Lincoff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

_______________________________________

)

MATTHEW LINCOFF and TAYLOR )

LINCOFF, Co-Personal Representatives )

of the Estate of Landon Lincoff, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) Civil Action No.

v. ) 23-12125-BEM

)

TOWN OF TOPSFIELD, JOHN BOYLE, )

and JENNIFER COLLINS-BROWN )

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MURPHY, J.

Plaintiffs Matthew Lincoff and Taylor Lincoff (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “the Lincoffs”)

brought this action after the tragic death of Landon Lincoff (“Landon”), their 8-month-old child,

who suffered from a cardiac arrest following an illness on June 5, 2021.1 The Lincoffs contend

that the Town of Topsfield (the “Town”), Fire Chief Jennifer Collins-Brown (“Collins-Brown”)

(collectively, with the Town, the “Town Defendants”), and Paramedic Lieutenant John Boyle

(“Boyle”) (collectively with the Town Defendants, “Defendants”) are responsible for Landon’s

death, alleging that they are liable for the negligent care provided and the policy and act of

cancelling necessary supplemental ambulance service. Before the Court now are motions from

both the Town Defendants and Boyle for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the

Lincoffs’ federal claims. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant both motions.

1 Plaintiffs are co-personal representatives of Landon’s estate.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

1. Topsfield Emergency Services

The Topsfield Fire Department (“TFD”) provides emergency transport services for the

Town, including providing both Advanced Life Support (“ALS”) and Basic Life Support (“BLS”)

services. Dkt. 55 (“Town Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts” or “Town’s SMF”) ¶ 101;

Dkt. 50 (“Boyle’s Statement of Material Facts” or “Boyle’s SMF”) ¶¶ 1–4.2 Since 2020, TFD has

been the primary transport service, though the Town maintains agreements with other emergency

first responder services to provide backup emergency services. Town’s SMF ¶ 101; Boyle’s SMF

¶¶ 1–4, 7. Backup emergency services are available via an “intercept,” which refers to any

ambulance or individual dispatched for the purpose of supplementing staff. Boyle’s SMF ¶ 8.3

One such service is Northeast Regional Ambulance Service (“NRAS”). Town’s SMF

¶ 101; Boyle’s SMF ¶ 7. The Town claims to have decided to make TFD the primary

transportation service because when NRAS was the primary transport provider, NRAS’s delayed

response time would result in TFD personnel arriving to provide services but then needing to wait

2 The Court cites to Boyle’s and the Town Defendants’ statements of material facts where the Lincoffs have

admitted or otherwise adopted the relevant facts in their counterstatements of material facts. The Court treats as

undisputed those facts for which the Lincoffs provide only additional information or context which fails to actually

dispute the facts as presented. See, e.g., Dkt. 62-2 (“Plaintiffs’ Counterstatement to Boyle’s SMF” or “Boyle

Counterstatement”) ¶¶ 1–4.

3 The Lincoffs purport to dispute this because they “lack personal knowledge.” Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 8.

But this fails to create a genuine dispute of material fact at summary judgment. See Local Rule 56.1 (“Material facts

of record set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed for purposes of the

motion to be admitted by opposing parties unless controverted by the statement required to be served by opposing

parties.”); Silva v. Town of Uxbridge, 771 F. Supp. 3d 56, 65 (D. Mass. 2025) (“The nonmovant ‘must present

affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.’” (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986))). Thus, the Court treats this fact as undisputed.

for NRAS to arrive to make the transport. Town’s SMF ¶¶ 104, 106–08;4 Boyle’s SMF ¶ 10.5

The Town experienced additional difficulties relying on NRAS’s staffing of ambulances, including

sending BLS services instead of ALS. Town’s SMF ¶¶ 83, 97–100.6

Around the same time, Collins-Brown expressed a desire to ensure that TFD paramedics

gain more experience in the field, to provide better and faster care to Topsfield residents. Dkt. 61-2

(“Plaintiffs’ Counterstatement to Town’s SMF” or “Town Counterstatement”) ¶¶ 136–39;

Dkt. 62-2 (“Plaintiffs’ Counterstatement to Boyle’s SMF” or “Boyle Counterstatement”)

¶¶ 114–16.7 Boyle was aware of this preference. E.g., Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 4.

Collins-Brown received documents reflecting concerns that because TFD was not equipped to

operate as the primary transport service, Topsfield residents would face increased danger. Town

Counterstatement ¶ 142; Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 119.8

The Lincoffs contend that this preference became a policy or practice of cancelling NRAS

intercepts to allow the TFD paramedics to gain more experience. See, e.g., Town

Counterstatement ¶ 85. However, none of the TFD personnel involved in this case were aware of

4 The Lincoffs do not dispute that this was the claimed basis, but dispute that this was the real reason for the

change. Dkt. 61-2 (“Plaintiffs’ Counterstatement to Town’s SMF” or “Town Counterstatement”) ¶¶ 104, 106–07.

5 The Lincoffs purport to dispute this fact but only address the cancellation of NRAS intercepts after TFD

became the primary transport service, which does not relate to the pre-2020 NRAS transports. Boyle Counterstatement

¶ 10. Thus, the Court treats this fact as undisputed.

