stating an issue is moot if “during the course of litigation, it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue”
How later courts described this case
- stating an issue is moot if “during the course of litigation, it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue”
- “[W]hen an agency waives requirements equally for different offerors, no prejudice results.”
- “There can be no injunctive relief without a corresponding prevailing claim.”
- noting that there is no presumption of prejudice following a procurement error by an agency
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
ADVANTAGED SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
No. 25-cv-1806
v.
Filed Under Seal: January 30,
THE UNITED STATES, 2026
Defendant, Publication: February 6,
20261
and
OAKLAND CONSULTING GROUP, INC.,
Intervenor-Defendant.
Jeffrey M. Chiow of Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Washington, D.C., argued for Plaintiff. With him
on the briefs were Pamela Marple and Christopher O’Brien of Greenberg Traurig, LLP,
Washington, D.C.
Reta Emma Bezak of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C.,
argued for Defendant. With her on the briefs were Geoffrey M. Long and Patricia M. McCarthy
of the United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, and Brett A. Shumate, Assistant
Attorney General. Also with her on the briefs was Ashley Kelly, Supervisory Counsel of the
Defense Logistics Agency.
John R. Tolle of Barton, Baker, Thomas & Tolle, LLP, McLean, Virginia, argued for Intervenor-
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This post-award bid protest concerns a solicitation to procure a software update for the
Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA or Agency) Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) platform.
1
This Memorandum and Order was filed under seal, in accordance with the Protective Order
entered in this case. ECF No. 8. On February 6, 2026, the parties confirmed with the Court that
that there were no proposed redactions. The sealed and public versions of this Memorandum and
Order are identical, except for this footnote, the publication date, and the addition of counsels’
names.
Plaintiff, Advantaged Solutions, Inc. (ASI or Plaintiff), is a minority-owned business and
authorized reseller of SAP products and services, with its principal place of business in
Washington, D.C. ECF No. 1 (Complaint or Compl.) ¶ 1. Defendant, the United States, acted
through DLA in this matter. “The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is a United States (US)
Department of Defense (DoD) agency that provides worldwide logistics support for the missions
of the Military Departments and the Unified Combatant Commands under conditions of peace and
war.” AR at 15. Intervenor-Defendant, Oakland Consulting Group, Inc., (Oakland) is a business
which also offers licensed, SAP-based ERP support. AR 1386.
In its initial selection decision, DLA deemed Oakland’s proposal deficient and awarded the
contract to ASI. However, immediately after making the award, DLA discovered an issue with
the evaluation process: its evaluators had assigned ASI and Oakland different ratings for their
technical approach, even though their proposals were identical in that regard. DLA rescinded the
contract, reevaluated the proposals, and ultimately awarded the contract to Oakland for
approximately $130 million. Plaintiff’s protest follows. Plaintiff challenges DLA’s corrective
action, its final award to Oakland, and alleged descoping of the solicitation as arbitrary and
capricious or unlawful.
FACTUAL HISTORY
DLA uses an ERP platform “to establish end-to-end processes to fulfill acquisition,
logistics and financial reporting requirements, streamline and use data sources effectively, reduce
inefficient or non value-added operations, and audit its resources.” AR 4. The ERP platform relies
predominately on brand-name software provided by SAP Public Services, Inc. AR 4, 6. It also
requires lifecycle refreshes—in this case, DLA must upgrade the ERP platform with a newer
version of several SAP programs: SAP S/4HANA Private Cloud Edition 2025, SAP Ariba
Sourcing and Procurement for Public Sector in S/4HANA (SAP S/4 PPS), and SAP Bulk Fuels
2
Management 4.0 (BFM). AR 15–16. This bid protest arises from DLA’s procurement for the
“design, build, test, training and deployment of SAP S/4 PPS and BFM 4.0.” AR 4.
On April 28, 2025, DLA released a request for quotations (RFQ or solicitation) for brand-
name SAP Support Services against a Department of Defense (DOD) Enterprise Software
Initiative (ESI) Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) issued under a General Services
Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) Multiple Award Schedule contract. AR 71,
3. DLA issued a limited source justification to purchase brand-name SAP services from an
authorized SAP reseller. AR 3. The RFQ stated that the basis for award would be the “lowest
priced, technically acceptable offer based upon the total price for all items contained within this
solicitation and the corresponding Performance Work Statement (PWS).” AR 71.
As one of Plaintiff’s allegations centers around purportedly improper reductions to the
scope of the solicitation, the Court must examine the content of the original solicitation. According
to the original solicitation, DLA would evaluate each solicitation using three non-price factors: (1)
Level of Effort/Labor Mix, (2) Key Personnel, and (3) Technical Approach.” AR 72. “Technical
acceptability requires being acceptable for all non-price factors and meeting all requirements” of
the Performance Work Statement (PWS). Id. Originally, the scope of solicitation included seven
(7) tasks: (1) Program Management and Administration Services; (2) Environment Build and
Transition; (3) Execution; (4) Testing, Evaluation, and Documentation; (5) DIBBS Modernization;
(6) Human Performance; and (7) Hypercare, Transition to Post Production Support and Site
Development. AR 20–38. Over the several months before the initial award, DLA amended the
solicitation 11 times. See AR 788 (Amendment 11). The most significant amendment was
Amendment 5, dated September 17, 2025, because it significantly trimmed down the scope of
3
(descoped) the PWS. AR 1786–88. Among other things, Amendment 5 eliminated Task 6 of the
PWS: Human Performance. See AR 688–89.
Another important requirement of the solicitation is that the ERP upgrade requires a
“Hybrid Agile approach.” AR 20. This “Hybrid Agile approach” means “continuous requirements
evaluation, effective integration, testing, evaluation, cybersecurity, implementation, and the use of
automation [in] the development processes, where possible, to help ensure programs and projects
are executed successfully.’” AR 278. The evaluation of Plaintiff’s and Oakland’s “Hybrid Agile”
sections in their proposals also becomes a central question in this bid protest.
On May 30, 2025, offerors ASI and Oakland both submitted timely proposals. See AR
789; 1384. DLA found deficiencies in both proposals during the initial technical evaluation. AR
1590–91; AR 1595. Namely, as DLA informed both Plaintiff and Oakland, the proposals failed
to fulfill PWS Section 3.3 Task 3: Execution by failing to “propose[] a Hybrid Agile Method” and
were “resource intensive based on continuous feedback.” AR 1591; AR 1595.
