“We have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”
How later courts described this case
- “We have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”
- “When both core qualified immunity issues are involved, we have jurisdiction for de novo review”
- use of taser between five and eighteen times reasonable when plaintiff lunged at officers and “resisted during the entire time” officers attempted to handcuff him
- holding it was clearly established that using a taser “is excessive where the suspect is non-violent and has not resisted arrest”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
USCA11 Case: 24-12307 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 02/06/2026 Page: 1 of 37
FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-12307
____________________
JAFET CASTRO-REYES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CITY OF OPA-LOCKA,
Defendant,
GERMAN BOSQUE,
LUIS SERRANO,
SERGIO PEREZ,
DANIEL KELLY,
City of Opa-Locka Police Department
Opa-Locka, FL,
Defendants-Appellants.
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-21397-KMW
____________________
Before HULL, MARCUS, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellee Jafet Castro-Reyes experienced an episode
of erratic behavior at his apartment in Opa-Locka, Florida. During
that episode, Castro-Reyes’s friend and family members became so
concerned with his behavior that they tied Castro-Reyes up at his
hands and feet using electrical wires and clothing cords. They
called 911, and police responded and detained Castro-Reyes under
Florida’s Baker Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 399.451, 394.463(1).
While attempting to handcuff Castro-Reyes, a struggle
allegedly ensued, and the officers tased, punched, and dragged him.
After his release from the hospital, Castro-Reyes brought this
action against the City of Opa-Locka and Defendant-Appellant
Officers German Bosque, Daniel Kelly, Luis Serrano, and Sergio
Perez individually. His complaint raised multiple claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida law.
The Officers moved for summary judgment on qualified
immunity and state agent immunity grounds, which the district
court granted in part and denied in part. The district court allowed
these claims, inter alia, to proceed to trial: (1) a false arrest claim
brought under § 1983 against Officers Bosque and Kelly; (2) an
excessive force claim brought under § 1983 against Officers Serrano
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24-12307 Opinion of the Court 3
and Perez; and (3) an assault and battery claim under Florida law
against Officers Serrano and Perez. This is the Officers’ appeal.
After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
we (1) reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to
Officers Bosque and Kelly as to the false arrest claim under § 1983;
(2) affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to
Officers Serrano and Perez as to the excessive force claim under
§ 1983; (3) affirm the district court’s denial of state agent immunity
to Officers Serrano and Perez as to the assault and battery claim
under Florida law; and (4) remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS
A. Body Camera Videos
In addition to affidavits and deposition testimony, the
parties filed body camera videos from multiple officers as evidence.
We accept these videos’ depictions to the extent they are clear or
obviously contradict Castro-Reyes’s or his witnesses’ version of
events. 1 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007) (concluding
that because one party’s account was “blatantly contradicted” by
video evidence, “[t]he Court of Appeals should not have relied on
such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light
depicted by the videotape”); Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093,
1 At deposition, Castro-Reyes testified he could not recall any of the events at
issue. The record, however, contains affidavits and deposition testimony from
Castro-Reyes’s friend and family members who were present that day.
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
1098 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Where a video in evidence obviously
contradicts the nonmovant’s version of the facts, we accept the
video’s depiction instead of the nonmovant’s account . . . .”
(citation modified)).
Here though, at key moments the body camera videos fail
to provide an unobstructed view of the events, or are blurry, or
omit Castro-Reyes from the frame, or are otherwise indiscernible.
The videos thus contain ambiguities, which we must construe in
favor of Castro-Reyes. See Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268,
1277 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that, at the motion-to-dismiss
stage, “courts must construe all ambiguities in the video footage in
favor of the plaintiff”); Johnson v. City of Miami Beach, 18 F.4th 1267,
1269 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Where no video exists or where the videos
do not answer all the questions or resolve all the details of the
encounter, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to [the
non-moving party].” (citing Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217,
1226-27 (11th Cir. 2020))); Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298,
1313 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that at the summary judgment stage,
“[w]e resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff, and
then determine the legal question of whether the defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity under that version of the facts”
(quoting Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003)));
Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam) (noting the silent video from a closed circuit security
camera is “not obviously contradictory because it fails to convey
spoken words or tone and because it sometimes fails to provide an
unobstructed view of the events”).
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24-12307 Opinion of the Court 5
Applying these standards, we recount the facts in the light
most favorable to Castro-Reyes.
B. Events Prior to the Arrival of Law Enforcement
Nineteen-year-old Castro-Reyes lived in an apartment by
himself in Opa-Locka, Florida. On the morning of September 21,
2020, Castro-Reyes told his cousin who lived next door, Pamela
Betancourth, that he wanted to move and begin a new life.
Castro-Reyes began clearing items like food from the fridge and
pieces of furniture from his apartment.
Later that same day, Misael Perez, Castro-Reyes’s childhood
friend who lived nearby, observed Castro-Reyes behaving “a bit
hyperactive[ly].” This behavior included Castro-Reyes: (1) moving
his apartment furniture outside because he was trying to “cleanse
his life,” and (2) hyperventilating upon Misael Perez’s arrival to
Castro-Reyes’s apartment. Concerned, Misael Perez called
Castro-Reyes’s cousin Jose Varela, aunt Rina Ayala, and cousin
Betancourth to check on him. Around the same time,
Castro-Reyes also unsuccessfully called his cousin Varela multiple
times.
Between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., cousin Varela and aunt
Ayala arrived. Varela observed Castro-Reyes crying, walking
around the living room, and saying he felt bad. Castro-Reyes told
his family members that he wanted to leave, but Ayala and Varela
stood in front of the door to stop him from exiting the apartment.
Castro-Reyes was not aggressive towards his family at any point,
but he asked them to move aside. His family believed
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
Castro-Reyes was “not well” and “unrecognizable,” and Varela and
Ayala continued to block the door out of concern for his safety.
