United States v. Leonard

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

____________ United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 23-40652 FILED

____________ February 11, 2026

Lyle W. Cayce

United States of America, Clerk

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Xavier Jerel Leonard,

Defendant—Appellee.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 9:22-CR-38-1

______________________________

Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Oldham and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

Pursuant to a valid warrant, officers entered a home and seized drugs,

cash, and two guns. In the ensuing criminal prosecution, the defendant filed

a motion to suppress. The defendant’s original attorney deemed the motion

“frivolous.” But the magistrate judge disagreed. She suggested the district

court should wield the judge-made exclusionary rule to suppress the

evidence. The district court obliged. We reverse.

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

I

A

The Crockett Police Department received a call that a man was

sprawled on the ground in a residential area. When officers arrived on the

scene, they spotted a group of concerned neighbors gathered around a 400-

pound man. The large man was thrashing about on the grass near the road in

nothing but torn underwear.

That man was Xavier Leonard. And it is obvious from the officers’

bodycam videos that Leonard was in dire straits. His body was bloodied and

bruised. And his only response to questioning was to grunt and flail. After the

officers struggled for a few minutes to keep Leonard from smashing his head

on the pavement, someone noted that Leonard “smell[ed] like PCP.” Gov’t

Ex. 1 at 6:53–55. Officer Kerri Bell, a former EMT who had taken charge of

the situation, agreed: “He’s high. Super high.” Id. at 6:53–7:02.

Meanwhile, Deputy Juan Noyola arrived. Deputy Noyola was not part

of Crockett PD. He was from the Houston County Sherriff’s Office. Deputy

Noyola, who had grown up in the area, identified Leonard. A woman present

at the scene claimed Leonard was her neighbor and that she had never seen

him act this way before. With Deputy Noyola’s help, the officers realized that

Leonard’s home was just down the street. So Deputy Noyola went to look

around.

Deputy Noyola noticed that a side door to the house had been left

open. He radioed Officer Bell, who went to assist. Deputy Noyola knocked

on the open door and announced: “Crockett PD!” Gov’t Ex. 1 at 9:20–40.

Silence.

2

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

Drawing her weapon, Officer Bell peeked through the cracked door.

The inside of the home was in disarray. Among other things, Officer Bell

could see a broken coffee table.

The officers entered. Officer Bell proceeded room by room, shouting,

“Police Department, if you’re in here, make yourself known!” Gov’t Ex. 1

at 9:20–11:26. Upon entering the main bedroom, she spotted a gun on the

bed. She then opened the closet. “Marijuana plants,” she murmured. Id. at

3

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

10:15–25. In the next bedroom, she found a tent with marijuana plants and

multiple containers for PCP or meth. Officer Bell then announced that she

would “check[]” the remainder of the potential hiding spots in the home

“for safety, and then” they would get “out.” Gov’t Ex. 1 at 11:00–23. The

officers were in the home for under two minutes.

B

Officer Bell then prepared an application for a search warrant. “For

safety,” she explained, “and to ensure there were no suspects hiding or fur-

ther victims in need of immediate medical attention, the deputy and I made

entry into the residence through the open door.” ROA.368. A state judge

signed the warrant to search for narcotics, contraband, cash, and firearms.

Law enforcement searched Leonard’s home and seized, inter alia, marijuana

plants, marijuana, other drugs, cash, and two guns.

Leonard was charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a

felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and one count of possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Leonard

wanted his attorney to move to suppress the fruits of the search of his home.

But the attorney told Leonard that “would be frivolous.” ROA.227–28. After

the attorney informed the court, the court appointed Leonard a new attorney.

Leonard’s new attorney filed the motion to suppress.

A magistrate judge held a hearing and issued a report recommending

that the district court grant Leonard’s motion. The district court adopted the

magistrate’s recommendation and suppressed the evidence.

The Government appealed. On appeal, it does not contest the merits

of the Fourth Amendment issue. It argues only that the exclusionary rule

does not apply.