In answer to DLA’s letters informing each of its proposal deficiencies, Plaintiff and
Oakland provided identical responses in an attempt to remedy their proposals’ flaws. AR 1598–
99; 1678.2 In the section of each response titled “Agile Delivery Components,” both offerors
stated that “‘Business involvement is limited to a few subject matter experts for each Agile team,”
and that “We plan to work side by side with key DLA stakeholders during the design and build
2
The responses are virtually identical, with differences only in capitalization, punctuation, and the
occasional shortening of a word. Compare AR 1598–99 with 1678. Since the responses are
otherwise the same, the Court will refer to them as “identical” throughout this Memorandum and
Order.
4
phases to facilitate real-time decision-making and feedback, improving efficiency and reducing
rework.” AR 1599 (Plaintiff’s response), 1678 (Oakland’s response).3
In July 2025, after reviewing this response, DLA deemed the deficiency in Plaintiff’s
Hybrid Agile Methodology section resolved and found Plaintiff’s proposal technically acceptable.
AR at 1711–12. The Agency explained that “[Plaintiff’s] proposal revision stated that they will
use a Hybrid Agile method coupled with a traditional waterfall delivery. [Plaintiff] stated,
‘Business involvement is limited to a few subject matter experts for each Agile team.’
[H]ighlighting SME’s gets to the right level of support. This deficiency has been resolved.” AR
1711.
Meanwhile, a different team of evaluators at DLA found Oakland’s offer technically
unacceptable, even after reviewing Oakland’s identical response, citing the following reasons:
[T]he vendor does not accurately identify the teams needed. The vendor stated in
their revised proposal, “We plan to work side by side with key DLA stakeholders
during the design and build phases to facilitate real-time decision-making and
feedback, improving efficiency and reducing rework.” DLA stakeholders are the
management layer and may not be the correct team. As a result, the deficiency
remains.
AR 1720; see AR 3115 (detailing how the evaluation team “split up” the work of evaluating the
proposals). On September 17, 2025, in a letter informing Oakland of Amendment 5, DLA once
again highlighted Oakland’s deficiency in its proposed Hybrid Agile Methodology: “The vendor’s
revised proposal . . . satisfied a portion of this deficiency, however the vendor does not accurately
identify the teams needed.” AR 1787. In response, Oakland modified its Hybrid Agile
Methodology section but continued to use the language of “DLA stakeholders.” Compare AR
3
Identical language in procurements involving brand-name SAP services is not unusual and,
according to DLA, even to be expected, as proposals will often use the same subcontractors who
provide this language. See infra at 6 (citing AR 3114).
5
1720 with AR 1996. DLA determined that, while Oakland had “partially addressed” the
deficiency, its Hybrid Agile Methodology section remained deficient, as the proposal failed “to
meet the Government requirement of engaging DLA’s business community at the right level.” AR
2620.
Also during the bidding process, the Department of War team for the Department of
Government Efficiency (DOGE) became involved in the procurement. AR 2631. When
informing the bidders about the final amendment (Amendment 11), on September 26, 2025, DLA
indicated that the DOGE team “is concerned about some of the labor pricing being too high,” and
asked the bidders whether their pricing could be updated. See AR 2631, 2627. Neither Plaintiff
nor Oakland changed their pricing in response. See AR 2643, 2638. While Oakland did not alter
its pricing, it added language to its Hybrid Agile Methodology section while continuing to
highlight “a few subject matter experts for each Agile team” and “key DLA stakeholders.” AR
2650. DLA’s final evaluation of Oakland stated that the continued use of the term “DLA
stakeholders” demonstrated a “material failure” to meet the “requirement of engaging DLA’s
business community at the right level.” AR 2724. DLA therefore determined Oakland’s proposal
was technically unacceptable. Id. On September 29, 2025, DLA awarded ASI, the sole technically
acceptable offeror, the contract for SAP services. AR at 2744–45.
On October 2, 2025, DLA discovered that “[t]he deficiency that [DLA] identified with the
Oakland response was also uncovered [Plaintiff’s] response today.” AR 3110. In internal Agency
correspondence, DLA explained “‘how’ the Tech Eval process missed a key step.” AR at 3114.
The emails mention that DLA typically assumes that the responses in a brand-name software
services procurement like this will all be identical. AR 3114. This is because all bidders usually
6
work with the same subcontractors. Id. In this case, however, that assumption “apparently was
overlooked and therefore escaped the usual parties throughout the process.” Id.
In emails dated October 6, 2025, a DLA site manager asked for confirmation that both
Plaintiff’s and Oakland’s proposals had the same language. AR 3112. He then asked his DLA
team that, if the language is identical, whether “the deficiency language was resolved by both
offerors, and therefore they are both Acceptable, or does the deficiency stand for both offerors,
and therefore they are both Unacceptable.” Id. The response email answers that “[b]ased on the
back and similar language on ‘stakeholder engagement’ then both vendors can be considered
Acceptable.” Id.
The next day, on October 7, DLA issued Plaintiff a stop-work order that explained
“[d]uring post-award review, the Government identified an issue with the evaluation of offers
process which requires corrective action, including re-evaluation of offers.” AR at 3118. In its
response to the stop-work order, Plaintiff stated that, “[i]f this causes you to re-address our award,
we hope and respectfully request that if the Government finds an issue with your evaluation that
ASI [be] given the opportunity to renegotiate through a best and final opportunity.” AR 3121.
DLA then re-evaluated Oakland’s technical proposal and the previously-identified deficiency in
the Hybrid Methodology Approach and determined that the “initial identification of deficiencies
in this area was based on a misinterpretation of the vendor’s approach. This assessment has been
corrected.” AR 3126. DLA subsequently asked both offerors to submit best and final offers,
wherein each could revise any aspect of the proposal. AR 3132, 3135.
The next day, prior to the deadline for best and final offers, ASI submitted an agency-level
protest asserting that its price had been revealed to other offerors, giving the other offerors an
advantage. AR 3161. ASI asked the Agency to cancel the procurement and issue a new
7
solicitation. Id. On October 14, 2026, Agency sustained the protest but did not cancel the
procurement; instead, DLA rescinded the request for best and final offers, declaring that it would
instead re-evaluate the final proposals received prior to the initial award. AR 3171. No party
protested that decision. On October 14, 2025, DLA released the final technical evaluations for
Oakland and ASI. AR 3172–89. It also released an Award Decision Document Addendum (ADD
or Addendum), where it concluded that Oakland’s price was lower, and its proposal was
technically acceptable, so it was therefore the lowest-priced technically acceptable offer. AR
3191–92 (noting Oakland’s offered price of $130,398,773.02 was $4,117,875.42 less than ASI’s
price of $134,516,648.44). Accordingly, DLA terminated the contract with ASI and awarded it to
Oakland. AR 3197–98, 3201. This protest follows.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed its bid protest with this Court. See Complaint. On
October 29, Oakland filed a Motion to Intervene, which the Court granted the same day. See ECF
No. 10 (motion); ECF No. 18 (granting Oakland leave to intervene).
