Clata Renee Brewer v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County

02/04/2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

October 30, 2025 Session

CLATA RENEE BREWER ET AL. v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT

OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 23-538-III I’Ashea L. Myles, Chancellor

___________________________________

No. M2024-01139-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

In the spring of 2023, The Metro Nashville Police Department (“Metro”) received several

public records requests seeking information about a school shooting that occurred in a

Nashville private school on March 27, 2023. Metro denied all such requests. The various

requestors filed petitions for access to the records in the Davidson County courts, which

were eventually consolidated into one action. The private school at which the shooting

occurred, its affiliated church, and parents of surviving children intervened in the action as

parties. These intervening parties advocated that the school shooter’s personal writings and

other creative works, which Metro collected in the course of its investigation, should

remain confidential. The trial court ultimately denied all petitions for access to Metro’s

file for numerous reasons. The requestors appeal to this Court. Following our review, we

affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the intervening

parents have standing to raise arguments under the United States Copyright Act. We also

affirm the trial court’s finding that neither Article I, section 35 of the Tennessee

Constitution, nor Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-102, bar disclosure of any

public records in this case. On all other issues, we reverse the trial court. The case is

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

in Part; Reversed in Part; Case Remanded

KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY,

P.J., E.S., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

John I. Harris III, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, James Hammond and The

Tennessee Firearms Association.

Paul J. Krog, Brentwood, Tennessee; and Nicholas R. Barry, Washington, DC, for the

appellants, Michael Patrick Leahy and Star News Digital Media, Inc.

Richard L. Hollow, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Todd Gardenhire.

Eric G. Osborne, Rascoe S. Dean, William L. Harbison, Christopher C. Sabis, C. Dewey

Branstetter, Ryan T. Holt, Micah N. Bradley, Hunter C. Branstetter, William D. Pugh,

Edward M. Yarbrough, Hal Hardin, and Mark J. Patterson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the

appellees, Parents of Minor Covenant Students Jane Doe and John Doe.

Lora Barkenbus Fox and Cynthia E. Gross, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee,

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.

Rocklan W. King III, F. Laurens Brock, and Stacia M. Daigle, Nashville, Tennessee, for

the appellee, Covenant Presbyterian Church.

Peter F. Klett and Autumn L. Gentry, Nashville, Tennessee; and Nader Baydoun and

Stephen Knight, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, The Covenant School.

Michael B. Bressman and Jennifer Safstrom, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amici curiae,

Intellectual Property and First Amendment Scholars and Advocates in support of

appellants.

Samuel P. Funk, James K. Vines, and Evan S. Rothey, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amici

curiae, Franklin Road Academy, Montgomery Bell Academy, Oak Hill School, and St.

Paul Christian Academy in support of appellees.

OPINION

BACKGROUND

This case stems from the tragic shooting that occurred at The Covenant School

(“Covenant School” or “the School”) in Nashville, Tennessee, on March 27, 2023. After

killing six victims within the School, including three children, the perpetrator (or, the

“shooter”) was shot and killed by responding Metro police officers. Following the deadly

event, several individuals and entities lodged requests for information from Metro pursuant

to the Tennessee Public Records Act (the “TPRA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-501 et

seq. The Tennessean requested the police reports “with [the shooter] named[;]” the report

for the initial response to Covenant School on March 27, 2023; “[a]ll documents in [the

shooter’s] possession immediately prior to [her] death, including the car and home,

including journals and hand-drawn maps[;]” and “copies of any search warrants filed on

[the shooter’s] home[.]” State Senator Todd Gardenhire filed a TPRA request on April 12,

2023, seeking essentially the same information. James Hammond and the Tennessee

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Firearms Association, Inc. (the “TFA”) also submitted a total of three public records

requests, seeking to inspect or obtain copies of public records related to the events at the

School, including the shooter’s written “manifesto.” Additional individuals and

organizations, including Judicial Watch, Inc., Ms. Clata Brewer, the National Police

Association, Inc., Michael Patrick Leahy, and Star News Digital Media, Inc. (“Star

News”),1 all filed TPRA requests seeking information about March 27, 2023, and the

deceased shooter. Of particular interest to the requestors are the shooter’s journals and

personal writings, some of which Metro confiscated from her car the day of the shooting.

According to a lengthy investigative report later released by Metro, the shooter began

journaling several years prior to the shooting, and Metro’s file is voluminous.

Metro denied all records requests, citing Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16

and stating that its investigation into the shooting remained ongoing. Eventually, several

petitions for access to the records were filed in the Davidson County courts, and “[t]he

petitions were subsequently transferred to the Davidson County Chancery Court, Part III

(‘trial court’), and consolidated into one action.” Brewer v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &

Davidson Cnty., No. M2023-00788-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 8281582, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Nov. 30, 2023) (hereinafter, “Brewer I”).

On May 12, 2023, Covenant Presbyterian Church (the “Church” or “Covenant

Church”), which houses and operates the School, filed a motion to intervene in the

consolidated TPRA action, asserting that “[t]he records sought . . . may include and/or

relate to information owned by Covenant Church, including, but not limited to, schematics

of church facilities and confidential information pertaining to Covenant Church

employees.” On May 15, 2023, and May 17, 2023, respectively, Covenant School and

parents of Covenant School students (“the Parents” or the “Covenant Parents”) followed

suit and filed motions for intervention. They raised similar arguments as Covenant Church.

The requestors opposed intervention, but in an order entered May 24, 2023, the trial court

allowed the Church, the School, and the Parents (together, the “Covenant Intervenors”) to

intervene as parties pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.02. Several

requestors appealed that ruling,2 and a dispute ensued in the trial court regarding whether

the case could proceed while the appeal remained pending in this Court.

In another order entered May 24, 2023, the trial court directed Metro “to file

pursuant to a Notice of Filing, a list setting forth all exemptions to the Tennessee Public

Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-501, et seq. and any other legal authority that it will

raise . . . as support for limiting the public release of the records requested by Petitioners.”

1

Mr. Hammond is the former sheriff for Hamilton County, Tennessee. Mr. Leahy is the CEO of

Star News.

2

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.05 provides: “Any order granting or denying a motion to

intervene filed pursuant to this rule shall be a final judgment for purposes of Tenn. R. App. P. 3.”

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The trial court allowed Metro to put forth any additional TPRA exemptions on which it

intended to rely in refusing to turn over its records. Metro filed the notice on May 24,

2023, listing five purported TPRA exemptions: 1) Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

16 addressing open investigations; 2) Tennessee Code Annotated section

10-7-504(a)(29)(A) addressing personally identifying information; 3) Tennessee Code

Annotated section 10-7-504(p) addressing school security; 4) Tennessee Code Annotated

section 10-7-504(t) concerning crime victims who are minors; and 5) Tennessee Code

Annotated section 38-7-110(c) addressing medical records of deceased persons.

In the interim, the Covenant Intervenors filed briefs opposing the requests for

Metro’s records. In a brief filed on May 30, 2023, Covenant Church requested that the trial

court deny Petitioners’ requests or, in the alternative, redact sensitive information from the

disclosures:

Because of the ongoing criminal investigation, the Court should deny

Petitioners’ request for records. By the time this matter is heard on June 8,

2023, it will only have been 73 days since the March 27, 2023 attack. The

victims of that attack deserve time so this crime may be investigated. And,

Tennessee law affords them that time. Finally, even if the Court is inclined

to produce some records in a redacted form, the Court should withhold any

information relating to the security at the Church and School, along with any

employee information for the Church’s employees.

The Church maintained that no information should be disclosed insofar as Metro continued

to investigate the shooting. In the alternative, the Church argued that the “school security”

exception, found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-504(p), exempts from

disclosure any information regarding Covenant School’s security system.3 The Church

also urged that any personal or private information about church personnel should be

exempted under the TPRA’s “catch-all” provision. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 10-7-503(a)(2)(A). Covenant School’s brief, also filed on May 30, 2023, raises similar

arguments. The School maintained that “the shooter’s writings, as well as any other

documents relating to the School’s safety or security be excluded from the documents

produced in response to Petitioners’ TPRA request.” The School urged that Metro’s

investigation “remain[ed] active” and that it “ha[d] yet to confirm no other actors were

involved in the horrific attack.” Also citing school security, Covenant School urged that

“[t]he perpetrator’s writings are critical to [Metro’s] ongoing investigation and therefore,

are connected to the Covenant School’s security. Moreover, the release of the perpetrator’s

writings increases the risk of a ‘copycat’ or subsequent attack.”

3

Covenant Church pointed out that the School and the Church share a security system and have

overlapping security features.

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The Covenant Parents also filed a brief in opposition to Petitioners’ requests.

According to the Parents, the shooter’s writings and “anything else that is likely to inspire

future attacks should never be publicly released because doing so will violate [the Parents’]

rights as victims under the Tennessee Constitution and other applicable Tennessee law, is

contrary to multiple exceptions to the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tennessee Code

Annotated §§ 10-7-503 et seq. . . . and will likely lead to future attacks and the unnecessary

loss of additional innocent life.” (Emphasis added). The Parents opined that the trial court

should

exercise caution in releasing information about internet sites visited by the

shooter or files downloaded by the shooter to the extent such information

would implicitly give the shooter a voice with which to haunt her victims and

potentially inspire troubled individuals to access those same sources. The

Parents ask that any such records not be released.

In support of the above-listed arguments, the Covenant Parents argued that Rule 16, as well

as the school security exception to the TPRA, barred disclosure of the shooter’s writings.