4

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

II

The exclusionary rule is a disfavored judge-made remedy, which

should be used only as a “last resort.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591

(2006). It also has many exceptions. For example, unlawfully obtained

evidence might nevertheless be admissible under the good faith exception.

See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908, 922 (1984).

The good faith exception has several offshoots. Relevant here, is our

court’s “close enough” doctrine. See United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512 (5th

Cir. 2014). Evidence is admissible if the officer’s conduct that led to the

information in the warrant affidavit was “‘close enough to the line of validity’

that an objectively reasonable officer . . . would believe that the information”

gathered “was not tainted by unconstitutional conduct.” Id. at 528. That

standard is susceptible to valid criticism. See post, at 14–16 (Oldham, J.,

concurring). But it is what it is.

No matter how we define that “close enough” standard, it’s clearly

met here. A large man was half-naked and thrashing about on the ground in a

residential neighborhood. He was bruised and bloodied. The people nearby

did not know Leonard; they knew only that he had come stumbling up the

road before falling. The man himself lacked the wherewithal to offer any

further explanation, such as whether he was attacked or was suffering from a

medical crisis. All he could do was groan in apparent pain and torment in

response to questioning. The officers sought to care for the man in his

disturbed and pitiable condition by protecting his head from smashing against

the ground and calling emergency medical services. The officers eventually

determined that the man’s house was nearby. When they went over to look,

they noticed a door to that house had been left open. Through that door, the

officers could see a broken coffee table, suggesting a violent struggle had

occurred inside. Before entering, they knocked and announced their presence

5

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

as required under the Fourth Amendment. They heard only silence. So they

entered.

It doesn’t matter whether the officers entered Leonard’s home to

clear the area of Leonard’s possible attacker, identify other potential victims

of an attack, or to find someone with information that could help with

Leonard’s medical care. Any of those reasons could qualify as an exigent

circumstance. See, e.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (warrant-

less entry may be justified where “there [is] an objectively reasonable basis

for believing that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger”

(quotation omitted)). The “mere possibility” that an assailant, victim, or

critical medical information was inside the home won’t always satisfy the

Fourth Amendment, but the officers could have reasonably believed it was

enough here given the circumstances. United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556,

563, 565–66 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted) (concluding that an ajar front

door was not enough to create probable cause of a crime occurring inside, but

officers were not objectively unreasonable for suspecting as much). That

reasonable belief is all that’s required under the “close enough” variant of

the good faith exception.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

6

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, joined by Wilson, Circuit Judge,

concurring:

I agree that Leonard’s motion to suppress should be denied. But our

circuit’s interpretation of the good faith exception under United States v.

Massi, 761 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2014), leaves much to be desired. I would clarify

when an officer’s conduct is “close enough to the line of validity” that we

will allow officers to rely on a valid warrant, even though it was obtained using

unlawfully acquired information. Id. at 528.

I first (I) walk through the history of the exclusionary rule. Then, I

(II) explain why we should define the “close enough” standard in reference

to the objective reasonableness inquiry we use in qualified immunity cases.

I

As the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned, the exclusionary rule

is a disfavored judge-made remedy, which should be used only as a “last

resort.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006). Here, I (A) explain

the tension between the exclusionary rule and the Constitution’s text and

history. Then, I explain the (B) rise and the (C) fall of the exclusionary rule.

A

As the Supreme Court has told us, the exclusionary rule has no basis

in the Constitution’s text. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–238

(2011) (The Fourth Amendment “says nothing about suppressing

evidence.”); see also Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127

Harv. L. Rev. 1885, 1889 (2014) (“Fourth Amendment suppression

explicitly rests on essentially atextual notions of policy or morality.”). By its

plain text, the Fourth Amendment only secures certain rights; it is not a font

of remedies.

7

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

Nor does the Amendment’s historical backdrop suggest otherwise.

