Williamson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BOBBY KENNETH WILLIAMSON, :

Plaintiff : CIV. ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-1781

v. (JUDGE MANNION)

JOHN RIVELLO, et al., :

Defendants i

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court in this prisoner civil rights case is

defendants’ motions for summary judgment for plaintiff's failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and plaintiffs motion for sanctions and motion to

compel discovery. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary

judgment will be granted and plaintiff's motions will be denied as moot.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Bobby Kenneth Williamson, and two other named plaintiffs

filed this case as a putative class action on behalf of themselves and a class

of similarly situated inmates at SCl-Huntingdon on September 28, 2023.

(Doc. 1). The case was initially assigned to United States District Judge

Christopher C. Conner. On April 2, 2024, Judge Conner dismissed the

complaint with respect to plaintiff Edwards for his failure to pay the requisite

filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 17).

On May 20, 2024, Judge Conner denied plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification, dismissed their complaint without prejudice, and granted them

leave to file an amended complaint limited to their individual claims. (Docs.

19-20). Plaintiffs Williamson and Bundy filed separate amended complaints

on September 17, 2024, and September 23, 2024. (Docs. 27, 30). On

November 18, 2024, Judge Conner dismissed Bundy’s amended complaint

in its entirety, dismissed Williamson’s amended complaint in part, and

allowed the case to proceed solely as to (1) Williamson's deliberate

indifference claim against defendants Rivello, Banks, Price, McMullen,

Holms, and the facility maintenance manager, and (2) Williamson's

negligence claim against defendants Rivello and Holms. (Docs. 31-32).

Defendants moved to dismiss Williamson’s amended complaint on

January 16, 2025. (Doc. 41). The case was reassigned to the undersigned

on January 21, 2025, following Judge Conner’s retirement from the court.

The court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part on August

11, 2025, dismissing the negligence claim because defendants were entitled

to sovereign immunity, but denying the motion to the extent that it sought to

dismiss the deliberate indifference claim for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. (Docs. 61-62). Recognizing, however, that there appeared to be

an arguable basis to conclude that Williamson failed to exhaust

administrative remedies, the court set an expedited discovery schedule for

discovery related to the issue of exhaustion, and required all dispositive

motions on the issue of exhaustion to be filed no later than October 31, 2025.

(Docs. 61-62). Defendants then answered the amended complaint on August

25, 2025. (Doc. 65).

Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment based on

Williamson’s purported failure to exhaust administrative remedies on

October 30, 2025, along with a statement of material facts and a supporting

brief. (Docs. 70-72). Williamson did not respond to the motion for summary

judgment, nor did he seek an extension of time to do so.

On November 5, 2025, Williamson filed a motion for sanctions,

asserting that defendant Rivello deliberately destroyed video evidence

relating to his claims. (Doc. 73). Williamson then filed a motion to compel

defendants to produce discovery on November 21, 2025. (Doc. 77).

Defendants opposed the motion for sanctions on December 19, 2025, (Doc.

80), but have not responded to the motion to compel discovery. All three

motions are ripe for review and are resolved in this opinion.

Il. |§ STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery

[including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file]

and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp.,

901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable

jury could find for the non-moving party, and is material if it will affect the

outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 254 (1986); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.

Ericksen, 903 F. Supp. 836, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1995). At the summary judgment

stage, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also Marino v. Indus. Crating

Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (a court may not weigh the evidence

or make credibility determinations). Rather, the court must consider all

evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).

To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively

identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving party

can discharge that burden by showing that “on all the essential elements of

its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could

find for the non-moving party.” /n re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir.

2003); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets this initial

burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to material facts,” but must show sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny,

139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving

party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant]

will bear the burden of proof at trial,” Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary

judgment because such a failure “necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche,

Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).

lll. | MATERIAL Facts’

A. Grievance Policy

Exhaustion of administrative remedies in the DOC is governed by the

three-step process outlined in the DOC’s grievance policy, DC-ADM 804.

(See DC-ADM 804, available at □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

pagov/en/cor/documents/about-us/doc-policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievan

ces. pdf) (last visited Jan. 27, 2026). Under DC-ADM 804, a prisoner must

' Local Rule 56.1 requires a motion for summary judgment to “be

accompanied by a separate, short and concise statement of the material

facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there

is No genuine issue to be tried” and requires that the party opposing a motion

for summary judgment file a statement responding to the numbered

paragraphs in the movant's statement of material facts, which “shall include

references to the parts of the record” that support the nonmovant’s

opposition to the motion. M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. If a non-moving party fails to

respond to a moving party’s statement in the manner required by Local Rule

56.1, the facts asserted in the moving party’s statement are “deemed to be

admitted.” /d. In this case, defendants have filed a statement of material facts

as required by Local Rule 56.1, (Doc. 71), but Williamson has not responded

to the statement. The facts included in defendants’ statement are accordingly

deemed admitted for the purpose of resolving the motion for summary

judgment. M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. The court cites directly to defendants’

statement as to any facts included in the statement.

