Cranford, II v. United States Department of the Interior

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DUEWARD W. CRANFORD, II, et

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 25-1116 (EGS)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, et

al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dueward W. Cranford, II; Jon Colburn; William Braun; and

the Citizens for Equal Rights Alliance (“CERA”) (collectively

“Plaintiffs”) sue the U.S. Department of the Interior

(“Interior”); U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs; the National Indian

Gaming Commission; the U.S. Department of Justice; Dough Burgum,

Secretary of the Interior; William Doffermyre, Solicitor, U.S.

Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor; Eric

Shepard, Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of

the Interior; Bryan Mercier, Director, U.S. Bureau of Indian

Affairs, Office of the Solicitor; Ryan Hunter, Acting Regional

Director, Pacific Southwest Regional Office, U.S. Bureau of

Indian Affairs, and Head of the California Fee to Trust

1

Consortium; Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General; Adam R.F.

Gustafson, Acting Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice

Environment and Natural Resources Division; Gina Allery,

Director, Office of Tribal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice;

and the Acting Director, Tribal Resources Section, U.S.

Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources

Division (collectively, “Defendants”). 1 See Compl., ECF No. 1. 2

Plaintiffs sue the individual Defendants in both their official

and individual capacities. See id. Plaintiffs state the

following claims for relief: (1) violations of the Federal

Recognition Tribal List Act, see id. at 34; (2) the Ione Band is

not eligible under the Indian Reorganization Act and/or the

Indian Consolidation Act to acquire land; (3) violations of the

“property/territory” clause of the U.S. Constitution and the

Tenth Amendment, see id. at 55; and (4) Conspiracy under 42

U.S.C. § 1985, see id. at 67.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction in which Plaintiffs seek, among other

1 William Doffermyre was confirmed as the Solicitor of the

Department of the Interior on September 18, 2025. Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 25(d), he is

automatically substituted for Acting Solicitor Gregory Zerzan.

Acting Regional Director Ryan Hunter is substituted for his

predecessor, Amy Dutschke pursuant to Rule 25(d).

2 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the

Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page

number of the filed document.

2

things, to halt further construction of the Ione Band of Miwok

Indian’s (“Ione Band”) Acorn Ridge Indian Gambling Casino

located in Plymouth City, Amador County, California. See Mot.

for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 17; and Mem. of Law in Support

(collectively “MPI”), ECF No. 17-1. The groundbreaking for the

casino occurred in October 2024 and it is scheduled to open in

February 2026. Upon careful consideration of Plaintiffs’ motion,

the Defendants’ oppositions, the reply, surreply, and

sursurreply thereto; the applicable law; and for the reasons

discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion.

I. Background

A. Factual

1. Prior Litigation

The casino at issue in this case has been the subject of

two prior lawsuits in federal court in California. First, in

2015, the County of Amador challenged, pursuant to the

Administrative Procedure Act, the 2012 Record of Decision

(“ROD”) issued by Interior that lead to the construction of the

casino. See County of Amador, California v. Dep't of the

Interior, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) affirmed the

District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants in

the case. See County of Amador, California v. Dep't of the

Interior, 872 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017).

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The County challenged two of Interior’s determinations in

the ROD. It first challenged “Interior[‘s] determin[ation] that

the Ione Band qualifies to have land taken into trust for its

benefit under the [Indian Reorganization Act ‘IRA’] because the

Band is now ‘recognized’ and was ‘under Federal jurisdiction’ in

1934 when the IRA took effect.” Id. at 1020. In response to this

challenge, the court held “that a tribe qualifies to have land

taken into trust for its benefit under § 5108 if it (1) was

‘under Federal jurisdiction’ as of June 18, 1934, and (2) is

‘recognized’ at the time the decision is made to take land into

trust.” Id. at 1024.

The County also challenged “Interior[’s] determin[ation]

that the Ione Band may conduct gaming on the Plymouth Parcels

under the ‘restored lands of a restored tribe’ provision of [the

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ‘IGRA’].” Id. at 1020. In response

to this challenge, the court held “that Interior did not err in

allowing the [Ione] Band to conduct gaming operations on the

Plymouth Parcels under the ‘restored tribe’ exception of IGRA.”

Id. at 1031.

On October 1, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the petition

for the writ of certiorari. See County of Amador, California v.

Dep't of the Interior, 139 S. Ct. 64 (2024) (mem).

The second lawsuit was filed in 2018 by three of the

Plaintiffs in this case—Dueward W. Cranford, II; Jon Colburn;

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William Braun; three other individuals—Dr. Elida Malick, David

Logan, and Catherine Coulter; and No Casino in Plymouth, a

“representative citizens group and a non-profit corporation.”

Compl. in Civil Action No. 18-1398, District Court for the

Eastern District of California, Ex. 1 to Gov’t Defs.’ Opp’n for

Prelim. Inj. Relief (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 32-1 at 1, 9.