On December 5, 2025, Plaintiff and Intervenor-Defendant filed their Motions for Judgment
on the Administrative Record (MJAR). See ECF Nos. 33 (Oakland MJAR or Oak. MJAR), 34
(Plaintiff’s MJAR or Pl. MJAR). On the same day, Defendant filed its Partial Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. See ECF No. 35 (Defendant’s Partial
Motion to Dismiss and MJAR or Def. Mot.). On December 19, 2025, Defendant and Intervenor-
Defendant filed their Responses to Plaintiff’s MJAR, and Plaintiff filed its Response to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and MJAR. See ECF Nos. 41 (Pl. Resp.), 42 (Def. Resp.), 43
(Oak. Resp). The parties filed their Replies in support of their MJARS on January 5, 2026. ECF
Nos. 45 (Pl. Reply), 46 (Def. Reply), 47 (Oak. Reply). On January 15, 2026, the Court conducted
8
oral argument on the pending motions. See Minute Entry dated January 15, 2026; see also
Transcript dated January 15, 2026 (ECF No. 54) (OA Tr.).
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
In the Court of Federal Claims, bid protests are adjudicated under Rule 52.1(c), which
provides an expedited trial on a “paper record, allowing fact-finding by the trial court.” Rule
52.1(c) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Rule(s)); Bannum, Inc. v. United
States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referencing Rule 56.1, which was replaced by Rule
52.1(c)). Unlike at summary judgment, genuine disputes of material fact do not preclude the Court
from granting a motion for judgment on the administrative record. Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1357.
This Court is empowered to provide any relief, including declaratory or injunctive relief, that it
deems proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2); Oak Grove Techs., LLC v. United States, 116 F.4th 1364,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2024)
i. Blue and Gold
“It is settled law that ‘a party who has the opportunity to object to the terms of a government
solicitation . . . and fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding process waives its ability to raise
the same objection subsequently in a bid protest.’” Newimar S.A. v. United States, 160 Fed. Cl.
97, 121–22 (2022), aff’d, No. 2022-1949, 2023 WL 8534614 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2023) (quoting
Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). This is so even
where “a challenge to the terms of the solicitation” is “characterize[d] . . . as a challenge to the
evaluation of [an awardee's] proposal.” DevTech Sys., 176 Fed. Cl. at 321 (citing Blue & Gold,
492 F.3d at 1313). The Federal Circuit has held that the reasoning of Blue & Gold applies to “all
situations in which the protesting party had the opportunity to challenge a solicitation before the
award and failed to do so.” COMINT Sys. Corp. v. United States, 700 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
9
Accordingly, to preserve a challenge to a procurement action in this Court, a plaintiff must
formally protest the error before the procuring agency, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), or the Court of Federal Claims prior to either the close of bidding or the close of award.
See Bannum, 779 F.3d at 1380; SEKRI, Inc. v. United States, 34 F.4th 1063, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
(citing Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC v. United States, 20 F.4th 759, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2021)) (“[A]
bidder’s ‘timely, formal challenge of the solicitation before [the agency] removes [a] case from
the ambit of Blue & Gold and its progeny.’”).
Any objection to a patent error in the terms of the solicitation should be raised prior to the
close of bidding. Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1313. If knowledge of the error was not possible or
objection not practicable until after the close of bidding, then the challenge may be brought prior
to award. COMINT Sys. Corp., 700 F.3d at 1382. (“To be sure, where bringing the challenge prior
to the award is not practicable, it may be brought thereafter.”). Blue & Gold waiver “only applies
where the protesting party ‘had the opportunity to challenge aspects of a solicitation before the
award but failed to do so.’” Kropp Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 512, 555 (2025)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Couture Hotel Corp., 138 Fed. Cl. 333, 340 (2018)). For this
reason, the Federal Circuit has held that Blue & Gold bars claims which could have been raised
based on information the Plaintiff “knew, or should have known.” Inserso Corp. v. United States,
961 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
ii. Bid Protests
This Court reviews post-award bid protests in two steps. First, the Court analyzes the
procurement under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standard to determine whether the
agency “acted without rational basis or contrary to law when evaluating the bids and awarding the
contract.” Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1351; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4); see Oak Grove Techs., 116 F.4th
10
at 1374. Second, the Court considers whether the alleged errors prejudiced the protestor. DynCorp
Int’l, LLC v. United States, 10 F.4th 1300, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing Bannum, 404 F.3d at
1351).
For the first step, the APA standard requires a reviewing court to determine whether an
agency’s action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). To prevail in a post-award bid protest, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that “(1) ‘the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis’ or (2) ‘the
procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure.’” DynCorp, 10 F.4th at
1308 (quoting WellPoint Mil. Care Corp. v. United States, 953 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).
The Court will consider “whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable
explanation of its exercise of discretion.” Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 992
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Banknote Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).
The agency’s decision lacks a rational basis when the agency “entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or . . . is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view of the product of agency expertise.” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States,
586 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43, 103
S.Ct. 2856). Courts “will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may
reasonably be discerned.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286
(1974)). Indeed, “[a]lthough the inquiry under the APA ‘is to be searching and careful, . . . [t]he
court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’” Insight Pub. Sector,
11
Inc. v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 760, 786 (2022) (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416–20 (1971)). As Federal Circuit has stated, “the disappointed bidder
bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis.” Centech Grp.,
Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Impresa Construzioni Geom.
Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting a similarly high
burden for claims of a violation of regulation or procedure, which must involve “a clear . . .
violation of applicable statutes or regulations”)). Consistent with this high burden, agency
decisions are “entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1338 (citing Bowen
v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626–27 (1986)).
At step two, the Court evaluates the factual question of prejudice. Sys. Stud. & Simulation,
Inc. v. United States, 22 F.4th 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2021); WellPoint Mil. Care Corp. v. United
States, 953 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2020). A protestor establishes prejudice by showing “that
there was a ‘substantial chance’ it would have received the contract award but for that error.” Sys.
Stud. & Simulation, 22 F.4th at 998 (quoting Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1353); see also REV, LLC v.
United States, 91 F.4th 1156, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (noting that a disappointed bidder must have
“had greater than an insubstantial chance of securing the contract” (quoting Info. Tech. &
Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). In other words, the
disappointed bidder must have been “within the zone of active consideration.” Colonial Press
Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 788 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Statistica, Inc. v.
Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see Frawner Corp. v. United States, 161 Fed.