6 The Lincoffs purport to dispute this fact on the basis that they “lack personal knowledge . . . and therefore

cannot admit or deny the truth of the assertions contained in Paramedic Hallinan’s affidavit.” Town Counterstatement

¶¶ 83, 99–100. But this fails to create a genuine dispute of material fact at summary judgment, and thus the Court

treats such facts as undisputed. See supra note 3.

7 The Town Defendants and Boyle did not respond to the Lincoffs’ additional facts. The Court thus treats

any additional facts set forth as undisputed, except where Town Defendants and Boyle elsewhere have raised a dispute

through their statements of facts.

8 Boyle and the Town Defendants separately moved to strike this and certain exhibits that the Lincoffs rely

on to oppose summary judgment. Dkts. 68–69. Because the Court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate

even including such exhibits in the record, the Court denies the motions to strike as moot.

a policy or practice of cancelling intercepts for any reason other than because it was deemed

unnecessary for patient care. Town’s SMF ¶¶ 87–89, 105, 118; Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 11–12, 14, 98.9

2. Landon’s Emergency

The evening of June 4, 2021, into the early hours of June 5, 2021, eight-month-old Landon

stopped breathing at his home in Topsfield, Massachusetts, after having been sick with a cough

and respiratory illness in the preceding days. Town’s SMF ¶¶ 4, 19–21; Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 18–19.

After his father, Matthew Lincoff, noticed Landon had stopped breathing, he brought Landon to

Taylor Lincoff—his wife and Landon’s mother—who then called 911. Town’s SMF ¶¶ 2–3,

22–23; Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 19–20.

Two Topsfield officers arrived at the Lincoffs’ residence around 2:11 a.m. and began to

administer first aid to Landon.10 Town’s SMF ¶ 27; Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 21–22. The officers found

Landon pulseless and not breathing. Town’s SMF ¶ 33; Boyle’s SMF ¶ 22.11

TFD Paramedic Jonathan Hallinan (“Hallinan”) overheard the dispatch call for an infant

not breathing and drove to the Topsfield Fire Department. Town’s SMF ¶ 38. At the time,

Hallinan was certified to practice at the Paramedic level and certified by the American Heart

Association as a Pediatric Advanced Life Support (“PALS”) Provider and as an Advanced

9 The Lincoffs purport to dispute this by arguing the existence of a pattern or practice of intercept

cancellations, but they provide no evidence that the TFD members had awareness of this pattern or practice. See, e.g.,

Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 97. The Court notes that the Boyle Counterstatement skips responding to paragraph 86 in

Boyles SMF, and so the numbering of the remaining paragraphs are all off by one.

10 The Lincoffs dispute the effectiveness of this aid, see, e.g., Town Counterstatement ¶ 30, 34, such a dispute

is not material to the federal claims at issue in the present motions.

11 The Lincoffs purport to “[p]artially dispute[] . . . the characterization of Landon’s condition,” because the

“[a]ccording to the TFD Patient Care Report, Landon was ‘pale, warm, and unresponsive.’” Boyle Counterstatement

¶ 22. None of those descriptions undermines the contention that Landon was pulseless and not breathing at the time.

Cardiovascular Life Support (“ACLS”) Provider.12 Id. ¶¶ 40–41; Boyle’s SMF ¶ 24. Hallinan

requested ALS mutual aid at 2:12 a.m., though this request did not ask any specific group to

respond,13 and he stated that he did not know whether NRAS would be the service responding.

Town’s SMF ¶¶ 42, 80;14 Boyle’s SMF ¶ 25. Hallinan initiated this request “based on the reported

acuity of the call and because he felt two paramedics were needed for the call.” Town’s SMF ¶ 42.

NRAS indicated that they were responding at 2:13 a.m. Boyle’s SMF ¶ 26. Boyle received the

alert while he was off duty at home and indicated that he was responding to the call, leaving to

intercept the ambulance along its route to Beverly Hospital. Id. ¶¶ 27–28. At the time, Boyle was

also certified in PALS and ACLS. Id. ¶ 24; Town’s SMF ¶ 65.

At approximately 2:16 a.m., the TFD ambulance arrived at the Lincoffs’ residence. Town’s

SMF ¶ 44. Two EMT-Basic providers staffed this ambulance, and they took over care after

observing that Landon was limp and not crying. Id. ¶¶ 45–53; Boyle’s SMF ¶ 30. At

approximately 2:17 a.m., NRAS radioed that they were heading to the Lincoffs’ residence.

Boyle’s SMF ¶ 29. By 2:19 a.m., the TFD ambulance had departed the Lincoffs’ residence with

Landon and Taylor Lincoff on board and headed for Beverly Hospital with a police escort. Id.

¶ 30; Town’s SMF ¶¶ 54–55. As of 2:19 a.m., the NRAS ambulance indicated it was “en route as

well [and would] intercept on [route] 97 if needed.” Boyle’s SMF ¶ 31. By 2:22 a.m., the TFD

12 The Lincoffs emphasize that Halliman at the time had only been certified for approximately five months

and had no experience responding to pediatric or infant cardiac arrest calls, but do not dispute his actual qualifications.

Town Counterstatement ¶¶ 40–41.

13 Neither party suggests that it was unusual for a mutual aid request not to seek any specific group to respond.

14 The Lincoffs purport to dispute this because they “lack personal knowledge regarding the statements made

in Paragraph 42 and therefore cannot admit or deny the truth of the assertions contained in Paramedic Hallinan’s

affidavit” and that the affidavit was provided four years after the incident. Town Counterstatement ¶ 42. But this

fails to create a genuine dispute of material fact at summary judgment, and thus the Court treats this fact as undisputed.

See supra note 3.

ambulance had picked up Hallinan. Boyle’s SMF ¶ 32; Town’s SMF ¶¶ 43, 60. At 2:23 a.m., the

TFD ambulance picked up Boyle. Boyle’s SMF ¶ 33; Town’s SMF ¶ 64.

With two paramedics now on board—Hallinan and Boyle—the ambulance’s staffing

comported with the local protocols and requirements for responding to Priority I calls involving

cardiac arrests, including the EMS Dispatch Priority protocol and 105 Mass. Code Regs. 170.305.

Boyle’s SMF ¶ 35;15 Town’s SMF ¶ 117.16 “Upon boarding the ambulance, Boyle confirmed that

two Paramedics were aboard the TFD ambulance, and that the ambulance was appropriately

staffed for a Priority I call.” Boyle’s SMF ¶ 37.17 Throughout the response, NRAS and TFD

personnel focused on the number of paramedics on board the ambulance. Id. ¶ 36. Even before

Hallinan and Boyle boarded the ambulance, NRAS told the TFD ambulance that NRAS would “be

coming down [route] 97 also, we will intercept you as easy as possible. If you do not need to stop,

continue on, we will stop if you need to.” Id. ¶ 45. The NRAS paramedics were each also certified

PALS and ACLS providers. Town’s SMF ¶¶ 123–24.

15 The Lincoffs dispute that the requirement was satisfied “because the personnel on board lacked the requisite

pediatric emergency training and experience to qualify.” Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 35. But the evidence cited does

not support the contention that Boyle’s and Hallinan’s certifications and qualifications did not satisfy the policy’s

requirements.

16 The Lincoffs emphasize that the paramedics on the NRAS intercept were more qualified than Hallinan and

Boyle. See, e.g., Town Counterstatement ¶ 150 (“NRAS paramedic Christopher Colby, who was aboard the NRAS

intercept on June 5, 2021, has estimated that he has likely participated in somewhere between 50 and 100 ‘High Acuity

Low Occurrence’ Events related to sick or critical infants and/or children.”); Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 127 (same).

The Court notes that (1) there is no evidence that the Boyle knew this information, (2) this information says little about

Colby’s role in treating those infants or children or how successful his treatments were, and (3) the Lincoffs have not

provided evidence that Boyle could have or should have concluded that any NRAS paramedic who may have been on

the intercept had similar levels of experience.

17 The Lincoffs dispute “any suggestion” that having two paramedics on board “reflects adequate care for a

pediatric cardiac arrest patient.” Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 37. The Lincoffs do not contest that this is the staffing

required but assert that the medical services provided were suboptimal. Id. This does not contradict Defendants’

assertion that two paramedics is an appropriate staffing level for a Priority I medical emergency, and the Court thus

deems this fact undisputed.

While heading to Beverly Hospital, the ambulance driver asked whether he should cancel

the NRAS intercept because he “had never heard of a call needing more than two paramedics and

an EMT.” Town’s SMF ¶¶ 68–6918; Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 38–39. Boyle testified that he directed the

driver to cancel the intercept because they already had two paramedics on board, which he believed

reflected appropriate staffing, and because he was concerned that delaying transport for another

intercept would be detrimental to Landon’s care. Town’s SMF ¶ 72; Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 39–42.19

None of the TFD personnel on board the ambulance was aware of who was aboard the intercepting

NRAS ambulance, or their qualifications or experience. Town’s SMF ¶¶ 78–79, 81–82, 112;

Boyle’s SMF ¶ 48. Boyle testified that he believed having one more paramedic on board would

not have been clinically better than having an EMT-basic performing CPR. Town’s SMF ¶ 82,

112. The Lincoffs contend that Boyle was at least aware that NRAS paramedics are

PALS-certified, at a minimum, and that NRAS generally had more experience. Town

Counterstatement ¶¶ 78–79, 82, 112.

Throughout the transport, TFD personnel provided medical care to Landon, though the

parties dispute the effectiveness and quality of that care. See, e.g., Town’s SMF ¶¶ 62–63, 66–67;

Town Counterstatement ¶¶ 62–63, 66–67; Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 52–60, 81, 87; Boyle Counterstatement

18 The Lincoffs do not dispute that this was the rationale the driver provided, but they claim that “the

cancellation in this case was consistent with a broader pattern—not a patient-specific assessment” and that the “stated

rationale also reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of clinical requirements for a pediatric cardiac arrest rather

than an informed evaluation of Landon’s condition.” Town Counterstatement ¶ 69. This does not create a genuine

dispute about the driver’s reason for asking about cancelling the intercept. Whether the Lincoffs are correct or not,

they provide no evidence that the driver acted pursuant to this alleged pattern, as opposed to his understanding that an

intercept would be cancelled if the responding ambulance was staffed with the sufficient number of the appropriate

level of paramedics for the call. See Town’s SMF ¶¶ 88–89.

