Kary Jarvis v. City of Daytona Beach

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-13456

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

KARY JARVIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant,

versus

CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,

a Florida Municipal Corporation,

Defendant-Cross Appellee,

MARVILLE TUCKER,

in his official capacity and also, individually,

JAMES MACKENZIE,

in his official capacity and also, individually,

Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellees.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:23-cv-00508-JSS-RMN

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

Before KIDD, ANDERSON, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Marville Tucker and James Mackenzie appeal the district

court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on several

claims and Kary Jarvis cross-appeals the court’s denial of his motion

for summary judgment. We address each issue in turn. We write

only for the parties who are already familiar with the facts. For that

reason, we include only such facts as are necessary to understand

our opinion.

I. FACTS

Jarvis alleged the following relevant facts. Tucker and Mac-

kenzie, city police officers, conducted a traffic stop of Jarvis’s vehi-

cle while dispatched pursuant to an anonymous tip. After conclud-

ing the traffic stop and delivering Jarvis a written warning, the Of-

ficers asked Jarvis for consent to search his vehicle, which he de-

clined, but they attempted to search his vehicle anyway. During

the Officers’ search, Jarvis started driving the vehicle. Tucker and

Mackenzie attempted to stop Jarvis from driving away, causing

Tucker to hang from the moving vehicle, and ultimately causing

the car to veer off the road and crash into a tree. Jarvis was ar-

rested, his car was subject to an inventory search, and he was later

charged with aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, ag-

gravated fleeing, resisting an officer with violence, destroy-

ing/tampering with physical evidence, possession of THC oil, pos-

session of narcotic paraphernalia, and carrying a concealed electric

weapon. A state court judge granted Jarvis’s motion to suppress

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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 3

the evidence obtained from the search and the state’s attorney gen-

eral officer terminated the criminal proceedings against Jarvis in his

favor.

Jarvis filed suit against Tucker, Mackenzie, and the City of

Daytona Beach, asserting a total of fifteen claims against the de-

fendants under both federal and state law. Specifically, he asserted

claims for false arrest under state and federal law; unlawful deten-

tion and search; municipal liability; state and federal invasion of pri-

vacy; excessive force; malicious prosecution under both state and

federal law; negligence; vicarious liability assault; and conversion.

All parties moved for summary judgment. The district court

granted the City’s motion, denied Jarvis’s motion, and granted in

part and denied in part the motion filed by Tucker and Mackenzie.

Tucker and Mackenzie appealed the district court’s order and Jarvis

filed a cross-appeal against both the Officers and the City.

II. JURISDICTION

This Court issued jurisdictional questions asking the parties

to address (1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over Tucker and

Mackenzie’s appeal from the district court’s October 19 summary

judgment order, and (2) whether this Court should exercise pen-

dent appellate jurisdiction over Jarvis’s cross-appeal. On the same

day that this Court issued its jurisdictional questions in this case,

Tucker and Mackenzie moved to dismiss Jarvis’s cross-appeal for

lack of jurisdiction. They argue that their interlocutory appeal

may proceed immediately prior to the entry of a final judgment

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

because it concerns the district court’s denial of their immunity de-

fenses as to Counts 5, 12, and 15. They contend that this excep-

tion—allowing an interlocutory appeal for denials of qualified im-

munity—does not extend to Jarvis’s cross-appeal and that his ap-

peal is premature in the absence of a final judgment. Accordingly,

Tucker and Mackenzie ask this Court to dismiss Jarvis’s cross-ap-

peal for lack of jurisdiction. Jarvis responds to the motion to dis-

miss that this Court has jurisdiction over his cross-appeal “pursuant

to the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction.” He argues that

the immunity issues raised in Tucker and Mackenzie’s appeal are

“sufficiently related to and intertwined with” his cross-appeal, such

that this Court has jurisdiction over the cross-appeal.

Appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to final decisions

of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v.

City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that

an order is appealable if it is either final or falls into a specific class

of interlocutory orders made appealable by statute or jurispruden-

tial exception). “A final decision is typically one that ends the liti-

gation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but ex-

ecute its judgment.” Acheron Cap., Ltd. v. Mukamal, 22 F.4th 979,

986 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). An order that dis-

poses of fewer than all claims against all parties to an action is gen-

erally not final or immediately appealable. Supreme Fuels Trading

FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 2012).

