Hubbard

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WESTERN DIVISION

No. 5:25-CV-49-BO-RJ

DARRELL HUBBARD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

Vv. ) ORDER

)

CITY OF GOLDSBORO; WAYNE )

COUNTY; DETECTIVE ALVINO )

DANIELS, in his individual and official )

capacities; OFFICER BRAD E. GOODING, )

in his individual and official capacities; )

MARCUS SMITH, ANDREW )

NICHOLSON, and LARRY GRAY, JR., —)

)

Defendants. )

This cause comes before the Court on multiple pending motions, including two motions to

dismiss and two motions to amend the complaint. The appropriate responses and replies have been

filed, or the time for doing so has expired, and in this posture the motions are ripe for disposition.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who proceeds in this action pro se, filed a complaint alleging twenty causes of

action against defendants for violations of both state and federal Jaw. His claims arise from an

alleged assault he suffered while playing poo} at Pier 34, a restaurant and bar in Goldsboro, North

Carolina. Plaintiff alleges that defendants, who include the City of Goldsboro, Wayne County, two

police officers, and three private citizens, engaged the fabrication of evidence, police and

prosecutorial misconduct, conspired to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and otherwise

violated state law by intentionally inflicting emotional distress. '

This is the second case in this district in which plaintiff has alleged claims arising from his

assault at Pier 34. The first, Hubbard v. Goldsboro Police Dep’t, No. 5:24-cv-267-FL, 2024 WL

3899362 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2024) (Hubbard I), was dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

on recommendation of the magistrate judge. See Hubbard v. Goldsboro Police Dep't, No. 5:24-

CV-267-FL, 2024 WL 4179158, at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 24, 2024). The Hubbard J decision was

affirmed on appeal. Hubbard v. Goldsboro Police Dep’t, No. 24-6869, 2025 WL 314809, at *1

(4th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025). In Hubbard I, plaintiff named, among others, the Goldsboro Police

Department, the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office, Marcus Smith, Andrew Nicholson, and Larry

Gray, Jr. as defendants.

In the instant complaint, [DE 1], plaintiff alleges that defendant Marcus Smith is the owner

of Pier 34 and that Pier 34 employs off duty police officers for security. Smith allegedly developed

growing resentment toward plaintiff after repeatedly losing to plaintiff while playing pool. Plaintiff

alleges that Smith’s personal connection to Pier 34 and local law enforcement are critical to

understanding the events which led to plaintiff's assault.

Defendant Andrew Nicholson was a bartender at Pier 34. Plaintiff alleges that, on the night

of the attack, Nicolson engaged him in conversation immediately before plaintiff was struck from

behind, which caused plaintiff to lose consciousness. Nicolson was later identified as a suspect in

plaintiff's assault and allegedly confessed to being involved. Defendant Larry Gray, Jr. is an

associate of Smith and was present the night that plaintiff was assaulted.

' Plaintiff's complaint also lists “Relevant Third Parties.” See [DE 1] at 2-3. No summonses were

issued for these parties, and the Court does not construe them as defendants in this action.

Plaintiffs filings further support that the “Relevant Third Parties” are not defendants. See [DE 31]

at 3.

After the attack, plaintiff alleges that Smith distorted material facts and evidence to

minimize his liability and obstructed justice by falsely claiming that plaintiff's injuries were minor

and no weapon was involved, that the Goldsboro Police Department failed to properly investigate

and fabricated reports, and that Gray’s relationship with Smith and his involvement in shaping the

narrative of the incident warrant additional scrutiny. See [DE 1] at 3-5.

Plaintiff alleges, in claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that his Fourteenth Amendment

due process and equal protection rights were violated when: Smith, the Goldsboro Police

Department (GPD), and the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office fabricated and concealed material

evidence in an incriminating 911 call (Count 1); Detective Daniels, the GPD, and the Wayne

County Prosecutor’s Office coerced plaintiff into altering his witness statement in order to

undermine plaintiff's credibility (Count 2); Detective Daniels, the GPD, and the Wayne County

Prosecutor’s Office were grossly negligent in misclassifying plaintiff's injuries in order to obstruct

justice (Count 3); Detective Daniels and the GPD failed to seize and examine the weapon used in

plaintiff's assault (Count 4); Detective Daniels and the GPD failed to properly investigate and

secure video surveillance footage critical to the investigation (Count 5); Detective Daniels, the