The District Court noted that the lawsuit primarily

challenged the same Interior decisions that the courts had

considered in the Amador County case. See No Casino in

Plymouth v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm'n, Civ. A. No. 18-1398, 2022

WL 1489498, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 11, 2022) (“Plymouth I”).

Plaintiffs’ claims challenge various

determinations as follows: (1) the Tribe's

gaming ordinance (id. at ¶ 107); (2) [then-

Acting Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs

Donald] Laverdure's authority to approve the

ROD under the Appointment Clause of the U.S.

Constitution (id. at ¶ 118); (3) the Tribe's

federally recognized status under the Indian

Reorganization Act (“IRA”) (id. at ¶ 127); (4)

the Tribe's federal recognition under 25

C.F.R. Part 83 (id. at ¶ 136); (5) Defendants’

violation of Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection

rights by favoring the Tribe, a race-based

group, through approval of the ROD and gaming

ordinance (id. at ¶¶ 141–43); and (6)

Defendants’ violation of federalism

protections (id. at ¶ 150–51).

Id. at *2. The District Court first ruled that County of Amador

disposed of Claims One through Four pursuant to the “law of the

circuit doctrine.” Id. at *4. It then ruled that Plaintiffs had

conceded the two remaining claims by not meaningfully responding

5

to them, but that even if they had, it found Defendants’

arguments on the merits persuasive. Id. The Ninth Circuit

affirmed the District Court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings

to the Defendants. See No Casino in Plymouth v. Nat’l Indian

Gaming Comm’n, Civ. A. No. 22-15756, 2023 WL 4646113, at *1 (9th

Cir. 2023) (“Plymouth II”).

On April 15, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the petition

for the writ of certiorari. See No Casino in Plymouth v. Nat’l

Indian Gaming Comm’n, 144 S. Ct. 1347 (2024) (mem).

2. The Instant Litigation

Pursuant to Interior’s 2012 ROD, twelve parcels of land

were accepted into federal trust on behalf of the Ione Band for

gaming purposes. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 2. First, on March 20,

2020, ten parcels of land were accepted into federal trust on

behalf of the Ione Band. Id. ¶ 113. Then, on October 17, 2024,

two parcels of land were accepted into federal trust on behalf

of the Ione Band. Id. ¶ 133. Plaintiffs allege that the

acceptances of these parcels were unconstitutional. Id. ¶ 2.

Plaintiffs also allege that the “inclusion, on November 2,

1994, by the U.S. Department of the Interior and Bureau of

Indian Affairs, of the Ione Band of Miwok Indians in the list of

Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services

from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs under the

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Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act” was

unconstitutional. Id. ¶ 1.

The relief Plaintiffs seek is that the Court:

RESTRAIN[] AND ENJOIN[] Federal and Individual

Defendants, their agents, servants,

employees, attorneys and all others in active

concert or participation with Defendants, from

continuing the federal conspiracy entailing

their racial discrimination against

Plaintiffs on behalf of the Ione Band of Miwok

Indians pursuant to the fraudulent Federal-

Indian trust relationship, and thus, from

continuing to recognize and/or reaffirm the

acceptance into federal trust of the twelve

(12) California fee simple land parcels

identified in Doc. No. 1-6 and Doc. 1-10 of

the record, which fee-to-trust transfers the

Court preliminarily finds violate the

Constitution’s structural protections and

Plaintiffs’ foundational constitutional

rights and liberty interests.

. . .

RESTRAIN[] AND ENJOIN[] Federal and Individual

Defendants, their agents, servants,

employees, attorneys and all others in active

concert or participation with Defendants from

continuing to support, directly or indirectly,

the Ione Band of Miwok Indians’ gambling

casino construction and finance-related

activities made possible by these

unconstitutional racially discriminatory

federal actions.

Proposed Order, ECF No. 17-10.

B. Procedural 3

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on April 14, 2025, see

Compl., ECF No. 1; and Defendants’ response was initially due by

3 This section describes the procedural background most relevant

to the pending motion.

7

June 16, 2025, see Dkt. Entry (Apr. 23, 2025). The Court

granted, over Plaintiffs’ objection, two motions by Defendants

for extensions of time to respond to the Complaint. See Minute

Order (July 7, 2025); Minute Order (Aug. 26, 2025). Defendants

stated that additional time was needed to determine whether the

Department of Justice would represent the Defendants sued in

their individual capacities. See Mot. to Extend Time, ECF No.

11; Mot. to Extend Time, ECF No. 14. Accordingly, Defendants’

response to the Complaint was due by October 14, 2025.

On September 15, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the Motion for

Preliminary Injunction. See MPI, ECF No. 17. Thereafter, the

Court entered its standard Minute Order in response to a motion

for preliminary injunction requesting a joint status report

regarding: (1) whether Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary

Injunction should be consolidated with the merits under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 65; and (2) recommendations for further

proceedings including, if necessary, a briefing schedule for

plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See Minute Order

(Sept. 16, 2025).