Under the collateral order doctrine, a non-final order may

be appealed if it (1) conclusively determines a disputed question,

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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 5

(2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits

of the action, and (3) would be effectively unreviewable on appeal

from a final judgment. Plaintiff A v. Schair, 744 F.3d 1247, 1252–53

(11th Cir. 2014). An order denying qualified immunity at the sum-

mary judgment stage is immediately appealable to the extent the

denial turns on an issue of law. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299,

306–07, 311 (1996). An interlocutory appeal from the denial of

qualified immunity must raise legal issues such as “whether the le-

gal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly estab-

lished at the time of the challenged actions.” English v. City of

Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 2023). When that issue is

appealed, the factual issue of what the conduct was “may be ad-

dressed by an appellate court because it is a part of the core quali-

fied immunity analysis.” Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1091 (11th

Cir. 1996); see also English, 75 F.4th at 1156 (“When both core qual-

ified immunity issues are involved, we have jurisdiction . . . .”). The

issue of “whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitu-

tional right at all” is also a legal issue subject to interlocutory re-

view. Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1996).

However, if the only issues appealed are evidence suffi-

ciency issues, such as whether the district court erred in determin-

ing that there was an issue of fact for trial regarding the defendant’s

actions, then this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of

immunity. English, 75 F.4th at 1155–56; Behrens, 516 U.S. at 312–13

(noting that an immediate appeal is not permitted if the issue “is

nothing more than whether the evidence could support a finding

that particular conduct occurred”). In other words, this Court does

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

not have jurisdiction to entertain interlocutory appeals from the

denial of qualified immunity when the defendant’s argument is

merely, “I didn’t do it.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1294 n.19

(11th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, where an appeal from an order

denying qualified immunity includes both factual and legal issues,

this Court has jurisdiction to consider it under the collateral order

doctrine. See English, 75 F.4th at 1155–56. For example, even when

a district court states that it based the denial of qualified immunity

on the existence of genuine issues of material fact, this Court has

jurisdiction when the issue on appeal is a purely legal question.

Moniz v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 145 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998).

Florida law provides that officers, employees, and agents of

the State generally may not be held personally liable for actions

within the scope of their employment, so long as they did not act

in bad faith or with a malicious purpose. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).

Because Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a) affords protection from both

liability and the suit itself, the denial of a motion for summary judg-

ment on that basis is immediately appealable under the collateral

order doctrine. Butler v. Gualtieri, 41 F.4th 1329, 1335–36 (11th Cir.

2022). Florida law appears to require that the issue of sovereign

immunity turns on a question of law for interlocutory review to be

appropriate, and this Court has reiterated that holding in Aguirre v.

Seminole County, 158 F.4th 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2025).

Here, as an initial matter, the district court has not entered

a final order ending the litigation on the merits because it denied

Tucker and Mackenzie’s motion for summary judgment on some

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counts, and those counts remain pending. However, Tucker and

Mackenzie have raised at least some issues of law related to the

district court’s denial of qualified and sovereign immunity that may

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. As to Count 5 (unlawful search

and seizure), the Officers argue on appeal that there was no consti-

tutional violation, and that even if there was, it was not a violation

of a clearly established right. Thus, Tucker and Mackenzie have

raised a permissible legal issue for interlocutory review. See Cottrell,

85 F.3d at 1485; English, 75 F.4th at 1155.

Because Counts 12 (malicious prosecution) and 15 (conver-

sion) concern the Officers’ argument that they are entitled to Flor-

ida statutory sovereign immunity, the denial of that immunity

must turn on a legal issue to be immediately appealable. Aguirre,

158 F.4th at 1291. This Court may review Tucker and Mackenzie’s

appeal as to Count 12 because the Officers argued that their prob-

able cause to arrest Jarvis entitled them, as a matter of law, to sov-

ereign immunity as to his state-law malicious prosecution claim.

The district court disagreed with this argument, which establishes

a legal issue sufficient to allow immediate review on appeal. How-

ever, Tucker and Mackenzie have not raised a legal issue as to

Count 15 because they essentially argue on appeal that they should

have been granted sovereign immunity because Jarvis failed to es-

tablish the necessary elements of his conversion claim. That argu-

ment is an evidence sufficiency claim that, on its own, does not

present a legal issue that this Court can review.

