Trahant v. Mintz

Case: 25-30193 Document: 105-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/11/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

February 11, 2026

No. 25-30193 Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

In the Matter of Roman Catholic Church of the

Archdiocese of New Orleans,

Debtor,

versus

Richard Trahant; Amy Trahant,

Appellants,

versus

Mark Alan Mintz; Jones Walker, L.L.P.; Donlin Recano

& Company, Incorporated,

Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:24-CV-1873

______________________________

Before Haynes, Duncan, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

_____________________

*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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No. 25-30193

The claims at issue here are based on the alleged improper service of

an order in which the bankruptcy court concluded that Richard Trahant,

Plaintiff below, violated a protective order and removed his clients from the

committee of unsecured creditors. Trahant was later sanctioned by the

bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs, Trahant and his wife, Amy Trahant, sued

debtor’s counsel, Mark Mintz; Mintz’s law firm, Jones Walker LLP; and the

debtor’s service agent, Donlin, Recano & Co. Inc., for various state-law torts.

Defendants removed, arguing, among other things, that Plaintiffs’ action was

a core bankruptcy proceeding. The district court referred the action to the

same bankruptcy court that sanctioned Trahant. Plaintiffs filed a motion to

remand, which was denied because the bankruptcy court concluded that it

was in fact a core proceeding. Plaintiffs filed motions to recuse aimed at both

the bankruptcy court and the district court—all were denied. Defendants

eventually filed a motion for summary judgment alleging entitlement to

derivative judicial immunity because they served the order at issue at the

bankruptcy court’s direction. The bankruptcy court agreed and granted the

motion. Plaintiffs appealed the various orders, and the district court affirmed

in all respects. Plaintiffs timely appealed that decision. Finding no error, we

AFFIRM.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The conduct at issue occurred within the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case

of the Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans

(“Debtor”). In the bankruptcy case, Trahant represented a group of

creditors, “Certain Abuse Victims.” The Debtor was represented by Mintz,

who is a partner at Jones Walker LLP. The bankruptcy court appointed

Donlin, Recano & Company, Inc. (“DRC” and, collectively with Mintz and

Jones Walker, “Defendants”) as the Debtor’s “claims and noticing agent.”

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With respect to notice of developments in the bankruptcy case, the

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana’s Local Rules require

debtors to “file a complete mailing matrix containing the correct name and

address of all known creditors and other parties in interest,” known as a

“Mailing Matrix.” EDLA Bankr. L.R. 1007-2(A). Presumably because of

the Mailing Matrix’s size in the bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy court

approved a more narrow “Special Notice List,” which would be used for

matters that did not require notice to the Mailing Matrix. Trahant did not

take issue with the composition of the Mailing Matrix upon its creation.

In June of 2022, the United States Trustee informed the bankruptcy

court that it believed that there had been a violation of the bankruptcy court’s

protective order, which the bankruptcy court had entered in August 2020.

Upon review, the bankruptcy court found that Trahant had provided

confidential information he received through the bankruptcy case to a third

party and the media on multiple occasions and in violation of the protective

order. The bankruptcy court entered an order finding as much and removing

Trahant’s clients from the committee of unsecured creditors (“Trahant

Order”). The bankruptcy court then ordered the Debtor’s counsel to “serve

[the Trahant Order] via first-class U.S. Mail on those parties in interest who

will not receive service via this Court’s CM/ECF system and file a

certificate of service within three days.” The bankruptcy court later imposed

sanctions against Trahant in the amount of $400,000.1

_____________________

1

Trahant also appealed the bankruptcy court’s finding of contempt and imposition

of sanctions, but our court affirmed the district court’s judgment affirming the finding of

contempt and imposition of sanctions in another case. Trahant v. Off. Comm. of Unsecured

Creditors (In re Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of New Orleans), No. 23-30466, 2026

WL 18901, at *11 (5th Cir. Jan. 2, 2026) (unpublished).

