Jolliff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

KATHY JOLLIFF,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE ROGERS COUNTY Court No. 4:24-cv-00065-JCG-SH

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,

KAYLA JONES, DANIEL

JOHNSON, RYAN PRICE, ZANE

POWERS, AND LINDON

DANCER,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Kathy Jolliff (“Plaintiff” or “Jolliff”) filed this action on February

19, 2024, alleging Constitutional deprivations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from

her detention by Defendants the Rogers County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s

Office”) and then-unidentified employees or agents of the Sheriff’s Office (“John

and Jane Doe Defendants”) on February 26–27, 2022. Compl. (Doc. 2) at ¶¶ 7, 43.

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 1, 2024, and a Second Amended

Complaint on September 5, 2025. Am. Compl. (Doc. 5); Second Am. Compl.

(Doc. 64). Plaintiff added the following Defendants in her Second Amended

Complaint: Kayla Jones (“Jones”), Daniel Johnson (“Johnson”), Ryan Price

(“Price”), Zane Powers (“Powers”), and Lindon Dancer (“Dancer”) (collectively,

“Individual Defendants”). Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff removed John and

Jane Doe Defendants in the Second Amended Complaint. Compare id., with

Compl. at ¶ 3.

Individual Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, claiming that the statute

of limitations had expired on February 27, 2024. Mot. Dismiss Defs. Supp. Br.

(“Defs.’ Mot.”) (Doc. 71) at 1–3; Corr. Mot. Dismiss Defs. (Doc. 72). Plaintiff

filed her Response Opposing Motion to Dismiss and Individual Defendants filed

their Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss. Resp. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s

Resp.”) (Doc. 73); Defs. Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”) (Doc. 74).

For the following reasons, Individual Defendants’ motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff named the Sheriff’s Office, through Scott Walton, and John and

Jane Doe Defendants in her Complaint filed on February 19, 2024. Compl. at ¶ 2–

3. John and Jane Doe Defendants were described as “unknown individual

employees or agents of the Sheriff, whose identities Jolliff reasonably expects to be

obtained during Discovery.” Id. at ¶ 3. On July 7, 2025, the Court held a status

hearing regarding discovery. See Min. Sheet (Doc. 47). The Court ordered the

Sheriff’s Office to provide Plaintiff within fourteen days the names of the

individuals who were on duty the night of her detention. See id.; Scheduling Order

(Doc. 48). On July 22, 2025, the Parties filed Initial Disclosures pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a). Initial Disclosures Def. Sheriff’s Off. (Doc.

51); Pl.’s Initial Disclosures (Doc. 52). Plaintiff named Individual Defendants in

her Second Amended Complaint. See Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 3.

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint stated that Plaintiff did not know the

identities of the Individual Defendants until the Sheriff’s Office submitted its

Initial Disclosures. Id. at ¶ 111; see Initial Disclosures Def. Sheriff’s Off. at 1–3.

Plaintiff claimed that the Sheriff’s Office and Individual Defendants knew from the

Complaint that her claims were directed at them. Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 112.

Jolliff stated that Defendant Jones was the only female Deputy at the jail on the

night of the events, thus Defendant Jones “knew or should have known that the

averments directed at a specifically female Deputy must have been directed at her.”

Id. at ¶ 113 (emphasis in original); see Compl. at ¶ 34. Plaintiff alleged that

Defendant Johnson was the only on-site supervisor at the time and Defendant

Powers the only booking deputy that night, and that they both “knew or should

have known” that the allegations directed at the “on-site supervisor” and “booking

Deputy” involved them. Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 114–15; see Compl. at ¶¶ 21–

42.

Plaintiff stated that the Sheriff’s Office intentionally concealed the existence

and identity of medical professional Leighann Williams (“Williams”) and her

contract employer Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC (“Turn Key”). See Second Am.

