Opinion

HOLMAN

Court
District Court, M.D. North Carolina
Filed
Feb 4, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.4%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

QUENTON D. HOLMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23cv618

)

A.T. WIGGS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on “Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment” (Docket Entry 33) (the “Motion”). Because a

genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court should deny the

Motion.

BACKGROUND

Following his arrest on August 27, 2021, Quenton D. Holman

(the “Plaintiff”) sued, as relevant here, North Carolina Alcohol

Law Enforcement Division (“ALE”) Special Agents Todd Wiggs (“S.A.

Wiggs”) and Kaleb Kluttz (“S.A. Kluttz”) (collectively, the

“Defendants”) for excessive force pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as

well as battery under North Carolina law.1 (See generally Docket

Entry 2 (the “Complaint”).)

1 “Section 1983 authorizes a plaintiff to sue for an alleged

deprivation of a federal constitutional right by an official acting

under color of state law.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154,

171 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

I. Procedural History

Defendants “mov[ed] to dismiss [the] Complaint” (Docket Entry

16 at 1),2 arguing that qualified immunity and public official

immunity3 shield them from Plaintiff’s claims (see Docket Entry 17

at 7-16). The Court (per United States District Judge William L.

Osteen, Jr.) denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss because, “[a]t

th[at] stage of the proceedings, qualified immunity and public

official immunity afford[ed] Defendants no relief from Plaintiff’s

excessive force and battery claims” (Docket Entry 27 at 20). (See

Docket Entry 29 at 2 (adopting Docket Entry 27).)

Again contending that they “are entitled to . . . qualified

immunity . . . and [p]ublic [o]fficial [i]mmunity” (Docket Entry 34

at 1), Defendants “move for summary judgment” (Docket Entry 33 at

1). Additionally, Defendants maintain that “no genuine issues of

material fact [ ] support Plaintiff’s claims” (id.) because

“Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that [ ] Defendants used

excessive force to arrest him, and the undisputed facts show that

[Defendants’] actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”

2 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s

pagination.

3 “North Carolina courts refer to this form of immunity as

‘public officer immunity’ and ‘public official immunity,’

interchangeably, though the trend seems to indicate that ‘public

official immunity’ is more common now.” Hines v. Johnson, No.

1:19cv515, 2020 WL 1516397, at *16 n.8 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2020).

2

(Docket Entry 34 at 1). Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (See Docket

Entry 34 at 1). Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (See Docket Entry

37 at 3.)

II. Factual Record

As relevant to the Motion, Plaintiff avers:

[Defendants] were on duty when they encountered me

on August 27, 2021, at the Trinity Park Family Fare

[convenience store] in Durham, NC. When I was

approached, I was struck repeatedly by . . .

Defendants[], then the Duke University officer

approached. . . . Defendants . . . struck me repeatedly

in the ribs while I was in handcuffs. I went to the

ground and then was repeatedly struck in the torso and

ribs by [S.A.] Kluttz and [S.A.] Wiggs. I was handcuffed

and laying on the ground. The Unidentified Duke

University Police officer held me to the ground by

placing his hands on my neck. [S.A.] Kluttz pulled me to

my knees. . . . [S.A.] Wiggs delivered a forearm blow to

my neck. . . . [S.A.] Kluttz kneed me several times to

the ribs. The Duke University Police Officer that [sic]

was assisting in holding me down while [Defendants]

battered me[] then withdrew when I stopped moving. The

Duke University Officer stood and watched as [S.A.]

Kluttz kneed me in the ribs repeatedly.

(Docket Entry 24 at ¶¶ 11-12, 14-20 (paragraph numbers and breaks

omitted).) Consistent with these averments, Plaintiff previously

stated under penalty of perjury in conjunction with the Complaint:

[I] suffered repeated blows to the torso while in

handcuffs, as [I] was lying on the ground, restrained by

a total of three law enforcement officers. The only

crime [I] was believed to have committed was possession

of marijuana initially. . . . At the time of the

[alleged] use of excessive force, [I] posed absolutely

zero threat to officers or bystanders. [I] was unarmed,

restrained, and incapacitated by a forearm blow to the

brachial nerve.

(Docket Entry 3 at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

3

Conversely, S.A. Wiggs avers:

On Friday, August 27, 2021, I was . . . working in

my capacity as a Special Agent participating in

enforcement operations in and around Durham, NC. On this

evening, I was working with [S.A.] Kluttz.

At approximately 11:15 p.m., I observed an

individual, later identified as [Plaintiff], . . .

retrieve a plastic bag . . . contain[ing] a substance

consistent in appearance with marijuana. . . .