The parties were unable to reach an agreement on the

schedule, and the Court entered a scheduling order adopting

Plaintiffs’ proposed scheduling order pursuant to which, among

other things, Defendants’ opposition to the Motion for

Preliminary Injunction was due by October 31, 2025 and

8

Plaintiffs’ reply due by November 30, 2025. See Minute Order

(Dec. 12, 2025). Pursuant to the date Plaintiffs' Motion for

Preliminary Injunction was filed, the Local Rules of the Court

required the Court to have either held a hearing by October 6,

2025, or made a finding that a later hearing date would not

prejudice the parties. See LCivR 65.1(d). The Court made that

finding in view of its adoption of Plaintiffs' proposed schedule

under which they sought to first brief their Motion for Limited

Expedited Discovery, and under which their Reply in Support of

their Motion for Preliminary Injunction was due by November 30,

2025, nearly two months after the hearing date pursuant to the

local rule. See JSR, ECF No. 18 at 5. On September 30, 2025,

Plaintiffs’ sought clarification and reconsideration of the

Court’s scheduling order, requesting, among other things, an

October 8, 2025 hearing and “immediate” injunctive relief. See

Mot. to Clarify, ECF No. 19. The Court granted in part and

denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion and set an expedited briefing

schedule. See Minute Order (Dec. 12, 2025).

Between October 1, 2025, and November 11, 2025, civil cases

involving the United States were stayed due to the lapse in

appropriations. See Standing Order No. 25-55 (JEB) (Oct. 1,

2025); Standing Order No. 25-59 (JEB) (Nov. 13, 2025).

On December 10, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). See TRO, ECF No. 26.

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The Court denied the motion on December 12, 2025, see Mem. Op.

and Order, ECF No. 28; and set a new scheduling order, see

Minute Order (Dec. 12, 2025). On December 23, 2025, Plaintiffs

sought reconsideration of the Court’s denial of their Ex Parte

Motion for TRO. See Mot. to Reconsider, ECF No. 29. Following

expedited briefing on that motion, the Court denied the motion.

See Minute Order (Jan. 9, 2026). Because Plaintiffs asserted in

their motion for reconsideration that they have “new and updated

information” relevant to their Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, the Court updated the briefing schedule to permit

them the opportunity to include that information in their reply

and set a schedule for a surreply and sursurreply to ensure full

briefing on the issue. Id.

II. Standard of Review

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never

awarded as of right,” and only “upon a clear showing that the

plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22, 24 (2008). The moving party “must

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that

an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. Where the

federal government is the opposing party, the balance of

equities and public interest factors merge. See Nken v. Holder,

10

556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). “The purpose of a preliminary

injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the

parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex.

v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).

In this Circuit, the four factors have typically been

evaluated on a “sliding scale,” such that if “the movant makes

an unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does

not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another

factor.” Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288,

1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In the wake of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Winter, 555 U.S. at 7, “the D.C. Circuit has

suggested that a positive showing on all four preliminary

injunction factors may be required.” Holmes v. FEC, 71 F. Supp.

3d 178, 183 n.4 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Sherley v. Sebelius, 644

F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e read Winter at least to

suggest if not to hold that a likelihood of success is an

independent, freestanding requirement for a preliminary

injunction.”) (quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, “the

Circuit has had no occasion to decide this question because it

has not yet encountered a post-Winter case where a preliminary

injunction motion survived the less rigorous sliding-scale

analysis.” ConverDyn v. Moniz, 68 F. Supp. 3d 34, 46 n.2 (D.D.C.

2014); see also Changji Esquel Textile Co. v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th

716, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“In the past, we have . . . reserved

11

the question whether the sliding-scale approach remains valid.

We follow the same approach here because, even under the

sliding-scale approach, the movant must raise at least a serious

legal question on the merits.”)(quotations and internal

citations omitted); cf. Hanson v. Dist. of Columbia, 120 F.4th

223, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citations omitted).

Here, there is no reason for the Court to consider whether

Plaintiffs prevail under either approach because no factor

weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs.

III. Analysis

A. Plaintiffs Fail to Show Irreparable Harm

“[T]he basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has

always been irreparable harm”; thus “[a] movant's failure to

show any irreparable harm is [ ] grounds for refusing to issue a

preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors entering

the calculus merit such relief.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel

Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974)).

The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for irreparable

injury.” Id. “First, the injury must be both certain and great;

it must be actual and not theoretical.” Wisconsin Gas Co. v.

FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(per curiam). The movant

must show that “[t]he injury complained of is of such imminence

that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to

12

prevent irreparable harm.” Id. (citations, brackets, and

internal quotation marks omitted). “Second, the injury must be

beyond remediation.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454

F.3d at 297. “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to

prevent all harm but ‘merely to preserve the relative positions

of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.’”

Hanson, 120 F.4th at 244 (quoting Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney,

602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024)).