Compl. at ¶¶ 88, 89, 116. Plaintiff alleged that knowledge that there was a

qualified medical professional, Williams, at the jail was necessary “to bring her

claims against the Individual Defendants.” See id. at ¶ 117. Plaintiff claimed that

this intentional concealment provides adequate grounds for equitable tolling of her

claims against Individual Defendants. Id. at ¶ 118.

LEGAL STANDARD

A pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to a form of relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A response

to a pleading must state any affirmative defenses to the claims such as a statute of

limitations defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (“Iqbal”), 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (“Twombly”), 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. The Court must assume the factual

allegations contained in a complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences

in favor of the non-moving party when considering a motion to dismiss. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555–56. However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

I. Statute of Limitations

Individual Defendants argue that the applicable statute of limitations bars all

of Plaintiff’s claims against them. Defs.’ Mot. at 1. Individual Defendants claim

that Plaintiff “filed this suit on February 19, 2024, just days before the statute of

limitations expired on her claims.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff’s original complaint did not

name any of the Individual Defendants. Id. Both the original and Amended

Complaint named “John and Jane Doe” as Defendants. Id.; Compl. at ¶ 3; Am.

Compl. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, filed on September 5,

2025, substituted the names of Individual Defendants in place of the John and Jane

Doe Defendants. Defs.’ Mot. at 3; Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 3. Individual

Defendants argue that “this substitution is barred by law, as the statute of

limitations ran on all of [Plaintiff’s] claims against Individual Defendants on

February 27, 2024.” Defs.’ Mot. at 3.

The statute of limitations for a “[42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim is dictated by the

personal injury statute of limitations in the state in which the claim arose . . . and in

Oklahoma, that period is two years.” McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281, 1289

(10th Cir. 2011) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); 12 Okla. Stat.

tit. 12, § 95(A)(3) (2025) (“Civil actions other than for the recovery of real

property can only be brought within the following periods, after the cause of action

shall have accrued, and not afterwards: . . . [w]ithin two (2) years: . . . [for] an

action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract[.]”)).

Limitations periods in § 1983 actions are also determined by the states’

coordinating tolling rules. Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989)). A state’s limitations and

tolling rules are applied “unless doing so ‘defeats either § 1983’s chief goals of

compensation and deterrence or its subsidiary goals of uniformity and

federalism.’” Johnson v. Garrison, 805 Fed. App’x. 589, 593 (10th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. at 539). Oklahoma permits tolling of the

statute of limitations for a “legal disability,” the “discovery rule” that “tolls the

statute of limitations until the injured party knows of or should have known of the

injury,” and for “exceptional circumstances[.]” Id. (quoting Alexander v.

Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff acknowledged that she substituted Individual Defendants in her

Second Amended Complaint “[a]fter obtaining identification of several additional

individual defendants but following the running of the statute of limitations[.]”

Pl.’s Resp. at 7. Both Individual Defendants and Plaintiff recognize that the

primary question is whether Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint can

sufficiently relate back to the date of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(c) to be considered timely. See Defs.’ Mot. at 5; see also Pl.’s

Resp. at 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).

I. Rule 15(c) Relation Back of Amendments After the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s Garrett v. Flemming and the U.S.

Supreme Court’s Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(c) “governs when an amended

pleading ‘relates back’ to the date of a timely filed original pleading and is thus

itself timely even though it was filed outside an applicable statute of limitations.”

Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010). Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C), an amendment to a pleading relates back to

the date of the original pleading when:

[T]he amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against

whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within

the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and

complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: (i) received such

notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the

merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have

been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s

identity.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). Individual Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint that replaced the John and Jane Doe Defendants with

Individual Defendants does not sufficiently relate back to the filing of her original

complaint according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s (“Tenth

Circuit”) holding in Garrett v. Fleming (“Garrett”), 362 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 2004).

See Defs.’ Mot. at 5 (citing Garrett, 362 F.3d at 696–97). Individual Defendants

argue that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred and dismissal is required. Id.