Cl. 420, 455 (2022) (explaining that protestors must show that “barring the error the protestor
would have been ‘within the zone of active consideration.’” (quoting Off. Design Grp. v. United
States, 951 F.3d 1366, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2020))). Only if a protestor has established prejudice
12
can it prevail. DevTech Sys., Inc. v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 297, 313 (2025); see also Sys.
Stud. & Simulation, 22 F.4th at 998 (noting that there is no presumption of prejudice following a
procurement error by an agency).
iii. Injunctive Relief
The Court considers four factors when deciding whether to grant injunctive relief: (1)
whether the plaintiff has succeeded on the merits, (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
harm if the court withholds injunctive relief, (3) whether the balance of hardships to the respective
parties favors granting an injunction, and (4) whether the public interest is served by granting an
injunction. See Centech Grp., 554 F.3d at 1037. Success on the merits is “the most important
factor required to enjoin the award of [a] contract.” Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1312.
DISCUSSION
The Court will first address Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss before moving on to
the arguments in the parties’ MJARs. Plaintiff’s Complaint contends that DLA’s elimination of
elements of the solicitation (descoping) has resulted in a solicitation which does not reflect the
Agency’s minimum needs. Compl. ¶ 55. Defendant’s Motion argues that Plaintiff has waived this
challenge under Blue & Gold. See Def. Mot. at 6–7.4 For the reasons stated below, the Court
concludes that Defendant is correct: by waiting until after the close of bidding and after the initial
award, Plaintiff has waived any challenge to the descoping of the solicitation.
Next, the Court will turn to the arguments in the parties’ MJARs. In its MJAR, Plaintiff
makes three arguments that DLA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious: (i) DLA treated Plaintiff
unfairly by failing to host equal discussions, (ii) DLA was contradictory and lacked explanation
4
Citations throughout this Memorandum and Order correspond to the ECF-assigned page
numbers, which do not always correspond to the pagination within the document.
13
for its award to Oakland and determination that Oakland’s proposal was acceptable, and (iii)
DLA’s award to Oakland was improperly based on a solicitation that was descoped to the point of
failing to meet the Agency’s minimum needs. The Court finds that DLA’s actions in all three
areas had a rational basis; furthermore, Plaintiff has not shown prejudice. As a result, the Court
denies Plaintiff injunctive relief.
I. Partial Motion to Dismiss
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s challenges to the descoping of the solicitation as
waived under Blue & Gold. See Def. Mot. at 6–7.5 Defendant argues that since Plaintiff did not
challenge any of the changes to the scope of the solicitation before September 26, 2025, (the close
of bidding for the initial award), Plaintiff has waived this challenge. Id. As Defendant puts it:
“ASI waited until bidding had closed, an award had been made, and corrective action had been
announced before it submitted an agency-level protest.” Def. Reply at 4. Meanwhile, Plaintiff
maintains it preserved its challenge to the descoping through its formal agency-level post-award
protest on October 9, 2025. Pl. Resp at 9 (citing AR 3161). This agency-level protest letter argues,
among other things, that “DLA’s corrective action is insufficient,” raises the issue that the
procurement “no longer reflects [the] Agency’s minimum requirements,” and requests that DLA
“cancel[] the solicitation and issu[e] a new solicitation that reflects the Agency’s current needs.”
AR 3161–62. That this challenge occurred only after the Agency initially awarded Plaintiff the
5
Originally, in Count I of its Complaint, Plaintiff also disputed DLA’s decision to take corrective
action at all. See Compl. ¶¶ 37–47. At oral argument, however, the parties agreed that Count I
can be set aside as an issue in this case. See OA Tr. 47:20 (Plaintiff’s counsel agreeing that it is
not pursuing Count I); 47:24–48:5 (Parties agreeing that the issue can be set aside). The Court
therefore denies this portion of the Government’s Motion as moot. See Chapman L. Firm Co. v.
Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934, 939 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating an issue is moot if “during the
course of litigation, it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions
originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue”).
14
contract does not matter in Plaintiff’s eyes: according to it, Blue & Gold is “simply not implicated”
because DLA reopened the Solicitation during corrective action. Pl. Reply at 12. Finally, Plaintiff
accuses the Government of “myopically focusing” on the descoping challenge. Pl. Resp. at 11.
Instead, Plaintiff reframes its descoping challenge as merely saying that DLA “fail[ed] to consider
another important aspect of the problem besides its arbitrary and unexplained evaluation flip-
flop—that the Solicitation is flawed and does not reflect the [a]gency’s actual needs.” Id. (citing
Compl. ¶¶ 48–63).
The Court agrees with Defendant. For challenges to an evident error in the terms of a
solicitation, “it is settled law” that Blue & Gold sets a deadline of “prior to the close of the bidding
process.” Newimar S.A. v. United States, 160 Fed. Cl. 97, 121 (2022), aff’d, No. 2022-1949, 2023
WL 8534614 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2023) (citing Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1313). Applied in the
present action, this means Plaintiff needed to raise its objections to the elimination of certain terms
of the PWS by September 26, 2025—the deadline for close of bidding set by the last solicitation
amendment. See AR 788. Plaintiff’s attempts to reframe its challenge as a challenge to DLA’s
evaluation rather than the terms of the solicitation are fruitless. The Blue and Gold deadline of the
close of bidding applies even where “a challenge to the terms of the solicitation” is “characterize[d]
. . . as a challenge to the evaluation of [an awardee’s] proposal.” Blue and Gold, 492, F.3d at 1313;
see DevTech, 176 Fed. Cl. at 321.
Nor does the decision to take corrective action extend Plaintiff’s Blue & Gold deadline.
Although COMINT extended the period of time to file some bid protest challenges until after the
close of bidding or even after award, it conditioned this extension to cases where it was “not
practicable” for a protestor to challenge beforehand. 700 F.3d at 1382. Here, however, there is no
question that Plaintiff had the opportunity to challenge the descoping earlier, before either the close
15
of bidding or before the first award; Plaintiff did neither. Upon receipt of Amendment 5 on
September 17, 2025, Plaintiff knew of significant changes to the scope of the solicitation. See AR
1726 (informing Plaintiff that “Amendment 5 makes necessary PWS reductions”); AR 1749–52
(showing the elimination of Task 6: Human Performance in the PWS). Plaintiff then had the
opportunity to object to the terms of Amendment 5 when it submitted its proposal in response to
Amendment 5. See AR 1846, 1894; see also OA Tr. 13:4–5 (Plaintiff’s counsel stating that
“[T]here’s nothing in the record that has a protest at the time of [A]mendment 5.”). From
September 18 to the close of bidding on September 26, Plaintiff additionally submitted responses
to Amendments 7, 8, and 11. See AR 2075, 2078, 2630. At no time during these communications
did Plaintiff object to the descoping. Only after winning, and then losing, the award did Plaintiff
complain. This is precisely the kind of wait-and-see approach that is unacceptable in bid protests.
Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1314 (“A waiver rule thus prevents contractors from taking advantage
of the government and other bidders, and avoids costly after-the-fact litigation.”). “Having
[waited], [Plaintiff] cannot now . . . restart the bidding process and get a second bite at the apple.”
COMINT, 700 F.3d at 1383 (internal quotations omitted).6
Plaintiff’s agency-level protest later did not preserve its challenge to the descoping,
because it came too late. Plaintiff was content to remain silent after it won the first award and only
protested the terms of the work it accepted after receiving a stop-work order. See AR 3117 (Stop-
Work Order dated October 7, 2025), AR 3161 (agency-level protest dated October 9, 2025). In
sum, Plaintiff was silent in victory and now demurs in defeat. Plaintiff thus waived its objection
6
Aside from fairness, another “policy behind the forfeiture rule,” is to save agency resources by
raising remediable issues early on. Inserso, 961 F.3d at 1352. In contrast, here Plaintiff is “seeking
the relief it could have gotten from [the Agency] earlier, before [the Agency] had already expended
considerable time and effort evaluating the bidders’ proposals.” Id.
16
to changes to the scope of the solicitation. See Inserso, 961 F.3d at 1349; COMINT, 700 F.3d at
1382; Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1315.
II. Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record
In its MJAR, Plaintiff argues that the Agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by (i)
failing to afford Plaintiff equal discussions during corrective action, (ii) determining Oakland’s
proposal was acceptable during corrective action, and (iii) awarding based on a descoped
solicitation that did not meet the Agency’s minimum needs. Plaintiff argues that it should be
granted injunctive relief. Defendant responds that, because Plaintiff’s proposal was always
considered acceptable, there was no need to conduct discussions with Plaintiff. Instead, DLA
argues that the correct remedy for disparate treatment of Oakland was exactly the course of action
that DLA undertook: reevaluation of both proposals, this time using a consistent standard. Finally,
Defendant argues that, even if Plaintiff had not waived its challenge to the descoping under Blue
& Gold, that Plaintiff has not sufficiently overcome the presumption that the government is in the
best position to determine its own needs. Intervenor-Defendant Oakland supports Defendant’s
arguments that Defendant acted rationally and in accordance with law, and accordingly asserts that
Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief.7 The Court agrees with Defendant and Oakland and
finds that it acted with a rational basis on all three issues.
A. Unequal Discussions
“When procedural violations committed by the agency are egregiously removed from
fairness, this constitutes an abuse of the agency’s administrative discretion.” Progressive Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 457, 477 (2016) (citing Doty v. United States, 53 F.3d 1244,
7
As Oakland’s briefing, for the most part, supports Defendant’s position using similar arguments,
the Court primarily references Defendant’s briefing throughout this Memorandum and Order.
17
1251 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Uneven treatment” of offerors may constitute a violation of the “standard
of equality and fair-play that is a necessary underpinning of the federal government’s procurement
process” and may “amount[] to an abuse of the agency’s discretion.” PGBA, LLC v. United States,
60 Fed. Cl. 196, 207 (2004) (citing Doty, 53 F.3d at 1251). Here, Plaintiff asserts that DLA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously because it held multiple discussions with Oakland but not with
Plaintiff, therefore purportedly denying Plaintiff an equal opportunity to respond to the Agency’s
concerns about the Hybrid Agile Methodology portion of its proposal. Pl. MJAR at 22–23. In
other words, Plaintiff contends that since both ASI and Oakland had an unresolved material
deficiency, but only Oakland was given an opportunity to resolve that deficiency through multiple
discussions, DLA treated ASI unequally. Id.; Pl. Reply at 9. In support of its argument, Plaintiff
cites FAR 15.306(d)(3), which details how discussions should at minimum inform the offeror of
its deficiencies. Id. at 10. Plaintiff also notes that “where an [a]gency engages in such exchanges
in the context of a GSA Schedule procurement, they must be meaningful and equal.” Id. at 10–11
(citing Centerra Grp., LLC v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 407, 411, 414 (2018)); Ernst & Young,
LLP v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 475, 515–17 (2018)). According to Plaintiff, whether the
supposed inequality was inadvertent does not matter; “inadvertency is irrelevant in assessing
whether discussions were misleading.” Pl. Reply at 10 (citing8 Analytical & Rsch. Tech., 39 Fed.
Cl. 34, 48 (1997); see also Analytical & Rsch. Tech., 39 Fed. Cl. at 48 (quoting SRS Techs., B-
254425, 94-2 CPD ¶ 125, 1994 WL 576118 at *3 (Comp. Gen. Sep. 14, 1994)) (“An agency may
not inadvertently mislead an offeror, through the framing of a discussion question, into responding
8
While Plaintiff attributes this quotation to Analytical & Rsch. Tech., this precise quotation does
not appear in that case. See 39 Fed. Cl. at 48. The line appears to come from Caddell Constr. Co.
v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 30, 46 (2016), which also cites Analytical & Rsch. Tech.
18
in a manner that does not address the agency’s concerns; or that misinforms the offeror concerning
its proposal weaknesses or deficiencies; or the government’s requirements.”).
Plaintiff’s argument hinges on the premise that both Plaintiff’s proposal and Oakland’s
proposal contained identical, deficient language. Plaintiff emphasizes parts of the record where
individual DLA employees (not including the contracting officer) seem to indicate, upon first
glance, that Plaintiff’s proposal language was deficient. See Pl.’s Resp. at 8 (citing AR 3110 (“The
deficiency that we identified with the Oakland response was also uncovered in the ASI response
today.”)); AR at 3112 (“After the award it was noticed by one of the staff that we had not called
out a similar language deficiency ‘Stakeholder’ for ASI and therefore they were not tasked to fix
their language”)).
In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s argument fails because DLA never found
Plaintiff’s proposal to be deficient. Def. Resp. at 3, 5. Before corrective action, Plaintiff was
deemed acceptable and awarded the contract. AR 2744–45. After the stop-work order and the
start of corrective action, DLA again found Plaintiff’s offer acceptable in the final technical
evaluation and the final award decision addendum. See AR 3172, 3191. As for the internal emails,
Defendant’s counsel argued that the emails were not “made in the context of making an evaluation
determination or . . . an award decision.” OA Tr. 61:2–4. Nor, Defendant argues, do the emails
reflect a determination that the proposals themselves are deficient; rather, they identify a more
ambiguous “deficiency language.” Def. Resp. at 3–4. Defendant concludes that as Plaintiff was
not deficient, there was no reason to give it an “opportunity” to fix a non-existent deficiency. Id.
at 3.