Plaintiffs argue that they are likely to suffer irreparable

harm if preliminary injunctive relief is not granted based on

the deprivation of their constitutional rights, and because the

casino “will unequivocally and irreversibly disturb that quiet,

peaceful and safe quality of life that Plaintiffs have long

enjoyed and have strenuously fought to preserve.” MPI, ECF No.

17-1 at 42. Defendants dispute that Plaintiffs have shown they

will face irreparable harm because: (1) “the Complaint fails to

state any plausible constitutional claim”; (2) “Plaintiffs’

delay in moving for a preliminary injunction rebuts their

assertions of irreparable injury”; and (3) Plaintiffs’ fear of

injury is speculative. Opp’n, ECF No. 32 at 33-35. Plaintiffs

fail to respond to Defendants specific arguments regarding

irreparable harm, see generally Reply, ECF No. 44; but assert

that because the casino is now expected to open in February 2026

rather than April-May, 2026, there is now “an imminent threat of

13

actual bodily harm and loss of personal security/safety,” id. at

44.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate irreparable injury for the reasons explained below.

First, “the deprivation of constitutional rights constitutes

irreparable injury only to the extent such deprivation is shown

to be likely.” Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 335. Here, and

for the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs are unlikely to

succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims because

those claims are barred by Sovereign Immunity and the Statute of

Limitations. And the mere allegation of a constitutional

violation does not entitle Plaintiffs to a presumption of

irreparable harm. Hanson, 120 F.4th at 244. “Rather, a plaintiff

must show why the court will be unable to grant meaningful

relief following trial.” Id.

Plaintiffs have failed to make this showing. They contend

that “[u]nless this Court issues a permanent injunction before

the Ione Band’s casino is fully constructed and operational,

Plaintiffs will have no remedy available at law or in equity to

protect and preserve their foundational liberty interest of

participating in and maintaining their republican

form of politically accountable local government, their

foundational constitutional rights to due process of law and

equal protection of the law, and their unique quality of life.”

14

MPI, ECF No. 17-1 at 42-43. Plaintiffs fail, however, to explain

why this is so. See id. at 42-49. Rather, Plaintiffs discuss

their disagreement with the Ione Band’s plans to address the

“federal crimes” they claim accompany tribal casino operations.

See id. at 45-46. They also believe that the payments the Ione

Band and Amador County have agreed to for law enforcement

associated with the casino are inadequate. See id. at 45. But

they fail to provide a legal argument explaining why they “will

have no remedy available at law or in equity” following a trial

in the case. Id. at 42. They therefore have failed to explain

why the relief they request will be unavailable later.

Second, Plaintiffs claims of injury are speculative. They

claim that without injunctive relief, they “will suffer certain,

great and imminent irremediable/irreparable injury as the result

of the serious federal crimes of cigarette, felony drug and

human trafficking that the well-documented federal government

threat assessments have found to inflict tribal casinos

throughout the nation, including in California, and which are

similarly likely to inflict the Ione Band’s Acorn Ridge casino

once it is fully constructed and operational.” MPI, ECF No. 17-1

at 48-49. To support these claims, they point to the Declaration

of Mr. Cranford. However, Mr. Cranford’s claims of harm are not

supported by the evidence upon which he relies.

15

Mr. Cranford explains that it is his “understanding” that

Ione Band has understated the magnitude of federal crimes that

will be associated with the casino and that its plans to

mitigate those crimes is inadequate. Declaration of Due W.

Cranford, II (“Cranford Decl.”), ECF No. 17-6 ¶ 17. He also

asserts, without support, that the payments the Ione Band and

Amador County have agreed to for law enforcement associated with

the casino are inadequate. Id. ¶ 18.

To support his assertion that money laundering can be

expected in connection with the casino, he points to a 2007

National Money Laundering Strategy Report issued by the

Departments of Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security.

However, the report merely states that “the most notable

development” in casinos is the growth of Native American

casinos, which have “ample potential money laundering and other

types of financial crimes.” See U.S. Department of the Treasury,

U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland

Security, 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy (2007) at 58,

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/246/nmls.pdf. Plaintiffs

point to no evidence indicating that such money laundering has

actually taken place at any tribal casinos.

Mr. Cranford points to three incidents where cigarettes

were confiscated for non-payment of taxes in California, see

Cranford Decl., ECF No. 17-6 ¶ 20; however, the Court’s review

16

of Mr. Cranford’s sources reveals that none of these incidents

were related to casinos.

Relying on National Drug Threat Assessments issued in 2015,

2017, 2019, and 2025, Mr. Cranford states that tribal casinos

“have become havens for illicit Mexican cartel-related drug

trafficking of high-potency marijuana, methamphetamine,

fentanyl, cocaine and heroin.” Id. ¶ 21. However, only the 2017

threat assessment linked illicit drugs on tribal lands to tribal

casinos. See U.S. Department of Justice, Drug enforcement

Administration, 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment (Oct. 2017)

at 139, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/DIR-040-

17_2017-NDTA.pdf (explaining that “local gaming casinos” were

used as venues for delivering and selling methamphetamine).