In Garrett, the Tenth Circuit stated that “[a] plaintiff’s designation of an

unknown defendant as ‘John Doe’ in the original complaint is not a formal defect

of the type Rule 15(c)(3) was meant to address.” 362 F.3d at 697.1 Garrett

involved a civil rights claim in which the plaintiff filed an amended complaint

outside of the applicable statute of limitations naming correctional officers after his

1 Rule 15(c)(3) no longer exists in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after

stylistic amendments were made to Rule 15 in 2007. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 2007

Amendment (“The language of Rule 15 has been amended as part of the general

restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style

and terminology consistent through the rules. These changes are intended to be

stylistic only.”).

initial complaint named thirty “John Does,” whose names were then unknown to

him. Id. at 694–95. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the District Court that “a

plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the intended defendant’s identity is not a ‘mistake

concerning the identity of the proper party’ within the meaning of Rule

15(c)(3)(B).” Id. at 696. Individual Defendants and Plaintiff disagree on how this

Court should treat Garrett after the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Krupski v.

Costa Crociere S. p. A. (“Krupski”), 560 U.S. 538 (2010), that resolved differing

interpretations among federal courts regarding the elements of Rule 15(c). See

Krupski, 560 U.S. at 541–46; Defs.’ Mot. at 9; Pl.’s Resp. at 4–5.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Krupski focused on the knowledge aspect of

relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). See 560 U.S. at 541. In Krupski, the

Supreme Court held that “relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depends on what

the party to be added knew or should have known, not on the amending party’s

knowledge or its timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.” Id. The Supreme

Court in Krupski stated that the Court of Appeals incorrectly focused on the

plaintiff’s knowledge when applying Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) because the text of the

Rule “asks what the prospective defendant knew or should have known during the

Rule 4(m) period[.]” Id. at 548 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court

explained that “[i]nformation in the plaintiff’s possession is relevant only if it bears

on the defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff made a mistake regarding

the proper party’s identity.” Id.

II. The “Arising Out Of,” Unprejudicial Notice, and Knowledge

Requirements of Rule 15(c)

Individual Defendants and Plaintiff disagree over whether two out of three

required elements in Rule 15(c) are met. See Defs.’ Mot. at 19; see also Pl.’s Resp.

at 12. An amendment “that changes the party or the naming of a defendant” relates

back to the original pleading under Rule 15(c) when the listed requirements2 are

met:

(1) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set

out—in the original pleading and (2) within the period provided by Rule

4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought

in by amendment (i) received such notice of the action that it will not

be prejudiced in defending on the merits and (ii) knew or should have

known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a

mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.

Est. of Gonzales v. Brown, No. 12-CV-495-JED-PJC, 2014 WL 4748604, at *7

(N.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2014); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B)–(C). Rule 15(c) does not

2 The unprejudicial notice requirement of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) references the time

limits of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C).

Rule 4(m) requires service to a defendant within 90 days after the complaint is

filed, notwithstanding exceptions such as good cause or service in a foreign

country. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Rule 15(c) requires that the added party receive

notice of the “institution of the action”—the original complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P.

Rule 15(c) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; see Maycher v.

Muskogee Med. Ctr. Auxiliary, 129 F.3d 131, No. 97-7021, 1997 WL 698007, at

*2 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 1997) (unpublished table decision).

require formal notice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee’s note to 1966

amendment; see Krupski, 560 U.S. at 554 n.5; see also Ennis v. HCA Health Servs.

Okla., Inc., No. CIV-04-682-D, 2008 WL 2510101, at *4 n.3 (W.D. Okla. June 17,

2008). Notice may be actual, constructive, formal, or informal. Balanciere v. U.S.