On the contrary, by the time of the Founding, “the common law” had long

since “rejected the exclusionary rule.” William J. Cuddihy, The

Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 1602–

1791, at 431 (2009); see also Bishop Atterbury’s Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 323, 640

(1723). And so did the new Republic. As Justice Story explained:

The right of using evidence does not depend, nor, as far as I

have any recollection, has ever been supposed to depend upon

the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the mode, by which it is

obtained. . . . In many instances, and especially on trials for

crimes, evidence is often obtained from the possession of the

offender by force or by contrivances, which one could not easily

reconcile to a delicate sense of propriety, or support upon the

foundations of municipal law. Yet I am not aware, that such

evidence has upon that account ever been dismissed for

incompetency.

United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843–844 (C.C.D. Mass.

1822).

And “the logic of the exclusionary rule” would have made little sense

to the Founders. Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 603 (2018) (Thomas, J.,

concurring). First, the Founders cared only that evidence be “relevant and

reliable.” Ibid. But the exclusionary rule requires even the most probative

evidence to be excluded. Second, the Founders did not conceive of “a

wrongful act by an officer” as “a form of government illegality.” Thomas Y.

Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547,

554 (1999). Instead, “when a government official exceeded his legal

authority”—for example, by violating the Fourth Amendment—he acted

only “as a private individual.” Thomas Koenig & Christopher D. Moore, Of

State Remedies and Federal Rights, 75 Cath. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming)

(manuscript at 10), https://perma.cc/2GUZ-ENE5. So the proper recourse

8

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

for an individual whose rights had been violated came “through tort suits or

self-help.” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016). I am aware of no

Founding-era evidence that the government could not introduce probative

evidence against a criminal wrongdoer simply because some private

individual who happened to be an officer had committed a private wrong

against that same defendant.

B

So where did the exclusionary rule come from, if not from the

Founding?

Traces of the rule date to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,

Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases,

83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1372 (1983). In Boyd, “[i]nvestigators” obtained

a court “order requiring Boyd to provide the government with the invoice for

items he had recently imported to determine if he had paid the required

customs taxes on them.” Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth

Amendment Searches, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 67, 77. The Supreme Court held

that that production order violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

Boyd was a surprising start to the exclusionary rule. Most

fundamentally, it “injected exclusion into the picture” only because the case

presented what the Court deemed a Fifth Amendment violation. Stewart,

supra, at 1373. As the Court put it, subpoenaing the defendants’ “private

books and papers” was “compelling him to be a witness against himself”

within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. Since the

introduction of compelled testimony itself violates the Fifth Amendment, the

Court held that “admission” of the invoice “in evidence” was “erroneous

and unconstitutional.” Id. at 638.

9

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

Roughly 20 years later, in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), the

Supreme Court “seemed to bury the exclusionary rule—even before its birth

was recognized.” Stewart, supra, at 1374. In that case, Albert Adams was

convicted for gambling. To obtain the conviction, the prosecution had

admitted into evidence private papers seized by police. Adams argued the

seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. Ibid. And as relevant for our

purposes here, he argued the “admission” of the papers “into evidence

violated the [F]ifth . . . [A]mendment[.]” Ibid.

The Court disagreed. Echoing Justice Story nearly a century hence,

the Court explained that the evidence was “clearly competent as tending to

establish the guilt of the accused.” Adams, 192 U.S. at 594. So the

Government could introduce it. Ibid. The Court then distinguished Boyd on

the ground that it simply barred the compulsory “production” of “private

papers.” Id. at 597 (emphasis added). In Adams, by contrast, the papers were

not forcibly produced but freely introduced.

Just ten years later, the Court decided Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.

383 (1914). And “it became clear that the Adams case was just a wild turn in

the exclusionary rule roller coaster track.” Stewart, supra, at 1374. Weeks

involved a conviction for gambling. Officers entered Weeks’s house “and

carried away certain letters and envelopes found in the drawer of a

chiffonier.” 232 U.S. at 386. The Government introduced the letters into

evidence, see id. at 388, and the jury found Weeks guilty. On appeal, Weeks

argued that his “papers” had been “admitted into evidence” in violation of

the Fourth Amendment, Stewart, supra, at 1374.