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

Therefore, we have jurisdiction of the Officers’ appeal of the

district court’s denial of immunity for the Officers on Count 5 (un-

lawful search and seizure) and Count 12 (state law malicious pros-

ecution). However, we do not have jurisdiction of the Officers’

appeal of the district court’s denial of immunity for the Officers on

Count 15 (state law conversion).

Our pendant appellate jurisdiction on Jarvis’s cross-appeal is

determined separately with respect to each issue cross-appealed

and turns on whether the district court’s otherwise unreviewable

order with respect to such an issue is “inextricably intertwined”

with an issue properly before this Court, or if review of the unre-

viewable decision is necessary to ensure meaningful appellate re-

view of the appealable one. Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850 (11th

Cir. 2017). “Matters may be sufficiently intertwined where they

implicate the same facts and the same law.” Smith v. LePage, 834

F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and alteration

omitted). The “critical inquiry” in determining whether this Court

has pendent appellate jurisdiction “is whether the appealable issue

can be resolved without reaching the merits of the nonappealable

issues.” In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rts. Litig., 644 F.3d 1160,

1179 (11th Cir. 2011). “[T]he Supreme Court has signaled that pen-

dent appellate jurisdiction should be present only under rare cir-

cumstances.” King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 562 F.3d 1374, 1379 (11th

Cir. 2009). This Court has discretion whether to exercise pendent

appellate jurisdiction. See Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180

F.3d 1326, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that this Court “may,

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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 9

within [its] discretion, exercise jurisdiction over otherwise nonap-

pealable orders under the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine”).

In determining whether to exercise its discretionary pendent appel-

late jurisdiction, this Court should consider judicial economy inter-

ests. Hond. Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Hond., 129 F.3d 543, 545

(11th Cir. 1997).

The jurisdictional exception permitting interlocutory ap-

peals from orders denying qualified immunity does not necessarily

encompass a cross-appeal from an order partially granting and par-

tially denying qualified immunity. Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289,

1293–94 (11th Cir. 2000). In Hudson, a case with a similar proce-

dural posture, the court allowed the plaintiff’s cross-appeal to pro-

ceed. There, the district court had granted qualified immunity to

the defendant on the initial stop and for the search of the plaintiff’s

car because the plaintiff had consented to the search. Id. at 1293.

But the court denied qualified immunity for the defendant’s search

of the plaintiffs themselves, finding that at the summary judgment

stage and accepting the plaintiffs’ version of the facts, the defendant

lacked consent for the search. Id. And, the court continued, even

assuming the plaintiffs consented, the defendant exceeded that con-

sent. Id. On appeal, the defendant challenged denial of qualified

immunity on the search of person claim while the plaintiffs cross-

appealed the initial stop and search of car decisions. We held that

the plaintiffs’ claim were inextricably intertwined with the defend-

ant’s:

In deciding Officer Hall’s appeal, we must consider

whether Officer Hall’s search of Plaintiffs’ persons

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

clearly was unlawful given the totality of the circum-

stances. See United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 358

(11th Cir. 1989). In examining the totality of the cir-

cumstances—and especially because Officer Hall says

that Plaintiffs freely and voluntarily consented to

searches of their persons—we must take into account

whether Officer Hall’s initial stop and search of Plain-

tiffs’ car clearly were unlawful. See, e.g., United States

v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding

that consent to search was tainted by unlawful traffic

stop and, therefore, was not free and voluntary);

United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 549–50 (11th Cir.

1987) (same). In other words, to decide whether every

reasonable officer in Officer Hall’s position would

have known that Plaintiffs had not consented volun-

tarily to a search of their persons, we must consider,

among other things, whether Plaintiffs’ consent (if

any) was tainted by an illegal traffic stop and, more

important, whether every reasonable officer would

have been aware of such taint.

Id. at 1294 n.4.

Here, the Officers have only two claims of which we have

interlocutory jurisdiction: the denial of immunity for the unlawful

search and seizure and for malicious prosecution under state law.