Postal Serv., 648 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D. Colo. 1984). Courts have found notice when

the originally named defendant and added defendant share the same attorney or

have a close identity of interest. See 6A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &

Procedure §§ 1498.1, 1499 (3d ed. 2025); Krupski, 560 U.S. at 5543; Travelers

Indem. Co. v. U.S. Constr. Specialties Co., 382 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir. 1967)

(“Nor is the purpose of the federal rules furthered by denying the addition of a

party who has a close identity of interest with the old party when the added party

will not be prejudiced. The ends of justice are not served when forfeiture of just

claims because of technical rules is allowed.”).

Individual Defendants agree that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original pleading. Defs.’

3 The Supreme Court in Krupski refrained from analyzing the notice requirement

because the District Court’s holding that the defendant had “constructive notice”

was not challenged on appeal. Krupski, 560 U.S. at 554. The Supreme Court

concluded that relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) was satisfied. See id. at 541.

The District Court found that notice could be imputed onto the added party, Costa

Crociere S.p.A., because it shared an identity of interests with the originally named

defendant and both entities were represented by the same counsel. Krupski v.

Costa Crociere S.p.A., No. 08-60152-CIV, 2008 WL 7423654, at *4 (S.D. Fla.

Oct. 21, 2008), rev’d, 560 U.S. 538 (2010).

Mot. at 19. Plaintiff’s Complaint and Second Amended Complaint concern the

same events during her detention on February 26–27, 2022. Compl. at ¶¶ 7–43;

Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 7–74. The Court agrees with the Parties that the Second

Amended Complaint arises out of the same conduct and occurrence as the

Complaint and meets this requirement under 15(c)(1)(B).

The Parties disagree over whether Individual Defendants received

unprejudicial notice of the action within the required time period and whether

Individual Defendants had knowledge that the action would have been brought

against them but for a mistake concerning their identities. See Defs.’ Mot. at 19;

Pl.’s Resp. at 13–14. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has established the first

“arising out of” element of relation back and will analyze whether Plaintiff has

pled sufficient facts to establish Rule 15(c)’s unprejudicial notice and knowledge

requirements.

III. Analysis

At the pleading stage, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts “to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the alleged offense.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A well-pleaded complaint can move forward even if

proving the alleged facts is “improbable” and “recovery is very remote and

unlikely.” Id. Assuming that Plaintiff’s allegations are true in her Second

Amended Complaint, it is plausible that Individual Defendants received notice of

Plaintiff’s Complaint such that it did not prejudice them. Plaintiff claimed that

Individual Defendants are individual employees or agents of the Sheriff and named

the Sheriff’s Office in her Complaint. Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 3; Compl. at ¶ 2.

Plaintiff stated that the Sheriff’s Office and Individual Defendants knew from the

Complaint that the claims were directed toward them and it is reasonable to infer

that they had such knowledge because all the Defendants are uniquely related. See

Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 112.

There may be a close employment relationship or a chain of command

between the Defendants, assuming that it is true that Individual Defendants are

employees or agents of the Sheriff’s Office. It is plausible that Individual

Defendants, as Deputy Sheriffs, would have known informally or formally of this

legal action4 because it named their Sheriff’s Office and concerned events on dates

that they worked.5 See Initial Disclosures Def. Sheriff’s Off. at 1–5.

Plaintiff alleged that Individual Defendants are individual employees or

agents of the Sheriff’s Office and that suggests that they are closely related to the

4 It is relevant in determining whether all the Defendants are closely related to

consider that Individual Defendants and the Sheriff’s Office share two attorneys

because Randall J. Wood and Jessica Marie James Curtis have both entered their

appearances as counsel of record for all Defendants. See Entry of Appearance

(Docs. 6, 40, 65, 66).

5 The Sheriff’s Office’s Initial Disclosures indicate that Defendants Johnson,

Price, Powers, Dancer, and Jones were present at the Sheriff’s Office in various

roles on “February 26–27, 2022.” Initial Disclosures Def. Sheriff Off. at 1–5.