They also argued that the Tennessee Constitution and the Tennessee Victims’ Bill of Rights

prevent disclosure because the shooter’s victims have “the right to be free from the

intimidation, harassment, and abuse that would come from release of the shooter’s writings

and the other documents identified by the Parents.” Finally, Metro also filed a brief in

opposition to the TPRA requests, arguing that its records should not be produced for the

reasons listed in its May 24, 2023 notice.

The requestors all filed briefs in support of their records requests. Mr. Hammond

and the TFA filed a brief in support on June 2, 2023, arguing that the only issue properly

before the trial court was whether Metro appropriately denied the relevant requests

pursuant to Rule 16. Hammond and the TFA took issue with the fact that Metro and the

Covenant Intervenors raised “new” TPRA exemptions after access was sought in the trial

court. According to Hammond and the TFA, “[t]here is no authority extending Rule

16(a)(2) to an incident in which there are no criminal proceedings, person of interest, or

target, pending or contemplated.” The TFA and Hammond next asserted that the school

security exception does not apply in this case because Covenant School is a private school

and not a public entity subject to the TPRA. These petitioners asserted that the Covenant

Intervenors’ “generalized claim that all of [the shooter’s] writings are subject to the school

security exception sweeps far too broadly and is devoid of any tie to a particular, responsive

record.” While Hammond and the TFA agreed that some information in the files may need

to be redacted, as the records contain personally identifying information or information

regarding minors, they argued that the requestors would work with Metro in good faith to

keep such information confidential. As to the Parents’ assertion that they are entitled to

relief under the Victims’ Bill of Rights, the TFA and Hammond asserted that the Parents’

position is “long on rhetoric” but short on law.

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Mr. Leahy and Star News also filed a memorandum in support of their requests.

These requestors made “a limited request” asking for the shooter’s writings as well as “the

autopsy and toxicology reports obtained by [Metro].” According to Mr. Leahy and Star

News, these items are, unequivocally, public records to which no TPRA exceptions apply.

Regarding the Parents’ constitutional arguments, Mr. Leahy and Star News argued that the

Parents were essentially asking the trial court to create a policy-based exception to the

TPRA, something the trial court is not at liberty to do. In a brief filed shortly thereafter,

The Tennessean and Senator Gardenhire raised similar arguments.4

On June 12, 2023, the shooter’s surviving parents filed a notice of limited

appearance in the trial court. This notice informs the trial court that the shooter’s parents

assigned their rights in their daughter’s writings to another party. Two days later, the

shooter’s parents filed a document titled “Assignment and Transfer of Legal and Equitable

Title to Certain Personal and Intellectual Property Created by [the shooter].” This

document provides that the parents, in their capacity as next of kin and beneficiaries of the

shooter’s intestate estate,

[i]rrevocably assign and transfer all of their equitable, legal, and other rights

in the Writings and Intellectual Property Rights (including all tangible copies

thereof) as a gift to the Parents in trust for the benefit of the Children,

including all rights to and claims for damages, restitution, and injunctive and

other legal and equitable relief for past, present, and future infringement or

misappropriation of any of the Intellectual Property Rights, for the express

purpose of preventing harm to the Children including preventing

dissemination of the writings and to pursue all legal rights and remedies

available[.]

Essentially, the shooter’s parents transferred any intellectual property interest in the

disputed writings to a trust to be held for the benefit of the Covenant Parents’ children. The

Tennessean and Senator Gardenhire opposed the shooter’s parents’ limited appearance in

the case, asserting that the parents lacked standing and that the shooter’s estate had not

been properly administered such that the assets were even transferrable. However, on July

7, 2023, the trial court entered an order staying any further proceedings in the trial court

pending this Court’s ruling on intervention. We upheld the trial court’s ruling on

intervention in an opinion filed on November 30, 2023. Brewer I, 2023 WL 8281582, at

*2.

After this Court issued the mandate for Brewer I on January 3, 2024, petitioner Clata

Brewer, who is not participating in the present appeal, filed a motion requesting that the

4

Throughout their filings in the trial court, the requestors incorporate and adopt one another’s

arguments.

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trial court “set this matter for an expeditious show cause hearing as required by the

[TPRA].” The requestors, Metro, and the Covenant Intervenors continued filing exhibits

in support of their respective positions. The Covenant Intervenors filed declarations of

several Covenant Parents, as well as articles and other materials discussing the risks

associated with a school shooter’s writings being disseminated. To summarize the

voluminous appellate record, the Parents maintain that distribution of a mass shooter’s

writing or “manifesto” tends to lead to more mass shootings. The Parents further argued

in their supplemental briefing that the shooter’s estate is “drawing to a close and will soon

result in the ownership of the writings passing to the Parents in trust for the purpose of

protecting their children.” Covenant School filed a supplemental brief adopting and

incorporating the Parents’ arguments. The School also asserted that the shooter’s writings

are protected by federal copyright law, noting that “[c]opyright protection applies from the

time a work is created. . . . However repugnant, the shooter’s writings are original works

of authorship fixed in a tangible medium and they are therefore subject to copyright

protection.”

The requestors responded with amended supplemental briefing, largely reiterating

the same arguments and maintaining that the copyright argument lacks merit. In particular,

The Tennessean5 and Senator Gardenhire argued that the shooter’s parents lacked standing

to file the assignment, that the trial court, as a state court, lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate

a copyright issue, and that the TPRA does not contain a copyright exception.

On April 11, 2024, the parties filed a joint stipulation providing as follows:

Petitioners, Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County

(“Respondent”), and Intervenors jointly stipulate and hereby agree that

Petitioners are not seeking and that no photos, videos, or other images of

children or of any deceased persons should be released to the public. The

parties respectfully request that this Court affirm in its final order that no

such photos should be released.

The trial court held a show cause hearing on the disputed records over two

consecutive days on April 16 and 17, 2024. The trial court entered its memorandum and

final order on July 4, 2024, concluding that Metro’s file on the shooting is totally exempt

from disclosure. The trial court found that otherwise public records may be excluded from

disclosure under the TPRA pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. In this

case, the record contains affidavits from Metro officers providing that some aspects of the

investigation were still underway at the time of the show cause hearing, namely, whether

the shooter acted alone and whether she had any assistance in obtaining her weapons.

5

Although it actively participated in the proceedings below, The Tennessean is not participating in

the present appeal.

-7-

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Metro did not violate the TPRA by denying

Petitioners’ requests based on Rule 16.

Regarding school security, the trial court found that The School Security Act of

1981 does not apply to Covenant School because the Act’s plain language states that it

applies only to public schools.6 That law is therefore not a bar to disclosure of any

otherwise public records. The trial court also found, however, that the TPRA’s school

security exception, then found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-504(p), bars

disclosure of any “information, records, and plans that are related to school security,

produced by any person, entity or source.” The trial court concluded that the shooter’s

writings and compilations, created as she studied and devised her plan to attack the School,

are related to school security and are therefore exempt from disclosure.

Next, the trial court determined that the Covenant Intervenors have standing to

assert a copyright argument on behalf of the Covenant Children’s Trust, notwithstanding

the fact that the trust nor its trustee has ever intervened as a party. Further, the trial court

concluded that federal copyright law creates a TPRA exception and “thus preempts state

open records law.” The U.S. Copyright Act grants a copyright owner the exclusive right

to, among other things, distribute the covered work or display it publicly. In this case, the

TPRA’s disclosure requirement would give Petitioners the right to inspect and compile

copies of the shooter’s original work. This would result in Metro violating the copyright

holders’ exclusive rights under federal law by distributing or displaying the covered work

to the requestors. Consequently, the trial court concluded that the Copyright Act is in direct

conflict with the TPRA and that the Copyright Act controls.

Finally, the trial court concluded that the Tennessee Constitution and the Victims’

Bill of Rights do not apply to the Covenant Parents because, based on the plain language

of both, those rights attach to “crime victims while navigating investigation and

prosecution and their dealings” in the criminal justice system. No dealings with the

criminal justice system are pending or contemplated here.

The trial court also noted in its final order that the records in this case are

voluminous, explaining as follows:

[Metro] provided the Court with the following hard drives for its in camera

review: 1.) Scan disk 64 GB (57.2 GB of 64 GB); 2) Black hard drive (6.39

GB of 8 GB); 3) Data Stick Pro containing 2 PDFs (7.20 GB); 4) One

Expansion Drive (1.81 TB); 4) Data Stick Pro (7.20 GB); 5) Data Stick Pro

(14.3 GB of 14.4); 6) Data Stick Pro (14.3 GB of 14.4 GB); 7) Data Stick

Pro (57.7GB); 8) Data Stick Pro (3.71 GB of 3.74 GB) and 9) Data Stick Pro

6

This finding is not at issue on appeal.

-8-

(3.69 GB of 3.74 GB). The hard drives contained the following broad

categories of content and documents[:]

Original Videos Clip Art

Business Folders with Content Receipts, Mail

911 Phone Communications Medical Records

Email Communications Screenshots of Video Content

MNPD Incident Reports Search Warrants

MNPD History Reports Complied[7] Information

Original Writings Original Photographs

News Content Maps

Yearbook Downloaded Content

Internal MNPD Documents

While this Court understands that each criminal investigation and

prosecution is unique, the materials provided to the Court, while voluminous,

are the type of materials that one would expect to gather when investigating

and purs[u]ing a school shooting of this magnitude. Much of the material

analyzed by the Court came from the [shooter], compiled over many years.