The Court excluded the evidence—but not because of the

exclusionary rule. It held only that Weeks was entitled to get his papers back

when he petitioned for their return “before trial.” Id. at 1375. And under Boyd,

once Weeks had the papers in his possession, the Government could not

10

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

“subpoena their production.” Ibid. Thus, in Weeks, exclusion was just a

byproduct of “the hypothetical unavailability of the evidence.” Ibid.

So after Weeks, officers had an obvious workaround. They could just

make copies before returning any papers. Thus, they would comply with

Weeks’s holding that the defendant was entitled to their return. And they

would avoid Boyd’s holding because they would not need to subpoena

production of the papers. Then, in 1920, the Court closed that loophole:

“The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a

certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before

the Court but that it shall not be used at all.” Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.

United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).

Still, the development of the exclusionary rule was not complete. 1

That would not happen until 1961, almost two centuries after the Founding.

Then, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Warren Court overruled Wolf

v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and held the exclusionary rule applicable in

state court. The Court emphasized that “the criminal is to go free because

the constable has blundered.” Id. at 659 (quotation omitted). And with that,

the exclusionary rule reached its zenith.

C

Times have changed since Mapp. A lot.

These days, the Court recognizes the exclusionary rule as a relic of

“the heady days in which [the Supreme] Court assumed” unfettered powers

to create causes of action or remedies ex nihilo. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482,

491 (2022) (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the

_____________________

1

To tell the full story of the exclusionary rule, I would need to discuss many more

cases. But I leave that to the law reviews. See, e.g., Stewart, supra, at 1376 (discussing Gouled

v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)).

11

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

exclusionary rule is a judicial invention “designed to safeguard Fourth

Amendment rights.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906

(1984)(quotation omitted). Although that once led the exclusionary rule to

be celebrated, see Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939), that is

no longer the case. Today, the Supreme Court is cognizant that judges lack

free-wheeling lawmaking powers. So it has cautioned courts to wield the

exclusionary rule only in the “last resort.” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.

And it has imposed sharp limits on the exclusionary rule. In general

terms, the exclusionary rule now applies only “when the costs of exclusion

outweigh its deterrent benefits.” Strieff, 579 U.S. at 235. Because the costs

are always grave, the deterrence benefits must be weighty. Davis, 564 U.S. at

237. And only certain deterrence benefits count in the calculus. Specifically,

courts seek to deter only “intentional” police conduct that is “patently

unconstitutional.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009)

(emphasis added); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1995). But cf. Herring,

555 U.S. at 144 (leaving open the possibility that the exclusionary rule might

sometimes apply if only to deter “recurring or systemic” negligence).

In specific terms, the Supreme Court has held that if the causal

connection between evidence and underlying illegality becomes “too

attenuated,” the evidence is no longer deemed poisoned by

unconstitutionality and the “exclusionary rule does not apply.” Strieff, 579

U.S. at 235, 237 (explaining the “so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’

doctrine”). As it turns out, the causal connection is often too attenuated, see

id. at 237–38 (enumerating “several exceptions” while emphasizing the

narrowness of the exclusionary rule), even in cases when there is “a direct

causal connection,” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593.

Even when evidence remains poisoned, it might still be admissible

under the good faith exception. The good faith exception was first announced

12

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

in Leon. 468 U.S. at 925 . There, the Court held that evidence seized under a

“defective” warrant was still admissible if the officers who executed the

warrant had acted “objectively reasonabl[y]”—or in “good faith”—in

“rel[ying]” on it. Id. at 908, 922. Since Leon, the good faith exception has

expanded to encompass “objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate

precedent,” Davis, 564 U.S. at 249–50, on subsequently invalidated statutes,

Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), and on erroneous information

concerning arrest warrants, Evans, 514 U.S. at 4–6; Herring, 555 U.S. at 136–

37.

*

Today, the exclusionary “rule” is in fact the exclusionary exception.