Mr. Cranford claims that “tribal casinos . . . are

vulnerable to human forced labor and sex trafficking.” Cranford

Decl., ECF No. 17-6 ¶ 22; see also id. ¶¶ 23-29. The Court

acknowledges, as does the National Indian Gaming Commission, the

potential for human trafficking to occur at the casino once it

is open. See generally U.S. National Indian Gaming Commission,

Bulletin No. 2021-2, Subject: Human Trafficking (Feb. 26, 2021),

https://www.nigc.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2025/02/Human_Trafficking

_Bulletin_2-26-2021_Final.pdf. However, whether human

trafficking will occur at the Acorn Ridge Indian Gambling Casino

is speculative at this point.

17

Plaintiffs’ claims of harm are not supported by the

evidence upon which they rely and therefore are entirely

speculative. Plaintiffs point to no new evidence to support

their assertion there is “an imminent threat of actual bodily

harm and loss of personal security/safety” because the casino is

now expected to open in February 2026 rather than April-May,

2026. See Reply, ECF No. 44 at 44. Plaintiffs’ speculative fear

of personal injury does not satisfy the high standard for

irreparable injury in this Circuit.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking injunctive relief

undercuts their claim of irreparable harm. “[A] party requesting

a preliminary injunction must generally show reasonable

diligence.” Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 159 (2018). While

“a late filing, on its own, is [not] a permissible basis for

denying a preliminary injunction,” “untimely filings may support

a conclusion that the plaintiff cannot satisfy the irreparable

harm prong.” Gordon v. Holder, 632 F.3d 722, 724-25 (D.C. Cir.

2011).

As stated above, the Supreme Court denied the petition for

the writ of certiorari in No Casino in Plymouth v. Nat’l Indian

Gaming Comm’n on April 15, 2024. See No Casino in Plymouth, 144

S. Ct. at 1347. Plaintiffs could therefore expect construction

of the casino to commence. As alleged in the Complaint, the

parcels of land upon which the casino is being built were

18

accepted into federal trust on behalf of the Ione Band in March

2020 and October 2024. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 113, 133.

Exhibits to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction include the

Intergovernmental Agreement between the County of Amador and the

Ione Band dated May 28, 2024, the purpose of which is “to

provide a funding mechanism for the Tribe to compensate the

County for law enforcement services and to address certain

transportation impacts identified in the environmental

documents.” See ECF No. 17-8 at 4-5. Exhibits also include an

environmental study for the project dated January 24, 2024. ECF

No. 17-9 at 1-444. According to a local area news report, the

groundbreaking for the casino occurred in October 2024. Jackson

Ellison, A Tribal Casino Breaks Ground, After Decades in the

Making, ABC10, (Oct. 24, 2024),

https://www.abc10.com/article/money/business/amador-county-

casino-breaks-ground/103-5d49fb81-8f2e-4d8b-9c68-43efb0fe3cbc. 4

And Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that as of January 2,

2025, “contractors had already installed silt fencing around the

perimeter of the proposed casino construction site” and that as

of March 14, 2025, “contractors were continuing their

earthmoving activities at the site.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 138,

4 The Court can take judicial notice of facts generally known

as a result of newspaper articles. See Washington Post v.

Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

19

139. Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on April 14, 2025, but did

not file their Motion for Preliminary Injunction until September

15, 2025. See Compl., ECF No. 1; MPI, ECF No. 17. The apparent

reason for moving for preliminary injunctive relief was that the

rapid pace of construction meant the casino would open in Spring

2026. MPI, ECF No. 17 at 2. The opening date has since moved to

February 2026. Reply, ECF No. 44 at 44 n.14. In view of this

timeline, Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking injunctive relief

undercuts their claim of irreparable harm.

In sum, Plaintiffs are unlikely to show that deprivation of

their constitutional rights is likely. Furthermore, Plaintiffs

claims of injury are entirely speculative. Finally, Plaintiffs’

delay in seeking injunctive relief supports the Court’s

conclusion that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

irreparable injury. For all these reasons, Plaintiffs have

failed to satisfy this Circuit’s “high standard for irreparable

injury.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297.

B. Plaintiffs Are Unlikely to Prevail on the Merits of

Their Claims

“A movant's failure to show any irreparable harm is [ ]

grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if

the other three factors entering the calculus merit such

relief.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297

(quoting Sampson, 415 U.S. at 88). Nonetheless, the Court will

20

consider whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits

of their claims.

1. Standard for Likelihood of Success Is Unchanged

As an initial matter, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’

argument regarding the legal standard for likelihood of success

on the merits. Plaintiffs argue in their Reply that, based on

Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 860 (2025), the “likelihood

of success factor focuses on whether the movant ‘is likely to

prevail on the merits of the issue before [the court], not [on]

whether he is likely to prevail on the merits of the underlying

suit.’” Reply, ECF No. 44 at 14 (quoting Trump v. CASA, 606 U.S.

at 860).

