Malcolm S. Hunter, Sr. v. Board of Review

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2526-24

MALCOLM S. HUNTER, SR.,

a/k/a MALCOLM HUNTER,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW,

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

and VILLAGE SUPER MARKET

OF N.J., L.P.,

Respondents.

_______________________________

Submitted January 21, 2026 – Decided February 9, 2026

Before Judges Sumners, Susswein and Chase.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of

Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and

Workforce Development, Docket No. 345581.

Malcolm S. Hunter, Sr., self-represented appellant.

Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney General, attorney

for respondent Board of Review (Christopher Weber,

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gina

Labrecque, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Malcolm Hunter appeals from a June 25, 2024 Board of Review ("Board")

final agency decision that he is ineligible for unemployment benefits under the

Unemployment Compensation Law ("UCL"), N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -71, and, as a

result, is liable to refund $1,604 in benefits he received prior to the ineligibility

determination. We affirm.

I.

In September 2020, Hunter pled guilty to unlawful possession of a

handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of

five years. State v. Hunter, No. A-0325-22 (App. Div. Jan. 17, 2024). After his

transfer to a half-way house in October 2022, he began working through a work

release program with respondent,1 Village Super Market of N.J., LP.

("ShopRite").

Hunter provided two potential parole addresses to the parole board, one in

New Jersey and one in North Carolina. In March 2023, per his request, he was

paroled to North Carolina. Hunter then applied for unemployment benefits and

was awarded $401 weekly, for the weeks ending May 13 through June 3, 2023.

1

This respondent has not appeared, filed a brief, or participated in these

proceedings.

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Subsequently, the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce

Development, Division of Unemployment Insurance (the "Agency") deemed

him ineligible for benefits because he voluntarily resigned from his employment

without good cause. The Agency notified him of its decision and required him

to refund the $1,604 benefits paid to him. Hunter was then issued a re-

determination letter affirming he was ineligible for unemployment benefits and

liable to refund the $1,604 received.

Hunter timely appealed both determinations to the Agency's Appeals

Tribunal ("Tribunal"). In March 2024, Hunter testified via telephone before the

Tribunal's hearing examiner. He explained that the halfway house informed him

of his upcoming parole to North Carolina, an address he had provided. He told

ShopRite about his impending relocation and sought a transfer to a North

Carolina store, but ShopRite has no locations there.

The Tribunal upheld the Agency's decision, ruling that Hunter was

disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21 -5(a)

and N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1, and that he must refund the benefits under N.J.S.A.

43:21-16(d). The Tribunal found Hunter left work to relocate out of state for

personal reasons. Citing N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(6), the Tribunal classified his

separation as a voluntary departure to another area for personal reasons. While

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the Tribunal recognized that Hunter's relocation was personally compelling, it

found that his reason for leaving was not related to his work.

Hunter timely appealed to the Board. On February 20, 2025, the Board

affirmed the Tribunal's decision based on the record.

This appeal followed.

II.

Our review of decisions by administrative agencies is limited. D.C. v.

Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 464 N.J. Super. 343, 352 (App. Div.

2020); In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). "We review a decision made

by an administrative agency entrusted to apply and enforce a statutory scheme

under an enhanced deferential standard." E. Bay Drywall, LLC v. Dep't of Lab.

& Workforce Dev., 251 N.J. 477, 493 (2022). Thus, "we will disturb an agency's

adjudicatory decision only upon a finding that the decision is 'arbitrary,

capricious[,] or unreasonable,' or is unsupported 'by substantial credible

evidence in the record as a whole.'" Sullivan v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 471

N.J. Super. 147, 155-56 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State

Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).

"Moreover, '[i]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment

compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come

to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather

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whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs. '" Brady

v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Rev., 200

N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)) (alteration in original). We afford "[w]ide

discretion . . . to administrative decisions because of an agency's specialized

knowledge." Matter of Request to Modify, 242 N.J. 357, 390 (2020).

Although "we must give deference to the agency's findings of facts, and

some deference to its 'interpretation of statutes and regulations within its

implementing and enforcing responsibility,' we are 'in no way bound by the

agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal

issue[.]'" Utley v. Bd. of Rev., 194 N.J. 534, 551 (2008) (citations omitted) (first

quoting Matter of Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div.

1997), and then quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93

(1973)). In other words, a reviewing court "defer[s] to an agency's interpretation

of both a statute and implementing regulation, within the sphere of the agency 's

authority, unless the interpretation is plainly unreasonable." Ardan v. Bd. of

Rev., 231 N.J. 589, 604 (2018).

III.

Hunter argues the Board erred by finding that he voluntarily abandoned

his job. He contends his parole relocation prevented further employment and

deprived him of control over his movement. We are not persuaded.