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Unsure of exactly how to go about serving the Trahant Order,

Debtor’s counsel contacted the bankruptcy court’s chambers via email and

asked: “[W]as the Court’s intention that the [Trahant] Order be served on

all parties in interest who will not receive service via the CM/ECF system,

or rather, only on those parties identified in the Special Notice List . . . who

will not receive service via the CM/ECF system?” The bankruptcy court’s

chambers responded: “Please serve the [Trahant] Order on all parties in

interest who will not receive service via the CM/ECF system. Do not limit

it to the parties identified in the Special Notice List[.]”During a hearing that

occurred prior to service, however, the bankruptcy court discussed with

Defendants how to go about serving the Trahant Order and instructed that

the names of the creditors that Trahant represented be redacted. Defendants

then served the Trahant Order on the entire Mailing Matrix.

B. Procedural Background

Richard and Amy Trahant (“Plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit in Louisiana

state court, alleging, inter alia, claims for abuse of process, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress,

all based on the service of the Trahant Order. Plaintiffs named as defendants

Mintz, Jones Walker, and DRC. Plaintiffs specifically alleged that

Defendants served the Trahant Order on the entire Mailing Matrix. Plaintiffs

do not allege that Defendants served the Trahant Order on individuals

outside of the Mailing Matrix, only that the Mailing Matrix included

individuals who were not “parties in interest” in the bankruptcy proceeding.

Defendants promptly removed the action to federal court. Defendants

asserted that the federal district court had subject-matter jurisdiction

“pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1334, and 1367.” Upon Defendants’

request, the district court referred the action to the bankruptcy court. The

district court stated that referral was appropriate because the “claims

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constitute either a core proceeding . . . or, at least, a proceeding related to a

title 11 case.” The referral was “for all purposes.” Plaintiffs filed a motion to

reconsider, but the district court again concluded that referral was

appropriate.

Prior to the order of reference, Plaintiffs had filed a motion to remand,

which the bankruptcy court denied. The bankruptcy court reasoned that it

had in rem subject-matter jurisdiction because the Barton2 doctrine required

that the bankruptcy court first grant Plaintiffs leave to proceed against

Defendants, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1334(a), and the bankruptcy court, in turn, had jurisdiction to enter

a final judgment because the action was a “core” bankruptcy proceeding. 28

U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).

During this time, Plaintiffs also sought the bankruptcy judge’s recusal.

Plaintiffs filed motions to recuse, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443 and 455, in the

bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs asserted that the bankruptcy court had “personal

bias or prejudice against them.” The bankruptcy court denied the motion

asserted under § 144, finding that that section was inapplicable to bankruptcy

courts. As for the motion under § 455, the bankruptcy court concluded that,

in context, the actions at issue would not lead a reasonable, objective person

to doubt the court’s impartiality.

Defendants later filed a motion for summary judgment, which the

bankruptcy court granted. The bankruptcy court noted that Defendants “are

professionals of the Debtor” and concluded that, because Defendants acted

_____________________

2

Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881).

3

Plaintiffs first filed their motion to recuse in the district court under 28 U.S.C.

§ 144, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that § 144 requires that such a

motion must be filed before the bankruptcy judge as “the judge before whom the matter is

pending.”

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“‘under the supervision and subject to the orders of the bankruptcy judge,’

and, therefore, as an arm of the [bankruptcy court] in serving the [Trahant]

Order, they are entitled to derivative absolute immunity.” Plaintiffs sought

leave to conduct additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(d), but the bankruptcy court denied this motion, reasoning that the

information Plaintiffs identified would not affect the immunity analysis.

Plaintiffs appealed to the district court the orders denying the motions

to remand and recuse, as well as the order granting summary judgment.

Included in Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal were the district court’s own orders

of reference and denial of Plaintiffs’ first recusal motion. Relying in part on

this improper act, Plaintiffs filed a motion for disqualification under 28

U.S.C. § 47, directed at the district judge. Plaintiffs argued that the district

judge should be recused because a district court cannot review its own orders.

The district court denied the motion for disqualification, emphasizing

the fact that it only reviews orders rendered in the bankruptcy court, and

affirmed each of the bankruptcy court’s appealed orders, largely agreeing

with the bankruptcy court’s reasoning. Plaintiffs promptly appealed.

II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

The district court, exercising its own appellate jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), entered a final decision on Plaintiffs’ appeal from the

bankruptcy court. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal

under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) as well as under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Bank of N.Y.

