James

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

CODY JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:24-cv-04125-JEH

GRANT JAMES, et al.,

Defendants.

Order

This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration for Leave to File Amended Complaint. (Doc. 60). For the reasons

stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

I

On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was detained

at the Hancock County Jail (“HCJ”). (Doc. 1). On January 7, 2025, the Court issued

a Merit Review Order and allowed Plaintiff to proceed against Defendants Nicole

Johnson, Grant James, Christopher Becker, Cole Cornwell, and Austin Shuman for

allegedly violating his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by opening his

legal mail without justification on February 4, 2022, July 14, 2023, and August 3,

2023. (Doc. 14). The Court dismissed HCJ Administrator Kelly Twaddle

(“Administrator Twaddle”) and Hancock County State’s Attorney Bobi James

(“SA James”) without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Id.

Defendants filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses on February 24,

2025. (Doc. 25). On February 28, 2025, the Court entered a Scheduling Order, which

set a 90-day deadline of May 29, 2025 for Plaintiff to seek leave to amend his

Complaint; a discovery closure date of August 28, 2025; and a dispositive motion

due date of September 29, 2025. (Doc. 26).

On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first Motion for Leave to File

Amended Complaint, which the Court denied because Plaintiff failed to attach his

proposed Amended Complaint. (Doc. 53; d/e 12/22/2025). On December 23, 2025,

Plaintiff filed his second Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, which the

Court denied because Plaintiff did not sign his proposed Amended Complaint, as

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. (Doc. 54; d/e 12/29/2025).

On January 6, 2026, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Doc. 55). The same day, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Reconsideration for Leave to

File Amended Complaint” and attached his Motion for Leave to File Amended

Complaint and a signed Amended Complaint. (Doc. 60). Defendants filed a

Response in opposition on January 23, 2026. (Doc. 66).

II

The Court will interpret Plaintiff’s Motion as a renewed Motion for Leave to

File Amended Complaint instead of a Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc. 60).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that the Court should freely give

leave to amend when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In this case, the

time allowed for amendments has long since passed. (Doc. 26). As a result,

Plaintiff’s Motion must be reviewed under the “heightened good-cause standard

of Rule 16(b)(4).” Brehmer v. Dittman, No. 13-0888, 2014 WL 3404977, at *9 (E.D.

Wis. July 10, 2014) (citing Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 2011)).

“[A]mong the aims of Rule 16 are to prevent parties from delaying or

procrastinating and to keep the case ‘moving toward trial.’” Id. at 720. In

determining whether there is good cause to allow the amendment, the Court is to

consider “the diligence of the party seeking amendment.” Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Gen.

& Cologne Life Re of Am., 424 F.3d 542, 553 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding trial court’s

denial of leave to amend which was asserted nine months after the deadline).

“[D]istrict courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where there is

undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies,

undue prejudice to defendants, or where the amendment would be futile.” Arreola

v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008).

III

In his Motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to reinstate Administrator Twaddle

and SA James as Defendants, add claims for collusion/conspiracy and retaliation,

and add Hancock County’s insurance carrier as a necessary party. The proposed

Amended Complaint contains the following new allegations regarding the

individual Defendants:

[I]ncluded Exhibit marked A . . . court proceeding transcript of

August 2, 2021. Essentially instructing the Jail Administrator

Twaddle and or [Bobi] James to address the violation of my rights of

attorney client privilege, mail being open.

In retaliation of Plaintiff informing the criminal [sic] in Case No. 20

CF 125 of this matter, [Bobi] James, Shuman, Cornwell, Johnson,

Becker, Twaddle, Grant James, in collusion continued to open my

legal mail unlawfully on the dates of July 14th, 2023 and also August

3rd, 2023.

(Doc. 60 at p. 10, ¶¶ 4-5). Exhibit A is a transcript from a state court hearing on

August 2, 2021, in Plaintiff’s criminal case. During the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel

informed the court that one piece of Plaintiff’s legal mail had been opened outside

of his presence by an unidentified person. Id. at p. 16.

Plaintiff does not demonstrate good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) for seeking

leave to amend over seven months after the deadline of May 29, 2025. Plaintiff’s

amended pleading attempts to add what appears to be retaliation and conspiracy

claims against previously dismissed Defendants Administrator Twaddle and SA

James and the current Defendants. His new claims arise out of an August 2, 2021

criminal court hearing, which Plaintiff now alleges for the first time was the

impetus for his legal mail being opened on February 4, 2022, July 14, 2023, and

August 3, 2023.