Misael Perez, Varela, and Ayala decided to tie Castro-Reyes’s hands
and feet with electrical wires and clothing cords to prevent him
from leaving the apartment.
After observing Castro-Reyes’s behavior, the family decided
to call 911. Varela and Ayala hoped that fire rescue or an
ambulance would come to help Castro-Reyes. Varela asked
Betancourth, who was not in the apartment, to make the call.
Betancourth (1) called 911; (2) asked for police assistance; (3) stated
that she was unsure as to whether Castro-Reyes had smoked
marijuana; and (4) told the dispatcher that Castro-Reyes was acting
strangely, but was not violent.
C. Initial Response (Officers Bosque and Kelly)
On September 21, 2020, at approximately 3:40 p.m., Officers
German Bosque and Daniel Kelly responded to a dispatch
concerning a “234 domestic” disturbance at Castro-Reyes’s
residence. Dispatch advised that the subject—a potentially violent
male—was “possibly high on 52.” 2 As Bosque later testified, the
dispatch “went out as a violent family member.”
Officers Bosque and Kelly arrived by 3:44 p.m. and were met
outside the apartment by Varela, who was standing near the
entrance. Varela informed the Officers that he had tied up his
2 “Fifty-two” is the Opa-Locka Police Department’s code for a narcotics
investigation.
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24-12307 Opinion of the Court 7
cousin. Upon hearing this, Bosque advised over the radio, “Hold
the air a second. They’re advising me somebody’s tied up inside.”
As the Officers and Varela walked toward the apartment,
Varela explained that his cousin never acts like this, and that the
family did not know what was wrong with Castro-Reyes.
According to Varela, (1) Castro-Reyes had begun damaging his
own apartment, and Varela’s brother had contacted him about it;
(2) Varela’s mother and sisters were inside Castro-Reyes’s
apartment; and (3) Castro-Reyes proclaimed that he was “God.”
Officers Bosque and Kelly reached Castro-Reyes’s open
front door and entered the apartment. Castro-Reyes lay on the tile
floor of the apartment with his pants around his ankles and his
hands, legs, and ankles bound by electrical wires and clothing
cords. It was raining that day, and Castro-Reyes and the apartment
floor were completely wet. Indeed, the other individuals present
were also wet.
As soon as Officers Bosque and Kelly stepped inside,
Castro-Reyes told them to leave his apartment and informed them
that they did not have permission to be inside his home. Bosque
and Kelly did not retreat and continued their conversation with
Castro-Reyes.
Bosque ordered that Castro-Reyes be handcuffed.
Castro-Reyes asked Bosque to free him from the wires and cords,
to which Bosque responded he would not release him and that
Castro-Reyes needed to roll over because Bosque was going to
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
handcuff him. Castro-Reyes was not told he was being arrested for
a crime or detained pursuant to Florida’s Baker Act. 3
Varela informed Bosque that Castro-Reyes was not
aggressive and not dangerous. Bosque ordered Varela to untie
Castro-Reyes. Castro-Reyes remained calm while Varela
attempted to untie his hands. 4
At 3:45 p.m., Bosque made another announcement for
dispatch to “Hold the air a second until we untie him and secure
him.” When Bosque asked his name, Castro-Reyes responded, “I
am God” in Spanish but continued to lie unmoving on the floor.
At this point, approximately ninety seconds after first making
contact with Castro-Reyes, Bosque declared the situation to be a
“43” (Baker Act event) as Castro-Reyes prayed in the background.
Meanwhile, Varela successfully untied Castro-Reyes’s right
arm, and Kelly placed a handcuff around that wrist. Bosque and
Kelly then instructed that Castro-Reyes be “flipped over” into the
prone position so that Castro-Reyes could be handcuffed behind his
back. After several failed attempts at flipping Castro-Reyes, Bosque
called for backup. When relaying that request, the dispatcher
advised that the subject was a “violent male.”
3 Florida’s Baker Act, inter alia, provides for the involuntary detention of
individuals for mental health evaluations when certain criteria are met. See
Fla. Stat. §§ 399.451, 394.463(1).
4 Bosque testified that at no point during law enforcement’s attempts to take
Castro-Reyes into custody did Castro-Reyes ever attempt to strike any officer.
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24-12307 Opinion of the Court 9
As they waited for backup, a visibly upset Varela continued
trying to flip the still partially-bound Castro-Reyes over into the
prone position on the wet tile floor as Castro-Reyes repeatedly
demanded to be released “in the name of God.” Bosque held on to
Castro-Reyes’s unhandcuffed left hand, which was partially bound
by a cord. Castro-Reyes’s feet and ankles, however, were still
completely bound as he lay on the floor.
Unable to turn Castro-Reyes over into the prone position on
the slippery floor, and about five minutes after the officers
originally arrived, cousin Varela put Castro-Reyes in a quasi-
headlock to protect Castro-Reyes from a perceived, forthcoming
police action.5 Castro-Reyes continued pleading to be let go and
left alone.
D. Backup Arrives (Officers Serrano and Perez)
1. Officer Luis Serrano
At approximately 3:48 p.m., Officer Luis Serrano and two
other officers arrived on scene. Castro-Reyes was no longer in a
quasi-headlock. Upon entry, Serrano asked, “Who’s the subject,”
as the arriving officers grabbed Varela. Realizing that the arriving
officers mistakenly thought Varela was the subject, Bosque
exclaimed, “No. No. No. No . . . He’s helping . . . He’s helping,”
5 Varela later testified at his deposition that, due to a similar incident in the
community, the call for backup officers made him worried that Castro-Reyes
was going to be beaten by the police. So, Varela put Castro-Reyes in the quasi-
headlock to “protect him.”