[Metro] also provided redacted versions of certain content for the Court’s in

camera review. None of the materials produced to the Court were produced

to any other party to this case.

The above information in the trial court’s order is the only information in the

technical record indicating what is contained in Metro’s files. None of the materials

produced to the trial court for its in camera review have been included in the technical

record submitted to this Court on appeal.

Mr. Leahy, Star News, Senator Gardenhire, Mr. Hammond, and the TFA

(hereinafter, “Petitioners” or, “Appellants”) timely appealed to this Court.8

ISSUES

Petitioners, Covenant Intervenors, and Metro all raise issues on appeal. We

consolidate and restate those issues as follows:

7

This appears to be a typo; as best we can discern, this category is meant to be “Compiled

Information.”

8

On August 8, 2025, Petitioners Leahy and Star News filed a motion asking this Court to consider

post-judgment facts. They asked us to take notice of Metro’s now public investigative summary and the

fact that Metro’s investigation is now closed. In an order entered August 22, 2025, we deferred that motion

to the panel. The motion is granted.

-9-

I. Whether Metro’s investigative file is a public record.

II. Whether the trial court erred by allowing Metro to raise possible TPRA

exemptions aside from Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.

III. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Tennessee Rule of Criminal

Procedure 16 exempts Metro from disclosing any records to Petitioners.

IV. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Metro is exempt from

releasing the shooter’s personal writings pursuant to the school safety

exception to the TPRA found at Tennessee Code Annotated section

10-7-504(p).

V. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the U.S. Copyright Act

preempts the TPRA and bars disclosure of any of the shooter’s personal

writings.

VI. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the Tennessee Constitution

and the Victims’ Bill of Rights are inapplicable to the Parents in this case.

DISCUSSION

I. The TPRA generally

This case stems from public records requests made to Metro regarding its

investigation into the March 27, 2023 Covenant School shooting. Accordingly, a brief

overview of the TPRA is helpful.

“For more than a century, Tennessee courts have recognized the public’s right to

inspect governmental records.” Tennessean v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857,

864 (Tenn. 2016). The TPRA governs access to government records and is intended to

“provid[e] a tool to hold government officials and agencies accountable to the citizens of

Tennessee through oversight in government activities.” Id. “Through its provisions,

the [TPRA] serves a crucial role in promoting accountability in government through public

oversight of governmental activities.” Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Child. & Fam.

Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 74 (Tenn. 2002). In light of that purpose, the TPRA is

construed “liberally to enforce the public interest in open access to the records of state,

county, and municipal governmental entities.” Id.; see also Schneider v. City of Jackson,

226 S.W.3d 332, 340 (Tenn. 2007) (“[T]he General Assembly has directed the courts to

construe broadly the Public Records Act ‘so as to give the fullest possible access to public

records.’” (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(d))).

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Public records are “all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, photographs,

microfilms, electronic data processing files and output, films, sound recordings, or other

material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law

or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any governmental

entity[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(1)(A)(i). The TPRA also provides that

[a]ll state, county and municipal records shall, at all times during business

hours, which for public hospitals shall be during the business hours of their

administrative offices, be open for personal inspection by any citizen of this

state, and those in charge of the records shall not refuse such right of

inspection to any citizen, unless otherwise provided by state law.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A). While the foregoing provision is meant “[t]o

facilitate access to the records,” Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 864, it is also true that

“numerous statutory exceptions” to disclosure exist. Id. at 865. Indeed, access to public

records “is not absolute . . .” Id. Accordingly, even if material constitutes a public record

under the TPRA, it may be exempt from disclosure. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504

(providing categories of exempt public records); see also Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 865

(explaining that “over the years, the General Assembly has added over forty categories of

records specifically excepted from the Act[,]” and that “[t]he once all-encompassing Public

Records Act is now more narrow” (footnote omitted)). In addition to the specific

exemptions, there is “a general exception to the Public Records Act, based on state law.”

Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 865. “Tennessee Code Annotated section

10-7-503(a)(2)(A) provides that governmental records shall be open for inspection and that

the right of inspection shall not be denied ‘unless otherwise provided by state law.’” Id.

“‘State law’ includes statutes, the Tennessee Constitution, the common law, rules of court,

and administrative rules and regulations.” Id. at 865–66 (collecting cases).

The TPRA directs government entities on how to respond to records requests:

(B) The custodian of a public record or the custodian’s designee shall

promptly make available for inspection any public record not specifically

exempt from disclosure. In the event it is not practicable for the record to be

promptly available for inspection, the custodian shall, within seven (7)

business days:

(i) Make the public record requested available to the requestor;

(ii) Deny the request in writing or by completing a records request

response form developed by the office of open records counsel. The

response shall include the basis for the denial; or

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(iii) Furnish the request[o]r in writing, or by completing a records

request response form developed by the office of open records

counsel, the time reasonably necessary to produce the record or

information.

(3) Failure to respond to the request as described in subdivision (a)(2) shall

constitute a denial and the person making the request shall have the right to

bring an action as provided in § 10-7-505.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)-(3). Pursuant to the procedure outlined above, public

records custodians are directed to promptly provide for inspection of any public record not

exempt from disclosure. Id. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(B).

In the present case, the disputed records are in Metro’s possession because Metro

gathered the records during its investigation into the March 2023 Covenant School

shooting. The material was “made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in

connection with the transaction of official business by any governmental entity[.]” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(1)(A)(i). Moreover, a police department’s closed investigative

files are public records under the TPRA and thus presumed “subject to public inspection.”

Griffin v. City of Knoxville, 821 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tenn. 1991) (citing Memphis Publ’g Co.

v. Holt, 710 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. 1986)). Metro’s file is, therefore, a public record under

the TPRA. The dispute in this case is whether the trial court correctly concluded that the

records are exempt from disclosure.9 As this is a dispute of law, we review the trial court’s

decision de novo with no presumption of correctness. Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 862–63.

The trial court found that Metro’s complete investigative file is exempt from

disclosure for several reasons. We address those reasons in turn. As a threshold issue,

however, we must address which of the purported exemptions are properly before this

Court. Mr. Hammond and the TFA10 argue that the trial court erred in considering any

TPRA exemptions aside from Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. They argue that

because Rule 16 is the only purported exemption Metro offered upon initially denying the

records requests, Metro and the Covenant Intervenors are limited to that exemption.

According to Hammond and the TFA, “Metro never amended its original denials prior to

the filing of the petitions[,] [and] Intervenors have no textual basis under the TPRA to raise

any exception but continued to raise new exceptions nearly a year after these proceedings

began.”

9

The Parents assert in their appellate brief that Metro’s investigative file is not a public record.

This issue is without merit.

10

Senator Gardenhire filed a short appellate brief adopting and incorporating the arguments raised

by Petitioners Hammond, the TFA, Leahy, and Star News. To the extent that arguments raised by those

petitioners are addressed, any arguments raised by Senator Gardenhire are therefore also addressed.

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Hammond and the TFA rely on Friedmann v. Marshall County, Tennessee, 471

S.W.3d 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015), in arguing that the trial court erred in considering new

TPRA exemptions raised after Petitioners sought access to the records in court.

Friedmann, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case, petitioner Mr.

Friedmann sought various records related to the Marshall County jails pursuant to the

TPRA. Id. at 429. He sent his first request via letter, and a jail administrator informed him

that he would have to make his requests in person. Id. This exchange sparked a dispute

between Mr. Friedmann and county officials, including the sheriff for Marshall County, as

to whether the TPRA requires that records requests be made in person. Id. at 429–431.

Eventually, Mr. Friedmann filed a petition for access to the records in the Chancery Court

for Marshall County. Id. at 431. The chancery court held a hearing at which the county

argued “that Mr. Friedmann was denied access to the requested records due to Mr.

Friedmann’s failure to prove that he was a resident of Tennessee.” Id. The hearing on the

petition for access was the first time the county raised its argument regarding Mr.

Friedmann’s residency. Id. The chancery court ultimately ruled that the records should be

disclosed but denied Mr. Friedmann any attorney’s fees after finding that the county did

not act willfully in denying access to the records. Id. at 432.

Mr. Friedmann appealed to this Court, arguing that the county willfully refused to

turn over the records and that he should be awarded his attorney’s fees. Id. This Court

agreed, noting that “[a]lthough [the county] argue[s] on appeal that Mr. Friedmann was

denied access to records due to residency concerns, these concerns were not communicated

to Mr. Friedmann until the morning of trial.” Id. at 440. We further explained that

[a]s the history of correspondence among the parties reveals, Mr.

Friedmann’s request to obtain records was generally met with the same

refrain: to get the records, he would need to make a personal appearance.

With respect to his renewed March 24 request, he was simply re-directed

once again to [the county’s attorney]. At no point did the Sheriff’s Office’s

responses indicate a willingness to process Mr. Friedmann’s records request

absent a personal appearance. Given the state of the law and the

communication of that law to both the Sheriff’s Office and the County

Attorney, Appellees’ failure to comply with Mr. Friedmann’s records request

was willful.

Id. (footnote omitted). Accordingly, the primary issue on appeal in Friedmann was

whether, in the context of attorney’s fees, the county willfully denied Mr. Friedmann access

to the records. In analyzing that issue, this Court noted that the county raised a new

purported exemption the morning of the final hearing. Mr. Friedmann did not know about

this alleged exception until the final hour before trial.

