Dyer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

ADRIAN DYER, Case No. 1:25-cv-02189-MTK

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

JOHN DELEHANTY, et al.,

Defendants.

KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:

Adrian Dyer, proceeding self-represented, brings this action against Defendants John

Delehanty, Allan Graham, Feyga Saksonov, Marian Ryan, Town of Natick, and Commonwealth

of Massachusetts. Compl., ECF No. 1. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to

Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 2. The Court grants Plaintiff’s Application to

Proceed IFP but finds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants. For the reasons

stated below, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a resident of Oregon, alleges that Defendants’ actions initiating criminal

proceedings against him in Massachusetts violated his Constitutional rights under the First,

Second, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Supremacy Clause. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 40.

Defendants include: Delehanty and Graham, police officers at the Natick Police Department in

Natick, Massachusetts; Saksonov and Ryan, attorneys at the Middlesex County District

Attorney’s Office in Middlesex County, Massachusetts; the Town of Natick; and the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Id. ¶¶ 5-10.

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of an alleged affidavit that initiated criminal proceedings

against him, which was submitted by Defendant Delehanty and approved by Defendant Graham.

Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Saksonov appeared in her official capacity in the

prosecutorial proceedings against Plaintiff, under the supervision of Defendant Ryan. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.

Plaintiff alleges that “nearly ten weeks after charges were filed,” he received “the

complaint.”1 Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff “was never taken into custody, never served with a warrant, and

never granted an opportunity to respond to the allegations prior to his interstate appearance.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that “the complainant appeared at a local hearing without notice to Plaintiff and

successfully secured an ex parte Abuse Prevention Order.” Id. ¶ 15.

The Abuse Prevention Order was then “transmitted across state lines into Oregon without

Oregon’s awareness and involvement,” but served “by a Washington County sheriff.” Id. ¶¶ 15,

27. Per Plaintiff, “[t]he order sought to extend Massachusetts jurisdiction into Oregon without a

trial, without cross-examination, and without verification of facts.” Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff also alleges

that “[a]t no time did Massachusetts authorities coordinate with Oregon courts or law

enforcement in executing the arrest in absentia, initiating charges, or applying procedural

restrictions.” Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Id. ¶ 49.

1 It is unclear whether this refers to the affidavit signed by Defendant Delehanty or some other

document.

DISCUSSION

I. Financial Status

“The right to proceed in forma pauperis is not an unqualified one[.] It is a privilege,

rather than a right.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960) (citations

omitted). The Court shall dismiss a case if it determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A). While a plaintiff need not be completely destitute to qualify for IFP

status, a plaintiff must allege poverty “with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.”

Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff states in his IFP application that he is currently unemployed and earns no

income. ECF No. 2 at 1. Plaintiff states that his household’s only source of income is his wife’s

take-home pay of $540 every two weeks. Id. at 2. He further states that his wife’s income covers

only their basic household necessities, with no funds left over to pay the filing fee. Id. Based on

the lack of income and assets alleged in Plaintiff’s application, the Court finds Plaintiff is unable

to pay the cost of commencing the action and therefore grants Plaintiff’s Application for Leave

to Proceed IFP.2

II. Mandatory Screening

Congress has mandated that district courts screen IFP applications and dismiss any case

that “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Screening Plaintiff’s Complaint here, it is dismissed because the Court does not have personal

jurisdiction over Defendants.

2 While this application was pending, Plaintiff’s filing fee was paid. Accordingly, the Court will

issue a refund.

Under the facts Plaintiff has alleged, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over

Defendants. “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their

jurisdiction over [defendants].” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014)). “Oregon’s long-arm statute confers

jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process.” Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Mach. Co., 913

F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Or. R. Civ. P. 4(L). Due process requires the defendant to

“have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does

not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Courts may

exercise two types of personal jurisdiction over a defendant: general personal jurisdiction and

specific personal jurisdiction. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008).

A. General Personal Jurisdiction

A defendant may only be subject to general personal jurisdiction in the state where they

are domiciled or “at home.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). A court may not

assert general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant unless the defendant has contacts with

the forum state that are so “continuous and systematic” as to render the defendant “essentially at

home.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).

Defendants are neither domiciled nor “at home” in Oregon. Defendants Delehanty and

Graham are police officers employed by the Natick Police Department in Natick, Massachusetts.

Compl. ¶ 5-6. Defendants Saksonov and Ryan are attorneys employed by the Middlesex County

District Attorney’s Office in Middlesex County, Massachusetts. Id. ¶ 7-8. Finally, Defendants

Town of Natick and Commonwealth of Massachusetts are likewise not located within Oregon.

Id. ¶ 9-10. There are no facts alleging that any Defendant has continuous and systematic contacts

with Oregon, the forum state. The Court does not have general personal jurisdiction over

Defendants.

B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

A court has specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if three criteria

are met: (1) the claim arises out of the defendant's forum-related activities; (2) the defendant

purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is

reasonable. Terracom v. Valley Nat. Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1995).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants directly engaged in any events in Oregon

that give rise to his claims. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “projected prosecutorial

force across state lines.” Compl. ¶ 16. The primary action giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims is

Defendant Delehanty’s submission of an affidavit that initiated criminal proceedings against

Plaintiff in Natick, Massachusetts. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that the proceedings crossed state

lines when a Washington County sheriff served Plaintiff with a Massachusetts-issued Abuse

Prevention Order after Plaintiff had returned to his domicile in Oregon. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. These legal

proceedings are still ongoing in Massachusetts, and Defendants are requiring Plaintiff to appear

in person. Id. ¶ 20.

“[T]he plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” Walden v.

Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). For a state to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, the

defendant’s own actions must form a connection with the forum state. Id. Initiating criminal

proceedings against a plaintiff who later travels to a different state is not sufficient to form

contacts between the defendant and the forum state. See id. at 288-89 (holding that the plaintiffs’

connections to Nevada did not impose personal jurisdiction in Nevada on an officer who filed an

affidavit against the plaintiffs in Georgia). Here, Defendant Delehanty’s submission of an

affidavit in Massachusetts against Plaintiff, a resident of Oregon, is not sufficient to connect any

Defendants to Oregon.

The fact that the Abuse Prevention Order was transmitted across state lines and served in

Oregon likewise does not give rise to specific jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit has addressed the

question of what actions give rise to specific jurisdiction when individuals in another state

institute criminal proceedings against an individual in the forum state. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 693-94 (9th Cir. 2001). In Lee, the Ninth Circuit held that out-of-state (New York)

law enforcement officers took “deliberate actions” giving rise to specific jurisdiction in the

forum state (California) by “using the California criminal justice system to accomplish the

extradition, sending the LAPD an identification packet to facilitate the extradition, regularly

communicating with the LAPD during the extradition process, and traveling to Los Angeles to

escort the purported fugitive back to New York.” Id. at 693. The Court explained that because

the out-of-state officers were “directly and significantly involved” in the extradition, they were

subject to district court’s personal jurisdiction. Id. at 694.

Here, there are no allegations of direct and significant involvement by Defendants within

Oregon similar to those that existed in Lee. The mere transmission of the Abuse Prevention

Order to Oregon is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. Nothing in the Complaint

indicates that Defendants participated in forum-related activities or availed themselves of the

privileges of conducting business in Oregon. Accordingly, this Court lacks specific personal

jurisdiction over Defendants and Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed on that basis.

III. Leave to Amend

In civil rights cases in which the plaintiff is self-represented, the court construes the

pleadings liberally and must afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Bretz v. Kelman, 773

F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985). Ordinarily, self-represented plaintiffs are given leave to

amend their complaint. Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).

But if it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by

amendment,” leave to amend need not be given. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because

it is not clear this Complaint could not be cured by amendment, the Court will permit Plaintiff an

opportunity to amend his Complaint and address the deficiencies identified above.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) is

GRANTED. However, the Complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff has leave to amend his

Complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order. The Clerk of the Court is ordered to issue a

refund check for $405 to Jamie Eldrett at 1257 Plummer Avenue #B Grants Pass, OR 97527 (the

recipient and address reflected in the receipt issued for the payment of the filing fee).

DATED this 11th day of February 2026.

s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai

MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (he/him)

United States District Judge