That is, exclusion is now the exception to the ordinary rule that existed at the

Founding and that Justice Story applied in The La Jeune Eugenie. And over

the last 35 years, no criminal defendant has won a case before the Supreme

Court about exclusion. See Orin Kerr, The Court after Scalia: Scalia’s Absence

May Help Preserve the Exclusionary Rule, SCOTUSBlog (Sept. 16, 2016),

https://perma.cc/3S25-5ZDY. The exclusionary exception is itself subject to

exceptions, like Leon’s good faith exception. And Leon’s good faith exception

to the exclusionary exception is in turn subject to at least four other

exceptions. 2 So if the point of Mapp is to deter blundering constables, see 367

U.S. at 659, query how that is even possible when the exception-laden

doctrine is cumbersome to the point of unpredictability.

II

With that background, I turn to this case. I explain what standard our

circuit applies in cases like this where officers rely on a valid warrant that

_____________________

2

Only one of these four exceptions to the good faith exception is relevant. See Leon,

468 U.S. at 922–23. I discuss that exception below. See infra, at 14–18.

13

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

itself relied upon information unlawfully obtained. I also describe how I

would refine that standard.

Here, no one doubts that the warrant itself was valid. Instead, the

alleged problem is that Officer Bell sought the warrant based on information

she unlawfully obtained.

That argument is governed by United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512 (5th

Cir. 2014). In that case, a federal agent obtained a warrant to search an

airplane based on information he obtained during an illegal arrest. See id. at

519, 524. That is, the warrant itself was valid, but the information the officer

used to obtain the warrant was acquired illegally. The agent then executed

the warrant and seized over 10 kilograms of marijuana. Id. at 519.

We held that the evidence was admissible under the good faith

exception. Id. at 525, 532. In reaching that holding, we announced the

following rule: Evidence is admissible if the officer’s conduct that led to the

relevant information was “‘close enough to the line of validity’ that an

objectively reasonable officer . . . would believe that the information” gathered

“was not tainted by unconstitutional conduct.” Id. at 528 (emphasis added).

For shorthand reference, we call this Massi’s “objectively reasonable

officer” rule.

Massi’s “objectively reasonable officer” rule does not float in its own

little pond, disconnected from the sea of exclusionary rule precedent. On the

contrary, Massi situated its “objectively reasonable officer” rule within the

familiar framework of Leon. See id. at 531. Specifically, Massi held that its rule

fit within the first of Leon’s recognized exceptions to the good faith

exception: the “misleading the magistrate” exception. 3 Ibid. (Apologies for

_____________________

3

As noted, Leon’s three other exceptions are not relevant here. See supra, at 13 n.2.

14

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

how cumbersome that is. But here’s the Massi holding unpacked: Good faith

is an exception to the exclusionary rule. So if one of Leon’s exceptions to the

good faith exception applies, the exclusionary rule applies, and evidence

should be suppressed. So if an officer misleads the magistrate under

Massi/Leon, the evidence should be suppressed. The judge-made

exclusionary rule, its exceptions, and its exceptions’ exceptions are

convoluted to be sure.)

So under Massi, if an “objectively reasonable officer” would believe

he lawfully acquired the information in the affidavit, then the officer did not

“mislead” the magistrate. That allows the officer to make mistakes in

acquiring information and drafting affidavits—as long as they are not so bad

that any objectively reasonable officer would have recognized them. If the

magistrate then issues an affidavit, the reasonably errant officer can rely on

the warrant in good faith. But if no “objectively reasonable officer” would

believe he acquired the information constitutionally, then that officer misled

the magistrate. And if the magistrate issues a warrant based on the

information supplied by the objectively unreasonable officer, that officer

cannot then rely on the warrant in good faith.

What is the line for objective reasonableness and hence good faith

under Massi and Leon? Under our cases, it’s anyone’s guess. All we know is

that the officer’s conduct must be “close enough to the line of validity” that

it would be reasonable for an officer to rely on it. Id. at 528. But how can we

know whether an officer’s conduct is on the wrong side of the line? How

specific must the parties be when articulating the constitutional “line of

validity” the officer must not cross? Does the absence of a factually similar

case mean that the officer’s conduct is automatically over the line? Our

15

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

court’s members disagree. See, e.g., United States v. Holley, 831 F.3d 322,

326–27, 331–32 (5th Cir. 2016) (debating how to apply the test).