After reviewing the record and applicable law, the Court agrees with the Defendant; DLA
did not treat Plaintiff unequally. There are two reasons Plaintiff’s argument fails here. First,
19
Plaintiff’s line of reasoning relies on its unsupported assertion that its own proposal had a
deficiency about which it should have been informed and given the opportunity to amend.9 Putting
aside the peculiarity of a bid protestor arguing that its proposal should have been deemed
unacceptable for award, the record indicates otherwise. Indeed, context matters. While DLA
internal emails colloquially refer to a “deficiency” or “deficiency language” found in Plaintiff’s
proposal, such email language is always in the context of investigating the potentially disparate
treatment of Plaintiff and Oakland. See AR 3110 (“The deficiency that we identified with the
Oakland response was also uncovered in the ASI response today”); AR 3112 (“After the award it
was noticed by one of the staff that we had not called out a similar language deficiency
‘Stakeholder’ for ASI”). Moreover, these internal emails, while contemporaneous, are not
determinative evaluations of either Plaintiff’s or Oakland’s proposal. See Eisenhower Real Est.
Holdings, LLC v. United States, 139 Fed. Cl. 491, 496 (2018) (internal agency communications
that “reflect internal confusion” over procurement do not constitute an agency decision). All
official Agency evaluations of Plaintiff’s proposal consistently deem it acceptable. See AR 1711,
3172, 3191.
Overall, the record demonstrates that DLA’s favorable evaluation of Plaintiff remained
constant; and as so, there was no need to ask it to revise its proposal or to conduct discussions to
that end. See Unisys Corp. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 126, 140–41 (2009) (holding discussions
with only one offeror “did not violate the requirement of fundamental unfairness” that applies in
9
Although Plaintiff complains that it had no chance to revise its proposal during corrective action,
DLA abandoned its plan to let offerors submit amended proposals during corrective action in
response to Plaintiff’s own objection during the agency-level protest that doing so would put
Plaintiff at a disadvantage, since its pricing had been revealed. AR 3171.
20
FAR Subpart 8.4 procurements when discussions would not have helped protester); see also
Garrett Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 163 Fed. Cl. 632, 661 (2023) (noting that discussions should
be “meaningful and “should generally address weaknesses or deficiencies in an offeror’s proposal
that, unless corrected, would preclude award.” (internal citations omitted)); Integrated Fin. & Acct.
Sols., LLC v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 475, 491 (2022) (discussions not subject to FAR Part 15
requirements during Subpart 8.4 procurements as long as discussions do not create
“unfairness”); see also Centerra Grp., LLC v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 407, 415 (2018) (“The
caselaw from this court is also generally supportive of testing discussions undertaken during FSS
procurements by the fairness principles enshrined in FAR Part 15, although adherence to FAR Part
15 procedures is not required.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that DLA acted reasonably and
fairly when it conducted multiple discussions with Oakland and not Plaintiff, whose proposal DLA
had consistently deemed acceptable.
B. Reevaluation of Oakland as Acceptable
Plaintiff further objects to DLA’s award to Oakland and claims that in so doing, DLA
“contradicted its previous, repeated conclusions that this deficiency rendered a proposal
unacceptable and simply decided both offerors could be found acceptable without any explanation
or attempt to reconcile the conflicting evaluations.” Pl. MJAR at 20. Again relying on the
unsupported notion that Plaintiff’s own proposal was deficient, Plaintiff argues that restoring
Oakland’s evaluation to the same favorable outcome as that of its twin was entirely backwards,
because “the record is clear that the problem was always with the evaluation of ASI’s proposal.”
Pl. Reply at 8 (citations omitted). Plaintiff emphasizes the fact that Oakland’s proposal was denied
three times during the procurement process. Pl. Resp. at 6, n.2; OA Tr. 79:17–20. As a result,
Plaintiff contends that DLA appears to have arbitrarily ignored Oakland’s deficiency. Pl. MJAR
at 21. In this manner, according to Plaintiff, DLA violated the “fundamental precept that an
21
unacceptable proposal cannot serve as the basis for a contract award.” Id. (citing E.W. Bliss Co.
v. United States, 77 F.3d 445, 448 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
In addition, Plaintiff claims that DLA’s explanation for finding both its proposal and
Oakland’s proposal acceptable is flimsy, as the only contemporaneous explanation was the “rushed
email from an evaluation team member that was sitting on another panel.” Id. (citing AR 3112).
Instead, Plaintiff argues, Defendant relies on a brand new post-hoc justification for finding
Oakland acceptable in the Award Decision Document Addendum (AR at 3190–91), which states
that DLA’s identification of the deficiency was due to its “misinterpretation of vendor’s approach.”
Id. at 22. Plaintiff states that this explanation “is found nowhere else in the record and conflicts
with the repeated evaluation findings from the technical evaluation board.” Id. (citing AR 3114–
15; AR 3190–91).
In response, DLA argues that the internal emails reflect that the Agency recognized and
then explained how the disparate treatment in the evaluation occurred. Def. Resp. at 3–4; see also
AR 3114 (referencing how the DLA “missed a key step,” “overlooked” a common assumption of
SAP contracts, and had split up evaluation teams). Additionally, Defendant reiterates that DLA
did not deem Plaintiff’s proposal deficient at any point. See Def. Resp. at 3; OA Tr. 63:5–7 (“[T]he
[A]gency’s position now and in its ultimate determination is that there is no deficiency.”). DLA
states that, while the explanation for the ultimate outcome of the corrective reevaluation of the
Hybrid Methodology Language is “admittedly spare,” it nevertheless is present in the record. Id.
at 4. First, in its final evaluation of Oakland’s proposal, after corrective action, DLA explained
that “‘[t]he initial identification of deficiencies in this area was based on a misinterpretation of the
vendor’s approach.’” Def. Reply at 3 (quoting AR 3185). Second, in the original evaluation of
22
Plaintiff’s remedied Hybrid Agile Methodology section, DLA explained in more detail why this
language could be considered acceptable:
Vendor’s proposal revision stated that they will use a Hybrid Agile method coupled
with a traditional waterfall delivery. Vendor stated “Business involvement is
limited to a few subject matter experts for each Agile Team.” Highlighting [subject
matter experts] gets to the right level of support. This deficiency has been resolved.
AR 1711. Therefore, Defendant argues that applying this standard equally and deeming Oakland
acceptable merely remedied the disparate treatment Oakland had previously received. Def. Resp.
at 2.