Because I believed I observed violations of NC law

pertaining to drug possession, I drove my vehicle to

[Plaintiff’s] location[,] approached [him, and]

immediately identified myself as an ALE Agent

. . . . [Plaintiff] began reaching in his bag for items

that were out of my view. Fearing for my safety, I

grabbed his arms in an attempt to detain him. [S.A.]

Kluttz arrived and assisted me as I secured [Plaintiff]

with handcuffs. . . .

At one point [during a probable cause search of

Plaintiff], his keys fell to the ground, and as I bent

over to retrieve them, [Plaintiff] began to flee by

running while still handcuffed. After approximately 50

yards, [Plaintiff] lost his shoes, his balance, and

subsequently fell to the ground. At this time, [S.A.]

Kluttz was at [Plaintiff’s] side. [Plaintiff]

immediately began kicking wildly at [S.A.] Kluttz,

actively resisting arrest, and then attempt[ed] to stand

up and continue his escape.

When I approached and observed this assaultive

behavior, I delivered a single forearm strike to

[Plaintiff’s] brachial nerve on the right side of his

neck to gain compliance. He immediately stopped

resisting, and no other strikes or force was used by

[S.A.] Kluttz or me.

(Docket Entry 34 at 18-20 (paragraph numbers omitted).)

S.A. Kluttz similarly avers:

On Friday, August 27, 2021, . . . I was working with

[S.A.] Wiggs. . . . While [I was] preparing [a] citation

for [another] patron, [S.A.] Wiggs informed me . . .

[that Plaintiff] was holding a baggie of marijuana in his

4

hand. As I was finishing up with my patron, I observed

[S.A.] Wiggs pull across the street to deal with

[Plaintiff]. I finished up with my patron and went over

to [S.A.] Wiggs who had [Plaintiff] pushed up against the

back of the truck with his hands behind his back. I

assisted [S.A.] Wiggs by putting [Plaintiff] in handcuffs

while [S.A.] Wiggs had control of him.

I observed [Plaintff] to be wearing a small bag[,

and] . . . I observed [S.A.] Wiggs begin a probable cause

search of [Plaintiff] . . . . As [S.A.] Wiggs was

instructing [Plaintiff] to step out of the road, a set of

keys fell out of the bag.

[S.A.] Wiggs bent down to get the keys, at which

point [Plaintiff] began to flee by running while still

handcuffed. [S.A.] Wiggs and I began chasing

[Plaintiff]. . . . After approximately 50 yards,

[Plaintiff] lost his balance and fell to the ground in

the middle of the road. I quickly grabbed [Plaintiff] by

his left arm to gain control of him, and began to give

verbal commands for [Plaintiff] to stay on the

ground. [Plaintiff] did not comply and continued to

actively resist by kicking his feet at me and trying to

stand up. [S.A.] Wiggs assisted me and helped get

[Plaintiff] under control.

An unknown Duke University Police Officer was in a

neighboring parking lot and observed the situation taking

place and jumped the fence to come and assist us.

(Id. at 24-25 (paragraph numbers omitted).)

Defendants also submitted a copy of the “[ALE] Report of

Enforcement Activity” (id. at 29) describing Plaintiff’s arrest,

which generally accords with the foregoing averments of S.A. Wiggs

(see id. at 17-22) and S.A. Kluttz (see id. at 23-26), including

that S.A. Wiggs “delivered a single right forearm strike to

[Plaintiff’s] brachial nerve on the right side of his neck” (id. at

31).

5

DISCUSSION

I. Relevant Standards

A. Summary Judgment Standards

“The [C]ourt shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the burden of establishing the

absence of such dispute. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). Because the Court “tak[es] the evidence and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party,” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th

Cir. 2011) (en banc), that “party is entitled to have the

credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, his version of all

that is in dispute accepted, and all internal conflicts in it

resolved favorably to him,” Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087

(4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (brackets and internal quotation marks

omitted). “If, after reviewing the record as a whole, [the Court]

find[s] that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for [the

nonmoving party], then a genuine factual dispute exists and summary

judgment is improper.” Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv.

Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996).

6

B. Excessive Force and Battery Standards

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive

force and battery claims. (See Docket Entry 34 at 1.) As the

United States Supreme Court has explained:

Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in

the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free

citizen, it is most properly characterized as one

invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which

guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their

persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures” of the

person.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (ellipses in

original). Accordingly, “all claims that law enforcement officers

have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an

arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen

should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its

‘reasonableness’ standard[] . . . .” Id. at 395 (emphasis

omitted).

“Determining whether the force used to effect a particular

seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful

balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Thus, although “the right to make an arrest or

investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use

some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it,”

id., courts “have consistently held that officers using

7

unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force to seize a

secured, unarmed citizen, do not act in an objectively reasonable

manner,” Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 532 (4th Cir. 2003).