19 The Lincoffs dispute that the ambulance was appropriately staffed, see, e.g., Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 40,

but only respond that they “lack personal knowledge” with regards to the other asserted facts, see id. ¶¶ 39, 41–42.

As discussed supra, note 3, this is insufficient to show a genuine dispute at summary judgment.

¶¶ 52–60, 81, 86.20 The NRAS ambulance remained on standby “if needed.” Boyle’s SMF ¶ 44.

The TFD ambulance drove at a dangerously excessive speed to reach the hospital faster. Id. ¶¶ 76,

78; Town’s SMF ¶ 71. After the transport, Landon was treated at Beverly Hospital before being

transferred to Children’s Hospital, where he unfortunately passed away.21 Town’s SMF ¶ 77;

Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 92–93.

Collins-Brown was out of town during Landon’s emergency. Town’s SMF ¶ 109. During

the response, she monitored the radio, but she made no decisions and, in fact, made no radio

transmissions whatsoever. Id. ¶ 110. Collins-Brown testified that it would have been inappropriate

for her to interfere in the response from a state away, and that she would not have done so for any

call. Id. ¶ 113.

B. Procedural Background

The Lincoffs filed this action in Massachusetts Superior Court on July 21, 2023, alleging

six counts collectively against Defendants: negligence and wrongful death against the Town

(Count I); conscious pain and suffering against the Town (Count II); and violations of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (“section 1983”) against each Defendant (Counts III–VI). Dkt. 1-1. Defendants timely

removed the case to this Court on September 18, 2023. Dkt. 1. On October 14, 2025, Boyle moved

for summary judgment. Dkt. 48; see also Dkt. 51 (“Boyle Mem.”); Dkt. 62-1 (“Boyle Opp.”). On

October 15, 2025, the Town Defendants moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 53; see also Dkt. 54

(“Town Mem.”); Dkt. 61-1 (“Town Opp.”); Dkt. 67 (“Town Reply”). On December 8, 2025,

20 See supra, note 9, regarding the paragraph numbering in the Boyle Counterstatement.

21 Landon’s cause of death was listed as “complications of parainfluenza virus 2 and rhinovirus/enterovirus.”

Boyle’s SMF ¶ 94. The Lincoffs contend that though this was the listed cause of death, Landon’s death resulted from

a prolonged period of inadequate emergency response, resuscitation, oxygenation, and ventilation, which led to severe

brain injury. Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 93 (see supra, note 9, regarding the paragraph numbering in the Boyle

Counterstatement). This dispute is not material to the Lincoffs’ federal claims.

Boyle and the Town Defendants each filed a motion to strike certain exhibits filed in support of

the Lincoffs’ oppositions and portions of the Lincoffs’ statements of facts. Dkts. 68–69. The

Court held a hearing on January 8, 2026, and took the matter under advisement.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment will only be granted where the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Grogan v. All My Sons Bus. Dev. LLC, 552 F. Supp. 3d 142, 145 (D. Mass. 2021) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The

Court must view “the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable

inferences in his favor.” Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009). However, “[a]s

to issues on which the party opposing summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial,

that party may not simply rely on the absence of evidence but, rather, must point to definite and

competent evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Perez v. Lorraine

Enters., 769 F.3d 23, 29–30 (1st Cir. 2014).

“At summary judgment, the court’s task is not to weigh the evidence and determine the

truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citations and

internal quotes omitted). “[W]hen the facts support plausible but conflicting inferences on a

pivotal issue in the case, the judge may not choose between those inferences at the summary

judgment stage.” Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 53 F.3d 454, 460 (1st Cir. 1995). However, “[t]he

opposing party may not rely on conclusory allegations and unsupported speculation, and even

when ‘elusive concepts’ like motive or intent are at issue summary judgment may be appropriate.

The opposing party must offer ‘definite, competent evidence’ to defeat a properly supported

motion for summary judgment.” Burns v. State Police Ass’n of Mass., 230 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 2000)

(citations omitted).

III. Discussion

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the Lincoffs’ section 1983 claims. In

the two motions, Defendants argue that the section 1983 claims against Boyle and Collins-Brown

fail because there was no state-created danger and because Boyle and Collins-Brown are protected

by qualified immunity; and that the section 1983 claim against the Town fails because there was

no policy, practice, or custom that gave rise to the events at issue.22 See generally Boyle Mem.;

Town Mem.

“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person acting under color of state law

who deprives a person of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’”

Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 F. Supp. 2d 142, 167 (D. Mass. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983). To succeed on a section 1983 claim, plaintiffs must show: “(1) that the complained-of

conduct was committed under the color of state law, and (2) that such conduct violated [their]

constitutional or federal statutory rights.” Wadsworth v. Nguyen, 129 F.4th 38, 50 (1st Cir. 2025)

(alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Town of Wenham, 833 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2016)).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . .

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § 1. To establish a substantive due process violation, a plaintiff must show “a deprivation of

a protected interest in life, liberty, or property” and “that the deprivation of this protected right was

22 Defendants’ motions make additional arguments in support of summary judgment, which the Lincoffs do

not address in their oppositions. Because the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as

described below, the Court needs not and does not reach the remaining arguments.

caused by governmental conduct.” Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2005). There

is no dispute that Landon was deprived of life, which is a protected right. As to the second element:

The Due Process Clause does not create an “affirmative right to governmental aid,

even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests

of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.” DeShaney v.

Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). However, a

plaintiff may hold a state officer liable for “failing to protect plaintiffs from danger

created or enhanced by [the officer’s] affirmative acts.” Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d

65, 67 (1st Cir. 2020).

Cohen ex rel. Cohen v. City of Portland, 110 F.4th 400, 405 (1st Cir. 2024) (alteration in original).

A. State-Created Danger

The Lincoffs argue that the cancellation of the NRAS ambulance—the decision by Boyle,

allegedly approved by Collins-Brown, and made allegedly pursuant to the Town’s policy or

practice of cancelling outside EMS services—constitutes state-created danger. See, e.g., Boyle

Opp. at 7; Town Opp. at 8. A state-created-danger claim has four basic elements: a plaintiff must

establish that (1) “a state actor . . . affirmatively acted to create or enhance a danger to the

plaintiff”; (2) “the act or acts created or enhanced a danger specific to the plaintiff and distinct

from the danger to the general public”; (3) “the act or acts caused the plaintiff’s harm”; and (4) “the

state actor’s conduct, when viewed in total, shocks the conscience.” Irish, 979 F.3d at 75.

1. Boyle

a. Created or Enhanced a Danger Specific to Plaintiff

To establish the first two Irish requirements, a plaintiff must establish that a state actor

“affirmatively acted to create or enhance a danger” specific to that plaintiff, as opposed to a danger

to the public at large. Id. at 75. The affirmative act need not greatly enhance the danger to the

plaintiff; it must simply enhance it. Welch v. City of Biddeford Police Dept., 12 F.4th 70, 76

(1st Cir. 2021) (citing Irish, 979 F.3d at 75).

On the record before it, the Court cannot conclude Boyle’s decision to cancel the NRAS

intercept created or enhanced the danger to Landon. The Lincoffs argue that Boyle enhanced the

danger by preventing more qualified paramedics from providing care. Boyle Opp. at 7–9. But as

of June 2021, Boyle and Hallinan were both licensed paramedics who were certified in PALS and

ACLS, Town’s SMF ¶¶ 40–41, 65; Boyle’s SMF ¶ 24, just like both NARS paramedics, Town’s

SMF ¶¶ 123–24. There is no evidence that Boyle knew the experience level, qualifications, or

aptitudes of the NRAS providers who were available to intercept, other than that they were

generally PALS-certified.23 Id. ¶¶ 78–79, 81–82, 112; Boyle’s SMF ¶ 48. While neither Boyle

nor Hallinan had experience responding to an unresponsive infant, that does not mean that they

were not qualified to provide care pursuant to the licensing and certifications they held.24 The

availability of other paramedics who may have had more experience makes no difference—the

constitution does not require providing the most experienced providers or best possible care. See,

e.g., Peete v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 486 F.3d 217, 223 (6th Cir. 2007)

(“Generally, ‘it is not a constitutional violation for a state actor to render incompetent medical

advice or fail to rescue those in need.’” (quoting Jackson v. Schultz, 429 F.3d 586, 590 (6th Cir.

2005))). For example, in analyzing whether a due process right had been clearly established to

overcome qualified immunity, the Eighth Circuit rejected a state-created danger claim against

paramedics who failed to provide adequate medical care, emphasizing that no one intentionally or

23 The Lincoffs have put forth evidence that they argue demonstrates that Boyle should have known “NRAS

could not have had less experience than TFD,” Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 112. That does not reasonably suggest that

he should have known NRAS paramedics would have had more experience. An NRAS provider with equal or more

experience, broadly speaking, would not necessarily have experience with unresponsive infants. Moreover, the

Lincoffs have provided no evidence to permit the conclusion that Boyle should have known that any paramedic on

the NRAS intercept would be more experienced, let alone that Boyle would have been required to get the more

experienced paramedics involved in care rather than prioritize the speed of transport to a hospital.

24 Whether or not they did provide appropriate care is not at issue in these motions.

arbitrarily cut off emergency services to the plaintiff and that mere negligence or a failure to act

does not suffice under the state-created danger doctrine. Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 934

F.3d 876, 883 (8th Cir. 2019). Similarly, in the Eighth Amendment context, which also uses the

deliberate indifference standard,25 the First Circuit has explained that “allegations [that] simply

reflect a disagreement on the appropriate course of treatment . . . fall[] short of alleging

a constitutional violation.” Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1980).

The Lincoffs identify no authority for the proposition that Boyle or the other TFD members

had a responsibility to seek out more qualified personnel when the responding paramedics had the

requisite qualifications to provide care. While the Lincoffs point to the Seventh Circuit’s decision

in Ross v. United States, where the court held a county liable under the state-created danger theory

where the county “had a policy of arbitrarily cutting off private sources of rescue without providing

a meaningful alternative,” 910 F.2d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1990), here, Boyle provided a meaningful

alternative by way of the fully licensed and qualified paramedics on board the ambulance (Boyle

himself included).26 Critical in Ross was that the officers intentionally denied emergency aid. Id.

