time for pursuing direct review in this Court, or in state court,

expires.

565 U.S. at 150.5

Petitioner falls within the second category of Gonzalez petitioners—those

whose judgment of conviction “becomes final at the ‘expiration of the time for

seeking such review’ . . . in state court.” Id. (quoting § 2244(d)(1)(A)). Petitioner

did not appeal his conviction in either of his cases (Case Nos. CC-2000-275 or CC-

2003-584). Therefore, Petitioner had 42 days from the date of sentencing (October

20, 2003) to file an appeal. See Ala. R. App. P. 4(b)(1). The deadline to appeal was

December 1, 2003. See Ala. R. App. P. 26(a) (defining how to compute “any period

of time prescribed by these rules”).

The one-year limitation period under § 2244(d)(1)(A) began to run the next

day on December 2, 2003. See Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 877 F.3d 1244, 1247

n.3 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The limitation period [under § 2244(d)(1)(A)] began to run

the day after the conviction and sentence became final . . . .” (citing San Martin v.

McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil

5 The issue in Gonzalez centered on identifying when a judgment becomes final under

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) if a state petitioner forgoes review in a state’s highest court. 565 U.S. at 150.

There, the state petitioner pursued a direct appeal to the intermediate state appellate court but did

not seek discretionary review in the state’s highest court. See id. at 138. The Supreme Court held

that the judgment became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking discretionary

review in the state’s highest court expired under the state court’s filing deadlines. See id. at 150

(“We . . . agree with the Court of Appeals that because [the petitioner] did not appeal to the State’s

highest court, his judgment became final when his time for seeking review with the State’s highest

court expired.”).

Procedure 6(a)(1) applies to the calculation of the AEDPA’s one-year limitation

period and explaining that the limitation period therefore begins to run from the day

after the day of the event that triggers the period))). The one-year limitation period

expired on December 1, 2004. See Downs v. Mitchell, 520 F.3d 1311, 1318 (11th

Cir. 2008) (noting that the “limitations period expires on the anniversary of the date

it began to run”). Petitioner’s federal habeas petition, nearly two decades later,

comes too late under § 2244(d)(1)(A).

B. Statutory Tolling, Equitable Tolling, and Actual Innocence

An otherwise untimely petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may be considered

only if the petitioner demonstrates either entitlement to tolling or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. As explained below, Petitioner has not identified facts

establishing that tolling applies or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred.

1. Statutory Tolling

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the one-year limitation period is tolled during

the pendency of “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” A properly filed

state-court application must be pending during § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s one-year limitation

period for tolling to occur. In other words, “[a] state court petition . . . that is filed

following the expiration of the limitations period cannot toll that period because

there is no period remaining to be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259

(11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).

As recounted above, Petitioner filed his first Rule 32 petition in the state trial

court on September 13, 2021. The filing of this Rule 32 petition did not toll the one-

year limitation period under § 2244(d)(2) because that period expired more than a

decade-and-a-half earlier on December 1, 2004. A Rule 32 petition filed after the

expiration of the § 2244(d)(2) limitation period cannot toll it, as there is no remaining

time to toll. See id. Therefore, statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) cannot be applied

to the one-year limitation period, and Petitioner has not argued for statutory tolling.

2. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling of § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s one-year limitation period applies

where a petitioner “shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely

filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Equitable tolling is “an extraordinary remedy” and, thus, is “limited

to rare and exceptional circumstances and typically applied sparingly.” Thomas v.

Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1162, 1179 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “The petitioner

bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is warranted.” Hunter v. Ferrell,

587 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

Petitioner has not alleged that extraordinary circumstances prevented him

from filing his § 2254 petition on time or that he pursued his rights diligently during

the nearly sixteen years between the state-court judgment’s finality and the filing of

this petition. The § 2254 form petition requires Petitioner to address the one-year

limitation period if the challenged state-court judgment became final over a year

ago. Instead of discussing timeliness, Petitioner uses the space on this form to

further argue for relief based on the merits of the claims in his petition. (Doc. # 1

at 13–14.) In his reply brief, Petitioner reiterates these merits-focused arguments

and introduces additional grounds to challenge the legality of his convictions and

sentences. (Doc. # 16.) However, these arguments do not satisfy the standard for

equitable tolling because the standard focuses “on the circumstances surrounding the

late filing of the habeas petition, rather than the circumstances surrounding the

underlying conviction.” Helton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1314–

15 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Simply put, Petitioner’s arguments fail to explain

why he filed his petition late. Petitioner has not alleged extraordinary circumstances

or that he pursued his rights diligently so as to warrant equitable tolling.

3. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice: Actual Innocence

Even where there is no basis for tolling, a petitioner can overcome

§ 2244(d)(1)’s one-year limitation period where he can show a “fundamental

miscarriage of justice.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013). The

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception requires a showing that “a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Id. at 392 (citation omitted). “[A]ctual innocence, if proved, serves as a

gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a

procedural bar, . . . or . . . expiration of the [AEDPA] statute of limitations.” Id.

at 386.

The actual innocence exception “is exceedingly narrow,” Rozzelle v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1013 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), and requires

a petitioner “(1) to present new reliable evidence that was not presented at trial, and

(2) to show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the new evidence,” id. at 1011

(cleaned up). The actual innocence gateway requires a petitioner to show “factual

innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,

623 (1998).

Petitioner has not raised a claim of actual innocence to excuse his untimely

filing. He has not alleged that there is any evidence, let alone new and reliable

evidence, that would demonstrate that he did not commit the offenses for which he

was convicted, such that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Instead, Petitioner asserts that his habeas claims present jurisdictional issues

that cannot be waived and, therefore, are not subject to the AEDPA’s one-year

limitation period. (Doc. # 16 at 6–7.) These arguments lack merit. First, the

arguments concerning the state court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction due to an

involuntary plea and illegal sentence enhancement merely suggest legal innocence

rather than factual innocence. See McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1197

(11th Cir. 2011) (observing that “actual innocence” refers to factual innocence, not

“mere legal insufficiency” (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623; Sawyer v. Whitley, 505

U.S. 333, 339 (1992); and Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.

2001))).

Second, Petitioner’s labeling of his claims as “jurisdictional” does not exempt

them from AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. For one thing, his claims do not

appear to be jurisdictional. See, e.g., Cloud v. State, 234 So. 3d 538, 544 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2016) (“Although couched in jurisdictional terms, [the petitioner’s]

ineffective-assistance claims are not truly jurisdictional and, therefore, are subject to

the procedural bars of Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.”); Fincher v. State, 837 So. 2d 876,

878 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (“Claims relating to the voluntariness of guilty pleas are

not jurisdictional and, therefore, are subject to the procedural bars of Rule 32.2, Ala.

R. Crim. P.”). For another thing, even if Petitioner’s claims raised jurisdictional

issues, “[t]here is no exception to the limitation period in § 2244(d) for claims

alleging lack of jurisdiction by the state trial court.” Smith v. Giles, 2017 WL

4021125, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July 12, 2017), R&R adopted, 2017 WL 4019425 (M.D.

Ala. Sep. 12, 2017); see also Brown v. Patterson, 2012 WL 3264896, at *3 (M.D.

Ala. June 18, 2012) (“Brown argues that his claim challenging the validity of his

sentence presents a jurisdictional claim which is not governed by the one-year period

of limitation contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, neither the statute

nor federal case law makes such an exception for alleged jurisdictional issues arising

under state law.”), R&R adopted, 2012 WL 3264556 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 9, 2012).

Petitioner’s attempt to circumvent § 2244(d)’s one-year limitation period by

characterizing his claims as jurisdictional is without merit.

V. CONCLUSION

As explained, Petitioner did not file this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ

of habeas corpus within the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1), and he has not shown a basis for statutory tolling, equitable tolling, or

actual innocence. Therefore, the § 2254 petition must be dismissed with prejudice.

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, “[t]he district

court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant.” Petitioner has not shown, “at least, that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether [this]

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Therefore, Petitioner will be denied a

certificate of appealability.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Petitioner Bradley Earl Martin’s 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 petition is DISMISSED with prejudice and that Petitioner is DENIED a

certificate of appealability.

Final judgment will be entered separately.

DONE this 10th day of February, 2026.

/s/ W. Keith Watkins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE