Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

ISLAMIC CENTER OF NORTHWEST ARKANSAS PLAINTIFF

V. CASE NO. 5:25-CV-5090

CHURCH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, S.I. DEFENDANT

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendant Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I.’s

(“Church Mutual”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) and Motion to Exclude

Opinions of Edwin Rodriguez (Doc. 19). Plaintiff Islamic Center of Northwest Arkansas

(“ICNA”) opposes both Motions.1 For the reasons stated below, the Motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves a coverage dispute between Church Mutual and its insured,

ICNA. The parties agree that ICNA owns a metal-roofed building in Fayetteville,

Arkansas, which is used for community worship activities. Church Mutual insures the

building and its contents under a Commercial General Liability Insurance Policy that

covers costs of repairing or replacing non-cosmetic roof damage caused by wind and/or

hail. See Doc. 21-7, p. 97. In addition, the Policy covers the cost to repair interior water

damage, so long as: “(1) [t]he building or structure first sustains damage by a Covered

1 With respect to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court also considered Church

Mutual’s Brief in Support (Doc. 22) and Statement of Facts (Doc. 23); ICNA’s Response

in Opposition (Doc. 27), Brief in Support (Doc. 28), and Statement of Facts (Doc. 29); and

Church Mutual’s Reply (Doc. 34). With respect to the Motion to Exclude, the Court also

considered Church Mutual’s Brief in Support (Doc. 20) and ICNA’s Response in

Opposition (Docs. 26 & 30) and Brief in Support (Doc. 31).

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Cause of Loss [i.e., wind and/or hail] to its roof or walls through which the rain, snow,

sleet, ice, sand or dust enters; or (2) [t]he loss or damage is caused by or results from

thawing of snow, sleet or ice on the building or structure.” Id. at 72.

According to ICNA’s representative Dr. Khalil Sharif, he and other members of

ICNA’s congregation first started noticing water damage on the ceilings in the interior of

the building either in early June or early July [2024]. See Doc. 21-6 (Sharif Dep.), pp. 26–

27. The ceiling tiles became wet immediately after “a lot of rain,” and these wet spots

“were increasing in size,” which led ICNA to suspect there was a leak in the roof. Id. Dr.

Sharif on behalf of ICNA, called Church Mutual to report the suspected roof leak and

interior damage on September 7, 2024. See id. at 26. He testified that he could not

pinpoint the exact date of the storm or storms that caused the damage to the roof, but he

knew that severe storms had been in the area “certainly within a month or two from

when [ICNA] started noticing the water leaks.” Id. at 93.

Church Mutual hired Forensic Engineer Darin Teeman of CAT Forensic Services

to inspect the roof, and he did so on November 1, 2024. He determined that the metal

roof panels had not been materially damaged by wind or hail; that interior leaks were

consistent with installation or maintenance deficiencies with the roof panels unrelated to

wind or hail damage; that there was evidence of hail damage, but only on the east exterior

wall; and that some damage to the exterior walls was due to installation issues and not

some other cause. See Doc. 21-5, p. 9. Attached to Mr. Teeman’s report were multiple

photographs of the roof, walls, and interior of the building, as well as a CoreLogic Weather

Verification Services Report, which noted that two hailstorms took place within one mile

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of ICNA’s building, the first on May 8, 2024, and the second on August 18, 2024. See id.

at 41. Mr. Teeman testified that he saw only cosmetic hail damage on the roof, which is

not covered under the Policy. See Doc. 21-8 (Teeman Dep.), pp. 71–72, 120.

Dr. Sharif testified that weeks before Church Mutual sent Mr. Teeman to inspect

the roof, the company’s insurance agent Douglas Sorenson, had opined to Dr. Sharif over

the phone that ICNA’s claim would likely be denied. See Doc. 21-6 (Sharif Dep.), pp. 65–

66. Dr. Sharif interpreted this comment to mean “that Church Mutual ha[d] made their

decision to deny the claim” even before sending an inspector to survey the damage, which

suggested to Dr. Sharif that they were “just trying to find reasons to deny it.” Id. at 66.

Church Mutual denied ICNA’s claim in a letter dated December 2, 2024, after Mr. Teeman

completed his report. The letter informed ICNA that its claim for roof damage had been

rejected but that the company was tendering a payment of $9,586.84 to replace two non-

functioning air conditioning units that had been spotted on the property. Id. at 71–73, 78.

ICNA disagreed with Church Mutual’s decision, so Dr. Sharif called an attorney, who

recommended that ICNA hire its own expert to provide a second opinion. ICNA ultimately

hired a local roofing company called Nomads Enterprises, LLC, to perform a roof

inspection.