Sheriff’s Office. See Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 3. The original party was named

John and Jane Doe Defendants to represent employees or agents of the Sheriff’s

Office and, as Deputy Sheriffs, Individual Defendants share an identity of interests

to the Sheriff’s Office. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. U.S. Constr. Specialties Co.,

382 F.2d at 106. Individual Defendants may have had notice of the Complaint,

filed within the statute of limitations, based upon their close employee relationship

with the Sheriff’s Office and such notice would not prejudice Individual

Defendants in their defense of the Second Amended Complaint now.

Plaintiff’s Complaint recounted the events of her detention with specific

detail as to the individuals allegedly at fault and their actions or lack of actions.

See Compl. at ¶¶ 32–42 (stating that Plaintiff was refused a medical examination,

someone assisted Plaintiff with changing her clothes due to her injured arm, and

several individuals told her to “suck it up” and “quit whining”). The specific

details pled, such as Defendant Jones being the only female deputy at the jail,

Defendant Johnson being the only supervisor, and Defendant Powers being the

only booking deputy that night, make it plausible that Individual Defendants had

informal or formal notice of the Complaint as it mentioned their conduct directly.

See Second Am. Compl. at ¶ 113–15.

It is plausible that Individual Defendants received notice in some form of

Plaintiff’s Complaint given that it named their direct employer and pled detailed

factual scenarios involving their actions or lack of actions on February 26–27,

2022. The Court concludes that Plaintiff plausibly pled facts sufficient to

reasonably infer that Individual Defendants had unprejudicial notice, informal or

formal, of her Complaint in accordance with Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i).

Plaintiff’s alleged facts also suggest that Individual Defendants knew or

should have known that the Complaint would have been brought against them, but

for a mistake concerning their identities. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).

Plaintiff claimed that she did not know the Individual Defendants’ identities until

Initial Disclosures were filed and that Individual Defendants knew from her

Complaint that her claims were directed at them. Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 111–

12. The Initial Disclosures were not filed until after the Court ordered the Sheriff’s

Office to provide Plaintiff with the identification of individuals who were on duty

the night of Plaintiff’s detention. See Min. Sheet; Scheduling Order. Plaintiff

alleged that the Sheriff’s Office intentionally concealed the existence, involvement,

and identity of Williams and Turn Key, which were necessary to bring her claims

against Individual Defendants. Second Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 116–17.

Considering all the facts in favor of Plaintiff at the pleading stage, it is

plausible that Individual Defendants may have known or should have known that

Plaintiff named John and Jane Doe Defendants rather than Individual Defendants

in the Complaint for reasons that could include a mistake. Plaintiff only needs to

sufficiently allege facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of” this knowledge. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. If proof of the

alleged facts of Individual Defendants’ knowledge is “improbable[,]” that does not

prevent Plaintiff’s Complaint from surviving at the pleading stage. Id. Plaintiff’s

allegations are plausible enough to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery

may reveal evidence of Individual Defendants’ knowledge pursuant to Rule

15(c)(1)(C)(ii).

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint plausibly pled facts to meet the requirements under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)

and to state a claim for relief that is not barred by the statute of limitations.

CONCLUSION

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 71) is denied.

2. On or before February 12, 2026, the Parties shall meet and confer and file

with the Court a joint status report regarding discovery and a proposed

scheduling order, with a cover letter requesting that the Court enter the joint

proposed scheduling order (if there are no disputes or other issues

concerning scheduling) or to schedule a Scheduling Conference. If the

Parties are unable to agree upon a proposed scheduling order, each Party

shall file a proposed scheduling order by the deadline and contact my Case

Manager, Steve Taronji, by telephone at (212) 264-1611 or via e-mail at

steve_taronji@cit.uscourts.gov, to arrange a video conference with the

Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of February, 2026.

/s/ Jennifer Choe-Groves

Jennifer Choe-Groves

U.S. District Court Judge*

*Judge Jennifer Choe-Groves, of the United States Court of International Trade,

sitting by designation.