In contrast, Boyle and Hallinan provided emergency aid. Disputing whether the aid provided was

“meaningful” or sufficient is merely a reframing of the Lincoffs’ negligence claims. Again, both

Boyle and Hallinan were licensed and qualified to render aid to Landon. Thus, any enhanced

danger to Landon arose out of the allegedly negligent care provided, not the cancellation of the

25 See infra, Section III(A)(1)(b), discussing the application of the deliberate indifference standard.

26 Any issue with whether Boyle’s and Hallinan’s licensing renders them qualified to provide care is a dispute

about the sufficiency of the standards for certification of emergency medical service providers across Massachusetts,

not a due process issue.

intercept.27 But “mere negligence [is] insufficient to maintain a claim of substantive due process

violation.” Abdisamad v. City of Lewiston, 960 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2020).28

b. Shocks the Conscience

Finally, the section 1983 claim against Boyle fails because Boyle’s actions cannot be said

to “shock the conscience.” To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must

demonstrate “that the acts were so egregious as to shock the conscience” and “that they deprived

him of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property.” Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 32

(1st Cir. 2006). To shock the conscience, the conduct “must at the very least be extreme and

egregious, or, put another way, truly outrageous, uncivilized, and intolerable.” Id. The Lincoffs

contend that Boyle’s actions were “unconscionable” and “reckless,” putting Defendants’ “above

the very lives of children in the community.” Boyle Opp. at 14.

There is no dispute that the loss of life, especially that of an eight-month-old, is a tragedy.

But tragic circumstances, without more, do not give rise to a section 1983 claim. “The burden to

show [conscience-shocking] conduct ‘is extremely high, requiring stunning evidence of

arbitrariness and caprice that extends beyond mere violations of state law, even violations resulting

from bad faith to something more egregious and more extreme.’” Hewes v. Pangburn, 162 F.4th

177, 194 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 2010)).

A hallmark of successful challenges is an extreme lack of proportionality, as the

test is primarily concerned with “violations of personal rights . . . so severe . . . so

disproportionate to the need presented, and . . . so inspired by malice or sadism

rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal

and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.”

27 Nor is there any evidence that NRAS would have provided care unless someone on the TFD ambulance

explicitly requested NRAS’s involvement, see Boyle’s SMF ¶ 45, furthering the conclusion that the danger did not

arise out of the cancellation of the intercept.

28 The Lincoffs also argue that Boyle cancelled the intercept pursuant to a policy or practice of cancelling

NRAS intercepts in order to permit TFD teams to gain experience. E.g., Boyle Opp. at 7, 10–12. The Court discusses

and rejects this argument infra in Section III(A)(1)(c).

Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 881 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Moran v. Clarke, 296

F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). None of those “hallmarks” are present here. There is a

question as to whether Landon received the appropriate level of care, which will be resolved at a

trial on the Lincoffs’ negligence claims. But negligence does not constitute a constitutional

violation. See Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1064 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Not every negligent, or even

willfully reckless, state action that renders a person more vulnerable to danger ‘take[s] on the

added character of [a] violation[] of the federal Constitution.’” (alterations in original) (quoting

Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 993 (1st Cir. 1992))).

“[C]onduct ‘most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level’ is ‘conduct intended to

injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest.’” Hewes, 2025 WL 3677352, at *9

(alteration in original) (quoting Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 273 (1st Cir. 2009)).

“Where officials have the opportunity to make unhurried judgments, deliberate indifference may

shock the conscience, particularly where the state official performs multiple acts of indifference

to a rising risk of acute and severe danger.”29 Irish, 979 F.3d at 75. “At a bare minimum,”

deliberate indifference that shocks the conscience requires the plaintiff to show that the “the

defendant actually knew of a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk.” Id.

(citation modified).

29 The Court seriously doubts the Lincoffs’ argument that the deliberate indifference standard is appropriate

here, given the time constraints under which Boyle had to operate. While it is not clear at what time Boyle directed

the cancellation of the NRAS intercept, Boyle describes it as a “split second decision.” Boyle’s SMF ¶ 40. The

Lincoffs dispute only the justification for the decision, not the timing. Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 40. Even in the light

most favorable to the Lincoffs, the Court cannot conclude that Boyle’s decision was “unhurried.” See Irish, 979 F.3d

at 75. “[I]n situations ‘where government officials must act in haste, under pressure, and without an opportunity for

reflection, even applications of deadly force by those officials cannot be conscience-shocking unless undertaken

maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” Gonzalez-Fuentes, 607 F.3d at 881 (quoting

Coyne v. Cronin, 386 F.3d 280, 288 (1st Cir. 2004)). The record lacks any evidence to suggest that Boyle had any

intent to cause harm; in fact, Boyle rendered aid continuously throughout his involvement in Landon’s care. See, e.g.,

Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 52–60, 81, 87. The Lincoffs dispute only the sufficiency of the aid provided. E.g., Boyle

Counterstatement ¶¶ 52–60, 81, 86 (see supra, note 9, regarding the paragraph numbering in the Boyle

Counterstatement).

