The opinion
No. 98 February 11, 2026 129
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
MARIA LYNN MOLINA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Nichole BROWN,
Superintendent,
Coffee Creek Correctional Institution,
Defendant-Respondent.
Washington County Circuit Court
20CV10086; A183547
Patricia A. Sullivan, Senior Judge.
Submitted January 7, 2026.
Jedediah Peterson and Equal Justice Law filed the brief
for appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Ryan Kahn, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán,
Judge.
PER CURIAM
Affirmed.
130 Molina v. Brown
PER CURIAM
Petitioner appeals a judgment denying post-
conviction relief. After pleading guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement, petitioner was convicted of one count of murder.
Once the judgment of conviction was final, she sought post-
conviction relief. We limit our discussion to the one post-
conviction claim at issue on appeal. Petitioner claims that
trial counsel provided inadequate assistance under Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and ineffective assis-
tance under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, by not moving to withdraw from
representing her. The gist of petitioner’s claim is that trial
counsel was physically limited as the result of a past heart
attack and that such limitations resulted in deficient per-
formance by counsel and prejudice to petitioner. The post-
conviction court denied relief, and petitioner appeals. The
superintendent maintains that the court did not err in deny-
ing relief. We agree with the superintendent and, accord-
ingly, affirm.
A criminal defendant has the right to adequate and
effective assistance of counsel under Article I, section 11,
and the Sixth Amendment. Antoine v. Taylor, 368 Or 760,
767, 499 P3d 48 (2021). A violation of those rights entitles a
petitioner to post-conviction relief. ORS 138.530(1)(a). Under
the Oregon Constitution, to succeed on a claim of inadequate
assistance, a petitioner must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that “counsel failed to exercise reasonable
professional skill and judgment, and that the petitioner suf-
fered prejudice as a result.” Johnson v. Premo, 361 Or 688,
699, 399 P3d 431 (2017). “A functionally equivalent two-el-
ement standard governs petitioner’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.” Smith
v. Kelly, 318 Or App 567, 568-69, 508 P3d 77 (2022), rev den,
370 Or 822 (2023).
When the post-conviction court denies relief on a
claim of inadequate or ineffective assistance of counsel, we
review for errors of law. Green v. Franke, 357 Or 301, 312,
350 P3d 188 (2015). In doing so, we are bound by the post-
conviction court’s findings of historical fact so long as there
is evidence in the record to support them, and, to the extent
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 129 (2026) 131
that the court did not make explicit findings on all issues as
to which the facts could be decided more than one way, we
will presume that it decided the facts consistently with its
conclusions of law. Id.
Having reviewed the record and considered the
parties’ arguments, and relying on the findings of the post-
conviction court, we conclude that the court did not err in
denying post-conviction relief. As a threshold matter, based
on our record review, we agree with petitioner that the post-
conviction court’s ruling was based on the performance prong
of the analysis, without reaching the prejudice prong, and
therefore reject the superintendent’s procedural argument
for affirmance. On the merits, however, we agree with the
superintendent. The post-conviction court concluded that
petitioner had not shown that her trial counsel “was ineffec-
tive or incompetent due to his health or otherwise,” noting
the lack of evidence of “any mental or cognitive impairment”
and the fact that petitioner “had the opportunity to tell the
[trial court] that she was dissatisfied with Trial Counsel
and did not do so” but instead “specifically affirmed at entry
of plea that she was satisfied with his services.”
We are unpersuaded that the post-conviction court
committed any error of law in so concluding. Although there
is evidence that trial counsel had physical limitations in
the later years of his life, and even some evidence that he
might have performed at a higher level at an earlier point in
his career, that does not mean that counsel’s assistance to
petitioner was constitutionally deficient. See Krummacher v.
Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 872-74, 627 P2d 458 (1981) (emphasiz-
ing that the constitutional inquiry must focus on the specif-
ics of the lawyer’s actual representation in the specific case;
acknowledging that there is necessarily a degree of subjec-
tivity in assessing adequacy because advocacy “involves not
only the performance of specific tasks, but also the exercise
of art and professional judgment”; and recognizing “the
remarkable variety of effective advocacy displayed daily in
our trial courts by competent lawyers of differing approach,
style, personality, temperament, and strategic inclina-
tions”). The post-conviction court did not err in concluding
on this record that petitioner failed to prove constitutionally
132 Molina v. Brown
inadequate or ineffective assistance. We affirm the judg-
ment denying post-conviction relief.
Affirmed.