2 As requested by defendants, (see Doc. 72 at 6 n.1), the court takes

judicial notice of the policy and its contents as a document that is publicly

available on a government website. See Vanderklok v. United States, 868

F.3d 189, 205 n.16 (3d Cir. 2017). All citations to DC-ADM 804 will be to the

version of the policy that is available on the DOC’s website. The current

version of DC-ADM 804 has been in effect since May 1, 2015, and was

therefore in effect at all relevant times.

first submit a written grievance within fifteen working days from the date of

the incident. /d. §1(A)(8). DC-ADM 804 provides that the grievance must

include “a statement of the facts relevant to the claim,” “identify individuals

directly involved in the events,” and “specifically state any claims [the inmate]

wishes to make concerning violations of Department directives, regulations,

court orders, or other law.” /d. §1(A)(11). If the inmate is unable to comply

with the fifteen-day deadline, he may request an extension of time to file a

grievance. /d. §1(C)(2). Next, the prisoner must submit a written appeal to

an intermediate review level within fifteen working days. /d. §2(A)(1)(a).

Finally, the inmate must submit an appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate

Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA’) within fifteen working days. /d.

§2(B)(1)(b).

B. Plaintiff's Grievances

Williamson's claims assert generally that he was exposed to asbestos

and other harmful substances as a result of renovations that were performed

in his housing block. (See Doc. 27). The renovation work began in mid-2021.

(Doc. 71 415). He filed eight grievances during the period of time from

September 2021 to July 2023. (/d. 16). Seven of those eight grievances did

not pertain to the conditions of his confinement. (See id. J]J17-21). The only

grievance that pertained to the conditions of his confinement during the

relevant period was Grievance Number 1025327. (/d. 421). Grievance

Number 1025327 was rejected as untimely. (/d. ]23). Williamson ultimately

appealed the grievance to SOIGA, which rejected it for failure to submit

required or legible documentation in support of his claims. (/d. 427).

Williamson additionally alleges harm from exposure to asbestos during

renovation work performed on February 22, 2021. (/d. 931). He filed two

grievances during the period of time relevant to this claim. (/d. 34). One of

these grievances, Grievance Number 1077706, pertained to the conditions

of his confinement. (/d. 736). He stated that two staff members exposed him

to dust, but did not allege that the dust contained asbestos or lead paint. (/d.

937). The only staff members identified in the grievance were Sergeant

Snook and Correctional Officer Miller. (/d. 941). The defendants were not

named in the grievance. (/d. ]40).

IV. DISCUSSION

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA’), prisoners

complaining about the conditions of their confinement must exhaust

available administrative remedies before they may file suit in federal court.

42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). The PLRA requires proper exhaustion, meaning

plaintiffs must administratively grieve their claims in accordance with the

procedural rules of the prison in which they are incarcerated. Downey v. Pa.

Dep't of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548

U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an

affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove; it is not a pleading

requirement for plaintiffs. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).

A prisoner is only required to exhaust administrative remeciies that are

“available.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (21018) (citing

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93). An administrative remedy is unavailable, and

administrative exhaustion is thus excused, in three situations: “(1) when ‘it

operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consisteritly unwilling

to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates’; (2) when it is ‘so opaque that it

becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,’ such as wien no ordinary

prisoner can discern or navigate it; or (3) when ‘prison administrators thwart

inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process throug machination,

misrepresentation, or intimidation.” /d. at 266-67 (quoting Rass v. Blake, 578

U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016)). If defendants establish failures to exhaust

administrative remedies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to sshow that the

administrative remedy process was unavailable. /d. at 268.

Defendants argue that Williamson failed to exhaust administrative

remedies in the instant case because o1e of the relevant grievances—

Grievance Number 1025327—was dismissed by SOIGA for failiure to provide

required or legible documentation, and the other relevant grievance—

Grievance Number 1077706—failed to name the defendants and failed to

state that he was exposed to asbestos or lead paint. (Doc. 72 at 9-12).

The summary judgment record confirms defendants’ assertion that

Williamson failed to exhaust administrative remedies. First, defendants are

correct that he failed to properly appeal Grievance Number 1025327 through

all stages of administrative review. (See Doc. 71-10 at 2). Second,

defendants are correct that he failed to name any of the defendants in

Grievance Number 1077706. (See Doc. 71-11). Although the failure to name

a defendant in a grievance may be excused if the unnamed defendant is

“fairly within the compass of the prisoner's grievance,” Spruill v. Gillis, 372

F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), here, other than naming non-defendants Miller

and Snook, Williamson’s only assertion of which prison officials were

responsible for his injuries was a vague allusion to “staff.” (See Doc. 71-11

at 13, 15). This is plainly insufficient to conclude that defendants were “fairly

within the compass’ of the grievance. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234.

The burden accordingly shifts to Williamson to show that the grievance

process was unavailable to him. Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268. Williamson has

clearly failed to meet that burden because he has not responded to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment in any manner. Thus, the court

10

will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on Williamson's

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Having done so, the court will deny Williamson’s motion for sanctions

and motion to compel discovery as moot. Both motions seek relief based on

defendants’ alleged failure to produce evidence relevant to the merits of

Williamson's claims. (Docs. 73, 77). Neither of the motions nor the evidence

plaintiff seeks is relevant to the issue of exhaustion of administrative

remedies.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, deny Williamson’s motion for sanctions and motion to

compel discovery as moot, and close this case. An appropriate order shall

issue.

if

fo E. Mannion

United States District Judge

Dated: f¥26

23-1781-02

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