Mellon v. GC Merch. Mart, LLC (In re Denver Merch. Mart, Inc.), 740 F.3d

1052, 1055 (5th Cir. 2014).

We review for abuse of discretion orders denying motions to recuse,

Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1999), permissive abstention,

Howe v. Vaughan (In re Howe), 913 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1990), and

additional discovery, Dominick v. Mayorkas, 52 F.4th 992, 995 (5th Cir.

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2022). We review de novo determinations of subject-matter jurisdiction,

Bissonnet Invs. LLC v. Quinlan (In re Bissonnet Invs. LLC), 320 F.3d 520, 522

(5th Cir. 2003), as well as grants of summary judgment, Tex. Cap. Bank N.A.

v. Dall. Roadster, Ltd. (In re Dall. Roadster, Ltd.), 846 F.3d 112, 123 (5th Cir.

2017).

III. Discussion

At issue on appeal are multiple rulings of the bankruptcy and district

courts. We discuss each decision in turn. At the outset, we (A) discuss the

motion to remand, because subject-matter jurisdiction is central to that

analysis. Next, we (B) discuss whether the district court’s referral of this

action to the bankruptcy court was appropriate and then (C) the denial of

Plaintiffs’ motions to recuse and for disqualification. Last, we (D) discuss the

grant of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor and, relatedly, the denial of

Plaintiffs’ request for additional discovery.

A. Motion to Remand

Plaintiffs’ arguments with respect to their motion to remand contend

that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction in the first

place, so we start there.

Plaintiffs contend that remand was appropriate for a few reasons.

They say that the district court lacked federal subject-matter jurisdiction and,

in the alternative, assert that either mandatory or permissive abstention was

appropriate. Defendants echo the district and bankruptcy courts, contending

that subject-matter jurisdiction was satisfied because, among other

arguments, the claims at issue are “core” matters, and abstention was not

required. We agree with Defendants. Plaintiffs’ action is properly viewed as

a “core proceeding,” and abstention, either mandatory or permissive, is not

appropriate.

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1. Plaintiffs’ claims constitute a “core proceeding”

With respect to jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases, we have explained

that 28 U.S.C. § 1334 “lists four types of matters over which the district

court has jurisdiction:” “cases under title 11,” “proceedings arising under

title 11,” “proceedings ‘arising in’ a case under title 11,” and” “proceedings

‘related to’ a case under title 11.” Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90,

92 (5th Cir. 1987). Bankruptcy courts derive their subject-matter jurisdiction

from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157. “Specifically, § 157(b)(1) gives bankruptcy

courts full judicial power over ‘all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings

arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, referred under . . . this

section . . . .’” U.S. Brass Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Grp., Inc. (In re U.S. Brass

Corp.), 301 F.3d 296, 304 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)).

While bankruptcy courts have more limited power over other

proceedings, if a proceeding is “core,” “§ 157 authorizes the bankruptcy

court to decide the matter and enter a final judgment.” Id. We have explained

“that § 157 equates core proceedings with the categories of ‘arising under’

and ‘arising in’ proceedings.” Id. (quoting In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 97).

“Arising under” proceedings “involve a cause of action created or

determined by a statutory provision of title 11,” while “arising in”

proceedings “are not based on any right expressly created by title 11, but

nevertheless, would have no existence outside of the bankruptcy.” In re

Wood, 825 F.2d at 96–97. “[T]herefore, a ‘proceeding is core under [§] 157

if it invokes a substantive right provided by title 11 or if it is a proceeding that,

by its nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case.’” In re U.S.

Brass Corp., 301 F.3d at 304 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Wood, 825 F.2d

at 97).

Putting these principles into practice, we have held that claims are

core when they “are inseparable from the bankruptcy context.” Southmark

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Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand (In re Southmark Corp.), 163 F.3d 925, 931 (5th

Cir. 1999). We concluded in In re Southmark Corp. that a debtor’s malpractice

suit against a court-appointed examiner’s accountant was a core proceeding

because, among other things, the action implicated the bankruptcy court’s

ability to police “court-appointed professionals” and jurisdiction to

adjudicate claims by and against the debtor’s estate. Id. at 931–32. We have

also acknowledged that, where “a proceeding implicates the bankruptcy

court’s power to interpret and enforce its own orders, it is core in at least the

‘arising in’ way.” Deelen v. Dickson (In re McDermott Int’l, Inc.), No. 23-

20436, 2024 WL 3875141, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 2024) (per curiam)

(unpublished);4 see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 151 (2009)

(“[T]he Bankruptcy Court plainly had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce

its own prior orders.” (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239

(1934)).