GPD, and the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office refused to corroborate Gray’s disputed

eyewitness testimony using cellphone location records (Count 6); Detective Daniels, the GPD, and

the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Officer failed to pursue derivative responsibility against all

involved in the attempted murder of plaintiff (Count 7); the GPD failed to investigate credible

claims of false imprisonment and life threatening intimidation by Smith (Count 8); the GPD and

Officer Gooding failed to preserve and secure evidence, disregarded forensic procedures, and

otherwise conducted a grossly negligent investigation (Count 9); Detective Daniels and the GPD

conducted a grossly deficient investigation (Count 10); the GPD and Eric Goins obstructed justice

by providing false information about the status of plaintiff's assault case (Count |); the GPD and

Michelle Warren obstructed justice by failing to investigate new evidence and Warren abused her

authority and was complicit in misconduct (Count 12); the GPD and Mike West obstructed justice

by engaging in a deceptive internal affairs investigation, withholding critical records, and

concealing officer misconduct (Count 13); the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office engaged in

biased decision making, neglected evidence, was improperly influenced, and made arbitrary

charging decisions (Count 14); the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office and Assistant District

Attorney Andrew Tamer disregarded plaintiff's civil rights and demonstrated bias by neglecting

evidence and succumbing to improper influences (Count 15); and Smith, through his interactions

with GPD, acted in concert with the GPD to obstruct justice, fabricate evidence, and suppress

evidence (Count 16). Plaintiff further alleges that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) was violated when:

defendant Nicholson acted individually and in concert with others to violate plaintiff's civil rights

and obstruct justice (Count 17); defendant Gray, in conspiracy with Smith and Nicholson, engaged

in a scheme to interfere with plaintiff's civil rights by fabricating evidence, obstructing justice,

and depriving plaintiff of fair legal process (Count 18); and Smith conspired with others to interfere

with plaintiff's civil rights by making false statements, orchestratiag a premeditated assault, and

destroying or concealing evidence (Count 19). Finally, plaintiff alleges that the conduct of all

defendants amounted to the intentional infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina law

(Count 20).

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment [DE 13]

The Court considers first plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment on a uniform

immunity determination framework for law enforcement officials. Plaintiff seeks clarification of

the applicability of absolute and qualified immunity to ensure consistency in the application of the

immunity doctrines and promote judicial economy by resolving immunity at an early stage.

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

A district court may, “upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, [] declare the rights and

other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief

is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). However, ““a party may not make a motion for

declaratory relief, but rather, the party must bring an action for a declaratory judgment.’” Kam-Ko

Bio-Pharm Trading Co. Ltd-Australasia v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 560 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir.

2009) (citation omitted). Moreover, the applicability of the doctrines of absolute and qualified

immunity to this case are not appropriate for declaratory judgment. Plaintiff's motion for

declaratory judgment [DE 13] is denied.

B. Motion to dismiss by City of Goldsboro, Daniels, and Gooding [DE 19]

Defendants the City of Goldsboro, Detective Daniels, and Officer Gooding (the City

Defendants) have moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for improper service and failure to state

a claim pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal for lack of

personal jurisdiction. “Absent waiver or consent, a failure to obtain proper service on the defendant

deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304,

306 (4th Cir. 1998). Rule 12(b)(5) authorizes dismissal for insufficient service of process, or a

deficiency in service itself. See Washington v. Cedar Fair, L.P., No. 5:22-cv-244-MOC-DSC,

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16559, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 1, 2023). When a defendant moves to dismiss

for either insufficient process or insufficient service of process, the plaintiff must demonstrate that

service has been effected in accordance with the rules. Elkins v. Broome, 213 F.R.D. 273, 275

(M.D.N.C. 2003).

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 283 (1986). When acting on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the court should

accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). A complaint

must allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Bel/ Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Facial plausibility means that the facts pled “allow[] the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” and mere

recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by conclusory statements do not suffice.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint must be dismissed if the factual

allegations do not nudge the plaintiffs claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976) (internal quotation and citation omitted). However, a court does not “act as an advocate for

a pro se litigant”, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978), nor is it required to

“discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff].]’” Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Laber y. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n. 3 (4" Cir. 2006) (en banc)).

