Kennedy v. City of Arlington, Texas

Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

February 4, 2026

No. 25-10259

____________ Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Brittney Kennedy, Individually and as surviving spouse, on behalf of

minor M.S.K. and as anticipated personal representative of the estate of

Marquis Kennedy,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

City of Arlington, Texas; Shelly Bateman; Jonathan P.

Bucek; Richard Coleman; Tyler Ferrell; Patrick

Knight; David Kurbinsky; Michael Leonesio; Leonard

Ray; Ronnie McCoy; Bobby Mugueza; Officer Norwood;

Connor Shanahan; Sean Wheatley; Jastin D. Williams;

Bradley McNulty,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:24-CV-208

______________________________

Before Haynes, Duncan, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Brittney Kennedy appeals the dismissal of constitutional

claims she brought on behalf of her deceased husband, Marquis Kennedy,

who suffered a cardiac arrest after a self-defense simulation for police-cadet

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training. She claims the district court erred by concluding that the training

exercise involved no constitutional seizure and that the officers owed

Marquis no constitutional duty of medical care.

Marquis’s death is a tragedy, above all for his surviving wife and child.

Like the district court, however, we cannot find any plausible allegation that

the defendants violated the Constitution. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

I

In 2022, Marquis Kennedy (“Marquis”) sought to become a police

officer for Appellee City of Arlington (the “City”). After passing a

pre-employment physical examination, he enrolled in the Arlington Police

Academy. As part of his training program, Marquis had to complete a

self-defense course called Gracie Survival Tactics (“GST”), which requires

cadets to endure four consecutive four-minute self-defense scenarios against

Gracie-trained Arlington police officers. The GST course is mandatory for

all cadets.

Marquis participated in the self-defense simulation during his tenth

week at the academy on Friday, September 23 around 10:00 a.m. According

to Kennedy, the simulation required Marquis to submit to various “jiu-jitsu

submission holds, choke holds, compression holds, punches and wrestling.”

Although Marquis complained repeatedly of lightheadedness, thirst, and

fatigue, he was “denied water” and was not “permitted any breaks.”

Marquis continued to participate in the simulation, however, because he

would fail and have to “repeat the entire physical training program” if he

stopped.

Marquis’s condition deteriorated as the simulation progressed.

During the fourth and final self-defense scenario, Kennedy alleges that

Marquis dropped an “officer in distress” card, signaling that he was in

trouble and could not continue. She claims the instructors ignored the card,

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continuing the simulation until it was clear that Marquis could not continue.

The instructors then stopped the simulation and asked Marquis if he needed

an ambulance. “Yes,” he replied. At that time, Marquis was about fifteen

minutes into the simulation.

Given Marquis’s fatigued state, two individuals helped “carry [him]

out of the room.” They sat Marquis in the break room and gave him water.

At 10:24 a.m., Officer Shelly Bateman called dispatch, requesting emergency

medical services (“EMS”) for Marquis, who appeared to be “a little

overheated.” But then Marquis “stopped breathing, lost consciousness, and

fell off the chair, landing on his head.” In response, Officer Bateman called

dispatch at 10:28 a.m., stating that Marquis was “not breathing and that they

ha[d] begun CPR and [we]re attempting to use the AED to revive him.”

EMS arrived at 10:40 a.m. They immediately began lifesaving

measures after determining Marquis “was suffering from respiratory

failure.” Ultimately, the first responders resuscitated Marquis using oral

intubation. They then transported him to a hospital. Sadly, Marquis never

regained consciousness and died two days later. The autopsy and death

certificate list the cause of death as unknown but note that Marquis suffered

a “cardiac arrest” and that there was “[n]o apparent trauma.” The death

certificate suggests that “atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease” likely

caused Marquis’s cardiac arrest.

Kennedy sued the City and all officers present at Marquis’s training

simulation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She claimed Marquis’s

instructors—Appellee Officers Jastin D. Williams, Jonathan Bucek, David

Kurbinsky, and Bradley McNulty—violated Marquis’s Fourth Amendment

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Kennedy also asserted

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bystander-liability claims against eleven other Appellee officers1 who were

present for, but did not participate in, the simulation. On top of that,

Kennedy claimed that all officers violated Marquis’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights by acting “with subjective deliberate indifference to

[Marquis’s] serious medical needs.” Finally, Kennedy contended the City

was liable for failing to train its officers to not use excessive force and to

recognize when cadets are in medical distress.

The City and the individual officers moved to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6). The City also submitted a video recording of the training

simulation, which Kennedy viewed and relied on in drafting a supporting

affidavit for her claims. The district court referred the motions to a

magistrate judge, who concluded that the complaint failed to (1) plausibly

allege a Fourth Amendment seizure; (2) state a Fourteenth Amendment

substantive-due-process violation; or (3) establish any constitutional duty to

provide medical care in an employment setting. The magistrate judge

therefore held that qualified immunity applied and recommended dismissing

all claims against the officers and the City. The district court adopted the

magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions in full.2

Kennedy appeals.

II

The dismissal of Kennedy’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de

novo. Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023). To survive a motion to

_____________________

1

Those officers include Shelly Bateman, Richard Coleman, Tyler Ferrell, Patrick

Knight, Michael Leonesio, Leonard Ray, Ronnie McCoy, Bobby Mugueza, Officer

Norwood, Connor Shanahan, and Sean Wheatley.

2

Future references to the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and

recommendations will therefore be attributed to the district court.

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dismiss, the complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). We “accept all well-pled facts as true, construing all reasonable

inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” White

v. U.S. Corr., L.L.C., 996 F.3d 302, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2021). But we need not

“presume true a number of categories of statements, including legal

conclusions; mere labels; threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement.” Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1162–63 (5th Cir.

2021) (quotation omitted).

III

A

We begin by addressing whether the district court properly considered

the City’s video recording when ruling on the motions to dismiss.

When evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts are usually confined to

the complaint and its attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d

333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). But “[w]hen a defendant attaches documents to its

motion that are referenced in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s

claims,” then “the court can also properly consider those documents.”

Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 900 (5th Cir.

2019). This principle applies equally to videos: When a plaintiff relies on and

references video evidence “in their complaint and brief,” Fifth Circuit

“caselaw supports our consideration of the video.” Winder v. Gallardo, 118

F.4th 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2024) (per curiam).

Kennedy cites the City’s recording of Marquis’s training simulation

in the operative complaint. And because Kennedy did not witness Marquis’s

training simulation, her claims against the officers rely heavily on an affidavit

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in which she describes what she saw on the recording. As a result, the

recording is “central to [Kennedy’s] claims.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 920

F.3d at 900. The district court therefore did not err in considering the video.

Winder, 118 F.4th at 643.

B

Next, we consider whether the district court erred by holding that

qualified immunity bars Kennedy’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

claims against the four instructors.

Qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)

(internal quotations omitted). To overcome the defense of qualified

immunity, a plaintiff must “plead specific facts that both allow the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has

alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.”

Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Backe v.

LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012)).

Qualified-immunity defenses are analyzed under a two-prong inquiry.

See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Courts may address the

prongs “in either order” and may “resolve the case on a single prong.” Cloud

v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d

596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020)). Under the first prong, the plaintiff must plausibly

allege that “[the officers] violated a federal statutory or constitutional right.”

Ibid. (internal quotations omitted). The second prong requires that the

unlawfulness of the conduct be “clearly established at the time” of the

alleged misconduct. Ibid. (citation omitted).

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1

We begin with Kennedy’s claim that the instructors violated

Marquis’s Fourth Amendment rights by seizing him through excessive force.

A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when, under the totality of the

circumstances, a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). The Supreme Court

has long made clear that “a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur

whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual’s

freedom of movement”; rather, a seizure occurs only when there is a

termination of freedom of movement “through means intentionally

applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989) (emphasis

omitted). Put differently, a seizure requires the “detention or taking itself”

be “willful.” Gorman v. Sharp, 892 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis

omitted) (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 596).

The district court held that Kennedy did not plausibly allege a seizure

because the complaint lacked nonconclusory allegations suggesting that the

instructors “intended to seize Marquis Kennedy.” On appeal, Kennedy

argues the district court erred in two ways. First, she disagrees with the

court’s reading of seizure law, claiming that a seizure requires only that the

instructors “intended to commit the acts that resulted in the harm.” In her

view, because the officers intended to apply force to Marquis during the

simulation, and because that force was excessive, the instructors violated his

Fourth Amendment right “to be free from excessive force.” Second,

Kennedy argues that the instructors seized Marquis when they “continued

to assault him” after he withdrew his consent. According to Kennedy,

“Marquis revoked his consent when he dropped his ‘officer in distress’ card,

which was designed for that very purpose.”

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We agree with the district court that Kennedy has not plausibly

alleged a Fourth Amendment seizure. As a threshold matter, there is no

“generic ‘right’ to be free from excessive force.” Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 393 (1989). Kennedy’s conclusory suggestion to the contrary is

foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.