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10 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
and as to Castro-Reyes, “[h]e’s a 43.” A “43” is the Opa-Locka
Police Department code for “[a] mentally ill person or person in
need of a psychiatric evaluation [under the Baker Act].” Bosque
and Kelly told the newly arriving officers that Castro-Reyes was
“overpowering” them, and that they were trying to flip
Castro-Reyes to place handcuffs on him.
When Serrano and the backup officers arrived, (1) Kelly had
Castro-Reyes’s right wrist in a handcuff and Bosque was holding
firm on Castro-Reyes’s left wrist; and (2) Castro-Reyes was on his
back, with his hands clasped in front of his chest and feet fully tied
up. Shortly thereafter, an unnamed backup officer attempted to lift
Castro-Reyes by his clasped hands, but was unable to do so and
dropped Castro-Reyes on the floor.
A chaotic scene then unfolded as multiple officers grabbed
Castro-Reyes, pulling his body in various directions and shouting
at him to turn over. A few seconds later, Officer Serrano tased
Castro-Reyes. This first tasering lasted for about sixteen seconds.
As the taser connected with his skin, Castro-Reyes spasmed and
curled into the fetal position.
At this juncture, the available footage becomes blurry and
leaves Castro-Reyes out of frame for significant portions of time.
Serrano’s repeated tasing continued and can be heard on video.
Serrano’s report later revealed that he deployed his taser
approximately twenty-two times, doing so three to five times
within the first thirty seconds of deployment.
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24-12307 Opinion of the Court 11
2. Officer Sergio Perez
Then-Lieutenant Sergio Perez arrived around the same time
as Serrano and became the commanding officer at the scene.
Within a minute of arrival, Perez (like Serrano) was informed
before he deployed any force on Castro-Reyes that Castro-Reyes
was a “43” (mentally ill person). Although Perez was informed that
Varela was helping law enforcement, Perez and another officer
physically moved Varela away from Castro-Reyes. Castro-Reyes
was still tied up at his feet and ankles, wearing his pants around
his ankles.
Significantly, Perez testified that Castro-Reyes never kicked
or struck officers, and testimony of the family members
characterizes Castro-Reyes as not violent towards them or the
officers.
When the available footage refocuses, multiple officers are
atop Castro-Reyes and struggling to handcuff Castro-Reyes. While
one officer pressed Castro-Reyes’s face into the ground and others
pinned his body down, Perez punched Castro-Reyes in the face
three times with a closed fist. When Bosque told Perez not to
punch Castro-Reyes in the face, Perez responded, “Don’t fucking
tell me don’t do it,” to which Perez was again reminded that
Castro-Reyes was considered a mentally ill person:
Bosque: Don’t do it. Don’t do it. That’s not gonna
help.
Perez: What do you mean don’t fucking do it?
Bosque: OK. It’s not going to help.
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12 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
Perez: He’s resisting.
Bosque: I know, but he doesn’t know it. He’s a 43
[mentally ill person].
Perez: Don’t fucking tell me don’t do it. Turn
around.
Bosque: He’s a 43[, Lieutenant].
Perez testified that his hand was being pinned by Castro-Reyes
when he punched Castro-Reyes.
In November 2022, the Opa-Locka Police Department
relieved Perez from duty. Perez was ultimately charged with
battery against Castro-Reyes in connection with this incident. At
oral argument, Perez’s counsel represented that Perez was
“acquitted” of that charge.
E. Officers Remove Castro-Reyes from the Apartment
While standing across the room from Castro-Reyes and the
officers trying to handcuff Castro-Reyes, Bosque suggested Perez
move “everybody outside.” At 3:53 p.m., Perez walked over to
Castro-Reyes, grabbed him by the ankles, and dragged
Castro-Reyes on his back across the floor while saying, “let’s get
him outside, it’s slippery.” Once Perez and Castro-Reyes reached
the door frame, Kelly exclaimed from across the room: “Not his
head, not his head, not his head!”
Then, Castro-Reyes extended both of his arms and grabbed
the door frame, but Perez pulled him through it. Castro-Reyes’s
head hit the edge of the concrete step, but then he immediately
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24-12307 Opinion of the Court 13
pulled himself back up to the door frame with his arms. An
unidentified officer (presumably Serrano) deployed a taser on
Castro-Reyes, who then let go of the door frame. Perez dragged
Castro-Reyes down two concrete steps with Castro-Reyes
appearing to hit his head on both steps.
The struggle continued at the bottom of the steps in the rain.
Serrano again used his taser while other officers tried to handcuff
Castro-Reyes on the ground, prompting Perez to look directly at
Serrano and say: “No more taser, Serrano. That’s an order.”
Within seconds, a standing Serrano said, “watch out, I need
a clear shot,” and took a step back from the group of officers
surrounding Castro-Reyes on the ground. As an officer in the
group said, “I got an arm right here,” Serrano stepped closer,
leaned down, and inserted his taser in an opening between two
officers, as he stood behind them, to make direct contact with
Castro-Reyes and activated his taser. This prompted an officer to
ask, “Who’s tasing?” with no reply audibly given.
Serrano observed the group of officers still working to
handcuff Castro-Reyes for a few seconds, then walked back to his
patrol car. Bosque successfully handcuffed Castro-Reyes at around
3:55 p.m. Serrano (1) retrieved a restraint from his patrol car,
(2) walked back to the apartment steps, (3) remarked with laughter
that his taser battery was drained, and (4) replaced the restraints at
(the now-handcuffed) Castro-Reyes’s legs and ankles.
In his deposition, Officer Kelly testified it was at this time
that Perez ordered him to arrest Castro-Reyes. Kelly, however,
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14 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
refused to make the arrest due to Castro-Reyes’s mental state,
asking, “what was he going to be arrested for?” Kelly said he and
Officer Bosque had determined that (1) Castro-Reyes was having a
“mental breakdown,” (2) “he needed psychiatric help,” and (3) that
“jail would not be the best place for [Castro-Reyes].” Perez
allegedly threatened Kelly, saying that “if [Kelly] did not make the
arrest, [Perez] got something coming for [Kelly] on the back end.”