By contrast, Jarvis purports to challenge the district court order

that denied every claim made in his motion for summary judgment

outright to Jarvis. It is clear that Jarvis’s challenge to the district

court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment on his unlawful

search and seizure claim (Count 5) is inextricably intertwined with

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the Officers’ appeal of the district court’s order denying the Offic-

ers’ summary judgment on that same Count 5 claim alleging an

unlawful search and seizure. However, we do not believe that any

other of Jarvis’s claims should be entertained pursuant to the pen-

dant appellate jurisdiction doctrine. Unlike the plaintiff in Hudson,

Jarvis’s other issues on appeal do not challenge a decision that im-

pacts the outcome of either of the two issues that the Officers have

properly brought before us. Therefore, we exercise our discretion

to entertain pendant appellate jurisdiction only to Jarvis’s appeal so

far as it pertains to the unlawful search and seizure claim.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Officers Claim that the District Court Erred in Denying Their Mo-

tion for Summary Judgment on Jarvis’s Count 5, Alleging that the Officers

Violated his Fourth Amendment Rights by Prolonging the Traffic Stop and

Engaging in an Unlawful Search and Seizure

We have recently concisely explained the rationale and re-

quirements for qualified immunity:

Lawsuits levied against public officials in their per-

sonal capacity impose costs both on the defendant of-

ficials and on society as a whole, including litigation

expenses, diversion of official energy from pressing

public issues, deterrence of able citizens from accept-

ing public office, and dampening of officials’ ardor in

performing their duties. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 814, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736 (1982). The defense of

qualified immunity “is the public servant’s (and soci-

ety’s) strong shield against these dangerous costs.”

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12 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996). It

protects government officials performing discretion-

ary functions from civil litigation and liability if their

conduct does not violate clearly established constitu-

tional or statutory rights of which a reasonable per-

son would have known. Id. (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at

817–19, 102 S. Ct. at 2738). It accomplishes this pro-

tection by granting officials “immunity from suit,”

meaning “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the

other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell [v. Forsyth], 472

U.S. [511] at 526, 105 S. Ct. [2806] at 2815 [1985].

Each official who asserts qualified immunity is enti-

tled to “an independent qualified-immunity analysis

as it relates to his or her actions and omissions.” Alco-

cer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). The offi-

cial “must first prove that he was acting within his dis-

cretionary authority” when he performed the acts of

which the plaintiff complains. Bowen v. Warden, 826

F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Once this is established, “the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not

entitled to qualified immunity.” Holloman ex rel. Hollo-

man v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citing Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir.

2003)). The plaintiff must establish that “(1) the de-

fendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this

right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation.” Id. Judges may decide which of the two

prongs of this analysis to address first in light of the

circumstances in the case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan,

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555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565

(2009).

To be clearly established, the contours of a right must

be sufficiently clear such that every reasonable officer

would have understood his conduct to violate that

right. Fuqua v. Turner, 996 F.3d 1140, 1150 (11th Cir.

2021) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131

S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011)). A plaintiff may show this

through: “(1) case law with indistinguishable facts

clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a

broad statement of principle within the Constitution,

statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitu-

tional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a consti-

tutional right was clearly violated, even in the total

absence of case law.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach,

561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations

omitted). The law must not be defined at a high level

of generality, but rather be particularized to the facts

of the case. Fuqua, 996 F.3d at 1150.

When an officer moves for summary judgment on the

basis of qualified immunity, “[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the mo-

vant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). Even though, at this posture, the facts

are construed in the light most favorable to the plain-

tiff, Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir.

1999), the evidence may create a fact question about

whether the officer engaged in violative conduct, id.

at 1290. “[A] genuine fact issue as to what conduct the

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14 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

defendant engaged in would preclude a grant of sum-

mary judgment based upon qualified immunity.” Rich

v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1565 (11th Cir. 1988).

Aguirre v. Seminole Cnty., 158 F.4th 1276, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2025).

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The

Supreme Court has explained that “[t]emporary detention of indi-

viduals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only

for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’

of ‘persons’ within the meaning of this provision.” Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). For such

a stop to comply with the Fourth Amendment, an officer must

have reasonable suspicion, and a driver’s violation of a traffic rule

can constitute reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Heien v. North

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014). But “a police

stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the

stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreason-

able seizures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350, 135 S.

Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015).

However, such an extension is permissible if it was sup-

ported by reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. United

States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 970 (11th Cir. 2003). “While ‘reason-

able suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause

and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of

the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal

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level of objective justification.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,

123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675–76 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow,

490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)). When making a deter-

mination of “reasonable suspicion,” we must “look at the ‘totality

of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining of-

ficer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal

wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct.

744, 750 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–

18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)). “[A]n ‘inchoate and unparticularized

suspicion’ or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity” is not enough to satisfy

the minimum level of objectivity required. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at

124, 120 S. Ct. at 676 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct.

1868, 1883 (1968)).