Plaintiffs’ action is undoubtedly a core proceeding. The claims at issue

involve Plaintiffs’ (one of whom was a representative of a group of creditors

in the bankruptcy) allegation that Defendants (debtor’s counsel and court-

approved claims-noticing agent) improperly served a bankruptcy court order

(the Trahant Order) on the entire Mailing Matrix (a court-approved list of

parties interested in the bankruptcy) at the order of the bankruptcy court.

Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants arise from their roles as Debtor’s

counsel and court-approved claims-noticing agent in the underlying

bankruptcy. Like In re Southmark Corp., the conduct at issue here cannot be

separated from the bankruptcy context because the action implicated the

bankruptcy court’s ability to police “court-appointed professionals” and

_____________________

4

Although In re McDermott International, Inc. is not “controlling precedent,” it

“may be [cited as] persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir.

2006) (citing 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4).

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may also implicate the bankruptcy estate, as the appointment order for DRC

provides for indemnification in some circumstances. 163 F.3d at 931. Then,

similar to In re McDermott International, Inc., this case required the

bankruptcy court to interpret its own order, the Trahant Order, to determine

who should have been served. 2024 WL 3875141, at *3. Plaintiffs’ claims, by

their nature, “could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case.” In re

Wood, 825 F.2d at 97.5

2. Abstention is inappropriate

Plaintiffs argue that, even if subject-matter jurisdiction was satisfied,

either mandatory or permissive abstention should apply in this case. But

neither is appropriate.

Start with mandatory abstention. Abstention is mandated where “the

claim has no independent basis for federal jurisdiction, other than

§ 1334(b),” “the claim is a non-core proceeding,” “an action has been

commenced in state court,” and “the action could be adjudicated timely in

state court.” Edge Petrol. Oper. Co., Inc. v. GPR Holdings, LLC (In re TXNB

Internal Case), 483 F.3d 292, 300 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Because

this action is a core proceeding, mandatory abstention is not appropriate. Id.

at 300–01.

Next, permissive abstention, which we review for abuse of discretion.

In re Howe, 913 F.2d at 1143. Though we will “not gainsay the importance of

state courts deciding state law issues,” “[t]he decision to grant permissive

abstention . . . lies within the discretion of the district court and we will not

reverse that decision unless the district court clearly abused its discretion.”

_____________________

5

Because we conclude that this is a core proceeding, we need not reach

Defendants’ assertion that the Barton doctrine also provides a basis for subject-matter

jurisdiction or that federal-question jurisdiction exists.

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Id. The bankruptcy court noted that its justifications for declining to abstain

included the fact that the resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims depend upon the

bankruptcy court’s interpretation of its own orders and the state claims are

nonetheless “core” claims such that state law issues do not predominate over

the bankruptcy issues. Indeed, there is a close nexus between the bankruptcy

proceeding and the issues in this action. As such, it was not an abuse of

discretion, and surely not clearly so, to decline to abstain in this context.

* * *

All told, the district court did not err by affirming the bankruptcy

court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Subject-matter

jurisdiction exists in this case. Plaintiffs’ claims constitute “core

proceedings,” and they have failed to demonstrate that it was error for the

district court to affirm the bankruptcy court’s decision not to abstain.

B. Referral to the Bankruptcy Court

Plaintiffs next contend that the district court erred by referring this

case to the bankruptcy court without their consent. We disagree.