Similarly unavailing are Kennedy’s intent- and consent-based

arguments. Starting with intent, Kennedy does not plausibly allege that the

instructors willfully intended to restrain Marquis during his training exercise.

Our precedent makes this point clear. In Gorman v. Sharp, we reversed the

denial of qualified immunity when an officer accidentally shot a co-instructor

during a training exercise after forgetting to replace his real firearm with a

dummy weapon. 892 F.3d at 175. Although the incident was “unquestionably

tragic,” id. at 173, we held that no seizure occurred because the shooting

“was not ‘willful[ly] performed,’” id. at 175 (alteration in original) (quoting

Brower, 489 U.S. at 596). Indeed, the officer believed he was using a dummy

firearm and pulled the trigger solely “to educate his audience as a firearms

training instructor.” Ibid. Gorman thus shows that mere intent to perform the

act is not enough to effect a Fourth Amendment seizure.

That analysis controls here. Like the instructor in Gorman, the

instructors running Marquis’s training simulation did not intend to restrain

or harm him. They applied force to Marquis for instructional purposes during

a structured self-defense simulation. The complaint lacks nonconclusory

facts suggesting otherwise. Gorman also squarely rejects Kennedy’s

contention that a seizure requires only an intent to “commit the act that

resulted in the harm.” Otherwise, Gorman would have come out the other

way because the instructor there intended to pull the trigger. The complaint

therefore fails to plausibly allege the willfulness necessary to establish a

Fourth Amendment seizure.

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Nor does the complaint plausibly allege that Marquis withdrew his

consent during the simulation. Kennedy’s main theory—that Marquis

dropped an officer-in-distress card—is contradicted by the video recording.

And as we noted in Harmon v. City of Arlington, when a video recording is

“included in the pleadings” and “‘blatantly contradict[s]’” the “factual

allegations in the complaint,” this court adopts the video’s depiction of

events, “viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 16 F.4th at 1163

(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).

Even through that favorable lens, Kennedy’s theory is implausible.

Although the audio is not perfect, the video clearly shows how Marquis’s

final self-defense scenario proceeded. The simulation begins, and the

observing officers prompt Marquis to ask the approaching instructor for

identification. Marquis does so. The instructor replies, “ID, sure man it’s

right here,” offering an orange card. The instructor then begins punching

Marquis as part of the simulation, and Marquis drops the ID to defend

himself. Nothing in the video suggests—let alone supports—that Marquis

withdrew his consent by dropping the ID. And nothing else in the complaint

supports that Marquis withdrew his consent.

The D.C. Circuit has persuasively rejected Kennedy’s other

rationales for why Marquis “was not freely able to leave the training

exercise.” In Feirson v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit held that a police

officer was not seized during mandatory baton-training exercises, even

though a reasonable person might have felt unable to disobey orders without

jeopardizing their career. 506 F.3d 1063, 1067–68 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The court

rejected the theory that the officer was “‘seized’ during the attack exercise

because he could not stop it,” emphasizing that the officer had “submitted

to the exercise” and that nothing suggested the instructors would not have

stopped had he asked. Id. at 1068.

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So too here. Marquis voluntarily submitted to the training simulation.

And Kennedy does not plausibly allege that the instructors would have

refused to stop the simulation if asked. In fact, the record shows the opposite:

the instructors did stop the simulation when Marquis could not continue.

Like Feirson, Marquis consented to the simulation through voluntary

submission.

The complaint itself confirms Marquis’s voluntary participation. The

City’s website states that cadets should expect to undergo “Scenario

Training” and “Physical Training and Defensive Tactics”—trainings that

plainly encompass the simulation at issue. Marquis thus consented to

instructional force as a condition of cadet training and prospective

employment. Any limitation on Marquis’s freedom of movement thus

stemmed from his knowing and voluntary consent to be part of the training.

Because the complaint does not plausibly allege that the instructors

willfully restrained Marquis’s liberty during the simulation, it fails to state a

claim for a Fourth Amendment seizure. The district court therefore properly

dismissed Kennedy’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.

2

We turn to Kennedy’s claim that the instructors violated Marquis’s

substantive-due-process right to bodily integrity.