The CEO of Nomads Enterprises, Edwin Rodriguez, testified that he and two of his

employees inspected ICNA’s roof and interior on December 20, 2024, and submitted a

report on January 29, 2025. Mr. Rodriguez is not a professional engineer, but he has over

fifteen years of practical experience installing and inspecting roofs. He also holds various

professional certifications and memberships in building and roofing organizations. See

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Doc. 30, p. 119. Mr. Rodriguez inspected ICNA’s building for a few hours and took

hundreds of photographs. See Doc. 19-4 (Rodriguez Dep.), p. 59. He did not attempt to

establish when the roof suffered hail and wind damage because he knew that Mr. Teeman

had already pulled a CoreLogic storm report, see id. at 61, and because Mr. Rodriguez

had personal knowledge of “two major storms during that time that had come through”

the area, id. at 60. Mr. Rodriguez also testified that he had recently repaired or replaced

a number of roofs due to wind and hail damage at around the time ICNA submitted its

claim. See id. at 121. Mr. Rodriguez’s report concludes that ICNA’s roof, coping systems,

and gutters suffered hail damage that had “disrupted the property’s interior, necessitating

immediate attention to prevent further structural and material deterioration.” (Doc. 30, p.

6).

Church Mutual contends that summary judgment is appropriate because ICNA has

failed to make a prima facie showing that it suffered a covered loss within the Policy

period. This is because Dr. Sharif testified that he was not sure when the storm that

damaged the roof occurred. Church Mutual also contends that Mr. Rodriguez refused to

directly dispute any particular conclusions in Mr. Teeman’s report and failed to rebut Mr.

Teeman’s opinion that the hail damage was merely cosmetic. Church Mutual also argues

that ICNA has failed to produce any admissible evidence of its damages, which means

that even if ICNA proved at trial that it suffered a covered loss, it would not be entitled to

any award of damages.

In addition to moving for summary judgment, Church Mutual moves to exclude Mr.

Rodriguez’s expert report and opinions. Church Mutual observes that Mr. Rodriguez is no

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expert but is rather just “a roofer” who lacks the appropriate accreditation to testify as an

expert in this matter. (Doc. 19, p. 1). Church Mutual believes Mr. Rodriguez’s report is

devoid of any methodology; in particular, he failed to analyze the roof tiles, assess

“pertinent weather data,” or consider alternate causes of damage. Id. p. 2. Lastly, Church

Mutual complains that the two-page estimate of repair costs prepared by Mr. Rodriguez

lacks supporting documentation, which makes it unreliable and inadmissible at trial.

Specifically, Church Mutual criticizes the portion of the estimate for the use of heavy

equipment, a portable toilet, and a safety barricade; the cost of interior painting and

removing and replacing ceiling tiles; and the cost of buying and replacing carpets. See

Doc. 19-3. These costs total $165,166.67, and Church Mutual maintains that Mr.

Rodriguez lacks knowledge and expertise to opine about these costs at trial.

ICNA responds that Mr. Rodriguez qualifies as an expert in roof defects,

remediation, and repair, and although he did not specify the precise date of the wind and

hail event that caused damage to the roof, he confirmed in his deposition that one or more

storms close to the time of the claim most likely caused the damage. ICNA concedes that

Mr. Rodriguez’s explanations are not the same as Mr. Teeman’s, but it asks that the jury

be permitted to hear Mr. Rodriguez’s opinion in light of his expertise in inspecting and

installing storm damaged roofs. Finally, ICNA notes Mr. Rodriguez personally reviewed

and approved the estimate of damages, which includes services he would ordinarily

subcontract out to another entity but could perform if ICNA wished. He also explained in

his deposition that ICNA provided him the estimated cost of replacing the carpets in the

facility, and no particular evidentiary rule requires him to supply all his underlying

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documentation, calculations, or receipts to back up his estimate—if he does not intend to

rely on them at trial.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21)

“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after

adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986). Subpart (a) to Rule 56 provides that summary judgment should be

granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In considering a motion for

summary judgment, the Court must review the facts in the light most favorable to the

opposing party and give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn

from those facts. Canada v. Union Elec. Co., 135 F.3d 1211, 1212–13 (8th Cir. 1998).

After considering the briefing and the evidence presented by both sides, the Court

finds that summary judgment is inappropriate because several genuine, material disputes

of fact remain, including: (1) whether ICNA’s roof suffered cosmetic or non-cosmetic, i.e.

covered, damage due to hail and/or wind; (2) when the storm event or events that caused

any non-cosmetic damage occurred; (3) whether any water damage to the interior was

caused by non-cosmetic wind and/or hail damage to the roof; and the amount of damages

necessary to repair all damage covered under the Policy. ICNA and Church Mutual each

rely on their experts to establish the cause of the damage, and the jury is entitled to hear

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each expert’s qualifications, testimony, and other evidentiary support and decide which

to believe. As the Court will explain below, ICNA’s expert is qualified to render an expert

opinion in this case and will be permitted to do so.

As for Church Mutual’s argument that the two-page estimate of damages prepared

by Mr. Rodriguez is inadmissible, the Court disagrees. Mr. Rodriguez testified that he

reviewed and approved all line items on the estimate, and to the extent one line item was

provided to him by ICNA, he disclosed that fact and suggests ICNA’s representative can

testify, if necessary, about that line item. Further, though ICNA has not disclosed to the

Court any underlying documentation, receipts, or notes supporting the damages estimate,

it is clear that Mr. Rodriguez, witnesses from ICNA, and others may testify as to how they

arrived at these estimates. Of course, ICNA will not be permitted to introduce at trial any

documents that have not previously been disclosed to Church Mutual. Accordingly, the

Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

B. Motion to Exclude Expert Opinions (Doc. 19)

Whether to exclude expert testimony is committed to the district court’s

discretion—subject, of course, to the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 702.

Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, 754 F.3d 557, 561 (2014). Rule 702 states that:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the

proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

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(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and

methods to the facts of the case.

The Eighth Circuit has “boiled down” these requirements into a three-part test:

First, evidence based on scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge must be useful to the finder of fact in deciding the ultimate issue

of fact. This is the basic rule of relevancy. Second, the proposed witness

must be qualified to assist the finder of fact. Third, the proposed evidence

must be reliable or trustworthy in an evidentiary sense, so that, if the finder

of fact accepts it as true, it provides the assistance the finder of fact requires.

Johnson, 754 F.3d at 561 (quoting Polski v. Quigley Corp., 538 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir.

2008)). The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of showing by a

preponderance of the evidence that these requirements are satisfied. See Marmo v.

Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 757–58 (8th Cir. 2006).

Beginning with the first part of the test, the Court is persuaded that Mr. Rodriguez

possesses specialized knowledge or skill in the areas of roof damage, repair, and

replacement and general commercial contracting work. He has fifteen years of experience

in these areas and is qualified to offer his opinions. An expert need not have specialized

education to qualify as an expert and may be qualified on experience alone. See Schmidt

v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2009). “[F]or an expert witness to be

qualified based on experience, that experience must bear a close relationship to the

expert's opinion.” Id. (citing Sylla-Sawdon v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 47 F.3d 277,

283–84 (8th Cir. 1995)). Most jurors are not general contractors or roofing experts, so Mr.

Rodriguez’s testimony on these matters will be useful in helping them judge the relevant

facts. “Proponents of expert testimony need not demonstrate that the assessments of

their experts are correct, and trial courts are not empowered to determine which of several

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competing . . . theories has the best provenance.” Kuhn v. Wyeth, Inc., 686 F.3d 618, 625

(8th Cir. 2012) (citation modified).

With respect to the second part of the test, the Court finds that Mr. Rodriguez is

qualified to assist the trier of fact. “An expert's opinion should be excluded only if that

opinion is so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the

jury.” Synergetics, Inc. v. Hurst, 477 F.3d 949, 956 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). It is undisputed that Mr. Rodriguez personally inspected

ICNA’s roof and reviewed and authorized the written report that was produced to Church

Mutual in this case, which contains hundreds of accompanying photographs showing

areas of alleged non-cosmetic damage. Moreover, not all of Mr. Rodriguez’s opinions

regarding the roof are included in his report. He clarified and provided further explanations

for his opinions in his deposition testimony. See, e.g., Doc. 19-4 (Rodriguez Dep.) , pp.

110–26. Clearly, Church Mutual and Mr. Teeman disagree with Mr. Rodriguez, but such

disagreement cannot be dismissed out of hand because Mr. Teeman is a professional

engineer and Mr. Rodriguez is not. Mr. Rodriguez noted in his deposition that Mr. Teeman

“didn’t have that many pictures” of the roof attached to his report, which caused Mr.

Rodriguez to question whether Mr. Teeman actually looked at the entire roof or “just . . .

a small section or something.” Id. p. 28. Both experts are sufficiently qualified to offer their

dueling opinions to the jury.

As for the third part of the test, the Court finds that Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony as

to the likely cause of roof damage is reliable or trustworthy in an evidentiary sense. The

district court's role as gatekeeper of the evidence requires it “to discern expert opinion

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evidence based on good grounds from subjective speculation that masquerades as

scientific knowledge.” Ackerman v. U-Park, Inc., 951 F.3d 929, 933 (8th Cir.

2020) (quotation omitted). Both Mr. Teeman and Mr. Rodriguez noticed dented panels on

the roof. Mr. Rodriguez admits he did not perform scientific tests on any of the panels,

see Doc. 19-4, p. 119—but neither did Mr. Teeman, see Doc. 19-5, p. 8. Both experts

conducted purely visual inspections of the roof and interior and came to different

conclusions. Mr. Rodriguez’s conclusion is not inherently unreliable in an evidentiary

sense.

lll. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Church Mutual’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 21) and Motion to Exclude Opinions of Edwin Rodriguez (Doc. 19) are

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED on this 9'" day of February, 2026.

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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