The Court finds that DLA acted rationally when, during its self-initiated corrective action,
it considered Oakland acceptable and subsequently awarded it the contract. The Court first notes
that the final technical evaluation of Oakland is “entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Impresa,
238 F.3d at 1338 (citing Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626–27 (1986)). When
examining the record for DLA’s rational basis, the Court “will uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at
43 (citation omitted).
Here, the parties agree that the language at issue in both proposals was completely
identical. See Def. Mot. at 10; Oak. Resp. at 4; OA Tr. 15:10, 72:16. Yet, at the time of the first
award, only Plaintiff’s was deemed acceptable. Internal DLA emails then reflect its self-
identification of its disparate treatment of Oakland and Plaintiff. AR 3115 (“[T]he tech evals were
different but should have been the same”). The record also identifies two reasons for the
discrepancy: (i) DLA “missed a key step” when it “overlooked” a common assumption of SAP
contracts (that the language is usually identical); and (ii) the evaluation teams were split up for
expediency, resulting in different personnel conducting Oakland’s and Plaintiff’s evaluations. AR
3114, 3115. The result was a “misinterpretation” of Oakland’s proposed Hybrid Agile approach.
23
AR 3185. Once DLA discovered there was identical language in both, it engaged in corrective
action to correct the “issue” with the evaluations. AR 3118.
A reasonable explanation for why the same language at issue should be deemed acceptable
also appears in the record, twice. First, in an earlier evaluation, Plaintiff’s Hybrid Agile
Methodology section was determined to be acceptable because it “highlight[ed] [subject matter
experts]” which “gets to the right level of support.” AR 1711. Plaintiff acknowledges that this
initial evaluation of its proposal language as acceptable had a rational basis. OA Tr. 75:1 (“Yes,
there is a basis there”), 75:5 (affirming “Right,” in response to the Court’s inquiry that there is “[a]
rational basis for finding ASI’s proposal technically acceptable in this regard.”). Meanwhile,
Oakland, which used identical language and also referenced “subject matter experts” on its Agile
teams, was penalized for not identifying the “correct team.” AR 1787. Later, in its final technical
evaluations contemporaneous with the Award Decision Addendum, DLA’s evaluation of
Plaintiff’s proposal reiterates the reasoning for finding the language acceptable. See AR 3175.
The lowest-price, technically acceptable award formula did the rest; Oakland’s lower price merited
the award. AR 3192.
Nor do DLA’s final technical evaluations constitute post-hoc reasoning, as Plaintiff claims;
instead they reflect contemporaneous evaluations, released with the award decision addendum.
The Agency is entitled to rely on its evaluation documents in its decision making, and that reliance
is “entitled to a presumption of regularity.” Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1338 (citing Bowen v. Am. Hosp.
Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626–27 (1986)). Accordingly, the record demonstrates that—contrary to
Plaintiff’s assertion that the record is “without any explanation [for the final outcome of the
evaluations] or attempt to reconcile the conflicting evaluations”—DLA has explained its initial
24
error, the reason for that error, and the rational basis for the outcome of its corrective re-evaluation.
Pl. MJAR at 20.
C. Awarding on the Descoped Solicitation
Finally, Plaintiff argues that when DLA reevaluated and awarded to Oakland based on a
purportedly inadequate solicitation, DLA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. Pl. Resp. at 11.
Even if Plaintiff had not waived this argument under Blue & Gold (which it did, see supra I), it
still would fail on the merits.
Plaintiff claims that DLA has “fail[ed] to amend the solicitation to reflect the Agency’s
actual minimum needs” in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Pl. MJAR at 8. Plaintiff surmises
that DLA “arbitrarily descoped critical tasking . . . based on the demands of DOGE employees that
had no connection to DLA and no understanding of DLA’s requirements for the ERP platform
overhaul.” Id. at 19 (citing AR at 3565).10 In support of this view, Plaintiff points to the fact that
the Agency descoped approximately 30% of the work under the original PWS. Pl. MJAR at 25.
The work removed included “change management, training, and organizational alignment,” which
are “essential” to the modernization of the ERP platform, as they “ensure that users can effectively
use the upgraded platform.” Id. (citing AR 688–91). The descoped work included circulating
training material, ensuring profiles are created, and preparing users for Go Live, all of which are
purportedly “baseline” requirements. Id. As support for categorizing these tasks as “baseline,”
Plaintiff seems to say that it is self-evident, and supported by the Government’s indication that it
intends to provide some of these services itself. Pl. Reply at 13 (“The fact that DLA acknowledges
that it still intends to provide this training is empirical evidence that it is indeed a baseline
10
At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that, according to the record, DOGE did not look
at the technical evaluations or technical proposals. See OA Tr. 11:7–12.
25
requirement.”). Procuring these services from another source would, according to Plaintiff, be
“irrational,” because consolidation would permit “far greater efficiencies.” Pl. MJAR at 26.
Furthermore, according to Plaintiff, procuring elsewhere would cost “significantly more money,
leading to a less efficient and effective outcome, and, in turn, a less effective use of taxpayer
funds.” Id. at 26–27. Plaintiff again surmises, without any citation to the record, that “DLA does
not have the manpower or resources to accomplish all of the tasks that were descoped.” Id. at 26.
Plaintiff points out that, despite Defendant’s claims that it could accomplish some of these services
itself, DLA’s Limited Source Justification states that only SAP Public Services, Inc., or its
authorized providers can fulfill the procurement’s requirements, due to the proprietary nature of
SAP software. Pl. Reply at 13 (citing AR 6).
Defendant replies that Plaintiff has not explained why the two areas descoped (training
materials and assessments of the modernization effort on users) are “baseline.” Def. Resp. at 7.
Even if these categories were necessary, Defendant adds, “the solicitation does still require training
development in several ways.” Id. (citing AR 679, 687). “More to the point, DLA is in the best
position to evaluate its needs.” Id. at 7–8 (citing Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 150
Fed. Cl. 307, 318 (2020)). Defendant explains that “DLA will offset these reductions through
increased insourcing and active involvement by the existing Government workforce.” Id. at 8. At
bottom, however, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is essentially arguing that the Agency is
prejudiced by the descoping which the Agency itself determined was necessary and appropriate.
Id. at 8–9.
Defendant is correct. “[D]etermining an agency’s minimum needs ‘is a matter within the
broad discretion of agency officials . . . and is not for [the] court to second guess.’” Savantage
Fin. Servs. 595 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Wit Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 62
26
Fed. Cl. 657, 662 (2004)). For Plaintiff to successfully demonstrate that DLA’s determination was
improper, the decision must be “so plainly unjustified as to lack a rational basis.” Id. at 1287.