Kelly still refused to make the arrest and called the on-call State
Attorney the following day, who advised him that “if [he was] not
comfortable with making th[e] arrest, [he did] not have to make
the arrest.”
Eventually, Fire and Rescue transported Castro-Reyes to
Jackson Memorial Hospital. Officer Kelly went to the hospital
following the incident. Dr. Jonathan Brandon told Kelly that he
was going to involuntarily commit Castro-Reyes, i.e., “Baker Act”
him, to perform a psychological evaluation. However, other than
Castro-Reyes’s medical bills, there are no records of his hospital
stay showing that he was in fact committed pursuant to Florida’s
Baker Act. Castro-Reyes remained at Jackson four nights until
September 25, 2020.
As a result of this incident, Castro-Reyes states that he
suffered a dislocated right shoulder, back pain, lacerations to his
face, and kidney issues associated with his injuries. No criminal
charges were filed against Castro-Reyes.
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24-12307 Opinion of the Court 15
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2022, Castro-Reyes filed this civil rights action
alleging multiple violations of federal and state law. In his
amended complaint, he brought Counts I-III under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Count I alleged that each officer’s warrantless entry into
his home violated the Fourth Amendment, asserting there was
neither consent nor exigent circumstances. Count II challenged
the lawfulness of Castro-Reyes’s seizure, asserting that the officers
lacked probable cause and committed a false arrest. Count III
presented an excessive force claim, which alleged in part that
punching and tasing Castro-Reyes to effectuate his seizure was
clearly excessive. Counts IV and V raised state law claims of false
imprisonment, battery, and assault.
All four appellants—Officers Bosque, Kelly, Perez, and
Serrano—were named in Counts I-V. Castro-Reyes brought
similar claims, along with a negligent training and supervision
claim, against the City of Opa-Locka in Counts VI-IX.
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. In part, the officers argued that (1) qualified immunity
shielded them from Castro-Reyes’s claims brought under § 1983,
and (2) state agent immunity under Florida statutory law shielded
them from Castro-Reyes’s claims brought under Florida law.
The district court issued an omnibus order ruling on the
motions. As to Officers Bosque and Kelly, the district court granted
summary judgment on Counts I and III-V and denied summary
judgment for the false arrest claim (Count II). The district court
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16 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
granted Perez and Serrano summary judgment on Counts I-II and
V, but denied summary judgment on the excessive force claim
(Count III) and the state-law battery and assault claim (Count IV).
The district court further declined to grant Castro-Reyes’s motion
for summary judgment on any issue, including on the issue of
whether the officers were acting under color of law. Finally, the
district court granted in part and denied in part the City of
Opa-Locka’s motion for summary judgment.
The officers timely appealed.
III. JURISDICTION
Castro-Reyes did not cross-appeal, and instead, challenges
our jurisdiction over the officers’ appeal. Because “[w]e have a
threshold obligation to ensure that we have jurisdiction to hear an
appeal,” Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir.
2020), we address this issue first and reject Castro-Reyes’s
jurisdictional challenge.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this Court has jurisdiction over
appeals only from “final decisions” of the district courts. A district
court’s denial of summary judgment is generally not a final
appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Gray ex rel. Alexander
v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2006). However, the
Supreme Court has held “that a district court’s denial of a claim of
qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is
an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
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24-12307 Opinion of the Court 17
This Circuit has clarified that “[w]hether we have
interlocutory jurisdiction to review the denial of summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds depends on the type of
issues involved in the appeal.” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480,
1484 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted). That is, “where the only
issues appealed are evidentiary sufficiency issues” and no issues of
law are raised, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. Id.
Qualified immunity analyses often involve both questions of
evidentiary sufficiency and questions of law. As a result, it can
sometimes be difficult to discern between purely fact-bound
questions and legal determinations. See English v. City of Gainesville,
75 F.4th 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that appellants may
“cast their arguments as legal disputes” when the appeal actually
raises only questions of fact).
Even so, our precedent is clear that we have jurisdiction
when there are mixed questions of law and fact in an interlocutory
appeal of the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds. See Hall v. Flournoy, 975 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2020)
(“To be sure, the presence of a factual dispute on appeal does not
automatically foreclose interlocutory review; rather, jurisdictional
issues arise when the only question before an appellate court is one
of pure fact.”); Koch v. Rugg, 221 F.3d 1283, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“When both core qualified immunity issues are involved, we have
jurisdiction for de novo review”). And these same principles apply
to interlocutory appeals involving state agent immunity under
Florida law. See Coleman v. Hillsborough Cnty., 41 F.4th 1319, 1324
(11th Cir. 2022) (“Because the district court’s order denied the
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18 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
officers immunity under [Fla. Stat.] § 768.28(9)(a), it is immediately
appealable.”).
In the present case, while the parties dispute what the
available body camera footage shows, (1) Bosque and Kelly also
challenge the district court’s conclusion that they did not have
arguable probable cause under Florida’s Baker Act; (2) Serrano and
Perez also challenge the district court’s legal analysis regarding the
alleged use of excessive force; and (3) Serrano and Perez also
challenge the district court’s conclusion that state agent immunity
does not shield them from Castro-Reyes’s assault and battery
claims under Florida law. It is these mixed questions of law and
fact that plainly give us jurisdiction over this matter. See Hall, 975
F.3d at 1276.
IV. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
As to Castro-Reyes’s § 1983 claims, this appeal involves the
district court’s denial of qualified immunity on his (1) false arrest
claims against Officers Bosque and Kelly and (2) excessive force
claims against Officers Serrano and Perez.
