Taylor v. Board of Parole

858 February 4, 2026 No. 68

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion

pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited

except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

RUBY IRIS TAYLOR,

Petitioner,

v.

BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON

SUPERVISION,

Respondent.

Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision

A184634

Submitted October 14, 2025.

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate

Section, and David O. Ferry, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon

Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for petitioner.

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,

Solicitor General, and Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant

Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and

Jacquot, Judge.

KAMINS, J.

Affirmed.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 346 Or App 858 (2026) 859

KAMINS, J.

Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final order of

the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision determin-

ing that she was not likely to be rehabilitated within a rea-

sonable amount of time and deferring her next hearing for

three years, following a murder-review hearing, at which

petitioner had the burden of proving that she was likely to

be rehabilitated within a reasonable amount of time. ORS

163.105(2); OAR 255-032-0020. Petitioner first assigns error

to the board’s finding that she failed to prove that she was

likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable time. In her

second assignment of error, she contends that the board

erred by deferring her next review hearing for three years.

We affirm.

We review the board’s order for substantial evi-

dence and reason. Castro v. Board of Parole, 232 Or App 75,

83, 220 P3d 772 (2009). In contending that the board’s order

lacks substantial evidence and reason, petitioner argues

that the board erred by relying on hearsay contained in a

post-sentence report.

The board contends that petitioner did not timely

object to the board’s consideration of the contents of the post-

sentence report. As the board noted in its administrative

review response, despite having had access to the material

in question for 14 days before the murder-review hearing,

neither petitioner nor her attorneys filed a written objec-

tion, and they made no oral objection to the evidence at the

murder-review hearing. The board had advised petitioner

that if she had objections to evidence, she needed to object

at the time the evidence was offered. To demonstrate preser-

vation on appeal, petitioner cites only the arguments in her

request for administrative review of the board’s decision—

not prior to or during her murder-review hearing. We agree

with the board that it did not err by rejecting the objections

as untimely. And to the extent that petitioner now argues

that consideration of the evidence violated her due process

rights, that argument is unpreserved.

The remainder of petitioner’s arguments on both

her first and second assignments of error also do not provide

860 Taylor v. Board of Parole

a basis for reversal of the board’s order. She argues that the

board erred in determining (1) that her involvement in indi-

vidualized therapy treating her gender dysphoria was inad-

equate to address her substance abuse and other rehabilita-

tion issues; (2) that she lacked maturity and responsibility;

(3) that her prior criminal history weighed against her; and

(4) that she lacked accountability, insight, and empathy.

She also argues that the board lacked substantial evidence

and reason for deferring her next murder-review hearing

for three years. Those arguments rely in part on her argu-

ment that the board improperly relied on the contents of the

post-sentence report. Having rejected that argument, we

consider the evidence in the record in determining whether

substantial evidence supports the board’s order.

We conclude that the board relied on substantial

evidence and substantial reason for its determination that

petitioner had not carried her burden of persuasion that

she was likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable time,

and for its determination that her next hearing should be

deferred for three years. We do not reweigh the evidence,

and the record was not such that the board would have

been compelled to find that petitioner had met her burden

of persuasion. See State v. A. R. H., 371 Or 82, 96, 530 P3d

897 (2023) (when petitioner has the burden of persuasion,

if the factfinder found that petitioner did not carry that

burden, that finding is binding unless the evidence in the

record compelled the factfinder to find the facts another way

as a matter of law). The factors the board identified—lack

of effort to address criminal risk factors; lack of effort to

address substance abuse; inability to demonstrate remorse;

and lack of concern for others—are supported by substantial

evidence and reason.

Specifically, the board found that it was commend-

able that petitioner had engaged in individualized therapy

throughout her incarceration to address depression and

gender dysphoria, but also found that her “engagement in

rehabilitative programming and treatment [was] lacking.”

It found that she did not demonstrate true remorse for her

actions, but that she focused on her feelings of shame, and

that she did not express remorse for her physical and sexual

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 346 Or App 858 (2026) 861

violence against her siblings and her first wife. Petitioner

argues that the board “ignored petitioner’s direct expres-

sions of remorse and empathy” but it is for the board to

weigh evidence and make credibility findings. The board

also found that despite participation in domestic violence

programming petitioner demonstrated only a “rudimentary”

understanding, lacking in insight relating to her triggers,

the cycle of violence, and the impacts of domestic violence on

victims. The board also found that petitioner minimized and

denied having a substance abuse problem despite evidence

of a history of substance abuse, including in connection with

the murder for which she is currently incarcerated. In light

of those findings, the board was not required to determine

that petitioner’s individual therapy adequately addressed

other rehabilitation issues that it identified.

The board’s order was supported by substantial

evidence and substantial reason. We therefore affirm the

board’s order.

Affirmed.