Based on the undisputed record before the Court, Boyle’s actions cannot be said to have

been deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. As discussed above, there is no

evidence that Boyle knew that the NRAS intercept had more qualified paramedics or that turning

away the intercept posed any risk to Landon. See supra Section III(A)(1)(a). Nor is there any

evidence that Boyle’s actions were taken to, as the Lincoffs argue, “[p]rioritz[e] the gaining of

practical skills on a pediatric patient in a high acuity call” pursuant to a policy or practice

established by Collins-Brown. Boyle Opp. at 15. Instead, the undisputed evidence demonstrates

that Boyle acted on his belief that this was the appropriate care to provide, pursuant to his

understanding of the dispatch protocols and training that shorter transport times increase patient

survival.30 Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 39–42. Specifically, there is no genuine dispute that Boyle cancelled

the intercept because the ambulance already had two paramedics on board, consistent with

pertinent regulations, and his belief that they could provide the necessary care to Landon without

needing to further delay transport. Id.

The only evidence regarding Boyle’s knowledge of the alleged policy is that he was aware

that Collins-Brown had expressed a preference for TFD to serve as the primary transporting

ambulance and that she believed TFD responders could gain additional experience by performing

more transports. E.g., Boyle Counterstatement ¶ 4. But that awareness alone does not create a

genuine dispute about the basis for Boyle’s actions on the night in question. In light of the

undisputed evidence regarding why Boyle cancelled the intercept, the Lincoffs’ arguments that

Boyle acted pursuant to such a policy amount to mere “speculation unsupported by facts [that] is

30 The TFD team’s prioritization of transport speed is further evidenced by the Lincoffs’ own allegations that

the ambulance driver was speeding and driving recklessly, attributed to—at least in part—the driver’s concern for

getting Landon to the hospital faster for “definitive care.” Town Counterstatement ¶ 71.

manifestly inadequate to stave off summary judgment.” Trahan v. Wayfair Me., LLC, 957 F.3d

54, 63 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d 447, 460 (1st Cir. 2016)).

Additionally, the record shows that Boyle took active steps to try to save Landon’s life,

even if the effectiveness of those efforts is disputed. Cf. Cohen, 110 F.4th at 405 (noting that

defendant’s “retrieval of rescue boat was an attempt to mitigate the danger” a drowning victim

faced). As the Eighth Circuit has explained, “[p]lacing a person in need of emergency medical

care on a medical transportation hold and transporting [him] to a hospital ‘demonstrates a

deliberate concern for [his] well-being, and not an indifference.’” Buckley v. Hennepin Cnty., 9

F.4th 757, 764 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Haslar v. Megerman, 104 F.3d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1997)).

In sum, the Lincoffs have failed to demonstrate a triable issue on whether Boyle’s actions

shock the conscious. Thus, Boyle is entitled to summary judgment on the Lincoffs’ section 1983

claim.31

2. The Town Defendants

The Lincoffs also assert a state-created danger claim against the Town Defendants. But

the act that the Lincoffs argue created or enhanced the danger to Landon is the cancellation of the

NRAS intercept, for which it is undisputed that Boyle was responsible. See Welch v. City of

Biddeford Police Dep’t, 12 F.4th 70, 76 (1st Cir. 2021) (“Officers are not liable under § 1983 for

the actions of other officers.”).32 To the extent the Lincoffs argue liability based on

31 To the extent the Lincoffs argue that a different theory of liability under section 1983 applies, for

substantially the reasons set forth by Boyle, see Boyle Mem. at 3–6, the Court concludes that the Lincoffs have failed

to establish a constitution violation.

32 Courts do recognize a claim of supervisory liability under section 1983. See, e.g., Cifizzari v. Town of

Milford, 2025 WL 1899043, at *14 (D. Mass. July 9, 2025). Such a claim is distinct from the tort theory of respondeat

superior and “cannot ‘rest solely on [the supervisor’s] position of authority.” Id. (final alteration in original) (quoting

Guadalupe-Báez v. Pesquera, 819 F.3d 509, 515 (1st Cir. 2016)). But “there can be no supervisory liability” where a

plaintiff falls to “show that behavior of a subordinate resulted in a constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting Pineda v.

Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008)).

Collins-Brown’s actions in allegedly approving Boyle’s decision,33 such action (or in this case,

inaction) simply does to rise to the level of conscious-shocking behavior sufficient for a section

1983 claim where she was not on scene (or even in the state), took no affirmative action herself,

and merely relied on her team’s judgment to handle the response. Town’s SMF ¶ 109–10, 113.

There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Collins-Brown would have or should have

doubted the TFD team’s ability to respond or Boyle’s determination that NRAS involvement was

not necessary, especially where she was not present.34 See supra Section III(A)(1)(a) (discussing

how TFD team was qualified to respond and concluding that there was no obligation to seek more

experienced paramedics to provide emergency care in this situation). That such a decision may

have furthered her own preference to get the TFD team more experience does not change the

conclusion.35

33 It is unclear from the Lincoffs’ briefing that the Lincoffs seek to make this argument, as their memorandum

focuses on Collins-Brown’s creation of a policy or practice of “cancel[ling] NRAS responses across the board in order

to prioritize her staff’s skill-building and to obtain necessary experience to sharpen their then inadequate skills.” Town

Opp. at 10; see also id. at 14, 17.