So, in practice, Massi’s “close enough” standard is nothing more than

an “I know it when I see it” test. That’s a huge problem. The current

objective reasonableness standard gives officers zero ability to know in

advance if their conduct will lead to exclusion. It makes little sense to graft

such a freewheeling standard onto the good faith exception, especially when

we are only supposed to use the exclusionary exception to deter “intentional”

police conduct that is “patently unconstitutional.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 143

(emphasis added).

In my view, there’s a clearer way to draw the line. The “same standard

of objective reasonableness that . . . defines the qualified immunity accorded

an officer” should define Massi’s “objectively reasonable officer” rule.

Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 n.1 (2012) (quoting Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986)). That might sound surprising, so let me

explain. Leon held that its “good-faith exception[] turn[s] . . . on objective

reasonableness.” 468 U.S. at 924. And “the same standard of objective

reasonableness” “defines” both “the qualified immunity accorded an

officer” and Leon’s good faith exception. Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 546 n.1

(quotations omitted). And of course, as we just noted, Massi’s “objectively

reasonable officer” rule is part of Leon’s good faith exception. So “the same

standard of objective reasonableness that . . . defines the qualified immunity

accorded an officer” defines Massi’s “objectively reasonable officer” rule.

Ibid. (quotation omitted).

16

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

In other words, the logic works like this:

P1: (A) Objective reasonableness for purposes of qualified

immunity = (B) objective reasonableness for purposes of Leon.

See ibid.

P2: (B) Objective reasonableness for purposes of Leon =

(C) objective reasonableness for purposes of Massi. See supra,

at 14–16; see also Massi, 761 F.3d at 528 (invoking the concept

of the “objectively reasonable officer” familiar from both Leon

and qualified immunity).

∴ (A) Objective reasonableness for purposes of qualified

immunity = (C) objective reasonableness for purposes of Massi.

The upshot? We may borrow the “objective reasonableness” framework

from our qualified immunity cases to decide if the officer’s conduct was

“close enough to the line of validity” under Massi. If the officer’s conduct

was close enough to that line, the officer was wrong but not objectively

unreasonably wrong. That means the Massi/Leon good faith exception to the

exclusionary rule applies.

How would this proposal work in practice? Leonard would bear the

burden of showing that an objectively reasonable officer in the officers’ shoes

would have known he was violating the Fourth Amendment when he entered

Leonard’s home. He must do so by citing “legal principle[s]” that have a

“sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent.” District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). As in our qualified immunity

cases, he cannot define those principles “at a high level of generality.”

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).

Instead, Leonard must point to factually similar cases that “clearly prohibit

the officer[s’] conduct in the particular circumstances before [them].” Wesby,

583 U.S. at 63 (emphasis added). If he can’t identify any factually similar case

clearly establishing the law, Leonard must argue that his case involves such

17

Case: 23-40652 Document: 82-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

No. 23-40652

utterly “egregious facts” that there could be no “doubt about the

obviousness” of the violation. Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 9 & n.2 (2020)

(per curiam).

Using qualified immunity doctrine’s “objective-reasonableness

standard” in cases like this one not only clarifies the Massi rule, but also

prevents us from reaching odd results. As it stands today, we analyze an

officer’s “objective reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment

differently depending on the type of proceeding in which the injured party

raises the allegation. I would rather take the Supreme Court at its word and

hold that the “same standard of objective reasonableness” applies in both

contexts. Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 546 n.1 (quotation omitted).

One might worry that using modern qualified immunity doctrine’s

“objective-reasonableness standard” in cases like this one places a high

burden on defendants seeking to suppress evidence. But that is a virtue, not

a vice. Reading Massi to avoid an undisciplined, “I know it when I see it”

standard upholds the Supreme Court’s command to suppress evidence only

as a “last resort.” Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.

* * *

“Close” only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades—not in

evidentiary suppression hearings. I would require criminal defendants to

show that the officer who illegally discovered the information used to obtain

a warrant violated clearly established law. Otherwise, the good faith

exception applies and officers may rely on the warrant.

18