This is a far cry from the procedure used by the trial court in this case. Here, the

trial court directed Metro to file a notice reflecting all purported TPRA exceptions on May

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24, 2023. There is nothing in the TPRA or Friedmann prohibiting such action. Moreover,

Petitioners had ample time to respond to all purported TPRA exemptions in this case,

including those raised by the Covenant Intervenors. The final show cause hearing did not

occur until nearly a year after Metro filed its notice of exemptions and several months after

Covenant Intervenors filed their briefs in opposition. The trial court then held a two-day

hearing at which all Petitioners had the opportunity to address the alleged TPRA

exemptions. Unlike Mr. Friedmann, Petitioners encountered no surprises at the final

hearing.

Accordingly, this issue is without merit. We turn to the exceptions found applicable

by the trial court.

II. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16

The trial court’s first basis for denying Petitioners’ requests is Tennessee Rule of

Criminal Procedure 16, which addresses inspection and discovery of evidence in criminal

prosecutions. In pertinent part, the Rule provides:

(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except as provided in paragraphs

(A), (B), (E), and (G) of subdivision (a)(1), this rule does not authorize the

discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal state

documents made by the district attorney general or other state agents or law

enforcement officers in connection with investigating or prosecuting the

case. Nor does this rule authorize discovery of statements made by state

witnesses or prospective state witnesses.

In the TPRA context, our Supreme Court has explained that Rule 16 exempts disclosure of

law enforcement’s investigative files which “are open and are relevant to pending or

contemplated criminal action.” Appman v. Worthington, 746 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tenn.

1987). The High Court reiterated the Appman holding in 2016, explaining that “if the

media could make a public records request and obtain the investigative files, then [a]

defendant and potential jurors could learn about the State’s case against the defendant by

reading a newspaper or watching a television news broadcast.” Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d

at 871. Accordingly, requestors relying on the TPRA cannot gain access to “materials

subject to discovery between the State and a defendant during the pendency of the criminal

case or any collateral challenges to the criminal conviction[.]” Id. at 873.

In the present case, the parties spent significant time in the trial court disputing

whether Metro’s investigation into the shooting remained ongoing or related to a pending

criminal matter. Because Metro officers killed the shooter on March 27, 2023, Petitioners

argued that no criminal investigation or prosecution was underway. Petitioners maintained

that Metro’s position was disingenuous and obstructionist. Throughout the trial court

proceedings, however, Metro filed sworn statements by its officers providing that Metro

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continued investigating whether the shooter acted alone, how the shooter obtained her

weapons, and whether the shooter had any co-conspirators. Relying on those sworn

statements, the trial court concluded that Rule 16 exempts Metro’s file from disclosure.

On appeal, Petitioners argue that this issue is moot and, alternatively, that the trial

court erred in applying Rule 16. We address mootness first.

Tennessee courts have long recognized, “since the earliest days of statehood, . . .

self-imposed rules to promote judicial restraint and to provide criteria for determining

whether the courts should hear and decide a particular case.” Norma Faye Pyles Lynch

Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 196, 202 (Tenn. 2009). Because “the

province of a court is to decide, not advise, and to settle rights, not to give abstract

opinions[,]” our role is limited to deciding “legal controversies.” Id. at 203 (quoting State

v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 204, 210 (1879); White v. Kelton, 232 S.W. 668, 670 (1921)). A “legal

controversy” exists when “the disputed issue is real and existing,” rather than “theoretical

or abstract[.]” Id. (internal citations omitted).

As such, we adhere to several justiciability doctrines in determining whether

a case presents a legal controversy. Id. “These doctrines include: (1) the prohibition

against advisory opinions, (2) standing, (3) ripeness, (4) mootness, (5) the political question

doctrine, and (6) exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Id. (footnotes omitted). The

justiciability doctrine implicated here is mootness. As our Supreme Court has explained:

While the doctrines of standing and ripeness focus on the suit’s birth, the

doctrine of mootness focuses attention on the suit’s death. 13B Charles Alan

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper Federal Practice and

Procedure § 3533.1, at 735–37. A moot case is one that has lost its

justiciability either by court decision, acts of the parties, or some other reason

occurring after commencement of the case.

Id. at 203–04 (citations omitted). “[A] ‘case must remain justiciable (remain a legal

controversy) from the time it is filed until the moment of final appellate

disposition.’” Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Norma Faye

Pyles, 301 S.W.3d at 203–04). “A case, or an issue in a case, becomes moot when the

parties no longer have a continuing, real, live, and substantial interest in the outcome.” Id.

“Determining whether a case is moot is a question of law.” Alliance for Native Am. Indian

Rights in Tenn., Inc. v. Nicely, 182 S.W.3d 333, 338–39 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Because it is now undisputed that Metro’s investigation into the Covenant School

shooting is closed, Rule 16’s applicability is moot. By the time this opinion is released, it

will have been nearly three years since the Covenant School shooting. Metro concedes in

its brief that its investigation into the shooting is closed and that there is no pending or

contemplated criminal prosecution related to the shooting. There is no indication that the

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shooter acted in concert with anyone. The Parents likewise concede in their appellate brief

that Rule 16 is no longer an applicable bar to any TPRA requests. As such, there is no

longer a real and existing dispute as to this issue, and we need not consider it.11

The primary dispute in this case is whether the shooter’s personal writings and

compilations must be disclosed to Petitioners under the TPRA. Indeed, much of the

proceedings in the lower court centered around the potential consequences of disclosing

those items. Nonetheless, it is clear from the trial court’s order that a portion of Metro’s

investigative file includes material created or collected by Metro, or other government

agencies, during Metro’s investigation into the shooting. For example, the trial court lists

Metro internal documents, search warrants, Metro history reports, Metro incident reports,

and 911 phone communications in its final order. As best we can discern from what we

know about Metro’s file, such items are different from and unrelated to the shooter’s

personal writings. To the extent that any such material is responsive to Petitioners’ records

request and was withheld pursuant to Rule 16, those records must be made immediately

available for inspection by Petitioners.12

III. The school security exception

The next disputed exception is referred to by the parties as the “school safety” or

“school security” exception. The relevant version of the TPRA13 provides:

(p) Information, records, and plans that are related to school security, the

district-wide school safety plans or the building-level school safety plans

shall not be open to public inspection. Nothing in this part shall be interpreted

to prevent school administrators of an LEA from discussing or distributing

information to parents or legal guardians of children attending the school

regarding procedures for contacting or obtaining a child following a natural

disaster.

11

No party in this case argues that, notwithstanding mootness, we should still address Rule 16. See

Scripps Media, Inc. v. Tenn. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 614 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2019) (TPRA dispute moot where state released records by the time appeal was heard; however,

this Court determined that the matter was one of great public importance). Nor do we see any reason to do

so.

12

Petitioners concede that certain information may need to be redacted, such as personally

identifying information. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a)(29). They also concede that they do not seek

photographs of minors or deceased victims.

13

There was some dispute in the trial court as to which version of section 10-7-504 applies, as the

General Assembly amended the statute following the shooting. The trial court ultimately applied the

version of the statute in effect when the petitions for access were filed. No party challenges this ruling on

appeal.

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Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(p) (effective July 1, 2022 through April 24, 2023). The extent

to which this exception applies is a matter of statutory interpretation. “[W]hen an issue on

appeal requires statutory interpretation, we review the trial court’s decision de novo with

no presumption of correctness.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas &

Water, 578 S.W.3d 26, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Wade v. Jackson-Madison Cnty.

Gen. Hosp. Dist., 469 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015)). The polestar of statutory

interpretation is the intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute. Id. We

begin by “reading the words of the statutes using their plain and ordinary meaning in the

context in which the words appear.” Id. When the language is clear and unambiguous, we

look no further than the language of the statute itself to determine its meaning. Id.

The Covenant Intervenors rely on section 10-7-504(p) to argue that the shooter’s

writings and compiled materials should be kept completely confidential and never open to

the public. They argue that disseminating those materials will inspire future mass shooters.

Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that this is an overly broad application of the statute.

The trial court agreed with the Covenant Intervenors, determining that the statute’s

language is broad enough to bar disclosure of any “materials and content created and/or

compiled by [the shooter] as she studied and devised her plan, not only against this school

but others[.]” In pertinent part, the trial court’s order provides:

[T]his Court finds that the Legislature gave a broad exception, which would

cover any information, records and plans which are related to three separate

categories: 1) school security; 2) the district-wide school safety plan or 3) the

building-level school safety plan. Unlike the School Security Act of 1981,

“school” is not defined in the TPRA, nor is the term “security.” Merriam

Webster’s Dictionary defines the word “school” as an organization that

provides instruction, such as an institution for the teaching of children.

(Merriam-Webster 2024). Security is defined as the quality or state of being

secure. Id. In this section of the exceptions, the General Assembly did not

include any qualification or limitation for the type of school security

information, records and plans which are subject to this exception. Instead,

the exception is left with a broad construction to encompass all information

related to the security of any school. The Court of Appeals has further

instructed that the term “related to” and other similar phrases also carry a

broad meaning as well. Cordell v. Cleveland Tennessee Hosp., LLC, 544

S.W.3d 331, 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). That meaning should not be twisted

beyond its ordinary and common understanding. Id. Something is “related

to” something if it is “connected.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1288 (6th ed.