However, Defendants are correct that this misunderstands

the impact of the Trump v. CASA decision. Sur-Reply, ECF No. 47

at 8. The full text of the quoted language Defendants cite

discusses the standard the Court uses in deciding applications

for a stay. CASA, 606 U.S. at 860. Furthermore, the issue before

the Court in Trump v. CASA was not whether the injunction was

proper based on the likelihood of success of the underlying

claim, but rather, the scope of the injunction issued, and

whether the entry of a universal injunction exceeded the

authority of a federal court. Id. The Court considered, and

found that, the government was “likely to succeed on the merits

of its argument regarding the scope of relief.” Id. at 841. The

21

holding did not disturb the standard for evaluating whether a

preliminary injunction should be granted.

2. Plaintiffs’ Claims Against the Government

Defendants Under 1981, Section 1983, and Section

1985 Are Barred by Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants' ongoing recognition

of the twelve parcels at issue and continuation of what

Plaintiffs claim is a “fraudulent Federal-Indian trust

relationship” qualifies as an “ongoing federal conspiracy to

deprive Plaintiffs and other similarly situated California

citizens of their liberty interests and constitutionally

protected rights in violation of 42 U.S. §§ 1981, § 1983, and

§ 1985.” MPI, ECF No. 17-1 at 26. Defendants argue that the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claims

Plaintiffs bring against Defendants under Section 1981, Section

1983, or Section 1985 because these claims are barred by

Sovereign Immunity. Opp’n, ECF No. 32 at 15.

As an initial matter, “Section 1983 does not apply to

federal officials acting under color of federal law,” and

therefore that statute is not the proper vehicle for Plaintiffs

to bring claims against the Defendants. Settles v. U.S. Parole

Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Moreover, with

respect to Sovereign Immunity, the government is correct that

the “[c]laims against the individual defendants in their

official capacities should be treated as if they were brought

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against the United States directly.” Opp’n, ECF No. 32 at 15

(citing Gonzalez v. Holder, 763 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148 (D.D.C.

2011) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66

(1985)(“an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than

name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”))). The

“United States may not be sued without its consent and [] the

existence of such consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”

U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). A waiver of

sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally expressed in statutory

text” and strictly construed “in favor of the sovereign.” Lane

v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).

Neither Section 1981, Section 1983, nor Section 1985

contain such an explicit waiver of immunity. See Jean-Baptiste

v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 23-432, 2024 WL 1253858, at *4

(D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2024) (stating that nothing in the text of

these three statutes “suggests the United States has waived its

immunity to suit” and noting that “courts have expressly held

the opposite”); Roum v. Bush, 461 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46 (D.D.C.

2006) (“[Section] 1985 does not waive the federal government's

sovereign immunity, so federal employees acting in their

official capacities are immune from liability for alleged

violations of § 1985”); Ali v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, No. 06-0235,

2007 WL 902312, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2007) (finding sovereign

immunity barred § 1983 claims against federal government

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defendants sued in official capacities); Zhu v. Gonzales, No.

04–1408, 2006 WL 1274767 (D.D.C. May 8, 2006) (quoting Hohri v.

U.S., 782 F.2d 227, 245 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other

grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987) (stating that civil rights statutes,

including Section 1981, “by their terms, do not apply to actions

against the United States”)).

Plaintiffs argue in their Reply that they “may” secure

injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants in their

official capacities. Reply, ECF No. 44 at 51. Plaintiffs cite

case law discussing Ex Parte Young to show that suits against

government officials sued in their official capacities “are not

immune” from being enjoined. Id. at 52 (citing Vann v. U.S. DOI,

701 F.3d 927, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Mich. v. Bay Mills Indian

Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 796 (2014); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

(1908)). However, like Section 1983, the Ex Parte Young doctrine

allows for suits against state officials acting in violation of

federal law, not federal officials, and thus does not apply

here. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159 (“It is simply an illegal

act upon the part of a state official in attempting, by the use

of the name of the state, to enforce a legislative enactment

which is void because unconstitutional.”).

Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over Plaintiffs’ Section 1981, Section 1983, and Section 1985

claims.

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3. Plaintiffs’ Remaining Claims Are Barred by the

Statute of Limitations 5

Plaintiffs seek preliminary injunctive relief

to stop the ongoing violation of Plaintiffs’

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due

process rights and their foundational liberty

(freedom) interests resulting directly from

the Federal and Individual

Defendants’(“FID”)s’ actions to extend Indian

tribal recognition, promote solely Indian

interests in taking 12 parcels of land into

"trust" and in obtaining approval for Indian

gaming on those parcels. All of these

continuing actions are completely race based

from the assumed Indian trust relationship.

These actions are continuing constitutional

violations, of the Property/Territory Clause,

the Fifth, Tenth and Thirteenth Amendments,

and separation of powers and federalism

principles. The FIDs continue to violate these

structural protections by continuing to

reaffirm the federal government’s prior

exercise of extra-/pre-constitutional

territorial war powers pursuant to 25 U.S.C.