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The UCL's purpose is to assist workers who face involuntary

unemployment by providing temporary income when job loss occurs through no

fault of their own. Brady, 152 N.J. at 212. The UCL, given its remedial purpose,

"'is to be liberally construed in favor of claimants.'" McClain v. Bd. of Rev.,

Dept. of Labor, 237 N.J. 445, 461 (2019) (quoting Brady, 152 N.J. at 212).

While doing so, we must remain cognizant of "the importance of 'preserv[ing]

the [unemployment insurance trust] fund against claims by those not intended

to share in its benefits.'" Ardan, 231 N.J. at 602 (quoting Brady, 152 N.J. at

212); see also Bannan v. Bd. of Rev., 299 N.J. Super. 671, 674 (App. Div. 1997)

(discussing that the Board's responsibility is to serve both the interest of the

unemployed and "the interests of the general public").

Eligibility to receive unemployment benefits is governed by N.J.S.A.

43:21-5, which reads, inter alia:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

(a) For the week in which the individual has left work

voluntarily without good cause attributable to such

work, and for each week thereafter until the individual

becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in

employment, which may include employment for the

federal government, and has earned in employment at

least ten times the individual's weekly benefit rate, as

determined in each case. . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) (emphasis added).]

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Per N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b), "'good cause attributable to such work' means a

reason directly related to the individual's employment, which . . . give[s] the

individual no choice but to leave the employment." See Brady, 152 N.J. at 214

(quoting Zielenski v. Bd. of Rev., 85 N.J. Super. 46, 52 (App. Div. 1964))

(stating "[t]he test of 'ordinary common sense and prudence' must be utilized to

determine whether an employee's decision to leave work constitutes good

cause"). Further,

(e) An individual's separation from employment shall

be reviewed as a voluntarily leaving work issue where

the separation was for the following reasons including,

but not limited to:

....

6. Relocating to another area for personal reasons;

[N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e).]

"In the wake of a voluntary departure from work, the claimant bears the burden

to establish good cause attributable to such work for leaving." Ardan, 231 N.J.

at 603 (internal quotation marks omitted); N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c).

When an employee voluntarily leaves work for personal reasons unrelated

to the employment, he or she is disqualified from receiving benefits under

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Self v. Bd. of Rev., 91 N.J. 453, 457-58 (1982). We have

held a parolee, who quit work because she had no car and was required as a

condition of parole to move to a residence thirty-eight miles away from

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employment was disqualified. White v. Bd. of Rev., 146 N.J. Super. 268, 269-

71 (App. Div. 1977). We have also held an employee who leaves work because

they found a different place to live is disqualified from employment

compensation. Roche v. Bd. of Rev., 156 N.J. Super. 63, 65 (App. Div. 1978).

Hunter cannot establish that his parole to North Carolina is involuntary

within the meaning of the statutory framework. Under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.54 and

N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.10, a parolee must participate actively in the parole process

and select a relocation address. The record does not support that the Parole

Board sent Hunter to North Carolina arbitrarily or without his assent. Hunter

would have had to actively engage in the parole process and choose North

Carolina as a location. Therefore, the Board properly concluded that Hunter is

ineligible for unemployment benefits, as his separation stemmed from personal

reasons and does not qualify as good cause attributable to the work. See Haley

v. Bd. of Rev., Dept. of Labor, 245 N.J. 511, 521 (2021) (requiring a fact-

sensitive analysis).

Once it was determined that Hunter was found to have not been entitled

to receive benefits, N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d)(1) requires the full repayment of

unemployment benefits received by a claimant. Bannan v. Bd. of Rev., 299 N.J.

Super. at 674. Refunds must be paid "regardless of good faith," hardship, or

reliance on an initial agency determination. Sullivan, 471 N.J. Super. at 155

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(quoting Bannan, 299 N.J. Super. at 674-75). And under federal law, states must

provide for recoupment in their unemployment compensation laws to be eligible

for "federal funds to assist in the administration of those laws." Bannan, 299

N.J. Super. at 675; see also 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(9) and (g) (requiring states to

implement effective procedures to prevent and detect unemployment insurance

fraud and overpayments).

Nevertheless, where overpayment is not pursuant to misrepresentation or

omission of material facts, the Agency, "[u]pon request of the claimant[,] . . .

may grant the claimant a full waiver of recovery of an overpayment of benefits

. . ." only where: (1) the claimant is deceased; (2) the claimant is disabled and

unable to work; or (3) recovery of the overpayment would be patently

inequitable. N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(a). Per N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(d), in

determining if repayment would be inequitable the Agency considers "whether

the terms of a reasonable repayment schedule would result in economic hardship

to the claimant."

Hunter does not proffer any facts supporting his claim that it would be

inequitable to require him to repay the $1,604. Notably, he has failed to provide

information regarding his current employment, income, or a repayment plan.

Having reviewed the record, we discern no error in the Board's decision.

Affirmed.

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