The City Defendants first challenge plaintiff's service, arguing that plaintiff improperly

served the City Defendants by serving them himself and by serving Daniels and Gooding through

an individual not authorized to accept service on their behalf. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2); 4(e). In

response, plaintiff argues, among other things, that he should be afforded additional time within

which to effect proper service. [DE 34] at 5; see also [DE 39-1]. However, because, as is discussed

more fully below, plaintiff's claims against the City Defendants are barred by the doctrine of res

judicata and otherwise fail to state a claim, affording plaintiff additional time to effect proper

service would be futile.

“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of any claims that were or could

have been raised in a prior proceeding between the same parties.” Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284,

287 (4th Cir. 2008). The Court applies federal preclusion law because the prior suit, Hubbard IJ,

was decided by this Court and this Court’s jurisdiction rested on federal question grounds. See

Foye v. Lassiter, No. 7:24-CV-709-FL, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1274, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 3,

2025).

“For the doctrine of res judicata to be applicable, there must be: (1) a final judgment on

the merits in a prior suit; (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit;

and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits.” Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d

345, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2004). A defendant may raise the res judicata defense in a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, and “when entertaining a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, a court may take

judicial notice of facts from a prior judicial proceeding when the res judicata defense raises no

disputed issue of fact[.]” Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000).

Here, each element of the res judicata defense is satisfied, in particular as to defendants

Daniels and Gooding. First, Hubbard I represents a final decision on the merits, as plaintiff's

complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (mandating

dismissal of in forma pauperis complaint which fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted); Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (dismissal for failure

to state claim is judgment on the merits). The Hubbard I court further denied leave to amend,

finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim in his proposed amended complaint. Hubbard I, 2024

WL 3899362, at *2. Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the Hubbard I decision. Hubbard I,

2025 WL 314809, at *1. That the dismissal occurred under § 1915 following the grant of leave to

proceed in forma pauperis is of no moment. See Corbin v. Johnson, No. 5:11-CV-456-FL, 2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112126, at *13-16 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2012) (collecting cases).

The claims in Hubbard J and this case, Hubbard I, are essentially identical, and the claims

raised in the proposed amended complaint in Hubbard J and the claims in this case are also

essentially identical. Compare Hubbard I, [DE 6] with Hubbard IT, [DE 1]. Both complaints allege

§ 1983, § 1985, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims arising from plaintiff's

assault at Pier 34, the investigation thereof, and the prosecutorial decisions arising from the

investigation.

The test for deciding whether the causes of action are identical for claim preclusion

purposes is whether the claim presented in the new litigation arises out of the same

transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgment.

Newly articulated claims based on the same transactional nucleus of facts may still

be subject to a res judicata finding if the claims could have been brought in the

earlier action.

Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up, citations

omitted). There is no doubt that the claims raised in Hubbard IJ arise from the same transaction or

series of transactions as those in Hubbard J, and that any claims brought in Hubbard II could have

been raised in Hubbard I. See Pueschel, 369 F.3d at 356. Thus, despite plaintiff's argument that

the complaint in Hubbard II is based on new legal theories, his claims are nonetheless identical

for purposes of the res judicata analysis.

Finally, there is identity of parties as to plaintiff and defendants Daniels and Gooding, as

in both cases they were sued in both their official and individual capacities. The City Defendants

argue further that the City of Goldsboro, a defendant in this suit, is in privity with the Goldsboro

Police Department, a defendant in Hubbard I but not in Hubbard II. However, the Court need not

decide that issue as plaintiff has failed to otherwise state a claim against the City of Goldsboro.

Assuming then, without deciding, that res judicata does not bar plaintiff's claims against

the City of Goldsboro, the Court holds that plaintiff's federal claims against this defendant are

conclusory and fail to state a claim. Under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978), a local government can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for its

unconstitutional policies. Municipal Jiability only results “when execution of a government’s

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be

said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury[.]” Jd. at 694. Municipal liability is not available

under the theory of respondeat superior. Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th

Cir. 1984).

A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four

ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2)

through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an

omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that ‘manifest [s] deliberate

indifference to the rights of citizens’; or (4) through a practice that is so ‘persistent

and widespread’ as to constitute a ‘custom or usage with the force of law.’

Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003).