1990). Indeed, to “relate to” something is “to bring into association with or

connection with.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1288 (6th ed. 1990). The

Legislature intentionally omitted defining the sources or providers of

information, records, and plans concerning school security. This deliberate

choice was made to encompass a broad range of information and plans

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pertaining to school security that may be in the possession of or come into

the possession of the government. Further, the General Assembly’s use of

the word “or” in this exception, which is used to separate the blanket and

nondescript information, records and plans from the other sources of school

security plans listed in the exception, is further indicative of the intent to cast

a broad net on things which are related to school security. This approach is

logical as it is not always feasible to pinpoint the origin and/or perpetrator of

information, plans or actions which may be related to school security. In our

society, such information and plans often emerge in hindsight, after an

incident has occurred. Moreover, if such information happens to be

intercepted before an incident, it would be counterproductive to subsequently

make it publicly accessible to anyone.

Therefore, this Court finds that Tennessee Code Annotated

§ 10-7-504(p) creates a valid and applicable exemption from disclosure for

any information, records, and plans that are related to school security,

produced by any person, entity or source. This Court would be hard pressed

to find that the original and complied [sic] writings, photos, video content,

information, original and assumed plans and artwork of an individual whose

intent and plan was to cause and inflict harm on the innocent in a school

setting would not be related to school security and thus exempt from

disclosure.

Having determined that Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-504(p)

creates a valid exemption from disclosure, this Court must analyze if this

exemption should apply to all documents and information in the possession

of Metro or only certain documents and information. Respondent Metro

asserts that redacted versions of certain information and materials can be

released without implicating school security, while the other documents at

issue do not fall under this particular exception and at the close of the

investigation and any contemplated criminal proceedings may be released in

toto. The Intervenors, on the other hand, argue that all of the material and

information held by Respondent in this matter relate to school security and

should be exempt from disclosure completely, as the release of any

information will inspire copycat attacks and thus all of the information is

related in some form to school security.

In presenting their arguments regarding the applicability of Tennessee

Code Annotated § 10-7-504(p), Petitioner Brewer and Intervenor Parents

both rely upon competing experts which have diametrically opposed views

on the long- and short-term contagion effects of the writings, material and

content of persons who commit crimes such as the ones at issue in this case.

Petitioner Brewer relies upon the expert report of Dr. Katherine Kuhlman,

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filed with this Court on June 20, 2023 and her supplemental report, filed on

March 18, 2024. Dr. Kuhlman is a licensed psychologist who is Board

Certified in police and public safety psychology. Dr. Kuhlman supports the

release of all requested information. She opined that the release and study of

[the shooter’s] writings could assist in the understanding of a shooter’s

pathway to violence and in the prevention and mitigation of targeted

violence. She also stated that “the research concerning whether the release of

information about a shooter, including his or her writings, will create a

contagion that could cause a ‘copycat’ killer is mixed and uncertain” and that

any such possible contagion is highest in the short term, about fourteen (14)

days after a shooting incident. She opined that releasing information will be

helpful for school security by way of prevention.

The Intervenor Parents rely upon a report from Dr. Erika Felix. The

Parents filed an unverified expert report of Dr. Felix on June 20, 2023 and

on April 24, 2024 filed it again with the proper verification. Dr. Felix is a

licensed psychologist and a professor at the University of California Santa

Barbara. She opined that the release of [the shooter’s] writings would cause

psychological harm to the survivors of the shooting and to the broader

community and that such release would also create a risk of inspiring copycat

attacks. Dr. Felix thus concluded that the release of information would have

the opposite effect of that suggested by Dr. Kuhlman.

* * *

This Court has [ ] reviewed and analyzed firsthand the materials,

compilations, information, journals, writings, plans, photos and videos both

authored by and complied [sic] by the [shooter]. Some information, which

the Court finds most concerning, in relation to school security, is the detailing

of specific plans and specified places and persons that [the shooter] intended

to succumb to injury upon plan implementation. Of grave concern to this

Court is that the [shooter] in this incident relied on similar past events across

the United States as a blueprint to accomplish and carry out the events on

March 27, 2023. [The shooter] studied the plans, writings and video content,

inclusive of news coverage footage, of past assailants and idolized how prior

terror events were conducted and implemented and the outcomes for both the

victims and assailants. [The shooter] used the writings of other perpetrators

in similar crimes to guide how this plan was constructed and accomplished,

mimicking some not only in their methodology, but also choice of weapons

and targets. [The shooter] even held past perpetrators out as heroes in their

attacks, idolizing them.

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Given the expert reports and the actual documentation analyzed, this Court

finds that the contagion and risk of copycat behavior to be real, present and

credible long after any fourteen (14) day period. The information analyzed

by this Court shows an assailant who depended on, researched and imitated

the plans set forth by others in their school shootings, years after their

massacres occurred. Considering both expert opinions, this Court finds the

Intervenor Parents’ expert more persuasive, especially in consideration of the

materials analyzed by the Court, regarding the effect on school security that

the potential release of the [shooter’s] materials and the incentivization of

copycat actors.

Finally, in finding that the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated

§ 10-7-504(p) excepted from disclosure any information related to school

security, this Court finds that there are no limitations in the exception

regarding the type of information, who created the information, where it

came from, nor for whom it was intended. While the Court is aware of the

policy favoring disclosure, there is a valid exception for records that relate to

school security. . . . Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-504(p) created an

exception from disclosure for anything related to school security.

Consequently, this Court concludes that materials and content created and/or

compiled by [the shooter] as she studied and devised her plan, not only

against this school but others, is information related to school security. This

Court finds the possibility that these materials could be used by a copycat

shooter, as was the case with [the shooter], to be a real security concern for

schools here in Tennessee and across this nation. Therefore, pursuant to

Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-504(p)[], such documents are exempt

from disclosure.

(Footnotes and record citations omitted).

On appeal, the Covenant Intervenors defend the trial court’s ruling while Petitioners

call it “impossibly broad.” Petitioners also assert that the statute does not apply to the

Covenant School at all, as Covenant School is a private entity not subject to the TPRA.

First, we are unconvinced by the notion that section 10-7-504(p) is inapplicable

because Covenant School is private. Petitioners assert that “[t]his exception plainly

contemplates records created by or for public schools. The Covenant School is not a

government entity. It does not have a ‘public records request coordinator,’ nor does it have

a ‘Records Custodian.’” Covenant School, as a private entity, is not itself subject to a direct

TPRA request. In this situation, however, we are concerned with records pertaining to a

private entity that Metro “received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the

transaction of official business[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(1)(A)(i). The

material’s origin is not dispositive; rather, it is public record by virtue of being collected

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by Metro during its official government business. Nothing in section 10-7-504(p) suggests

that we must consider the material’s origin if the material came into the government’s

possession in the course of government business. Id.

Nonetheless, we agree with Petitioners that the trial court’s construction is an overly

broad, policy-based application of section 10-7-504(p).14 Our concern over the ruling is

two-fold. First, we do not have the benefit of reviewing the material at issue because it

does not appear, even sealed, in the appellate record. Nor is there any manner of privilege

log shedding light on the contents. The only information this Court is privy to is the “broad

categories of content” listed in the trial court’s final order, noted above. The trial court

further states in its final order that the material is voluminous and spans many years. To

that point, the lengthy investigative report released by Metro explains that the shooter’s

writings precede the Covenant School shooting by many years and that the shooter began

journaling years prior as a therapeutic exercise.

Against this backdrop, we are asked to accept at face value the trial court’s finding

that every single item compiled or created by the shooter, for many years before the event

at issue, relates to the Covenant School’s security. This conclusion strains credulity, and

we are neither willing nor able to make the blind logical leap the Covenant Intervenors ask

of us. Without a more robust record reflecting which TPRA exceptions apply specifically

to which responsive documents and why, our review of this issue is severely hindered. We

are particularly troubled by the request made of us considering the TPRA’s “noble and

worthwhile purpose[,]” which is to “provid[e] a tool to hold government officials and

agencies accountable to the citizens of Tennessee through oversight in government

activities.” Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 864; see also Memphis Publ’g Co. v. City of

Memphis, 871 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tenn. 1994) (directing courts to be “vigilant in upholding

th[e] clear legislative mandate” to construe the TPRA broadly, “even in the face of serious

countervailing considerations”).

Second, affirming the trial court would require us to adjudicate a policy debate we

are ill-equipped to address as an intermediate appellate court. The trial court concluded

that dissemination of the shooter’s original works creates a substantial likelihood of

copycat school shootings and that preventing access to such material furthers the greater

good of Tennessee schools and schools nationwide. By so concluding, the trial court

rejected Petitioners’ argument that academic study of a criminal’s manifesto lends itself to

prevention. Petitioners relied on the affidavit of Dr. Katherine Kuhlman, who opines that

academic study of mass shooters’ writings is an important aspect of early intervention for

potential school shooters.

The trial court adopted the Covenant Intervenors’ policy position, which is that “the

hateful words of the shooter in this particular case certainly may have an audience in the

14

Our research revealed no Tennessee cases construing the school safety exception to the TPRA.

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general public. And as a result, you do have individuals who could take the writings of the

shooter and commit violence against the Covenant School or some other school.”15

(Emphasis added). Respectfully, this argument is rooted in speculation about potential

future events, not facts present in the record before us. This is a policy debate not

contemplated by, or anywhere mentioned in, the TPRA. The trial court’s interpretation of

section 10-7-504(p) is, in essence, a policy exception to the TPRA barring any disclosure

of a school shooter’s writings and compilations. While the language of section 10-7-504(p)

is broad, it is not the blanket policy exception created by the trial court. This interpretation

ignores the legislative directive “to broadly construe the [TPRA] ‘so as to give the fullest

possible access to public records[,]’” Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 864 (quoting Tenn. Code

Ann. § 10-7-505(d)), and instead gives the exemption the broadest possible construction to

limit public access to the documents.