Referral of Plaintiffs’ core claims was appropriate. “District courts

have jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, and they may refer cases at their

discretion to bankruptcy courts.” EOP-Colonnade of Dall. LP v. Faulkner (In

re Stonebridge Techs., Inc.), 430 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 28

U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157). Bankruptcy courts “may enter all appropriate

orders and judgments in core proceedings,” but, in non-core proceedings, “a

bankruptcy judge must submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law . . . to the district court” unless the parties consent otherwise. Id. (citing

28 U.S.C. § 157(b)–(c)). Stated plainly, consent is not required for core

proceedings. Id. Because Plaintiffs’ claims are “core,” the district court was

permitted to refer this action to the bankruptcy court for all purposes without

Plaintiffs’ consent.

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Plaintiffs’ contention regarding the bankruptcy court’s analysis of

their core claims is of no moment. Plaintiffs assert that the bankruptcy court

did not properly establish that this case constitutes a core proceeding because

it did not perform a claim-by-claim analysis. See Halper v. Halper, 164 F.3d

830, 839 (3d Cir. 1999) (adopting a claim-by-claim approach). But this

argument fails for multiple reasons. For one, Plaintiffs have not pointed to

any controlling authority from the Supreme Court or our court

demonstrating that a claim-by-claim analysis is required. For another, that

analysis was effectively conducted in this case. The district court first

reasoned that the bankruptcy court likely conducted a claim-by-claim

analysis even if not expressly. The district court next concluded for itself that,

in all events, “each of [Plaintiffs]’ claims (abuse of process, intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium) arise out of

the same set of alleged facts concerning [Defendants]’ interpretation and

enforcement of an order of the bankruptcy court and, thus, [Plaintiffs]’ state-

court action” is a core proceeding. Then for yet another, Plaintiffs have failed

to demonstrate that the analysis would differ for any particular claim of theirs

such that one claim would be “non-core” while the other claims are “core.”

Likewise, Plaintiffs’ reliance on the alleged “personal injury tort”

nature of this action does not alter our conclusion. Plaintiffs aver that the

referral was improper because the bankruptcy court is not authorized to “try

or otherwise dispose of tort claims.” In support of this assertion, Plaintiffs

point to both 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and (b)(5). As for § 157(b)(2)(B), this

subsection clarifies that core proceedings do not include “the liquidation or

estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful

death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under

title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). But Plaintiffs fail to explain how this

action constitutes a liquidation or estimation of claims against the estate for

purposes of distribution. Id. Next, § 157(b)(5) states that the district court

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“shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried

in the district court.” Id. § 157(b)(5). Courts have handled § 157(b)(5)’s

demands with respect to personal injury torts in different ways.6

Nonetheless, we need not reach this issue because the bankruptcy court had

jurisdiction (as this was a core proceeding), the district court conducted a de

novo review of the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment order, and

Plaintiffs have not explained how they have been harmed by the bankruptcy

court’s ruling on the motion for summary judgment in light of these facts.7

* * *

In sum, the district court did not err by referring this action to the

bankruptcy court for all purposes.

C. Motions to Recuse and for Disqualification

Plaintiffs take issue with the bankruptcy court’s denial of their

motions to recuse under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144, as well as the district

_____________________

6

“Some courts read this provision broadly to mean that the bankruptcy court has

no jurisdiction to rule on a motion for summary judgment to the effect that there is no viable

claim.” 1 Bankruptcy Law Manual § 2:14 (5th ed.). But others “emphasiz[e] the

words ‘shall be tried’ and permit[] the bankruptcy court to conduct pretrial

proceedings . . . and even . . . make a dispositive ruling on summary judgment.” Id. Though

we need not fully resolve this issue, we note that appeals of summary judgment to the

district court are reviewed de novo, which does not present the same sort of issues that an

appeal after a jury trial would. In that latter case, the action would need to be tried in the

district court in the first instance, but, at any rate, that situation is not in play here.

7

Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 479 (2011) (holding that Ҥ 157(b)(5) is not

jurisdictional”). This is not a case in which the bankruptcy court lacked power to act.

Contra United States v. Ruiz–Rodriguez, 277 F.3d 1281, 1293 n.17 (11th Cir. 2002)

(“[H]armless error analysis does not apply when a magistrate judge lacks the power to

act.”); cf. Singh v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1190, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (any error by the IJ was

rendered harmless by de novo review of the issue).

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court’s denial of their additional motion to disqualify. As Defendants aver,

each of these motions was properly denied. We agree.