A. Qualified Immunity
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for
government officials sued in their individual capacities if their
conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Where a
defendant officer was operating within the scope of his
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24-12307 Opinion of the Court 19
discretionary authority, the plaintiff bears the burden of
“demonstrat[ing] that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Gray
ex rel. Alexander, 458 F.3d at 1303 (quoting Lumley v. City of Dade
City, 327 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11th Cir. 2003)).
It is undisputed that defendant officers were acting within
the scope of their discretionary authority. Accordingly, Castro-
Reyes bears the burden of demonstrating “both (1) that the officers
‘violated a statutory or constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that the right
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’”
Acosta v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 97 F.4th 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Mikko v. City of Atlanta, 857 F.3d 1136, 1144 (11th Cir.
2017)); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). We address each
claim in turn.
B. False Arrest Claims Against Officers Bosque and Kelly
Because probable cause is a complete bar to § 1983 claims
for false arrest, Officers Bosque and Kelly are entitled to qualified
immunity if the undisputed facts show that they had arguable
probable cause to detain Castro-Reyes under the Baker Act. See
Khoury v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th 1118, 1126 (11th Cir.
2021). “Arguable probable cause exist[ed] if a reasonable officer,
knowing the information [Bosque and Kelly] possessed, could have
believed that probable cause existed to involuntarily commit
[Castro-Reyes].” See id. When making that assessment, this Court
“look[s] to the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
To involuntarily commit someone for a mental health
examination under Florida’s Baker Act, an officer must have
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“reason to believe that the person has a mental illness and because
of [their] mental illness”: (1) “has refused voluntary examination
after conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of the
examination,” or “is unable to determine for [themselves] whether
examination is necessary”; and (2) “[w]ithout care or treatment,
the person is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for”
themselves or “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that without care
or treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm to
[themselves] or others in the near future, as evidenced by recent
behavior.” Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1) (2020).
As to the “neglect or refusal” prong, (1) a person’s neglect or
refusal of care must “pose[] a real and present threat of substantial
harm to [their] well-being,” and (2) it must not be “apparent that
such harm may be avoided through the help of willing family
members or friends or the provision of other services.” Id.
§ 394.463(1)(b)1 (2020).
Put differently, the Baker Act establishes conjunctive
requirements to support a peace officer’s decision to initiate an
involuntary detention. The officer must have “reason to believe
both that a person has a mental illness and that the mental illness
has led to other statutory criteria.” K.M. v. State, 359 So. 3d 414,
419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023). Florida courts have explained the
“other statutory criteria”:
The other statutory criteria also have two
requirements, both of which can be met in alternative
ways: (1)(a)1 refusal of voluntary examination or
(1)(a)2 inability to determine for himself whether
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examination is necessary and (1)(b)1 likelihood of
neglect with real and present threat of harm to his
wellbeing that cannot be avoided with other services
or (1)(b)2 substantial likelihood of serious bodily
harm to himself in the near future based on recent
behavior.
Id.
In consideration of this framework, we are mindful that:
(1) “Florida courts require more than erratic behavior or
knowledge that a person is suffering from a mental illness”; and
(2) “[v]ague notions about what a person might do—for example,
a belief about some likelihood that without treatment a person
might cause some type of harm at some point—does not meet this
standard.” Khoury, 4 F.4th at 1126, 1128 n.7 (citing Florida case
law).
Nonetheless, crediting Castro-Reyes’s own evidence, the
undisputed portions of the dispatch information and on-scene
observations provided Officers Bosque and Kelly with
particularized facts supporting their belief that Castro-Reyes:
(1) had a mental illness; (2) could not determine for himself
whether examination was necessary; and (3) posed a danger to
himself and potentially to others. These three beliefs established
arguable probable cause to detain Castro-Reyes under the
Baker Act.
We reach this conclusion recognizing the temporal
limitations placed upon the facts that we may consider.
Specifically, Florida courts have explained “that behavior that
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occurred after the initiation of the involuntary commitment for
treatment cannot form the justification for that same involuntary
commitment.” J.W. v. State, 313 So. 3d 909, 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2021). In other words, arguable probable cause to detain
Castro-Reyes under the Baker Act cannot be premised on his
behavior after the detaining officer has initiated the detention.
See id.
The parties dispute at what point Castro-Reyes’s
involuntary detention began under the Baker Act. Castro-Reyes
contends that Officer Bosque initiated the involuntary detention
within ten seconds of Officers Bosque and Kelly entering the home,
when Bosque told Kelly to handcuff Castro-Reyes. Bosque and
Kelly, on the other hand, imply that the involuntary detention did
not begin until after Bosque officially stated the situation was “a
forty-three.” Because the knowledge Bosque and Kelly possessed
when Bosque first ordered Castro-Reyes be handcuffed provided
arguable probable cause to detain him under the Baker Act, we
need not, and do not, resolve this dispute.
We explicate our conclusions by addressing each statutory
criterion for involuntary detention under the Baker Act in turn.
1. Mental Illness
The undisputed record provides ample support that Officers
Bosque and Kelly could have reasonably concluded Castro-Reyes
had a mental illness. First, Bosque heard dispatch report a “234
domestic” disturbance. Second, when Bosque and Kelly arrived,
cousin Varela was visibly distraught and immediately told them
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that he had tied Castro-Reyes up. Varela also told Bosque and Kelly
that Castro-Reyes was (1) acting strangely, (2) tearing up his
apartment, and (3) proclaiming he was “God.” Third, upon
entering the apartment, Bosque and Kelly were met with the
following scene: Castro-Reyes (1) on the ground, (2) surrounded by
visibly upset family members, (3) covered in water, (4) tied up,
(5) with pants around his ankles, and (6) no furniture in his
apartment.
Considering this evidence alone—which existed before
Bosque’s initial command to handcuff Castro-Reyes—an officer in
Bosque and Kelly’s situation could reasonably conclude
Castro-Reyes was mentally ill.