The Officers argue that there was neither a constitutional

violation nor a clearly established right, so they were entitled to

qualified immunity. In his cross-appeal, see infra note 1, Jarvis ar-

gues that the district court erred when it found that there were is-

sues of material fact that precluded summary judgment for him on

this issue.

The district court found that a reasonable jury could, view-

ing the facts most favorably to Jarvis and from the viewpoint of an

objective officer, find that a reasonable officer would know that his

authority to seize Jarvis ended when he confirmed the validity of

Jarvis’s driver’s license and registration, confirmed that Jarvis did

not have any outstanding warrants, and handed back his docu-

ments with a printed warning citation. The court next found that

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16 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

based on the totality of the circumstances, for qualified immunity

purposes, objectively reasonable officers would not believe they

had reasonable suspicion to detain Jarvis further after the traffic

stop. Specifically, the court rejected the Officers’ argument that

they had reasonable suspicion of Jarvis’s connection to drug activ-

ity at the apartment complex sufficient to prolong the traffic stop.

The court rejected the Officers’ reliance on the anonymous tip be-

cause they did not independently corroborate it and because the

basis of the tipster’s knowledge and the veracity of the information

was unknown. And the court found that a genuine issue of mate-

rial fact existed about whether Officer Tucker saw Jarvis make fur-

tive movements as well as whether Jarvis was avoiding eye contact

and target glancing. And these factors plus other information

gleaned during the stop, the court found, provided genuine issues

of material fact about whether the Officers had articulable reason-

able suspicion. Next, the court noted that the Supreme Court has

established that absent reasonable suspicion, police officers cannot

prolong a stop based on a traffic infraction to investigate unrelated

crimes. The Court has also rejected the use of anonymous tip to

establish reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry investigatory stop.

Thus, resolving all the disputed factual issues in favor of Jarvis—as

the court must do in analyzing the Officers’ motion for summary

judgment—the right to be free from seizure in the way the Officers

allegedly seized Jarvis was clearly established, and so the court de-

nied them qualified immunity

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We agree with the district court that whether the Officers

had reasonable suspicion of another crime based on the totality of

the circumstances is an issue for the jury.

As the district court explained, the Officers’ wholesale reli-

ance on the tip is misplaced. Although the tip did identify a car

similar to Jarvis’s at a nearby apartment complex, the tip was anon-

ymous and merely related that the car was in the parking lot sur-

rounded by people. Moreover, an anonymous tip, “standing alone,

would not warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that [a

stop] was appropriate.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)

(quotation marks omitted). For an anonymous tip to reasonably

support an officer’s suspicion of criminal activity, it must be accom-

panied by sufficient indicia of the tip’s reliability. Florida v. J.L., 529

U.S. 266, 270, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1378 (2000). A detailed, contempo-

raneous report of suspicious activity to a 911 emergency dispatcher

carries with it sufficient indicia of reliability when the details and

location of the described events turn out to be correct. Navarette v.

California, 572 U.S. 393, 400, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689–90 (2014).

Here, the caller reported that a black or blue Mitsubishi was

in the parking lot with a crowd around it and there was a white

man in his forties wearing a red tank top, black basketball shorts,

white shoes, and carrying a backpack, walking around the vehicle.

The dispatcher was the one who characterized the incident as pos-

sibly involving drugs. But Jarvis, according to the dashcam, was

wearing a green t-shirt and khaki shorts, so he did not match the

description. The Officers did not report there was a concern about

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18 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

drug activity in the area and did not independently investigate the

tip. They did not observe Jarvis engage in any narcotics activity

beforehand that would provide credibility to the tip. Between the

disconnect in the physical description and the caller’s lack of per-

sonal knowledge about what was occurring, the tip alone did not

provide enough for the Officers to extend the search.

The Officers also point to other circumstances to support

their continued detention. Specifically, they point to: Officer

Tucker’s observation of Jarvis’s furtive movements as he ap-

proached the vehicle; Officer Mackenzie’s observation of a knife on

the console; Jarvis’s avoiding eye contact and target glancing; and

Jarvis’s report that he had been recently arrested for drug activity

and been incarcerated twice for selling drugs, totaling nineteen

years.