34 The Lincoffs point to various exhibits to argue that Collins-Brown was aware that NRAS was more

experienced and qualified to provide care than TFD, and that having TFD provide primary transport services put

Topsfield residents at risk. See, e.g., Town Counterstatement ¶¶ 136–39; Boyle Counterstatement ¶¶ 114–16. None

of the Lincoffs’ cited exhibits demonstrates that TFD would take on care that the paramedics were not licensed to

provide, or that TFD would cancel NRAS intercepts that were medically necessary. See generally, e.g., Dkt 61-9

(Town of Topsfield 24/7 Fire Study Committee Report from 2016); Dkt. 61-10 (Proposed Charge for 24/7 Fire Service

Study from 2015); Dkt. 61-14 (undated, anonymous letter). A third-party complaint about TFD’s experience and

qualifications does not demonstrate that allowing TFD paramedics to provide care in accordance with their

qualifications establishes a constitutional claim, especially where TFD personnel were still able to accept NRAS

intercepts where they deemed it appropriate. Similarly, Town documents from five years prior containing general

discussions about wanting TFD to get more experience but rejecting plans to increase TFD use at the time do not

demonstrate that there was a policy or practice in 2021 of inappropriately canceling intercepts to take on care that

TFD personnel were not qualified to provide.

35 The Lincoffs do not appear to argue that they have asserted a state-created danger claim against the Town.

See, e.g., Town Opp. at 9, 11–12, 15 (making arguments with respect to only Boyle and Collins-Brown); compare

Dkt. 1-1 ¶¶ 82–86 (alleging violation of section 1983 against the Town without reference to a state-created danger),

with id. ¶¶ 68, 79 (alleging violations of section 1983 against Boyle and Collins-Brown and specifically alleging

state-created danger). The proper vehicle for redress for any harm allegedly caused by the Town is through the

Lincoffs’ Monell claim, see Lavigne v. Great Salt Bay Cmty. Sch. Bd., 146 F.4th 115, 123 (1st Cir. 2025) (citing

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)), which the Court addresses below, see infra

Section III(B).

B. Monell Liability

The Lincoffs also argue that the Town is liable under Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Town Opp. at 16–18. Under Monell, “[m]unicipalities cannot be

held liable for the conduct of their employees unless the municipality itself is also responsible in

some way for that conduct.” Lavigne v. Great Salt Bay Cmty. Sch. Bd., 146 F.4th 115, 123 (1st Cir.

2025) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). It is “when the

governmental employees’ ‘execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury’

and is the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation that a municipality can be liable.” Id.

(final alteration in original) (quoting Young v. City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, 404 F.3d 4,

25 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Critically, “Monell liability is contingent on an underlying constitutional violation, and ‘if

there is no underlying constitutional violation, there can be no municipal liability.’” Cifizzari v.

Town of Milford, 2025 WL 1899043, at *14 (D. Mass. July 9, 2025) (quoting Johnson v. City of

Biddeford, 665 F. Supp. 3d 82, 122 (D. Me. 2023)); see also Kennedy v. Town of Billerica, 617

F.3d 520, 531 (1st Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). As the Court has found that no Defendant has

committed an underlying constitutional violation, the Town cannot be held liable under Monell.36

36 Nor is there evidence that would permit the Lincoffs to establish the existence of a policy, practice, or

custom of canceling mutual aid. There is no evidence that any officers on the scene were aware of said policy. That

Boyle was aware of a preference for getting the TFD team experience does not amount to awareness of a policy of

cancelling mutual aid to obtain that experience. Instead, the evidence demonstrates that cancelling NRAS assistance

occurred infrequently and only where someone determined it was not necessary, given the specific circumstances.

Town’s SMF ¶¶ 87–89, 105, 118; Boyle’s SMF ¶¶ 11–12, 14, 97. Simply put, “a single instance of . . . misconduct

in the field, standing alone, is insufficient to establish the endorsement of an informal policy or custom by the

City.” McElroy v. City of Lowell, 741 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing cases). Even if the Court found

the evidence sufficient on the existence of a policy or practice, there is no evidence beyond speculation that Boyle

acted pursuant to such a policy or practice. See supra Section III(A)(1).

IV. Qualified Immunity

Having determined there was no constitutional violation, the Court will not address the

issue of qualified immunity for Boyle and Collins-Brown. See Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24, 34

(1st Cir. 2004); see also Penate v. Sullivan, 73 F.4th 10, 17 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Maldonado,

568 F.3d at 269).

V. Conclusion

This case concerns tragic circumstances, but it does not involve a due process

violation. For the foregoing reasons, Boyle’s motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 48, and the

Town Defendants’ motion for summary judgement, Dkt. 55, are each GRANTED. The Town

Defendants’ motion to strike, Dkt. 68, and Boyle’s motion to strike, Dkt. 69, are both DENIED as

moot.

So Ordered.

/s/ Brian E. Murphy

Brian E. Murphy

Dated: February 6, 2026 Judge, United States District Court