2. Consenting to Examination
The next criterion requires either that (a) the “person has
refused voluntary examination after conscientious explanation and
disclosure of the purpose of the examination” or (b) the “person is
unable to determine for [themselves] whether examination is
necessary.” Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1)(a) (2020). “An opportunity to
refuse voluntary examination is thus unnecessary if the subject is
unable to determine for himself or herself whether examination is
necessary.” Teel v. Lozada, 99 F.4th 1273, 1286 (11th Cir. 2024)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Officers Bosque and Kelly did not explain and disclose
the purpose of an examination. For Bosque and Kelly to succeed
at this stage, Castro-Reyes must have been “unable to determine
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24 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
for himself” that examination was necessary. See Fla. Stat.
§ 394.463(1)(a) (2020).
For the same reasons explained above, the undisputed
evidence in the record demonstrates that Castro-Reyes could not
determine for himself whether such an examination was necessary.
To wit, (1) Varela told Bosque and Kelly that Castro-Reyes was
tearing up his apartment and saying that he was God;
(2) Castro-Reyes immediately told the police that he did not want
them near him; and (3) family members used improvised restraints
to prevent Castro-Reyes from leaving. Thus, a reasonable officer
could conclude the family members restrained Castro-Reyes
because they feared for his safety and believed he was not able to
care for himself.
3. Danger to Himself or Others
The final criterion is met if: (a) without care or treatment,
Castro-Reyes was likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for
himself, posing a real and present threat of substantial harm to his
well-being that appeared unavoidable through the help of family
members, friends, or other services; or (b) there was a substantial
likelihood that without care or treatment Castro-Reyes would
cause serious bodily harm to himself or others in the near future,
as evidenced by recent behavior. See Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1) (2020).
Once again, for the reasons described above, there is
sufficient evidence that a reasonable officer with Bosque and
Kelly’s knowledge could find that Castro-Reyes met this criterion.
Even before Bosque’s initial order to handcuff Castro-Reyes, the
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combination of self-destructive behavior, disorientation, and
impaired judgment exhibited by Castro-Reyes could lead a
reasonable officer to conclude that Castro-Reyes posed an
immediate risk to his own safety or the safety of others.6
Given the totality of the circumstances, we easily conclude
that Officers Bosque and Kelly had arguable probable cause to
detain Castro-Reyes under the Baker Act and are entitled to
qualified immunity on this claim. We thus reverse the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity to Bosque and Kelly on
Castro-Reyes’s § 1983 false arrest claim.
C. Excessive Force Claims Against Officers Serrano and
Perez
To overcome Officers Perez’s and Serrano’s assertions of
qualified immunity on his excessive force claims, Castro-Reyes has
the burden to show that their use of force violated his Fourth
Amendment rights and that those rights were clearly established at
the time of the conduct. See Acosta, 97 F.4th at 1239; Ashcroft, 563
U.S. at 735. We conclude that Castro-Reyes does so on both
counts.
6 Although not the focus of the parties’ briefing, this same evidence could
arguably lead a reasonable officer to conclude that: (1) without care or
treatment, Castro-Reyes was likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for
himself; (2) this posed a real and present threat of substantial harm to
Castro-Reyes’s well-being; and (3) the threat of substantial harm appeared
unavoidable through the help of family members, friends, or other services.
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“The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures encompasses the plain right to be free from
the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.” Lee v. Ferraro,
284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989)). Even when an officer has probable cause
to arrest or detain an individual, the individual may still pursue a
§ 1983 excessive force claim if the force used to effectuate that
arrest or detention was objectively unreasonable. See Hardigree v.
Lofton, 992 F.3d 1216, 1231 n.7 (11th Cir. 2021) (noting that an
excessive force claim is not subsumed by an unlawful arrest claim
because a plaintiff may argue that, even assuming probable cause
existed, the force used was nevertheless unconstitutional). When
analyzing whether the force used was reasonable, this Circuit again
looks to the “totality of circumstances.” See Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S.
73, 76 (2025) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)).
Guided by the factors outlined in Graham v. Connor, this
Circuit assesses whether the use of force is “objectively reasonable”
by balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” against “the
countervailing governmental interests at stake” under the facts of
the particular case. Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir.
2009) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The quantum of force
employed against an individual is weighed against (1) “the severity
of the crime at issue”; (2) “whether the suspect posed an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others”; (3) whether the
suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest by
flight; (4) “the need for the application of force”; (5) “the
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relationship between the need and amount of force used”; and
(6) “the extent of the injury inflicted.” Acosta, 97 F.4th at 1239
(citation modified).
In undertaking the requisite balancing, “[t]he calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. This must be decided “on
a case-by-case basis from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1072 (11th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (quoting Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559
(11th Cir. 1993)).
In this appeal, we perform our excessive force analysis with
the benefit of body camera videos from multiple officers. The
parties hotly dispute what those videos show: Officers Perez and
Serrano say Castro-Reyes at times was visibly resisting and actively
fighting the officers, whereas Castro-Reyes says he did not actively
resist. That dispute is understandable because, at times, the videos
do not paint the entire picture and contain ambiguities that are
subject to interpretation. These ambiguities are at the heart of the
parties’ dispute, and it therefore bears repeating that we construe
any ambiguities within the body camera videos in Castro-Reyes’s
favor. See Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277-78 (explaining that, at the motion-
to-dismiss stage, “courts must construe all ambiguities in the video
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footage in favor of the plaintiff”); Johnson, 18 F.4th at 1269
(“[W]here the videos do not answer all the questions or resolve all
the details of the encounter, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to [the non-moving party] . . . .”).