§§ 71 and 177, 43 U.S.C §§ 1457 and 1458, and

18 U.S.C. § 1151, based on a nonexistent

common law fiduciary Federal-Indian “trust”

relationship with the Ione Band of Miwok

Indians. The FIDs employed these powers on the

Ione Band’s behalf, in contravention of the

5 The Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiffs may bring

claims under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and that

the organizational Plaintiff has standing. See In re Grand Jury

Subpoena (Judith Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1159 (D.C. Cir.

2006)(Henderson, J., concurring)(“In our circuit it is a

venerable practice, and one frequently observed, to assume

arguendo the answer to one question . . . in order to resolve a

given case by answering another and equally dispositive one . .

.”). Because the Court determines that Plaintiffs are barred

from bringing their claims on sovereign immunity and statute of

limitations grounds, the Court does not reach whether

Plaintiffs’ claims are precluded; whether Plaintiffs allege any

violation of the Tenth Amendment, the Property Clause, or the

Fifth Amendment; or whether Plaintiffs allege any Ultra Vires

claim.

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Federally Recognized Tribe List Act (“List

Act”), the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”),

Indian Land Consolidation Act (“ILCA”), and

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) to

ensure the 12 third-party-owned Amador County

California fee simple land parcels located

within one mile of Plaintiffs’ residences were

accepted into "trust" status. This created

land status based upon the Indian trust

relationship.

Reply, ECF No. 44 at 15. Plaintiffs also seek “Ultra Vires

Review of the President’s Ongoing Reaffirmation of the Nixon

Indian Policy Extending the 1871 Indian Policy Which the FIDs

Continue to Employ to Violate the Constitution’s Structural

Protections and Plaintiffs’ Individual Constitutional Rights and

Liberty Interests.” Id. at 49-51.

All of Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to a six-year statute

of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(“every civil action

commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the

complaint is filed within six years after the right of action

first accrues.”). A claim subject to this statute of limitations

accrues when “the injured party discovers—or in the exercise of

due diligence should have discovered—that it has been injured.”

Sprint Commc'ns Co., v. FCC, 76 F.3d 1221, 1228 (D.C. Cir.

1996); see also Adams, Nash & Haskell, Inc. v. U.S., No. 20-

1916, 2021 WL 1340918, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2021) (quoting

Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336, 342 (D.C. Cir.

1991)) (“‘the discovery rule is the general accrual rule in

26

federal courts’ applicable to federal questions ‘in the absence

of contrary directive from Congress’”).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred

because they challenge the May 24, 2012 Decision. Opp’n, ECF No.

18. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the six-year statute of

limitations applies, arguing rather that the continuing

violation doctrine applies to their claims because the

Defendants’ “continuing reaffirmation of the acceptances into

federal trust of the 12 Amador County land parcels began in

March 20[20] and continued through October 2024, and continues

to the present day, resulting in ongoing violations of the

Constitutions’ structural protections and Plaintiffs’ individual

constitutionally protected rights and liberty interests.” Reply,

ECF No. 44 at 62. Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue, “the ordinary

three or six year statute of limitations for constitutional

torts in the District of Columbia is tolled indefinitely until

the constitutional and statutory violations cease.” Id.

The continuing violation doctrine is an exception to the

general rule that “[a] claim normally accrues when the factual

and legal prerequisites for filing suit are in place.” Earle v.

Dist. of Columbia, 707 F.3d 299, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting

Norwest Bank Minnesota Nat'l Ass'n v. FDIC, 312 F.3d 447, 451

(D.C. Cir. 2002)(internal quotations omitted)). Although “[t]his

doctrine is ‘muddled,’” the D.C. Circuit recognizes at least two

27

applications: (1) where the “character [of the challenged

conduct] as a violation did not become clear until it was

repeated during the limitations period, typically because it is

only its cumulative impact ... that reveals its illegality”; and

(2) where “the text of the pertinent law imposes a continuing

obligation to act or refrain from acting.” Id. at 306-07

(citations omitted).

Neither of these conditions are met here. Plaintiffs do not

argue that the illegality of Defendants’ conduct only became

apparent through repeated actions, nor do they dispute that the

May 24, 2012 Decision injured them. Reply, ECF No. 44 at 62. Nor

do Plaintiffs argue that the text of the pertinent law imposes a

“continuing obligation to act or refrain from acting,” Earle,

707 F.3d at 307; but instead generally state that the government

reaffirming the original acceptances into federal trust resulted

in “ongoing violations of the Constitutions’ structural

protections and Plaintiffs’ individual constitutionally

protected rights and liberty interests.” Reply, ECF No. 44 at

62.

When Interior announced its May 24, 2012 Decision, upon

that action by Interior, Plaintiffs’ claims became “immediately

actionable.” Earle, 707 F.3d at 307. This is clear from the fact

that other litigants, including three of the Plaintiffs in this

case, challenged the Decision at the time. See County of Amador,

28

California, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1193; Plymouth I, 2022 WL 148949.