In this case, plaintiff has failed to allege the existence of any written policy or regulation

which would have authorized the alleged unconstitutional conduct by any other defendant or any

decision by a final policymaker which resulted in the violation of his constitutional rights. Nor

does plaintiff plausibly allege any failure to train by the City of Goldsboro which manifested in

the deliberate indifference to plaintiffs or any other citizen’s rights. Finally, plaintiff has not

plausibly alleged any persistent or widespread pattern or practice. In opposition to the motion to

dismiss, plaintiff argues there was a systemic failure to train police officers in handling victim-

witness statements, a de facto policy of ignoring or covering up officer misconduct, and a refusal

by the City to reform its practices or discipline or investigate its officers. But these conclusory

statements fail to identify factual allegations in the complaint which would support a claim for

municipal liability under Monell. Moreover, to establish liability based on a pattern or practice, a

plaintiff must allege more than “sporadic or isolated violations of rights[.]” Owens v. Baltimore

City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 403 (4th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff has simply failed to plausibly

allege any of the City of Goldsboro’s own acts which could support a finding of liability under

Monell. The federal claims against the City Defendants are therefore properly dismissed.

C. Motion to dismiss by Wayne County [DE 23]

Defendant Wayne County seeks also seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Wayne County

argues that plaintiff, who seeks to hold Wayne County liable for the acts of the Wayne County

Prosecutor’s Office, has failed to state a claim against it because a North Carolina district attorney

is an independent state officer, not a county employee. The Court agrees.

Under North Carolina law, an elected district attorney has sole prosecutorial authority

within the judicial district that elected him or her to the office of district attorney. N.C. Const., Art.

IV, § 18(1); State v. Wilson, 139 N.C. App. 544, 550 (2000). “The district attorney prosecutes ‘in

the name of the State all criminal actions and infractions requiring prosecution’ and is undoubtedly

a state official.” Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 249 (4th Cir. 2006). As a state official, the

district attorney is not an employee of the county, and Wayne County cannot be held liable for any

acts by the district attorney or assistant district attorneys. See also Uresti v. Murray, No. 3:11-CV-

538-RJC, 2012 WL 80235, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 11, 2012) (assistant district attorney is a state

employee).

In opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues that Wayne County incorrectly

frames his allegations as seeking to hold the County liable for prosecutorial misconduct and that

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plaintiff is asserting a Monell claim directly against Wayne County for failure to supervise,

investigate, or train persons within its criminal justice infrastructure.

First, plaintiff's arguments in his opposition are not supported by the allegations in his

complaint. For example, plaintiff alleges that “The City of Goldsboro and Wayne County, through

their agencies the GPD and [the Wayne County Prosecutors Office], failed to train, supervise, and

discipline personnel responsible for upholding constitutional protections, resulting in a pattern of

misconduct.” [DE 1] at 10. Plaintiff thus wrongly asserts that the prosecutor’s office is an agency

of Wayne County and that Wayne County is responsible for training and supervising prosecutors.

Moreover, even construing plaintiff's claims liberally as being alleged against Wayne County

itself, plaintiff's claims fail because Wayne County has no authority to train, supervise, or

discipline state prosectors. Additionally, plaintiff's allegations regarding the failure to train,

supervise, and discipline are otherwise conclusory. Plaintiff alleges that Wayne County “tolerated

a practice where prosecutors ignored exculpatory evidence” and failed to supervise the Wayne

County Prosecutor’s Office. Plaintiff has alleged no facts, however, which would support a claim

against Wayne County under Monell. The federal claims against Wayne County are therefore

properly dismissed.

D. Defendants Smith, Nicholson, and Gray

Defendants Smith and Gray have failed to answer the complaint, see [DE 26]; [DE 29],

and it does not appear from the record that defendant Nicholson has been served. These defendants

are named in Count 1 (a § 1983 claim against Smith), Count 16 (a § 1983 claim against Smith),

Count 17 (a § 1985 claim against Nicholson, conspiring with Smith and Gray); Count 18 (a § 1985

claim against Gray, conspiring with Smith and Nicholson), and Count 19 (a § 1985 claim agiain:st

Smith, conspiring with Gray and Nicholson), and Count 20 (an intentional infliction of emotional

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distress against all defendants). Though they have failed to appear or answer, under certain

circumstances, a court may consider the affirmative defense of res judicata sua sponte. Eriline Co.

S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006). One of those circumstances is where “a court

is on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented[.]” Arizona v. California, 530 U.S.

392, 412 (2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted). This serves both the interests of the

defendants in not having to twice defend against a suit but also the “avoidance of unnecessary

judicial waste.” Id. Accordingly, the Court may consider whether res judicata bars plaintiff's

federal claims against Smith, Nicholson, and Gray, and it concludes that its does.

As discussed above, there is a final judgment on the merits in Hubbard I. This case further

meets the “same cause of action” requirement because it again arises out of plaintiff's assault at

Pier 34 and the ensuing investigation and prosecution. F inally, Smith, Nicholson, and Gray, are all

named in both Hubbard I and this case. While this case expounds on the § 1985 civil conspiracy

claims to include claims against Smith, Nicholson, and Gray specifically, such claims could have

been raised in Hubbard I. Accordingly res judicata bars plaintiff's federal claims against these

defendants, and they are properly dismissed.

E. State law claim

The Court, in its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's

state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the absence of any claim over

which the Court has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

F. Motion for leave to file sur-reply [DE 39]

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a sur-reply in opposition to the City Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. Primarily, plaintiff's sur-reply provides new arguments related to his service on these

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defendants. [DE 39-1]. The Court, in its discretion, allows the motion for leave to file a sur-reply

[DE 39] and it has considered plaintiffs arguments raised therein.

G. Motions for leave to file amended complaints [DE 41]; [DE 42]

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his complaint, first to add claims against the North Carolina

Conference of District Attorneys and Lisa Coltrain in her individual capacity as an assistant district

attorney based on subsequent developments. Plaintiff seeks to allege, for example, that Coltrain

willfully ignored his constitutional rights as a crime victim, denied plaintiff a fair investigation,

and willfully furthered and sustained an unconstitutional investigation and prosecution. Plaintiff

further seeks an injunction against the North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys (NCCDA)

requiring it to refer his case to the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation for review.

Leave to amend complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) should be freely given when justice

so requires. See Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 461 (4th Cir. 2013).

“[L]eave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to

the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment

would be futile.” Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986). “An

amendment is futile when the proposed amended complaint does not state a claim under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Oliver v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 350 F. Supp. 3d 340, 346

(D. Md. 2018).

Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to add claims against Coltrain and the NCCDA

is denied as futile. As was addressed at. length in Hubbard IJ, plaintiff, as a crime victim, has “no

constitutional right to, orin fact any judicially cognizable interest in, the criminal prosecution or

non-prosecution of another person.” Derrick v. Thomas, No. CV 9:20-3816-MGL-MHC, 2021 WL

10428230, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 9:20-3816-

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MGL-MHC, 2023 WL 3061289 (D.S.C. Apr. 24, 2023); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.

54, 64 (1986); Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1988); Graves v. Haywood, No.

5:19-CT-3043-FL, 2022 WL 945598, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2022) (crime victim “does not have

a constitutional right to a thorough or complete investigation of her allegations”). Accordingly,

granting leave to amend the complaint to add Coltrain and the NCCDA as defendants would be

futile.

Plaintiff also seeks to amend his complaint to add state tort claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a) and for severance of the state personal injury claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Plaintiff

would add defendants Larry Barksdale, Gabriel Smith, and Micah Smith as defendants. Because

the Court has found that dismissal of all federal claims is appropriate, and that leave to amend to

add additional federal claims is futile, it declines to permit an amendment solely to allege state law

claims, over which the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Both motions to amend the complaint [DE 41]; [DE 42] are therefore denied.

H. Request for procedural clarification [DE 32]

In light of the foregoing, plaintiff's request for procedural clarification regarding wet

signatures [DE 32] is denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss by the City of Goldsboro,

Daniels, and Gooding [DE 19] and the motion to dismiss by Wayne County [DE 23] are

GRANTED. The federal claims against all defendants are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claim.

Plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment on a uniform determination frarnevvork [DE:

13] is DENIED, plaintiff's motion for leave to file a sur-reply [DE 39] is GRANTED, ard

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plaintiff's motions for leave to file amended complaints [DE 41] & [DE 42] are DENIED.

Plaintiff's motion for procedural clarification [DE 32] is DENIED as MOOT.

The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

—

SO ORDERED, this +2 day of February 2026.

<4

TPRRENCE W. BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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