We additionally consider other evidence. Namely, (1) in his
deposition, Perez testified that Castro-Reyes never kicked or struck
the officers; and (2) family members stated to police at the scene
and in depositions that Castro-Reyes was not violent. Further, the
body camera videos, construed in favor of Castro-Reyes, do not
contradict the family members and would support a jury finding
that Castro-Reyes’s resistance was de minimis and, at times,
non-existent. Indeed, throughout the incident Castro-Reyes was
bound at his feet and ankles, and most of the time an officer had a
handcuff or firm grasp on Castro-Reyes’s right wrist.
1. Officer Serrano
On appeal, Serrano argues that the undisputed facts in the
record show his use of force was reasonable considering the
circumstances. Serrano points to several cases where this Court
stated that “[t]he use of a taser is not categorically
unconstitutional.” Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 701 (11th Cir.
2021). Undoubtedly, the use of a taser can constitute a reasonable
amount of force, but the cases Serrano relies on are not analogous
here. Just the opposite.
For example, in Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir.
2008), this Court concluded that the force used was proportionate
and reasonable where the police had used a single taser shock
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against a “hostile, belligerent, and uncooperative” suspect, not
causing any serious injury and leaving the suspect “coherent” and
“calmed” shortly after the shock. Id. at 1278; see also Baker, 67 F.4th
at 1281 (single use of taser justified under the totality of the
circumstances).
That said, this Court has drawn a distinction between the
use of a taser on an uncooperative and combative individual and
the use of a taser on a generally cooperative individual. In the 2009
case of Oliver v. Fiorino, this Court concluded that while a single
taser shock “may have been justified,” the defendant officer’s
repeated use of a taser eight to ten times on a plaintiff who was
“largely compliant and cooperative” and was not suspected of
committing a crime was “grossly disproportionate to any threat
posed and unreasonable under the circumstances.” 586 F.3d at
906-07.
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Helm v. Rainbow
City, 989 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2021), where a teenager who was not
suspected of a crime, posed no danger to officers, and who was
already pinned to the ground by multiple officers was tased three
times while the teenager was suffering a grand mal seizure. Id. at
1275. In Helm, this Court concluded that while no case was exactly
on point with the circumstances, the defendant officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity because his actions so obviously
violated the right that lies at the core of the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on excessive force. Id. at 1276.
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On the other hand, more force is reasonable when a suspect
resists and lunges at the officer. See Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972, 979-
80 (11th Cir. 2012) (use of taser between five and eighteen times
reasonable when plaintiff lunged at officers and “resisted during the
entire time” officers attempted to handcuff him).
It is undisputed that Serrano responded to an emergency
backup call for help with a violent subject. But the body camera
videos show that when Serrano actually arrived, Castro-Reyes was
on the wet ground, restrained, and partially undressed. Moreover,
the initial responding officers informed Serrano that Castro-Reyes
needed psychiatric help or a mental health evaluation. With those
facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that (1) Castro-Reyes, in
that restrained state, posed no threat to Serrano or any defendant
officer; (2) the governmental interest in using a severe level of force
was minimal; and (3) any alleged “resistance” by Castro-Reyes to
officers’ orders to turn over was either de minimis or due to a
physical inability to turn over because of Castro-Reyes’s restraints,
the repeated tasing, the slippery floor, and officers physically
manipulating him in an uncoordinated manner.
Body camera video also shows, inter alia, that (1) Serrano
repeatedly deployed his taser until the battery was drained; (2) the
first tasing put Castro-Reyes in the fetal position, thrashing in pain;
and (3) Serrano tased Castro-Reyes despite an order from Perez to
stop tasing Castro-Reyes. From this, a reasonable jury could
conclude that Serrano’s use of force was “grossly disproportionate
to any threat posed and unreasonable under the circumstances.”
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Oliver, 586 F.3d at 907. The present record creates genuine issues
of material fact as to whether Serrano’s actions were unreasonable
and therefore constituted excessive force.
At the time of Serrano’s conduct in 2020, Castro-Reyes’s
rights against such unreasonable use of force through a taser were
clearly established. See Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1292
(11th Cir. 2011) (holding it was clearly established that using a taser
“is excessive where the suspect is non-violent and has not resisted
arrest”); Oliver, 586 F.3d at 906-08 (concluding that qualified
immunity did not apply to a defendant officer’s repeated use of a
taser eight to ten times on a plaintiff who was “largely compliant
and cooperative” and was not suspected of committing a crime).
In short, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Castro-Reyes, a reasonable jury could find that (1) Serrano’s
interest in using force was minimal considering that Castro-Reyes
was bound on the ground when officers arrived; (2) Castro-Reyes
never attempted to strike or kick the officers; (3) Castro-Reyes’s
resistance, if any, was de minimis; and (4) the force employed by
Serrano was disproportionally severe and substantial, leaving
Castro-Reyes in the fetal position, thrashing in pain. Thus, the
record creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Serrano’s actions were unreasonable, constituting excessive force.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny
qualified immunity and summary judgment to Serrano on
Castro-Reyes’s excessive force claim.
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2. Officer Perez
Castro-Reyes asserts that two separate actions of Perez
constituted excessive force. First, Castro-Reyes claims Perez used
excessive force when he employed three closed-fist blows to
Castro-Reyes’s face while he was restrained by six other officers
and not actively resisting. Second, Castro-Reyes claims Perez used
excessive force when he dragged Castro-Reyes outside by his
ankles, causing Castro-Reyes’s head to hit each of the concrete
stairs outside his apartment.
Perez contends that Castro-Reyes (1) failed to comply with
officers, (2) engaged in a “prolonged struggle,” and (3) appeared to
have “superhuman strength.” Perez also contends that his hand
was pinned under Castro-Reyes such that his closed-fist punches
were necessary to avoid serious injury.
But viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Castro-Reyes, a reasonable jury could conclude that Castro-Reyes
did not pose a threat to officers, and that any resistance was
minimal and did not justify the severe quantum of force used.