The subsequent reaffirmations thus “did not accumulate to

comprise a single, actionable violation.” Earle, 707 F.3d at

307.

Plaintiffs do not cite to, nor is the Court aware of,

binding case law addressing whether reaffirmations of trust

decisions are considered continuing violations of the

Constitution. At least one court has found that a challenge to

an entrustment decision by the BIA was time barred under six-

year statute of limitations despite subsequent actions taken by

BIA pursuant to that entrustment. Big Lagoon Rancheria v.

California, 789 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2015)(considering

challenge to BIA decision to hold parcel of land in trust for

Indian tribe and finding six-year limitations period applied).

In other contexts, courts have held that “to restart the

statute of limitations, an overt act [(1)] must be a new and

independent act that is not merely a reaffirmation of a previous

act, and (2) it must inflict new and accumulating injury on the

plaintiff.” In re Mission Health Antitrust Litig., No. 1:22-CV-

00114-MR, 2024 WL 759308, at *7 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 21, 2024)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As explained

above, there is no such “overt act” here.

In the 2012 ROD, Interior “announced its intention to take

land into trust for the benefit of the Ione Band” and Interior

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“allowed the Ione Band to build a casino complex and conduct

gaming on the land once it is taken into trust.” County of

Amador, 872 F.3d at 1015. This occurred in March 2020 and

October 2024 when the twelve parcels of land were accepted into

federal trust. Therefore, claims arising from the May 24, 2012

ROD are barred by the six year statute of limitations, which

expired before Plaintiffs filed this suit in 2025. See generally

Compl., ECF No. 1.

For all these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs

have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits

of any of their claims.

C. Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest

In view of the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs have

failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and that they have no

likelihood of succeeding on the merits, the Court need not

consider the final factors, but will briefly discuss them.

“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that

‘the balance of equities favors preliminary relief’ and that ‘an

injunction is in the public interest.’” Hanson, 120 F.4th at 246

(quoting Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). The

Court “must carefully balance the equities by weighing the harm

to the moving party and the public if there is no injunction

against the harm to the government and the public if there is.”

Id. The balance of the equities and the public interest “merge

30

when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken, 556 U.S. at

435.

Here, the only harm to the moving party and the public if

there is no injunction is the status quo. And the status quo is

as it is partially as the result of two challenges in federal

court to the Interior ROD in 2012 that lead to the construction

of the casino. These challenges were fully litigated, in each

case the government prevailed, and in each case the Supreme

Court denied the petitions for the writ of certiorari. The

litigation history here assures the Court that not providing

preliminary injunctive relief will not harm the moving party nor

the public. Indeed, the Court has already determined that the

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

D. Injunctive Relief Is Not Available Against Federal

Officials in their Individual Capacities

Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief from Defendants sued

in their individual capacities. See generally MPI, ECF No. 17.

However, such relief is not available against a government

defendant sued in their individual capacity. Dugan v. Rank, 372

U.S. 609, 620 (1963)(finding that “if the effect of the judgment

would be to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it

to act” the suit is brought against the sovereign)(citations and

internal quotation marks omitted); Hatfill v. Gonzales, 519 F.

Supp. 2d 13, 26 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that injunctive relief

31

“can only be provided by the government through government

employees acting in their official capacities because

deprivation of a constitutional right can only be remedied by

the government”). The D.C. Circuit has not addressed this issue

specifically, but other courts in this District and elsewhere

have maintained that “there is no basis for suing a government

official for declaratory and injunctive relief in his or her

individual or personal capacity.” Hatfill, 519 F. Supp. 2d at

19; see also Leyland v. Edwards, 797 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C.

2011) (denying injunctive relief sought against government

official sued in individual capacity); BEG Inv., LLC v. Alberti,

34 F. Supp. 3d 68, 80 (D.D.C. 2014) (same); Cayuga Nation v.

Zinke, 302 F. Supp. 3d 352, 359 (D.D.C. 2018) (same); Feit v.

Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 858 (7th Cir. 1989).

Because “only by acting as a government official (not as an

individual acting personally), can a public official's

compliance with a court decree remedy the governmental action,

policy or practice that is being challenged,” Defendants sued

here in their individual capacities cannot remedy the action

Plaintiffs challenge. Hatfill, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 26.

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IV. Conclusion

Preliminary injunctions are “an extraordinary and drastic

remedy.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting

11A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure

§ 2948 (2d ed. 1995)). “[C]ourts must [therefore] use great

caution [and] grant[ ] them only in cases where they are clearly

indispensable to the ends of justice.” Hanson, 120 F.4th at 243

(quoting Del. State Sportsmen's Ass'n, v. Del. Dep’t of Safety &

Homeland Sec., 108 F.4th 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2024)). Here,

Plaintiffs have failed to show irreparable injury or that they

are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not made the requisite showing for

a preliminary injunction.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’

Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 17. An appropriate

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

February 10, 2026

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