Examining each point, we agree with the district court that

several facts are disputed such that genuine issues of material fact

exist. For instance, Officer Tucker’s alleged observation of furtive

movements is undermined by the heavy tinting of Jarvis’s window

and Officer Mackenzie’s testimony that he did not observe any

such movements. Additionally, Officer Tucker saw the move-

ments before the stop began, undermining their importance to the

prolongation of the stop. Also, video of the stop does not support

the Officers’ argument that Jarvis was avoiding eye contact, and the

video shows he was cooperative. But the knife on the console, Jar-

vis’s admission of serious drug activity in the past, and Jarvis’s con-

firmation that he had just left the apartment do tend to support the

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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 19

Officers’ actions. In sum, because resolution of the reasonable sus-

picion issue will be influenced by the jury’s resolution of the genu-

ine issues of material fact, the issue is appropriate for the jury.

Turning to the issue of whether the alleged violation was

clearly established, the Officers argue that the cases the district

court relied upon are distinguishable. First, they argue that the is-

sue in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015),

was not if the officers were justified in extending the stop based on

their reasonable suspicion that other criminal activity was afoot.

But Rodriguez held that a traffic stop cannot be prolonged absent

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Citing precedent, it ex-

plained that once the tasks related to the traffic infraction have

been completed, the officer’s authority to hold the subject of the

stop ends. Id. at 354, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. And the district court relied

on Florida v. J.L. to show that reasonable officers would know that

an anonymous tip lacking sufficient indicia of reliability cannot be

used to justify a Terry stop. Taking all of the facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, as we must in the summary judgment

context, the Officers did not have reasonable suspicion of other

criminal activity. Therefore, there was clearly established law that

they could not prolong the traffic stop, and we affirm the district

court’s finding that qualified immunity for the Officers is not war-

ranted at this stage.

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20 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment denying

the Officers qualified immunity on Jarvis’s Count 5. 1

B. The Officers Claim that the District Court Erred in Denying Their Mo-

tion for Summary Judgment on Jarvis’s Count 12 Alleging a State-Law

Malicious Prosecution Claim

The Officers argue that the district court erred when it de-

nied them immunity for Jarvis’s state-law malicious prosecution

claim.

Under Florida law, to prevail in a malicious prosecution ac-

tion,

a plaintiff must establish that: (1) an original criminal

or civil judicial proceeding against the present plain-

tiff was commenced or continued; (2) the present de-

fendant was the legal cause of the original proceeding

against the present plaintiff as the defendant in the

original proceeding; (3) the termination of the origi-

nal proceeding constituted a bona fide termination of

that proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff;

(4) there was an absence of probable cause for the

1 As noted above, we do have pendant appellate jurisdiction of Jarvis’s cross-

appeal challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judg-

ment on his Count 5 claim (unlawful search and seizure). The discussion

above indicates that there are genuine issues of material fact relating to

whether the Officers had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop.

Therefore, the district court properly denied Jarvis’s motion for summary

judgment on his Count 5 claim, and we also affirm the district court’s judg-

ment in that regard.

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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 21

original proceeding; (5) there was malice on the part

of the present defendant; and (6) the plaintiff suffered

damage as a result of the original proceeding.

Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Fla. 1994)

(citing Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1986), and

Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974)). In context of mali-

cious prosecution, Florida courts have held that the lack of proba-

ble cause can be used to infer to malice. Gallucci v. Milavic, 100 So.

2d 375, 378 (Fla. 1958).

The district court denied official immunity to the Officers

because they failed to demonstrate that they had probable cause

for all of the crimes for which they arrested Jarvis. But as the Su-

preme Court noted, state-law malicious prosecution claims require

a finding of probable cause for each charge. Chiaverini v. City of

Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 563–64, 144 S. Ct. 1745, 1751 (2024). 2 And

2 Although our research has not uncovered a Florida case following the gen-

eral rule—that a state-law malicious prosecution claim requires a finding of

the absence of probable cause for each charge—the district court so held and

the Officers’ brief on appeal does not challenge this holding. Accordingly, the

Officers have abandoned any such challenge. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Ala-

baster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that issues not raised

on appeal are deemed waived).

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22 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

that failure to show probable cause means that malice can be in-

ferred. Gallucci, 100 So. 2d at 378. 3 Thus, the district court did not

err in denying the Officers immunity for this claim.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment denying

the Officers immunity on Jarvis’s Count 12.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court

is AFFIRMED.

3 And the genuine issues of fact with respect to whether the Officers lied about

seeing furtive movements and suspicious eye contact is potential evidence of

actual malice.