Plaintiff has not met that standard here. Whether DLA will practice greater or lesser efficiency by
consolidating or eliminating tasks, does not show a lack of any rational basis. Although Plaintiff
lists many tasks that were descoped, Plaintiff has not established that these are minimum, must-
have requirements of the solicitation. See Pl. MJAR at 25–26; Pl. Reply at 13.
Even if Plaintiff is correct that some of the descoped tasks cannot be accomplished in-
house because they require a licensed provider of SAP services, it has not established that these
tasks need to be accomplished at all. Assuming that the Court were to concur that some sort of
training is a baseline requirement, it cannot substitute its own judgment for DLA’s as to how much
training is required—and, as Defendant points out, the solicitation still retains some training
requirements. Def. Resp. at 7 (citing AR at 679, 687); see Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of
the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 30 (1983) (“[A] court is not
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”); Lacavera v. Dudas, 441 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (same). All in all, given the deference proper to an agency’s determinations of its own
needs, DLA is in a far better position to determine its own basic needs than Plaintiff or the Court.
Accordingly, even assuming that Plaintiff did not wave its descoping argument under Blue & Gold,
Plaintiff still cannot prevail on the merits of this argument.
D. Prejudice
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that DLA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious,
Plaintiff would still not be able to sustain its protest because it has not demonstrated that it has
suffered prejudice. As noted, in reviewing every bid protest, the Court must consider whether the
alleged errors prejudiced the protestor. DynCorp Int’l 10 F.4th at 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing
Bannum, 404 F.3d at 1351); see supra at 12. Plaintiff contends that finding both “technically
27
unacceptable” proposals to be acceptable was prejudicial because “[b]ut for that error, ASI would
either have retained its award or DLA would have reopened discussions with ASI.” Pl. Reply at
11 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff also contends that finding both proposals unacceptable would
still prejudice it because “ASI has not been afforded an equal opportunity to address the deficiency
through discussions. Either way, ASI is prejudiced.” Id.
The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument for several reasons. First, Plaintiff has not
sufficiently tied its harm to the action it challenges. “The correction of an error must yield a
different result in order for that error to have been harmful and thus prejudice a substantial right.”
Am. Relocation Connections, L.L.C. v. United States, 789 F. App'x 221, 228 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In
other words, plaintiffs must show “harm specific to the asserted error.” G4S Secure Integration
LLC v. United States, 159 Fed. Cl. 249, 262 (2022) (citing Labatt, 577 F.3d at 1381). Here,
Plaintiff’s path to prejudice is long and “requires jumping through multiple theoretical hoops.” Id.
at 254. As Plaintiff’s counsel described in oral argument, “If [the Agency] say[s] [the proposal]
[is] deficient and we’re going to give ASI an opportunity to respond to them in that scenario,
[Plaintiff] could answer it in a way that satisfied them.” OA Tr. 34:15–19. Said differently, if the
Court enjoined performance of the contract and declared that DLA was incorrect for failing to
evaluate Plaintiff and Oakland as both deficient, and the Agency decided to cancel the solicitation
or reopen discussions, and Plaintiff corrected its deficiency and/or lowered its price, then it is
possible that Plaintiff would win the award. “This mere possibility does not meet the bar the
Federal Circuit set for prejudice.” G4S Secure Integration, 159 Fed. Cl. at 258. (citing Bannum,
404 F.3d at 1358).
Indeed, Plaintiff’s position becomes wholly untenable by the simple fact that both Oakland
and Plaintiff had identical language in their Hybrid Agile Methodology sections, and so their
28
technical evaluations rise and fall together. Compare AR 1598–99 with 1678. For this reason, as
Defendant suggests, Plaintiff is in a double-bind: if Plaintiff’s proposal is acceptable, then
Oakland’s is acceptable as well, and Plaintiff rightly lost the procurement based on the lowest-
priced technically acceptable formula. Def. Resp. at 5. On the other hand, if Plaintiff’s proposal
is deficient, then it has no standing to protest, as it never would have won. Id. For this reason, it
is incomprehensible that finding the Hybrid Agile Methodology language unacceptable for
Oakland would have allowed Plaintiff, who shared that language, to have “retained its award.” Pl.
Reply at 11.
The same principle applies to Plaintiff’s argument that it was purportedly prejudiced by its
lack of discussions with DLA. If the language was never deficient, then ASI could not have been
prejudiced by not being given an opportunity to address a non-existent deficiency. If Plaintiff’s
proposal language ought to have been deemed deficient but was not, then it “benefitted from the
same error,” as Oakland, and so has suffered no prejudice. DevTech, 176 Fed. Cl. at 325–26; see
G4S Secure Integration, 159 Fed. Cl. at 258 (citing Safeguard Base Operations, LLC v. United
States, 989 F.3d 1326, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[W]hen an agency waives requirements equally for
different offerors, no prejudice results.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff was not prejudiced, and “non-
prejudicial errors in a bid process do not automatically invalidate a procurement.” Labatt Food
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
E. Injunctive Relief
The Court considers four factors when deciding whether to grant injunctive relief: (1)
whether the plaintiff has succeeded on the merits, (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
harm if the court withholds injunctive relief, (3) whether the balance of hardships to the respective
parties favors granting an injunction, and (4) whether the public interest is served by granting an
injunction. Centech, 554 F.3d at 1037. Success on the merits is “the most important factor
29
required to enjoin the award of [a] contract.” Blue & Gold, 492 F.3d at 1312; see Obsidian Sols.
Grp., LLC v. United States, 54 F.4th 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“There can be no injunctive
relief without a corresponding prevailing claim.”). In other words, a “plaintiff who cannot
demonstrate success upon the merits cannot prevail upon a motion for injunctive relief.” Insight
Pub. Sector, Inc. v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 760, 817 (2022) (quoting By Light Pro. IT Servs.,
Inc. v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 358, 367 (2017)); see also Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 999
(“[P]roving success on the merits is a necessary element for a permanent injunction.”). Here,
Plaintiff has not shown it is entitled to succeed on the merits; therefore, the Court denies its request
for injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for
Judgment on the Administrative Record (ECF No. 34). The Court GRANTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART AS MOOT Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 35), and
GRANTS Defendant and Intervenor-Defendant Oakland’s Motions for Judgment on the
Administrative Record (ECF Nos. 35 and 33). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter
Judgment accordingly.
The parties are directed to CONFER and FILE a Notice by February 13, 2026, attaching
a proposed public version of this Sealed Memorandum and Order, with any competition-sensitive
or otherwise protected information redacted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Eleni M. Roumel
ELENI M. ROUMEL
Judge
Washington, D.C.
January 30, 2026
30