Although an objective test, see Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, the

Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard “is not capable of

precise definition or mechanical application,” id. at 396 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Instead,

its proper application requires careful attention to the

facts and circumstances of each particular case,

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

Id. The Court conducts its inquiry “from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene,” id., and its determination of

“excessive[ force] turns on the information possessed by the

officer at the moment that force is employed,” Harris v. Pittman,

927 F.3d 266, 272 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks

omitted). As such, “force justified at the beginning of an

encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification

for the initial force has been eliminated.” Waterman v. Batton,

393 F.3d 471, 481 (4th Cir. 2005).

In turn, North Carolina law permits “a civil action for

damages for assault and battery . . . against one who, for the

accomplishment of a legitimate purpose, such as justifiable arrest,

uses force which is excessive under the given

circumstances.” Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 209, 215, 371

8

S.E.2d 492, 496 (1988). “Under the common law, a law enforcement

officer has the right, in making an arrest and securing control of

an offender, to use only such force as may be reasonably necessary

to overcome any resistance and properly discharge his duties.” Id.

Accordingly, “[h]e may not act maliciously in the wanton abuse of

his authority or use unnecessary and excessive force.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Importantly, “[t]he threshold for determining whether the

limits of privileged force have been exceeded for purposes of

liability under Section 1983 is higher than that for a normal tort

action.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]here a plaintiff

brings both a [Section] 1983 excessive force claim and a common law

claim for assault and battery, the [C]ourt’s determination of the

reasonableness of the force used with respect to the [Section] 1983

claim controls its assault and battery analysis,” 6 Am. Jur. 2d

Assault and Battery § 96 (2025) (footnote omitted), at least

insofar as constitutionally excessive force will be deemed to

constitute a battery. See Johnston v. Hefner, No. 5:24cv138, 2025

WL 2417760, at *9 (W.D.N.C. July 16, 2025) (“The Fourth Circuit has

recognized that[] ‘the jurisprudence governing Fourth Amendment

excessive force actions also controls a party’s actions for battery

and gross negligence.’” (quoting Njang v. Montgomery Cnty., 279 F.

App’x 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2008)).

9

C. Immunity Standards

Defendants also assert their entitlement to qualified immunity

and public official immunity. (See Docket Entry 34 at 1.) “The

doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

evaluating qualified immunity, courts consider “(1) whether the

plaintiff has established the violation of a constitutional right,

and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of

the alleged violation.” Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876, 881 (4th

Cir. 2015).4

A right qualifies as “clearly established” if “it would be

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202

(2001). In other words, “[t]he unlawfulness of the action must be

apparent when assessed from the perspective of an objectively

reasonable official charged with knowledge of established law[]

. . . .” Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 489 (4th Cir.

1990). “This is not to say that an official action is protected by

qualified immunity unless the very action in question has

4 The Court may address these prongs in whichever order “will

best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of [the]

case.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242.

10

previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light

of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation omitted).

Separately, as relevant to Plaintiff’s battery claim, under

North Carolina’s doctrine of public official immunity, “a public

official, engaged in the performance of governmental duties

involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, may not be held

personally liable for mere negligence in respect thereto.” Smith

v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 331, 222 S.E.2d 412, 430 (1976) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “The rule in such cases is that an

official may not be held liable [u]nless it be alleged and proved

that his act, or failure to act, was corrupt or malicious . . ., or

that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).5 Notably, “public officers’

immunity . . . is unavailable to officers who violate clearly

established rights because an officer acts with malice when he does

that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be

5 “Malice,” in this context,

does not necessarily mean that which must proceed from a

spiteful, malignant, or revengeful disposition, but a

conduct injurious to another, though proceeding from an

ill-regulated mind not sufficiently cautious before it

occasions an injury to another. If the conduct of the

defendant was unjustifiable, and actually caused the

injury complained of by the plaintiff, . . . malice in

law would be implied from such conduct . . . .

Betts v. Jones, 208 N.C. 410, 181 S.E. 334, 335 (1935) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

11

contrary to his duty.” Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 742 (4th

Cir. 2003) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted); see

also Hines v. Johnson, No. 1:19cv515, 2020 WL 1516397, at *17

(M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2020) (explaining that “[p]ublic official

immunity . . . is not available for intentional torts”).