The motion filed under § 144 as to the bankruptcy court judge was

correctly found inapplicable because it is only for district judges. Hepperle v.

Johnston, 590 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1979).

Turning to § 455, “[a]ny . . . judge . . . shall disqualify [herself] in any

proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28

U.S.C. § 455(a), and, likewise, she “shall also disqualify [herself] . . . [w]here

[she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,” id. § 455(b)(1).

“The judge abuses [her] discretion in denying recusal where a reasonable

man, cognizant of the relevant circumstances surrounding the judge’s failure

to recuse, would harbor legitimate doubts about that judge’s impartiality.”

Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation modified).

“[T]he standard for bias is not ‘subjective,’ as it once was, but, rather,

‘objective.’” Id. (citation omitted). “[R]eview should entail a careful

consideration of context, that is, the entire course of judicial proceedings,

rather than isolated incidents.” Id. at 455 (citation omitted). The litigant

“must (1) demonstrate that the alleged comment, action, or circumstance

was of ‘extrajudicial’ origin, (2) place the offending event into the context of

the entire trial, and (3) do so by an ‘objective’ observer’s standard.” Id.

Further, the litigant must demonstrate that the judge’s “refusal to recuse was

not merely erroneous, but, rather, an abuse of discretion.” Id.

Having reviewed the record in detail, we conclude that none of the

statements Plaintiffs rely on warrant recusal. The statements claimed were

made in the context of a discussion about a potential breach of the bankruptcy

court’s protective order, of which Trahant was suspected, or made after the

bankruptcy court had sanctioned Trahant for the discovered breach. In that

context, Judge Grabill was either discussing how to prevent further leaks,

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how to share the Trustee’s report and prevent leaks, or discussing Trahant

after the court had indeed found him to be a bad actor—i.e., that he willfully

violated the protective order. Even if we were to assume an extrajudicial

source was involved with respect to some of the statements, once placed in

context, none of these statements “display a deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Andrade, 338 F.3d

at 455. Moreover, the statement Plaintiffs emphasize the most, that Trahant

is a “bad actor,” was effectively restating exactly what the bankruptcy court

said in the Trahant Order.

We note that the mere collection of declarations from other people

asserting that the declarants believe recusal is required cannot support

recusal where it is not otherwise required based on a judge’s conduct. As

Defendants point out, “[e]ach of the declarations is virtually identical and

merely recites that it was ‘offensive’ for the bankruptcy court to find

against . . . Trahant.” Indeed, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the quantity

of declarations a litigant compiles is not determinative on a question of

recusal, especially where declarations appear to be form declarations. The

declarations collected also do not attempt to place Judge Grabill’s conduct in

the broader context discussed above. Furthermore, the declaration filed by

Amy Trahant, a plaintiff in this action, also does not alter the above recusal

analysis. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in declining to

consider Plaintiffs’ declarations.8

_____________________

8

Plaintiffs also assert that Judge Grabill’s participation in CLEs with Jones Walker

attorneys and teaching a class with Mintz also show favoritism. But Plaintiffs cite no

support for this conclusion, nor do they provide support in the record for this assertion. See

Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an

argument . . . by failing to adequately brief the argument on appeal.”). Nonetheless, the

bankruptcy court provided a thorough rebuttal of this point.

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Plaintiffs next argue that the district court erred by refusing to

disqualify itself. They assert that the district court was reviewing its own

orders on appeal, which is prohibited. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (“No judge shall hear

or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.”).

But Plaintiffs erroneously included these orders in their notice of appeal.

Further, as Defendants point out, the district court’s interlocutory orders

were never part of the appeal to the district court because 28 U.S.C. § 158

does not provide a mechanism for a party to appeal a district court order back

to the district court. Indeed, § 158 “expressly grants district courts

jurisdiction to hear appeals from bankruptcy courts’ decisions.” River Prod.

Co., Inc. v. Webb (In re Topco, Inc.), 894 F.2d 727, 734 (5th Cir. 1990)

(emphasis omitted). It was improper for Plaintiffs to designate any of the

orders as the subject of their appeal to the district court because the district

court, of course, has no jurisdiction to review them. The district court

clarified that it would “not review its orders referring the case to the

bankruptcy court.” It also noted that its prior orders were, at any rate, not

final and thus not appealable. So, there could be no possible violation of § 47.