Specifically, a reasonably jury could conclude that Castro-Reyes:
(1) was physically unable to comply with commands due to the
slippery floor, restraints, taser shocks, and officers physically
manipulating him in an uncoordinated manner; (2) was already
fully restrained by six officers surrounding him when Perez
employed his closed-fist punches and dragged Castro-Reyes by his
ankles outside; and (3) was severely injured by Perez’s use of force,
as evidenced by Castro-Reyes’s dislocated right shoulder, back
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pain, lacerations to his face, and the kidney issues associated with
his injuries. Bosque’s admonition to Perez not to punch
Castro-Reyes only bolsters our conclusions.
Since at least 2014, this Circuit has found that officers cannot
continue to use gratuitous force on an individual who does not
pose a threat to officers’ safety, even if that individual previously
posed a threat. Acosta, 97 F.4th at 1242; see also Saunders v. Duke,
766 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have repeatedly ruled
that a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment, and is denied
qualified immunity, if he or she uses gratuitous and excessive force
against a suspect who is under control, not resisting, and obeying
commands.”) (citing Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919,
927 (11th Cir. 2000); then citing Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225,
1233 (11th Cir. 2000); and then citing Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198). So, if
a jury believes Castro-Reyes’s account of the record that Perez
punched and dragged a bound teenager, who was partially
handcuffed, pinned down by multiple other officers, and unable to
physically comply because of repeated taser shocks, then Officer
Perez is not entitled to qualified immunity under the clearly
established law of this Circuit.
As such, the district court did not err when it concluded that
material disputes of fact precluded a finding that Officer Perez’s use
of force was constitutional as a matter of law. Therefore, we affirm
the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and summary
judgment to Perez on Castro-Reyes’s excessive force claim.
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34 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
V. CLAIMS UNDER FLORIDA LAW
Officers Serrano and Perez challenge the denial of summary
judgment on Castro-Reyes’s assault and battery claims under
Florida law. The officers argue that state agent immunity under
Florida law shields them from liability. We are not persuaded.
Under Florida law, a police officer “may not be held
personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any action
for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or
omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or
function,” except if the officer “acted in bad faith or with malicious
purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of
human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).
Officers Serrano and Perez are thus entitled to state agent
immunity from Castro-Reyes’s state-law assault and battery claims
unless Castro-Reyes demonstrates a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether (1) Serrano and Perez acted with “actual malice,”
defined as acting with “ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent”;
(2) Serrano’s and Perez’s conduct was “worse than gross
negligence”; (3) their conduct was “more reprehensible and
unacceptable than mere intentional conduct”; or (4) they acted
“with a conscious and intentional indifference to consequences and
with the knowledge that damage was likely to be done to persons
or property.” Coleman v. Hillsborough Cnty., 41 F.4th 1319, 1325,
1329 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Peterson v. Pollack, 290 So. 3d 102,
109-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)) (citation modified).
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1. Officer Serrano
Taking the record in the light most favorable to
Castro-Reyes, a jury could reasonably view (1) Officer Serrano’s
repeated deployment of the taser, (2) his joking about the tasing
with other officers, and (3) his administration of a final shock after
Officer Perez ordered him to stop as conduct reflecting a
malevolent intent or, at minimum, a willful disregard of
Castro-Reyes’s safety and rights. Because these facts, if credited,
could satisfy the statutory standard for malice or wanton and
willful disregard of Castro-Reyes’s safety and rights, we affirm the
district court’s denial of state agent immunity to Officer Serrano
under Florida law.
2. Officer Perez
In a single footnote, Officer Perez argues this Court should
reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to
Castro-Reyes’s state-law assault and battery claims because there is
insufficient evidence that Perez acted with bad faith, malice, or
wanton disregard of Castro-Reyes’s safety or rights.
Under our Circuit precedent, an appellant abandons an issue
on appeal when he fails to raise and meaningfully develop it in his
initial brief. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681
(11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that an appellant abandons a
claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises
it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and
authority.”) (collecting cases); see, e.g., Walter Int’l Prods. Inc. v.
Salinas, 650 F.3d 1402, 1413 n.7 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding
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36 Opinion of the Court 24-12307
appellant abandoned claim for tortious interference by making
“nothing more than a passing reference” to it in initial brief). Perez
did not meaningfully develop his argument on this issue and, thus,
likely abandoned it. We nonetheless address the merits of this issue
in the interest of judicial economy.
To that end, we conclude that the district court properly
denied Officer Perez state agent immunity for Castro-Reyes’s
state-law assault and battery claims. When the evidence is viewed
in the light most favorable to Castro-Reyes, a reasonable jury could
conclude that Perez acted with malice or in a manner exhibiting
wanton and willful disregard for Castro-Reyes’s safety and rights.
The record includes evidence that Perez (1) delivered multiple
closed-fist strikes and (2) dragged Castro-Reyes down a flight of
concrete stairs at a time when Castro-Reyes was already pinned
beneath several officers, largely restrained, and being repeatedly
tased.
Officer Perez engaged in this level of force despite having
little information about why the officers were struggling with
Castro-Reyes in the first place. In fact, the initial responding officer
admonished Perez for punching Castro-Reyes. Notably, Florida
courts have previously found that officers may be found to have
acted with malice or wanton disregard when they use significant
force without understanding the underlying situation or when the
suspect is already restrained. See Thompson v. Douds, 852 So. 2d 299,
309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Under the totality of the
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24-12307 Opinion of the Court 37
circumstances, a jury could reasonably find malicious purpose or
willful disregard of Castro-Reyes’s safety and rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we (1) reverse the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity to Officers Bosque and Kelly as to the
§ 1983 false arrest claims; (2) affirm the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity to Officers Serrano and Perez as to the § 1983
excessive force claims; (3) affirm the district court’s denial of state
agent immunity to Officers Serrano and Perez as to the Florida
assault and battery claims; and (4) remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.