To the extent a school-shooter manifesto exception to the TPRA is warranted, that

decision is more appropriately left to the General Assembly or our Supreme Court. See

Schneider, 226 S.W.3d at 340 (explaining that public policy exceptions to the TPRA are

the province of the legislature). Thus, the trial court erred in concluding that section

10-7-504(p) bars disclosure of all the shooter’s writings and compilations.

Petitioners concede that they do not seek any information created by Covenant

Church or Covenant School regarding its internal safety measures or plans. In addition,

such information may be contained within the writings made by the shooter. Any such

information should be redacted from responsive documents. See id. at 346 (providing that

a non-exempt public record “should not be deemed exempt simply because it contains some

exempt information. Rather, redaction of the exempt information is appropriate.”) (citing

Eldridge v. Putnam Cnty., 86 S.W.3d 572, 574 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)).16

IV. Copyright

Standing

Next, the trial court concluded that the United States Copyright Act (hereinafter, the

“Act”) conflicts with the TPRA and preempts same. Before we address the substance of

the trial court’s ruling, however, Petitioners make a justiciability argument as to the

Covenant Parents’ ability to raise the copyright argument. To reiterate, the shooter’s

15

This quote is taken from the Covenant Intervenors’ oral argument at the show cause hearing.

16

Again, we note that this Court does not have access to the disputed documents, nor do we have

access to the trial court’s log of the information contained in Metro’s file. We are thus forced to rely on the

information in the trial court’s final order and Metro’s report summarizing the shooter’s writings. In the

event that future appellate review is required in this case, including the trial court’s index of documents in

the record, under seal if necessary, would greatly aid in this Court’s review of any purported TPRA

exceptions.

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parents assigned the intellectual property rights to the shooter’s original works to the

Covenant Parents, to be held in trust for the benefit of their children. The assignment

document provides that the shooter’s parents “[i]rrevocably assign and transfer all of their

equitable, legal, and other rights in the Writings and Intellectual Property Rights (including

all tangible copies thereof) as a gift to the Parents in trust, for the benefit of the Children[.]”

The assignment document also provides that the trust created by the gift is called the

Covenant Children’s Trust. Inasmuch as the shooter’s writings are purportedly original

works, the Parents argue that the Act bars Metro from allowing Petitioners to access the

writings.

According to Petitioners, however, the Covenant Parents cannot raise this argument

because they ignore the legal formalities surrounding trusts. Petitioners point out in their

briefing that neither the trustee, in his official capacity, nor the trust itself is a party to this

litigation. Petitioners claim that

[t]he trial court ignored this obvious flaw . . . courts cannot just gloss over

the distinction between a party in his individual capacity and a party in his

official capacity as trustee. “[I]n most jurisdictions, a trust ... cannot sue or

be sued in its own name, and therefore, the trustee, rather than the trust, is

the real party in interest in litigation involving trust property.” Khan v.

Regions Bank, 572 S.W.3d 189 (Tenn. App. 2018); see also Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 35-15-811. Because no trustee and no trust claiming ownership of the

alleged copyrighted materials intervened in these proceedings, no Intervenor

has standing to assert claims on behalf of the trust.

(Record citations omitted).

The Covenant Parents disagree, arguing in their brief that

[t]he intellectual property ownership of the writings was transferred to the

Parents, who are defined in the transfer documents as the same class of

people certified by Chancellor Myles to represent the interests of the

children. The Parents themselves own the writings and can therefore assert

the rights they have in their property. The writings are held in trust for the

express benefit of the Parents because they were given for the express

purpose of protecting the children by using copyright and other vehicles to

prevent release of the writings and the attendant harm that would befall the

children. It is not necessary for the trust to intervene to assert the Parents’

property interests in their property.

Thus, according to the Parents, they have sufficient standing to raise the copyright

argument because their children are the trust beneficiaries.

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Petitioners’ argument implicates non-constitutional standing, as it deals with who

may take legal action on behalf of a trust, which is governed by statute. See Case v.

Wilmington Tr., N.A., 703 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2024) (“Non-constitutional standing is

grounded either in self-imposed rules of judicial restraint, such as whether a party asserts

its own legal rights and interests rather than those of third parties, or in statutory

interpretation, such as whether a party’s complaint falls within the zone of interests

protected by the statutory provisions at issue.”); see also Denson ex rel. Denson v.

Methodist Med. Ctr. of Oak Ridge, No. E2023-00027-SC-R11-CV, 2025 WL 2902229, at

*2 (Tenn. Oct. 13, 2025) (same)). It also implicates the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code,

found at Tennessee Code Annotated section 35-15-101 et seq. (the “Trust Code”).

“Consistent with the evolution in trust law . . . the [Trust Code] confers broad powers on

trustees.” Harvey ex rel. Gladden v. Cumberland Tr. & Inv. Co., 532 S.W.3d 243, 257–58

(Tenn. 2017). The Trust Code provides, as relevant:

(a) A trustee, without authorization by the court, may exercise:

(1) Powers conferred by the terms of the trust; and

(2) Except as limited by the terms of the trust:

(A) All powers over the trust property which an unmarried competent

owner has over individually owned property;

(B) Any other powers appropriate to achieve the proper investment,

management, and distribution of the trust property; and

(C) Any other powers conferred by this chapter.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-815. Moreover, “[a] trustee shall take reasonable steps to enforce

claims of the trust and to defend claims against the trust.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-811.

Accordingly, the trustee of the Covenant Children’s Trust, if made a party in his or

her capacity as trustee, would most likely17 have standing to raise the copyright argument.

Petitioners claim, however, that the trustee’s right to raise this argument is exclusive to that

of the rights of the trust beneficiaries. Stated differently, Petitioners suggest that trust

beneficiaries18 lack standing to bring a claim on behalf of a trust where the trustee is not

17

Imperatively, aside from the assignment documents executed by the shooter’s parents, the record

does not contain any documents pertaining to the Covenant Children’s Trust. There is no way to discern

the full rights conferred to or limitations placed on the trustee without the trust instruments. See Harvey ex

rel. Gladden, 532 S.W.3d at 259 (“[T]he broad powers given by statute to trustees may be either expanded

or limited by the provisions of the governing trust instrument.”).

18

Or, in this case, the parents of beneficiaries where the beneficiaries are minors.

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also a party in his or her official capacity. No legal authority cited by Petitioners supports

this contention, however, and our review of the Trust Code did not reveal any such

authority. Rather, the Trust Code generally provides broad powers to the trustee subject to

the terms of the trust instrument. Harvey ex rel. Gladden, 532 S.W.3d at 258–59.

The case Petitioners rely on, Khan v. Regions Banks, 572 S.W.3d 189 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2018), also does not support their position. In that case, a woman became embroiled

in a dispute with a lender which had extended a line of credit to a trust. 572 S.W.3d at

191–92. The woman, who was the trustee, later sued the lender under the Tennessee

Consumer Protection Act, both in her individual capacity and in her capacity as trustee. Id.

at 191. The case proceeded to arbitration at which the lender was awarded its attorney’s

fees; later, the trustee challenged the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award.

Id. at 192. The trustee argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the trust because

the trust itself was never specifically named as a party in any of the pleadings. Id. at 195.

Instead, the named party was the trustee, Ms. Khan, “as trustee of the Rafia N. Khan

Irrevocable Trust.” Id. This Court rejected that argument, explaining that “[w]e accept as

a matter of fact that none of the previous pleadings identify ‘the Rafia N. Khan Irrevocable

Trust’ as a party. That fact, however, is insufficient as a matter of law to prove that the trial

court lacked personal jurisdiction over the trust.” Id. We explained that “[i]n most

jurisdictions, a trust ... cannot sue or be sued in its own name, and therefore, the trustee,

rather than the trust, is the real party in interest in litigation involving trust property.” Id.

(quoting 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 601 (West 2018)). As such, we determined that because

Ms. Khan, in her official capacity as trustee, was a party to the arbitration, the trust was

bound by the arbitration award.

Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, Khan does not go so far as to state that without

the trustee, the trust beneficiaries or their representative wholly lack standing in any

litigation involving trust property. Further, the Trust Code specifically anticipates that one

or more beneficiaries of a trust may bring a claim of the trust in place of the trustee. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-811(b) (“A trustee may abandon or assign any claim that it

believes is unreasonable to enforce to one or more of the beneficiaries of the trust holding

the claim.”).19 Accordingly, this issue is without merit, and we affirm the conclusion that

the Covenant Parents have standing to raise the copyright argument.

The Act and the TPRA

Turning to the intersection of the Act and the TPRA, the trial court summarized the

parties’ respective positions in its final order:

The Intervenor Parents have asserted that any original works, in any

form, created by [the shooter] are exempted from disclosure because they, on

19

Our research revealed no cases citing section 35-15-811.

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behalf of their minor children, Jane Doe and John Doe, are the rightful

owners of the copyrights to those original works of authorship and original

materials held by [Metro] in this case. The Parents assert that although they

have not sought copyright registration for any such works, their ownership

rights prevent disclosure by [Metro]. They further assert that Metro’s release

of any of the copyright materials pursuant to the TPRA would violate the

federal Copyright Act and their exclusive rights under federal law. In

essence, the Parents assert that as the supreme law of the land, federal law

preempts the TPRA.

The Petitioners counter . . . that even if the Intervenor Parents did have

standing, they failed to register the copyrights with the copyright office.

Third, the Petitioners argue that they have the right to fair use of any works

protected by copyright as news media outlets and for educational purposes,

therefore, federal copyright is not a bar to disclosure under the TPRA.

Whether a valid copyright is an exemption to the TPRA is a matter of first

impression in Tennessee.

Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the Act preempts the TPRA and that “the original

writings, journals, art, photos and videos created by [the shooter] are subject to an

exception to the TPRA created by the [Act].” Having reviewed the appellate record and

the pertinent authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred, and we reverse the finding

that the Act and the TPRA conflict in this case. We reach this conclusion for several

reasons.

First, our review is again hindered by the absence of the disputed material in the

record. The trial court found that “certain materials responsive to the Petitioners’ requests

are original works of authorship, compilations and derivative works in various mediums

created by [the shooter], including those works created by her in digital form and on various

hard drives.” Without more information, we cannot reach the same conclusion. Per the

Act, “[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of

authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,

from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly

or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 102. “In no case does copyright

protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,

system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in

which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” Id. “The sine qua

non of copyright is originality. . . . [o]riginality is a constitutional requirement.” Feist

Publn’s, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991). Parts of an author’s

work may qualify for copyright protection, while other elements may not. Thus, “[t]he

mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be

protected.” Id. at 348. Rather, “[w]hether reproduction of a particular document would

violate the Copyright Act depends upon the characteristics of that document . . . .” Venetian

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Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. E.E.O.C., 530 F.3d 925, 935 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Harper

& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (“The copyright is

limited to those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp of the

author’s originality.”).

Both the trial court and Metro acknowledge that the material confiscated from the

shooter is voluminous and spans many years. Although the Parents claim that the shooter’s

writings and compilations are original, copyrightable works, the writings are not registered

with the United States Copyright Office,20 and it is unclear the extent to which the Parents

have examined the writings themselves. Nonetheless, the trial court found, and the Parents

assert on appeal, that Metro’s disclosure of the writings would essentially amount to

copyright infringement. An infringement claim, however, requires “(1) ownership of a

valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”

Feist, 499 U.S. at 361 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548). Inasmuch as the Parents

ask us to essentially conclude that disclosure to Petitioners amounts to copyright

infringement, it is a curious thing that neither this Court nor the Parents know what the

material at issue contains, much less the extent to which it qualifies for copyright

protection. Under similar circumstances, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

concluded that a copyright issue was not ripe for judicial review. See Venetian, 530 F.3d

at 935 n.4 (“Whether reproduction of a particular document would violate the Copyright

Act depends upon the characteristics of that document, but the record indicates neither the

precise nature of the documents Venetian has submitted nor of the documents, if any, the

Commission intends to disclose.”).21

20

The Parents correctly point out that copyright protection does not require registration. 17 U.S.C.

§ 408; see also Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs., 564 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2009). Registration

is, however, “a prerequisite to suing for infringement.” Brooks-Ngwenya, 564 F.3d at 806 (citing 17 U.S.C.

§ 411(a)). We only point out the lack of registration to highlight one of the logical problems with the

argument that Metro’s disclosure of the documents would amount to infringement; specifically, that we are

asked to assume one of the elements of an infringement action—a valid copyright.

21

For the same reason, we are unpersuaded by the trial court’s finding that “Tennessee would not

be the first state to hold that certain copyrightable works, where the right is asserted, are exempt from

disclosure pursuant to state public records laws.” In the cases cited by the trial court, the content of the

disputed material was clear. See Caroff v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J., No. A-3773-20, 2022 WL 3363911,

at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 16, 2022) (petitioner sought “film of the 12/05/2020 men’s college

football game between Penn State and Rutgers”); Attorney IO News, LLC v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,

No. 19SMCV01228, 2022 WL 1552234, at *3 (Cal. Super. Apr. 21, 2022) (petitioner sought college course

materials from computer science classes, but “Defendant [ ] produced evidence establishing that faculty

members, not Defendant, own the copyright to course materials they create”); Brancheau v. Demings, No.

2010-CA-6673, 2010 WL 7971871 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 15, 2010) (seeking video footage of the death of a

SeaWorld employee, where the “videos were created by SeaWorld, on SeaWorld’s private property . . .”).

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Second, assuming for purposes of argument that the material exempted by the trial

court qualifies for copyright protection, those protections do not necessarily conflict22 with

the TPRA in this case. Under the Act, a copyright owner holds certain exclusive rights,

subject to exceptions. These rights include the right:

(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;

(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;

(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public

by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;

(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,

pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform

the copyrighted work publicly;

(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,

pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the

individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display

the copyrighted work publicly; and

(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly

by means of a digital audio transmission.

17 U.S.C. § 106. Section 106 confers “a bundle of exclusive rights.” Harper & Row, 471

U.S. at 546. “[T]hese rights—to publish, copy, and distribute the author’s work—vest in

the author of an original work from the time of its creation.” Id. at 547. The Act defines

certain of these exclusive rights. For example,

“Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is

fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work

can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or

22

As the trial court correctly noted, “when a state law is in conflict with a federal law, the state law

is ‘without effect’ and thus displaced by federal law or in other words preempted.” (citing Cadence Bank,

N.A. v. The Alpha Tr., 473 S.W.3d 756, 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (internal citations omitted)). However,

“[a] state law is ‘conflict’ preempted only ‘to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when

it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to

the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Fenner v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 113

F.4th 585, 594 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)). Thus,

when it is possible to comply with both state and federal law and the state law does not stand as an obstacle

to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting the federal law, the state

law is not preempted.

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with the aid of a machine or device. The term “copies” includes the material

object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.

* * *

To “display” a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means

of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process or, in the

case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images

nonsequentially.

* * *

“Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the

public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.

The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for

purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display,

constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not

of itself constitute publication.

17 U.S.C. § 101.

Here, the trial court found that “[r]equiring [Metro] to allow public inspection,

display or copying of the original materials created by [the shooter] would violate and

conflict with the exclusive federal rights granted to copyright owners . . .” The Parents

reiterate this point on appeal, arguing in their brief that “by itself making copies, by

authorizing a request[o]r to make copies, or by making a copyrighted work available to the

public, [Metro] could be liable for direct and/or contributory copyright infringement.”

The trial court and the Parents, however, conflate the concept of access for

inspection with reproduction and display. Indeed, the TPRA requires that “[a]ll state,

county and municipal records shall, at all times during business hours, which for public

hospitals shall be during the business hours of their administrative offices, be open for

personal inspection by any citizen of this state . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A).

We interpret the TPRA broadly to promote access to the records, in keeping with the

statutory purpose. Considering this statutory purpose, we can construe the TPRA in such

a way that does not require Metro to publicly display its file. Nor need Metro distribute

the records to the public; rather, Metro need only allow Petitioners access for personal

inspection. Although the Act protects the means by which copyrighted material may be

obtained, the Act itself does not inure total confidentiality and secrecy. As another state

court confronted with this issue noted, “[o]ne could certainly disclose a record without

either reproducing or distributing the same record.” Nat’l Council on Tchr. Quality v.

Curators of Univ. of Mo., 446 S.W.3d 723, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014); see also Ali v. Phila.

City Plan. Comm’n, 125 A.3d 92, 102 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (“[N]ot every disclosure of

- 29 -

copyrighted material without the owner’s consent violates the Copyright Act.”). By the

same token, Metro may allow access to the records for personal inspection without itself

copying, displaying, or publishing the records. This result “allow[s] the public to scrutinize

[Metro’s] reliance on or consideration of the copyrighted material[,]”Ali, 125 A.3d at 105,

thus furthering the purposes of the TPRA.

That said, we acknowledge the potential issue foreseen by the trial court. Assuming

for argument that the Parents hold a valid copyright and that Petitioners seek copies of the

material pursuant to section 10-7-506, where does this leave Metro as the records

custodian? In Ali, the Pennsylvania appellate court explained this dilemma well:

Although the rights conferred on the copyright holder are subject to “fair

use,” the Copyright Act is nonetheless problematic for local agencies when

faced with a RTKL[23] request that seeks copyrighted materials. Unless the

copyright holder has consented to duplication, duplication of the copyrighted

material under the RTKL carries the risk that the copyright holder will sue

the local agency for infringement in federal court. If found to be an infringer,

the local agency could be held liable to the copyright holder for actual or

statutory damages, which, in the case of willful infringement, could be up to

$150,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504. The local agency could also be ordered to pay

the copyright owner’s costs and attorneys’ fees. Id. § 505. All the while, the

local agency is expending taxpayer dollars in costs and attorneys’ fees to

defend itself in an infringement action occasioned not by its own assessment

of the risk and subsequent voluntary disclosure, but by forced disclosure by

[court order].

Id. at 102.

This concern, while reasonable, falls outside the scope of what we must decide

today. This is a TPRA case in which Metro is the respondent. Thus, our ruling is narrowly

tailored to address only Metro’s obligations under the TPRA and whether it can meet that

obligation without running afoul of the Act. Construing the TPRA broadly to promote

access to public records, as we are required, we conclude that under these particular

circumstances, the only overt action Metro must take to meet its obligation is to allow

Petitioners access to the records for personal inspection. Although we acknowledge the

copying rights conferred to the public by section 10-7-506, we do not opine whether it is

advisable for Petitioners to copy or otherwise reproduce those records upon said personal

inspection and access.