* * *

At bottom, we conclude that the district court did not err by affirming

the bankruptcy court’s decision denying Plaintiffs’ motions to recuse and did

not err by denying Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify.

D. Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs next challenge the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary

judgment and denial of their request for discovery. Plaintiffs’ central

contention is that Defendants acted in bad faith, and ultra vires, by serving

the Trahant Order on the entire Mailing Matrix. Plaintiffs aver that the

bankruptcy court erred by granting Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the basis that Defendants are entitled to derivative absolute

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judicial immunity because there is a fact issue as to whether Defendants

actually complied with the bankruptcy court’s order. Plaintiffs also argue that

they should have been permitted to conduct discovery. We disagree on both

counts. We first discuss the motion for summary judgment and then the

request for discovery.

1. Summary judgment was appropriate

“Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact.” In re Dall. Roadster, Ltd., 846 F.3d at 123 (citation

modified). “When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review the

facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the

motion.” Id. (citation omitted). We discuss below the availability of

immunity and then the parties’ arguments regarding whether a fact issue

remains.

Immunity is available in appropriate circumstances. The nature of the

function performed determines whether immunity is appropriate. See Mays

v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation modified) (quoting

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993)). Court-appointed actors,

such as trustees, who act “under the supervision and subject to the orders of

the bankruptcy judge” act “as an arm of the [c]ourt” and, with court

approval, are “entitled to derived [judicial] immunity.” See Boullion v.

McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (per curiam);

Baron v. Sherman (In re Ondova Ltd. Co.), 914 F.3d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 2019)

(per curiam) (“Trustees are entitled to absolute immunity for all actions

taken pursuant to a court order.”).

Here, this principle applies to Defendants as Debtor’s counsel, since

debtors-in-possession share the rights and powers of a trustee in a bankruptcy

case, 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a), and DRC was approved by the bankruptcy court

as the Debtor’s “claims and noticing agent.” To be sure, derivative

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immunity extends to attorneys. In re Ondova Ltd. Co., 914 F.3d at 994

(citation omitted). Because Plaintiffs assert state-law claims, it is important

to note that “Louisiana jurisprudence on judicial immunity mirrors the

federal doctrine,” and Plaintiffs do not dispute this point. Sharp v. Palmisano,

No. 13-cv-5429, 2013 WL 5969661, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2013)

(unpublished) (citation omitted). Accordingly, if Defendants acted at the

order of the bankruptcy court and in accordance with that order, they are

entitled to derivative judicial immunity.

There is no fact issue as to whether Defendants complied with the

bankruptcy court’s order. The propriety of summary judgment hinges on

whether the bankruptcy court instructed Defendants to serve the Trahant

Order on the entire Mailing Matrix. If it did, then Defendants are entitled to

immunity, and summary judgment was appropriate. This is because Plaintiffs

specifically take issue with the Defendants’ decision to serve the Trahant

Order on the Mailing Matrix. Plaintiffs concede that this is what occurred, and

they do not say that Defendants provided notice to individuals outside of the

Mailing Matrix. As for whether the bankruptcy court ordered the entire

Mailing Matrix served, the record leaves no doubt—that is what was ordered.

Defendants followed the bankruptcy court’s instructions to the letter.

Defendants did not act ultra vires.

Indeed, the bankruptcy court, when reviewing its own prior

instructions, concluded that it had ordered Defendants to serve the entire

Mailing Matrix. The district court acknowledged the bankruptcy court’s

conclusion and, likewise, determined that “there is ample record evidence

showing that the bankruptcy court intended for the [Trahant] Order to be

served on the [M]ailing [M]atrix.” We ordinarily “review the bankruptcy

court’s interpretation of its own orders de novo,” and defer to the

bankruptcy court’s interpretation only where ambiguities persist. AKD Invs.,

LLC v. Mag. Invs., LLC (In re AKD Invs.), 79 F.4th 487, 491 (5th Cir. 2023)

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(emphasis omitted). The record is not ambiguous, and we reach the same

conclusion as the bankruptcy court.