“[T]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual

against arbitrary action of government.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523

U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (citation omitted). In “a constitutional sense,”

“‘[a]rbitrary action’ . . . encompasses ‘only the most egregious official

conduct,’ namely that which ‘shocks the conscience.’” Slaughter v. Mayor &

City Council, 682 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at

846). That bar is exceedingly high, requiring “conduct intended to injure”

that is “unjustifiable by any government interest.” Ibid. (quoting Lewis, 523

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U.S. at 849). Deliberate indifference may suffice in custodial settings with

“pretrial detainees,” but it is insufficient for “persons in an employment

relationship with the government.” Ibid.

As the Supreme Court has explained, “Neither the text nor the

history of the Due Process Clause” suggests that a governmental employer

has a “duty to provide its employees with a safe working environment.”

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992). Consistent with

Collins, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a dismissal of claims brought by the

estate of a firefighter recruit who died in a live-burn training exercise.

Slaughter, 682 F.3d at 323. “[B]ecause the complaint does not purport to

allege that the Fire Department staged the live burn training exercise with the

purpose of causing harm to [the decedent] or to any other recruit, it falls short of

alleging a substantive due process violation in the context of the facts

alleged.” Id. at 319. Likewise, in Carty v. Rodriguez, we held that qualified

immunity shielded state-trooper trainers when a trainee died following

defensive-tactics drills, underscoring that the Constitution does not impose

a duty to provide a safe training environment. 470 F. App’x 234, 236 n.5 (5th

Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

Taken together, these precedents teach that, to state a due process

claim, Kennedy had to allege more than an unsafe training environment. She

had to plausibly allege that the instructors intended to harm Marquis. As we

have already concluded, however, the complaint does not do that.

Furthermore, Kennedy argues only that various instructor actions

demonstrate deliberate indifference. The complaint alleges the same. But

because Marquis was a City employee voluntarily participating in workplace

training, not a police suspect in custody, pleading deliberate indifference

alone is insufficient. Slaughter, 682 F.3d at 321 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at

846). At most, the allegations sound in negligence—a claim rooted in state

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tort law, not constitutional due process. Collins, 503 U.S. at 127 n.10, 128; see

also Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.

The district court therefore properly dismissed Kennedy’s

bodily-integrity claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

3

Finally, we consider Kennedy’s other Fourteenth Amendment

claim—that all the Appellee officers were deliberately indifferent toward

Marquis’s medical needs.

The Due Process Clause imposes a constitutional duty on the

government to provide medical care only when it has restrained an

individual’s liberty such that they cannot care for themselves—typically

through incarceration, detention, or institutionalization. DeShaney v.

Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198–200 (1989).

Kennedy’s medical-care claim relies predominately on her seizure

theory, asserting that Marquis “enjoyed a constitutional right to medical

care” when the instructors seized him. Given that asserted right, Kennedy

alleges the officers failed to respond adequately to Marquis’s medical

distress, including by delaying the call for emergency medical services.

We have already rejected Kennedy’s seizure theory above, however.

And Marquis was not otherwise a detainee or in state custody. To the

contrary, he was a police-academy cadet participating in a voluntary

workplace training exercise. As Collins makes clear, government employees

injured in the course of employment are not in custody or deprived of their

liberty for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 503 U.S. at 127–28. Absent a

custodial arrangement or some other special relationship, allegations of

delayed or inadequate medical response sound in state-tort law and

negligence, not in substantive due process. Ibid.

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Kennedy’s deliberate-indifference claims therefore fail, and the

district court properly dismissed them.

C

Finally, we turn to Kennedy’s derivative claims, which include

(1) bystander liability against the observing officers for failing to intervene;

and (2) municipal liability against the City for failing to train its officers to not

use excessive force or to recognize when a cadet is in medical distress.

Bystander liability attaches only when an officer “(1) knew a fellow

officer was violating an individual’s constitutional rights, (2) was present at

the scene of the constitutional violation, (3) had a reasonable opportunity to

prevent the harm but nevertheless, (4) chose not to act.” Joseph ex rel. Est. of

Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 343 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Whitley v. Hanna,

726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013)). Because Kennedy has not plausibly alleged

any constitutional violation, the eleven officers cannot be liable for failing to

intervene. These claims necessarily fail.

The same is true for Kennedy’s claims against the City because

municipal liability also requires a predicate constitutional injury. See, e.g.,

City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person has

suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer,

the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of

constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.”). But even if that

weren’t the case, Kennedy’s claims would still fail because the Collins Court

rejected Monell liability for workplace-safety-related harms. 503 U.S. at

128–29 (explaining that decisions like employee training should be made by

“locally elected representatives, rather than by federal judges interpreting

the basic charter of Government for the entire country”).

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Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Kennedy’s

derivative § 1983 claims.

IV

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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