Plaintiff was present at the hearing on August 2, 2021, and was aware of his

potential claims for retaliation and conspiracy when he first filed his Complaint

nearly three years later on July 15, 2024. The Complaint included all three dates

his legal mail was allegedly opened. Therefore, there was nothing preventing

Plaintiff from including his retaliation or conspiracy theories of liability in his

initial Complaint. See Trustmark, 424 F.3d at 553. Similarly, “it is reasonable to

conclude that a plaintiff is not diligent when he in silence watches a deadline pass

even though he has good reason to act or seek an extension of the deadline.” Allen

v. Brown Advisory, LLC, 41 F.4th 843, 853 (7th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff has not

demonstrated good cause for failing to include these claims in his original

Complaint.

Even if Plaintiff had demonstrated good cause, allowing Plaintiff to amend

his Complaint would be futile, as the new claims would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss. To survive such a motion, a complaint “must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). If it only offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” the complaint fails to satisfy the

pleading requirements and dismissal is appropriate. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Merely alleging facts demonstrating the possibility, rather than the plausibility,

that a claim exists, is therefore insufficient. Id.

Here, Plaintiff presents a conclusory allegation that Administrator Twaddle

and SA James retaliated against him because his attorney complained during a

state court hearing in August 2021 about his legal mail having been opened and

that they acted in collusion with the current Defendants by allowing his legal mail

to be opened on three additional occasions. To prevail on a retaliation claim,

Plaintiff “must establish that (1) [he] engaged in activity protected by the First

Amendment, (2) [he] suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First

Amendment activity in the future, and (3) the First Amendment activity was at

least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.”

Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability on a conspiracy theory, [Plaintiff]

must demonstrate that [a] private party . . . reached an understanding with state

officials to deprive h[im] of h[is] constitutional rights.” Shelton v. Bump, 118 F.

App’x 69, 71 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s threadbare and conclusory allegations are

insufficient to proceed on a retaliation claim or conspiracy claim.

Plaintiff’s request to add Hancock County’s insurance carrier solely because

he believes it is a necessary party for indemnification purposes is futile. In

Defendants’ Response, Defendants state that the County affirmatively represents

to the Court that it will agree to indemnify Defendants for any judgment for

compensatory damages, as required by Illinois statute. See 745 ILCS 10/2-302

(local government entity can choose to indemnify its employees acting within the

scope of their employment for compensatory damages). (Doc. 66 at p. 11).

Finally, the Court finds Defendants would be unduly prejudiced by

allowing the amendment. Discovery closed on August 28, 2025, and Defendants

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 6, 2026. As Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment explains, Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeks redress for the allegedly

improper interference with his legal mail under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. 55). Plaintiff is required to demonstrate (1) the frustration of

a non-frivolous legal claim, (2) that each Defendant acted intentionally or

recklessly, (3) that there were repeated infractions amounting to more than

isolated incidents of mail interference, and (4) that the mail was, in fact, legal mail.

Id. at pp. 9-10.

In their Response, Defendants argue that allowing Plaintiff to proceed on

new claims would require reopening discovery to depose Plaintiff a second time

and to conduct discovery regarding whether Administrator Twaddle, SA James,

or the current Defendants reached an agreement to conspire against Plaintiff.

Defendants would also need to file another Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court finds the addition of new claims several months after discovery

closed and after an extensive Motion for Summary Judgment was filed would

cause undue prejudice. See Brown v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 23-CV-00107-

SPM, 2025 WL 3248170, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2025) (“Undue delay is most likely

to result in undue prejudice when a combination of factors, including delay in

proceedings without explanation, no change in the facts since the filing of the

original complaint, and new theories that require additional discovery, occur

together.”); see also McDavid Knee Guard, Inc. v. Nike USA, Inc., No. 08 CV 6584,

2010 WL 151998, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2010) (“Undue prejudice occurs when the

amendment brings in entirely new and separate claims … or at least entails more

than an alternative claim or a change in the allegations in the complaint and when

the additional discovery is expensive and time-consuming.”) (internal quotations

and citation omitted). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration for Leave to File Amended Complaint

[60] is DENIED.

(2) Plaintiff is directed to file a response to Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment [55] on or before March 12, 2026.

It is so ordered.

Entered: February 10, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge