McQueen

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

TYLER MCQUEEN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:25-cv-04044-JEH

CHANTIL SELMAN,

Defendant.

Order

This matter is now before the Court on Defendant Chantil Selman’s Motion

for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule

7.1(D). (Doc. 33). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

I

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 alleging Defendant Selman was deliberately indifferent to the treatment of

his self-inflicted laceration on January 25, 2024, while he was incarcerated at Hill

Correctional Center (“Hill”). (Docs. 9, 11).

On December 15, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Doc. 33). The Clerk issued a notice warning Plaintiff that if he failed to respond

within 21 days, the Motion would be granted, if appropriate, and the case would

be terminated without a trial. (Doc. 34). Plaintiff’s response was due on January 5,

2026. To date, Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s Motion or requested an

extension of time. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6), “[a] failure to respond to

any numbered fact will be deemed an admission of the fact.” Id. Accordingly, by

failing to file a response, Plaintiff has admitted every numbered fact asserted by

Defendant in her Motion.

II

During the relevant period, Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the

Illinois Department of Corrections and incarcerated at Hill. Defendant was

employed as a registered nurse to provide medical care to inmates at Hill. As a

nurse, Defendant could not prescribe medications, diagnose patients, or perform

certain procedures, such as administering sutures.

At approximately 5:30 a.m. on January 25, 2024, Plaintiff intentionally cut

his left wrist with a razor blade. When Defendant was notified at approximately

5:40 a.m., she responded immediately, examined Plaintiff, took his vitals (which

were normal), and applied a pressure wrap to the laceration to control the

bleeding. As Plaintiff was stable and the bleeding had been controlled, Defendant

used her medical judgment to determine that emergency transport to the hospital

was not medically required.

Defendant placed Plaintiff on suicide watch, indicated the wound might

need stitches, and began attempting to contact the on-call physician for further

instructions, as was proper and within her scope as a nurse. In correctional

healthcare settings, decisions regarding the management of lacerations and the

placement of sutures are made by orders from a supervising practitioner, not a

nurse. Between 5:45 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., Defendant attempted to contact the on-call

physician multiple times, but the on-call physician was unavailable.

When Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Kasey Kramer arrived at Hill at 7:00 a.m.

on January 25, 2024, Defendant informed her about Plaintiff. NP Kramer began

providing treatment, and Defendant’s involvement with Plaintiff’s care ceased.

NP Kramer removed the pressure bandage from Plaintiff’s arm, examined the

laceration, determined that Plaintiff needed sutures at the hospital, and arranged

for his transport.

According to Defendant’s expert, Meghan Harvey, a Board-Certified Family

Nurse Practitioner, the treatment Defendant provided was prompt, proper,

medically appropriate, and met the applicable standard of care. Defendant never

refused to provide care for Plaintiff or ignored his medical needs. No act or

omission by Defendant caused any improper delay in the provision of medical

care or caused Plaintiff any undue pain or suffering. Each time Defendant saw

Plaintiff or reviewed his chart, she provided care and made medical judgments,

which she believed to be appropriate and medically proper under the

circumstances. (Docs. 33-1, 33-7).

III

A

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he court has one

task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there

is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp.,

24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). In making this determination, the court must

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Inferences that are supported by only speculation or

conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion.” McDonald v. Vill. of

Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). In order to successfully oppose a

motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must do more than raise a

“‘metaphysical doubt’ as to the material facts, and instead must present definite,

competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Michael v. St. Joseph Cnty., 259 F.3d 842,

845 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).

B

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation by a prison official for failure

to provide adequate medical care, a prisoner “must allege acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1976). Deliberate indifference involves a two-

part analysis; the plaintiff must show that (1) the medical condition was objectively

serious, and (2) the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to his medical

needs. Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 241 (7th Cir. 2021).

An objectively serious injury or medical need is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that

even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”

Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1371 (7th Cir. 1997)). Indications of a serious

medical need can include “[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or

patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence

of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or

the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Id. at 1373.

To establish the subjective element of a deliberate indifference claim, the

plaintiff must show that the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state

of mind. Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2006). “[A] plaintiff must

provide evidence that an official actually knew of and disregarded a substantial

risk of harm.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug.

25, 2016) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “This is a high bar

‘because it requires a showing [of] something approaching a total unconcern for

the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.’” Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703,

710 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“[M]ere negligence” or even civil “objective recklessness” simply “is not enough.”

Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. “This subjective standard requires more than negligence

and it approaches intentional wrongdoing. The Supreme Court has compared the

deliberate indifference standard to that of criminal recklessness.” Holloway v.

Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837) (internal citations omitted).

“Within the universe of deliberate indifference cases is a narrower category

where a prisoner alleges not that his condition was ignored entirely, but that he

received constitutionally deficient treatment for the condition.” Lockett v. Bonson,

937 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir. 2019). “[T]hese cases are better framed ‘not [as]

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need,’ but as a challenge to ‘a

deliberate decision by a doctor to treat a medical need in a particular manner.’” Id.

(citing Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996)). In such cases, courts defer

to a medical professional’s treatment decisions “unless ‘no minimally competent

professional would have so responded under those circumstances.’” Pyles v.

Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95

(7th Cir. 2008)). A disagreement between the prisoner and his medical provider

“about the proper course of treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to

establish an Eighth Amendment violation.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (citing Johnson v.

Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006)).

IV

Defendant admits that Plaintiff’s self-inflicted laceration could be

considered a serious medical need. (Doc. 33 at p. 6). Therefore, the Court will focus

its analysis on the subjective element of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim.

The record shows that Plaintiff suffered a self-inflicted laceration at 5:30 a.m.

Within ten minutes, Defendant provided treatment by applying pressure

bandaging to the wound, which successfully controlled the bleeding. She also took

Plaintiff’s vitals (which were normal), placed him on suicide watch, and charted

that he might need stitches.

As medical decisions regarding sutures and diagnoses are outside of

Defendant’s scope of practice, Defendant attempted to contact the on-call

physician for further orders, but the physician was unavailable. During this time,

Plaintiff remained under continuous observation in the infirmary, was stable, and

the bleeding was under control. Based on her medical judgment, Defendant

determined it was proper to wait to discuss the case with a practitioner before

taking further action.

When NP Kramer arrived at 7:00 a.m., Defendant quickly informed her

about Plaintiff’s condition. At this point, Defendant’s involvement ceased. NP

Kramer examined Plaintiff and determined the laceration needed sutures at the

hospital. Within approximately 2.5 hours of the injury, Plaintiff was on the way to

the hospital after being properly evaluated by a practitioner.

According to Defendant’s expert, Defendant Selman “acted appropriately

and within the boundaries of her professional scope by promptly assessing the

Plaintiff upon notification of his reported injuries, communicating those concerns

to the supervising physician, and delivering attentive and appropriate nursing

care . . . .” (Doc. 33-7 at pp. 4-5). Plaintiff did not present any evidence that

Defendant’s treatment decisions were “such a substantial departure from accepted

professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that [Defendant]

did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th

Cir. 2011) (quoted citation omitted); see also Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (disagreement

between the prisoner and his medical provider “about the proper course of

treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to establish an Eighth Amendment

violation.”). An inmate claiming a delay in treatment must offer “verifying

medical evidence” that the delay, rather than the inmate’s underlying condition,

caused some degree of harm. Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714-15, (7th Cir. 2007);

Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235-40 (7th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff presents no verifying

medical evidence to support his claim. Based on the undisputed facts, no

reasonable jury could find that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

serious medical needs. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

Defendant has also asserted she is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 33

at p. 8). As the Court has found that Defendant’s conduct did not constitute cruel

and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, it need not

address whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See Johns v. Tinsley,

No. 16-1106-JES, 2018 WL 10811472, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2018) (citing Van den

Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778, 787 n. 9 (7th Cir. 2011)).

V

For the reasons stated, supra:

(1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [33] is GRANTED.

Defendant Chantil Selman is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff takes

nothing. Each side is to bear their own attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The

Clerk is directed to close this case and enter judgment.

(2) Although this case has been dismissed, Plaintiff remains responsible

for any remainder of the $350 filing fee. (d/e 2/21/2025).

(3) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of

appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(4).

(4) To proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, Plaintiff must file a motion to

proceed on appeal in forma pauperis and identify the issues he will present on

appeal to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith.

Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999) (An

appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for

appealing so that the district judge "can make a responsible assessment of the issue

of good faith."); Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000) (providing that

a good faith appeal is an appeal that "a reasonable person could suppose . . . has

some merit" from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff chooses to appeal, he will be

liable for the $605 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

It is so ordered.

Entered: February 10, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge