The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHERIECE BUCHANAN, UNPUBLISHED
February 09, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellee, 11:03 AM
v No. 372917
Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, LC No. 24-000010-MD
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this personal-injury case, defendant appeals by right the order denying its motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (immunity granted by law). Defendant argues that
it is entitled to immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401, et
seq., because the “highway exception” to governmental immunity does not apply to the parking
lane where plaintiff was allegedly injured. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand for entry
of an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
I. BACKGROUND
The material facts are undisputed. Plaintiff tripped over a depression in the surface of
Gratiot Avenue in Detroit, suffering leg injuries. Gratiot Avenue is a two-way street with three
travel lanes on each side delineated by white paint markings, a center lane delineated by yellow
paint markings, and parallel-parking lanes on either side of the street nearest to the curbs. It is
likewise undisputed that the lane with visible depressions that plaintiff allegedly tripped over was
not separated from the three travel lanes by paint markings. However, uncontested photos show
the lane was noticeably narrower than the travel lanes, and there were two parking signs and a
parking kiosk next to the parking lane. The parking signs read “ZONE 206,” indicated how to pay
for parking, and stated restrictions on when parking was allowed.
Plaintiff brought this claim against defendant under the “highway exception” to
governmental tort immunity found in MCL 691.1402. Defendant moved for summary disposition,
arguing that the defect was not in a “lane designed for travel” and thus did not fall within the
highway exception. Defendant submitted several photographs of the depressions in the roadway
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and the surrounding area in support of its motion, including pictures of the parking kiosk and two
parking signs mounted on poles next to the parallel-parking lane and images dating back to 2007
which showed the lane being used for parking. Defendant also submitted an affidavit from
Margaret Ceifetz, a Traffic Operations Engineer familiar with Gratiot Avenue, who attested to the
following:
10. The parking lane in which the alleged defect is located is a dedicated
parallel-parking lane with metered parking (Zone 206) marked by posted signs
(traffic-control devices). It is not designed to be a travel lane.
11. The parking lane is not designed for vehicular travel. It is not a transitional
or dual-use parking lane. The parking lane is only 7-feet wide and therefore too
narrow to be traveled in safely at the posted speed limit. If the parking lane were
to be designed for vehicular or dual-use travel, it would have been designed wide
enough to accommodate vehicular travel.
The Court of Claims denied defendant’s motion because it found that summary disposition was
premature given that there was a question of fact as to whether the parking lane was a dual-purpose
travel lane for the purposes of the highway exception.1 It noted that the “[p]hotographs of the
roadway reflect signage near the location of the defect that designate the area as parking, but no
lanes appear on the roadway.” Thus, it concluded that “[t]he record does not support [defendant’s]
position that no factual development could support plaintiff’s claim.”
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that the Court of Claims should have granted it summary disposition
because it submitted unrebutted evidence that the parallel-parking lane was not a dual-use lane or
otherwise designed for vehicular travel and thus was outside of the highway exception to
governmental immunity.
The applicability of governmental immunity is a question of law that this
Court reviews de novo on appeal. This Court also reviews de novo a trial court’s
determination regarding a motion for summary disposition. Under MCR
2.116(C)(7), summary disposition is proper when a claim is barred by immunity
granted by law. To survive such a motion, the plaintiff must allege facts justifying
the application of an exception to governmental immunity. The reviewing court
considers all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting as true the
contents of the complaint unless affidavits or other appropriate documents
1
The Court of Claims had previously held that the parking lane in this exact location on Gratiot
was not part of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Bullock-Pickens v Dep’t of Transp,
unpublished opinion of the Court of Claims, issued June 16, 2020 (Docket No. 20-000001-MD).
There was no mention why the present case was different than Bullock-Pickens, particularly when
the same affiant testified in both matters. It is a “basic principle of justice that like cases should
be decided alike.” Martin v Franklin Capital Corp, 546 US 132, 139; 126 S Ct 704; 163 L Ed 2d
547 (2005).
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specifically contradict them. If the facts are not in dispute and reasonable minds
could not differ concerning the legal effect of those facts, whether the claim is
barred by immunity is a question for the court to decide as a matter of law.” [Beals
v Michigan, 497 Mich 363, 369-370; 871 NW2d 5 (2015) (quotation marks,
brackets, and footnotes omitted).]
Under the GTLA, absent an exception, government agencies are immune from liability when
“engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” Mann v Detroit, ___ Mich
___, ___; 21 NW3d 451, 451 (2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[S]tatutorily created
exceptions to immunity are narrowly construed.” Id. Under the “highway exception” to
governmental immunity, “an injured person [can] recover damages from [a] governmental agency
arising out of its failure to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a
condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.” Yono v Dep’t of Transp, 499 Mich 636, 647; 885
NW2d 445 (2016) (quotation marks, ellipses, and citation omitted).
Importantly, the Legislature declared that this exception only extends “to the improved
portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” MCL 691.1402(1). Lanes used exclusively
for parking are not “designed for vehicular travel” and thus do not fit within the highway exception.
Yono, 499 Mich at 656-657. However, dual-purpose travel lanes that are not “designed exclusively
for vehicular travel” may still fall within the highway exception, such as where “signage might
indicate particular hours during which a designated parking lane is to be used as an additional
travel lane. Or a street in a residential neighborhood, with no designated parking lane, [that] might
be designed for both curbside parking and vehicular travel.” Id. at 656. Even if drivers
occasionally drive in a parking lane, that does not mean that the lane was designed for travel. Id.
at 653.
Plaintiff’s allegations that the highway exception applied were contradicted by defendant’s
undisputed evidence. Beals, 497 Mich at 370. The traffic engineer attested that the defect was in
a “dedicated parallel-parking lane with metered parking” that was “marked by posted signs,” that
was “not designed to be a travel lane,” and that was only 7 feet wide compared to the 11-foot-wide
travel lanes on Gratiot Avenue. And while there were no painted lines separating the parking lanes
from the wider travel lanes, paint markings are not the only way to delineate parking lanes. The
parking lanes in Yono were painted, but the Yono Court stated that “paint markings and other
traffic control devices can and do delineate how a highway is designed and redesigned over its
useful life.” Yono, 499 Mich at 652 (emphasis added). Traffic-control devices are “all signs,
signals, markings, and devices . . . placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having
jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.” Id. at 653 n 55 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Thus, the signs and kiosk on Gratiot Avenue were traffic-control
devices that indicated the highway’s design, just like painted lines could.
The Yono Court also found it important that “the only traffic-control devices present in the
lane at issue . . . indicate that it was designed to be used as a parallel-parking lane.” Id. at 653
(emphasis added). As in Yono, the only traffic-control devices present in the parallel-parking lane
on Gratiot Avenue indicated that the lane in question was a single-purpose parking lane. The
parking kiosk, the sign indicating that the lane was a parking zone, and the sign regulating the
parking hours make no mention of the lane being used for travel at certain times. And while these
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traffic-control devices differ from the traffic-control devices used in Yono, they were nonetheless
the only traffic-control devices present in the lane.2
Defendant provided evidence that established that it was entitled to governmental
immunity. Therefore, the burden shifted to plaintiff to demonstrate that a question of fact remains
in order to avoid summary disposition. Kincaid v Cardwell, 300 Mich App 513, 537 n 6; 834
NW2d 122 (2013). Plaintiff, however, submitted no evidence that showed the lane in question
was being used for travel. Nor did she offer other evidence to rebut defendant’s claim of immunity.
Plaintiff did not meet her burden of demonstrating that a question of fact remains. Thus, defendant
is entitled to governmental immunity, and the Court of Claims erred by denying defendant’s
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion is reversed, and the matter is remanded
for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Anica Letica
2
We recognize that plaintiff argues that Yono was wrongly decided, but this Court is bound to
follow “precedent from [our Supreme Court] that has not been clearly overruled by the Court or
superseded by subsequent legislation or constitutional amendment.” Associated Builders &
Contractors v City of Lansing, 499 Mich 177, 192-193; 880 NW2d 765 (2016). In any event, Yono
and prior decisions properly parsed the language of MCL 691.1402(1).
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