The record makes clear that the bankruptcy court ordered Defendants

to serve the entire Mailing Matrix.

The focal point of the dispute is the June 13, 2022, status conference.

At the time of the status conference, the bankruptcy court’s prior

instructions in the Trahant Order and via email were arguably unclear.

Defendants and the bankruptcy court explain that during the hearing, the

bankruptcy court ordered that the Trahant Order be served on the Mailing

Matrix. Plaintiffs disagree, so a review of that hearing is necessary.

The bankruptcy court ordered Defendants to serve the entire Mailing

Matrix during the hearing.9 The bankruptcy court clarified that it wanted to

make sure that the entire committee constituency was served with the

Trahant Order. The parties expressed to the bankruptcy court their concern

that the identities of four expelled committee members were contained in the

Trahant Order. Serving a notice of reappointment instead of the Trahant

Order was briefly discussed, and this was the only alternative discussed

during the hearing. But Mintz then suggested that these names could be

redacted from the Trahant Order. The bankruptcy court later confirmed that

_____________________

9

Early during the conference, Mintz, one of the Defendants and Debtor’s counsel,

addressed the bankruptcy court regarding service because the Trahant Order was unclear.

When explaining his understanding (or lack thereof) of what service was required, Mintz

mentioned to the bankruptcy court the possibility that the Trahant Order should be served

on the whole Mailing Matrix, to which the bankruptcy court responded “Uh-huh

(indicating an affirmative response)” in the middle of Mintz’s discussion. Defendants

contend that the court stating “Uh-huh” after Mintz mentions the Mailing Matrix proves

that the bankruptcy court instructed that the order be served on the Mailing Matrix. That

is not how we read the record. The bankruptcy court responded with “Uh-huh” multiple

times throughout the hearing, and this was not an affirmative directive, but rather a

colloquial mechanism to express understanding.

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Defendants should take that approach, and that the Trahant Order should be

redacted. When the hearing is viewed in its full context, it becomes evident

that the bankruptcy court directed that the redacted order should be served

on the entire Mailing Matrix. Moreover, a review of the transcript from this

hearing in combination with the preceding email exchange, where chambers

clarified that the Special Notice List (the only alternative service list other

than the Mailing Matrix) should not be used, makes plain that the bankruptcy

court intended for Defendants to serve the Trahant Order on the entire

Mailing Matrix.10

2. Plaintiffs were not entitled to further discovery

The final issue is whether further discovery was warranted. Plaintiffs

contend that the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment was

premature. That is not the case.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) permits a nonmovant to

demonstrate “that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to

justify its opposition” to a motion for summary judgment. But “the non-

moving party must set forth a plausible basis for believing that specified facts,

susceptible of collection within a reasonable time frame, probably exist and

indicate how the emergent facts, if adduced, will influence the outcome of

the pending summary judgment motion.” MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad

_____________________

10

Plaintiffs’ assertions about the composition of the Mailing Matrix are irrelevant.

Plaintiffs complain repeatedly throughout their briefing that people were served with the

Trahant Order that should not have been served. Plaintiffs’ averments in this respect take

issue not with Defendants’ conduct, but with the composition of the Mailing Matrix.

However, this is not the appropriate time to litigate the composition of the Mailing Matrix,

and, at any rate, the composition of the Mailing Matrix would not alter the immunity

analysis above.

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Limitada v. Proplant Inc., 25 F.4th 360, 366 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation

modified).

The facts Plaintiffs seek would not alter the above analysis. The facts

Plaintiffs say they need time to discover are a complete list of recipients of

the Trahant Order, the dates when each recipient was served, and

information regarding whether and when defendants had notice that the

service was overbroad. But these facts would only assist Plaintiffs in litigating

the construction of the Mailing Matrix. They would not help Plaintiffs avoid

Defendants’ assertion of immunity. The bankruptcy court did not err by

denying Plaintiffs’ request for discovery.

* * *

In the end, the district court did not err by affirming the bankruptcy

court’s grant of summary judgment and decision to deny Plaintiffs’ request

for discovery.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, we find no error and AFFIRM.

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