II. Analysis

The Court should deny Defendants’ Motion as to both of

Plaintiff’s claims. Construed in a light most favorable to

Plaintiff, as required at this stage of the proceedings and despite

Defendants’ alternate account, the evidence reflects that

Defendants suspected Plaintiff of drug possession and struck him in

the torso repeatedly and in the neck, including while Plaintiff lay

handcuffed on the ground. (See Docket Entry 3 at 2; Docket Entry

24 at ¶¶ 11-12, 14-20.) Considering, on those facts, “the severity

of the crime,” the “immediate threat [posed] to . . . officers or

others, and whether [Plaintiff] . . . actively resist[ed] arrest or

attempt[ed] to [flee],” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, Defendants

exercised excessive force when they, “unprovoked[, handcuffed and

repeatedly struck] a nonthreatening, nonresisting [Plaintiff] to

effect his arrest,” Barfield v. Kershaw Cnty Sheriff’s Office, 638

F. App’x 196, 203 (4th Cir. 2016). See Wiegang v. Long, C/A No.

2:19-1842, 2022 WL 2068951, at *11 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2022) (noting

the “substantial body of caselaw [finding excessive force] when an

officer strikes or continues to use force against a suspect who is

12

already restrained” and collecting Fourth Circuit cases (brackets

and internal quotation marks omitted)), recommendation adopted,

2022 WL 1590994 (D.S.C. May 19, 2022); Zephrine v. Prince George’s

Cnty., No. 02-1769, 2006 WL 8438040, at *9 (D. Md. June 15, 2006)

(“[B]eating a suspect while the suspect is restrained is not

objectively reasonable.”).

Likewise, because the record creates a genuine issue of

material fact as to excessive force — a “higher [liability

standard] than that for a normal tort action [such as battery],”

Myrick, 91 N.C. App. at 215, 371 S.E.2d at 496 — a genuine issue of

material fact also exists as to Plaintiff’s battery claim. See

Morgan v. City of Charlotte, No. 3:22cv3, 2023 WL 4002524, at *15

(W.D.N.C. June 14, 2023) (observing that a plaintiff’s North

Carolina “battery claim[] . . . rises and falls with the excessive

force claim”), appeal filed, No. 23-1748 (4th Cir. July 18,

2023). Therefore, Plaintiff’s “parallel state law claim of . . .

battery is subsumed within the federal excessive force claim and

[should] go[] forward . . . .” Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174

(4th Cir. 1994).

Defendants maintain, however, that qualified public immunity

and public official immunity shield them from liability. (See

Docket Entry 34 at 1.) Yet, viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the record reflects that Defendants repeatedly struck

Plaintiff as he lay handcuffed, violating the “Fourth Circuit[’s]

13

. . . clearly establishe[d case law] that officers employ excessive

force when they assault a . . . physically restrained [suspect],”

Goodman v. Barber, No. 7:11cv153, 2012 WL 4928873, at *7 (E.D.N.C.

Oct. 16, 2012), aff’d, 539 F. App’x 87 (4th Cir. 2013). See also

id. at *2 (denying qualified immunity at summary judgment stage to

a defendant who “hit” and “knee[d]” a “completely subdued”

plaintiff). Based on the facts the Court must accept as true at

this juncture, multiple Fourth Circuit decisions “ma[k]e plain

enough[] . . . the excessive nature of the force used here[] . . .

and [have] found excessive force when officers continued to assault

non-dangerous, controlled suspects. That is precisely the case

here.” Lewis v. Caraballo, 98 F.4th 521, 536 (4th Cir. 2024); see

also Gill v. Mallow, No. 22-2077, 2023 WL 7487165, at *4 (D. Md.

Nov. 13, 2023) (“It has been the well-settled law for more than 20

years that gratuitously punching or violating the bodily integrity

of an arrestee violates the Fourth Amendment.”). Accordingly,

qualified immunity does not entitle Defendants to judgment as a

matter of law at this point in the proceedings.

Similarly, because public official immunity “is unavailable to

officers who violate clearly established rights,” Bailey, 349 F.3d

at 742, said doctrine provides Defendants no relief at summary

judgment. “Accepting the facts as [presented by Plaintiff] . . . ,

a man of reasonable intelligence would have known that [beating

Plaintiff as he lay handcuffed] . . . was contrary to his duty,”

14

thereby “foreclos[ing] the availability of public officers’

immunity” at summary judgment. Id.; see also id. at 742 n.6

(“Because we find that the acts at issue violated rights that were

clearly established, an officer of reasonable intelligence would

have known that the officers’ actions were contrary to their duty.

This is all that is required to support a finding of malice under

state law, and it is clear that there is no public officers’

immunity where the officers act with malice.” (citation omitted)).

CONCLUSION

A genuine issue of material fact exists and, construing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, qualified

immunity and public official immunity do not shield Defendants from

liability.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 33)

be denied.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

February 4, 2026

15

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