Simply put, so long as Metro maintains the records, it must allow Petitioners access

to same for personal inspection. Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A). Whether

23

“RTKL” stands for “Right-to-Know Law.” See 65 P.S. § 67.101, et seq.

- 30 -

Petitioners choose to go further than that considering their potential copyright liability is

left to them. Likewise, if the Parents wish to pursue a copyright infringement action against

Petitioners based on how the Petitioners choose to use the information in the records, the

Act provides the Parents with that remedy. See Venetian, 530 F.3d at 935 n.4 (citing 17

U.S.C. § 504) (“We note also that, should the EEOC infringe its copyright, Venetian has a

remedy in damages.”); see also Nat’l Council on Tchr. Quality v. Minn. State Colls. &

Univs., 837 N.W.2d 314, 319 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (“If [Minnesota law] requires a

Minnesota governmental entity, such as MnSCU, to release copies of public data, the

person or entity receiving the data takes the information subject to the owner’s [federal

copyright] rights. All of the author’s rights and remedies under the [Act] are unimpeded.”).

The Parents argue that the weight of authority on this issue supports their position.

Respectfully, our research suggests otherwise. The cases addressing the issue before us

reflect a variety of results. For example, several courts have held that while the Act applies

to public records, the fair use limitation, found at 17 U.S.C. section 107, allows the records

to be copied. See, e.g., Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 731 N.W.2d 240, 247 (Wisc. 2007)

(“Applying the ‘fair use’ factors outlined in 17 U.S.C. § 107 in this case, we are satisfied

that the CD and the memo do not fall within the copyright exception under Wis. Stat.

§ 19.32(2).”); Nat’l Council on Tchr. Quality, 837 N.W.2d at 318 (fair use allowed

disclosure under Minnesota law where requestor, a non-profit working for educational

reform, planned to use the information for “criticism, comment, . . . scholarship, or

research”); ACLU of Utah Found., Inc. v. Davis Cnty., No. 180700511, 2021 WL 1215891,

at *6 (Utah Dist. Ct. Mar. 25, 2021) (concluding “that the laws of copyright do not limit

the release of the Utah Jail Standards to these Petitioners for the uses they have outlined[,]”

where “the type of use envisioned by these Petitioners falls easily within the fair use

doctrine of federal copyright law”); State ex rel. Rea v. Ohio Dep’t of Educ., 692 N.E.2d

596, 601–02 (Ohio 1998) (“Exceptions to public records requests do not include the

copyright defense where the public records fall under the ‘fair-use’ exception to the federal

copyright statute or where the copyrighted material is purchased by the public office or

agency that is the subject of the public records request.”).24

On the other hand, at least one court has rejected the fair use argument, finding that

to be the sole purview of the federal courts. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 446 S.W.3d at 729

(“[T]his court lacks the authority to determine whether a particular use of copyrighted

materials constitutes fair use, as federal courts have ‘original jurisdiction of any civil action

arising under the [Act].’”); see also Pictometry Int’l Corp. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n,

59 A.3d 172, 192 (Conn. 2013) (noting that the court lacks “jurisdiction to determine

whether a particular use of copyrighted materials infringes on the copyright holder’s rights

under federal copyright law or, instead, constitutes a fair use of the materials”).

24

Petitioners argue on appeal that the fair use exception allows Metro to release the disputed

records. In light of our decision that the TPRA and Act do not conflict here, we need not delve into

Petitioners’ intended uses for the information.

- 31 -

Accordingly, there is no weight of authority as the Parents suggest. Rather, the results vary

and depend in part upon the language of the state law at issue. And here, the TPRA’s text

provides a solution that allows Metro to comply with Petitioners’ requests while avoiding

conflict with the Act.

To summarize, the trial court erred in concluding that the Act preempts the TPRA

and presents an exemption for the disputed records in this case. Metro can satisfy its

obligations under the TPRA by allowing Petitioners to access the records for personal

inspection, thereby avoiding conflict with the Act. Ali, 125 A.3d at 102 (“The [Act] does

not restrict inspection.”); Curators of Univ. of Mo., 446 S.W.3d at 728 n.6 (same). To the

extent Petitioners then engage in actionable conduct under the Act, the Parents may pursue

the remedy available to them, as those remedies remain unimpeded, and Petitioners can

raise any relevant defenses.

The Tennessee Constitution and the Victims’ Bill of Rights

The final issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding that

rights conferred on crime victims in Tennessee do not bar disclosure of the shooter’s

writings. Pursuant to our Constitution, “victims of crimes” are entitled to “be free from

intimidation, harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice system.” Tenn. Const.

Art. I, § 35. Additional rights conferred by this section include:

the right to confer with the prosecution; the right to be present at all

proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present; the right to be

heard, when relevant, at all critical stages of the criminal justice process as

defined by the General Assembly; the right to be informed of all proceedings,

and of the release, transfer, or escape of the accused or convicted person; the

right to a speedy trial or disposition and a prompt and final conclusion of the

case after the conviction or sentence; the right to restitution from the

offender; and the right to be informed of each of the rights established for

victims.

See id. Likewise, “[a]ll victims of crime and prosecution witnesses have the right to . . .

[b]e treated with dignity and compassion . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-102(a)(1).

The TPRA provides that public records shall be open “for personal inspection by

any citizen of this state . . . unless otherwise provided by state law.” Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 10-7-503(a)(2)(A). “State law” in this context means “the Tennessee Constitution, the

common law, rules of court, and administrative rules and regulations.” Tennessean, 485

S.W.3d at 865–66 (citing Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 571–72 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2004)). Accordingly, the Covenant Parents posit that the “catch-all” TPRA exception

applies here, as they are crime victims under the Tennessee Constitution and section

40-38-102. The Parents assert that the writings should be exempt because releasing them

- 32 -

will cause the Parents and the surviving Covenant School students to suffer intimidation,

harassment, and abuse. The trial court ruled against the Parents as to this issue, concluding

as pertinent:

The plain language of Tennessee Constitution Article I, § 35 focuses

on the criminal legal system, the criminal process, and the treatment of crime

victims while navigating investigation and prosecution and their dealings in

that system. Tenn. Const. Art. I, § 35. While this Court acknowledges that

the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 40-38-102(a)(1) states

that crime victims have the right to be treated with dignity and compassion,

when the statute is read as a whole, it is limited to the treatment of victims of

crime as they make their way through the criminal legal system. While the

[Parents] may be correct that once a person has experienced a crime they are

always a victim, they can point to no Tennessee law or case, and this Court

has found none, which would shield victims of crime or offer them any

protections outside of the rights afforded to them while involved in the

criminal legal system. Therefore, this Court holds that neither Tenn. Const.

Art. I, § 35 nor Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-38-301, et seq. provides any

exception to disclosure under the TPRA for the materials at issue in this

particular case.

The trial court’s analysis is apt, and we affirm this portion of the ruling. The text of

both Article I, section 35 and section 40-38-102 makes clear that the rights conferred

therein apply to crime victims navigating a criminal case at various stages of a pending or

contemplated criminal prosecution. The Covenant Intervenors cite no legal authority, nor

did our research reveal any, supporting their contention that Tennessee victims’ rights law

serves as a shield against TPRA requests25 to a third party. On appeal, the Parents assert

that

the [trial court] limited victim protections to “the criminal legal system,” but

the actual language of the Tennessee Constitution says that victims are free

from “intimidation, harassment, and abuse throughout the criminal justice

system.” Tenn. Const., Art. I, § 35. Simply stated, the [trial court] applied the

wrong language. The rights of victims apply to the entire criminal justice

system, not just the legal system. The “criminal justice system” is defined to

include police investigations, whether or not they lead to prosecutions.

At this juncture, there is neither a legal proceeding nor a police investigation. While the

Parents are crime victims in the non-legal sense, they are not victims in the specific context

25

Although the argument was raised in a case before our Supreme Court, the majority did not

address it as part of the holding because the records at issue were exempted from disclosure for other

reasons. Tennessean, 485 S.W.3d at 873.

- 33 -

of the laws on which they rely. Moreover, the Parents’ argument is speculative. There is

simply no way to prove the future injuries the Parents assert they will suffer should the

writings be released. This issue is without merit and not a basis for exemption of any

documents under the TPRA. We affirm this portion of the trial court’s ruling.

Having addressed the issues raised on appeal, the question becomes what to do on

remand. First, the trial court shall instruct Metro to release any responsive documents that

were withheld solely based on Rule 16. Second, the trial court shall determine which of

the shooter’s writings and other works are exempt from disclosure under section

10-7-504(p), in accordance with this opinion. No record in Metro’s file should be

deemed exempt “simply because it contains some exempt information.” Schneider,

226 S.W.3d at 346 (emphasis added). “Rather, redaction of the exempt information is

appropriate.” Id. (citing Eldridge, 86 S.W.3d at 574). Further,

[t]he trial court has discretion to prescribe additional procedures as necessary

to govern the proceedings on remand. The entire process should be

concluded as expeditiously as possible. Because almost three years has

passed since the first request for this information, we encourage the trial court

to impose upon [Metro] an expedited schedule for completion of its review

of the [requested public records].

Id.

CONCLUSION

The ruling of the Chancery Court for Davidson County is affirmed in part, reversed

in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal

are assessed one-half to the appellants and one-half to the appellees, for which execution

may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE

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